Abstract
The Ladakh region of India has been recently in the limelight due to border tension between India and China. The differing perception of borders and vague demarcation has led to contested claims in the Ladakh region. India and China have fought a war (1962) and are presently engaged in intermittent skirmishes in the Ladakh region. Following the conflict, the borderland of Ladakh witnessed increased troop presence in the area, which created problems for the Changpas, a semi-nomadic community of Ladakh that is primarily dependent on available natural resources for survival. The political tension between India and China leads to the militarisation of the region and restrictions on the movement of Changpas near the borders. These have unintended consequences for the borderland community. The areas with counter-territorial claims include pastures for grazing the herds, and due to the dispute, the Changpas cannot access them. As a result, Changpas suffer economically and socially. While there is much discussion on the India and China border dispute in the region and beyond, the Changpas hardly get required attention in the mainstream debate. Drawing from Border Studies, this article argues that Changpas are an alienated borderland community. Changpas, because of their semi-nomadic lifestyles, lack an agency to highlight their plight or to articulate demands. This article underlines the ordeals of Changpas to present how border communities in conflict zones are compelled to adopt a life forced by circumstances and controlled by external actors.
Introduction
Generally, borders in South Asia are perceived as a matter of high security and state control. The drawback of this approach is that life near the borders is not much discussed, even in academic circles. Actually, borderlands are not barren spaces; humans inhabit them. Because of the people, borderlands are recognised as important sites of political, cultural and economic connections and also, at times, spaces of contestation. Near a borderland, one can experience the power of the state manifested in the form of strict surveillance and control. Indeed, with different kinds of structural, institutional and social turbulences, life is not easy for any borderland community. Thus, a study of borderland communities gives us an understanding that there are societies living at a horizon of formal territories and informal social spaces. These communities are usually overlooked in the dominant discourses due to their remoteness from the mainland. While we often discuss borders and borderlands, borderland communities are yet to appear frequently in our academic writings. This is particularly true for South Asia. Borderland communities vaguely appear in our academic discourses, even when border disputes are part of national news headlines. One such interesting borderland is between India and China in Ladakh. The region remains in bulletins for several reasons, but reporters and analysts seldom cover the borderland community in Ladakh.
The obsession with border security in South Asia leaves less scope for other subjects linked to borders to be examined and analysed. However, it is imperative for a post-colonial region that has witnessed violent partitions to evaluate borders from different perspectives, primarily going beyond the security lenses (Tripathi and Chaturvedi 2019). Moreover, any discussion on South Asia—political, economic and social—is incomplete without an engagement with borders. In political terms, South Asia is a post-partition region; in economic parameters, it is least integrated as cross-border trade is minimal, but in a social sense, the people of South Asia have strong cross-border cultural connections. Borders in South Asia, therefore, invoke contradictory emotions of connection and separation. Thus, to understand South Asia, we need to dive deeper into border studies that include much more focus on borderland communities.
The border we selected for our study is presently one of the most discussed in and outside the region. The reason is the current border standoff between India and China—the two prominent military powers of the world. Interestingly, the India–China border dispute discourse is largely focused on territorial disputes. There are few references to the hardship this tension creates for the borderland communities. This article attempts to understand changes in the everyday life of Changpas—a semi-nomadic border community, due to the India–China border tension. This article records the experiences of Changpas, who reside in a zone of military friction. This article avoids analysing the border dispute between India and China for a focused discussion.
Borderland Communities in South Asia
Border Studies as a field of study is new but has grown exponentially in different parts of the world. The multi-disciplinary approach of Border Studies is one of the reasons for its progress. Moreover, the old understanding of borders as a line of division has changed, and varied themes related to borders are now a matter of inquisitiveness for scholars, like cross-border trade, movement of people and border aesthetics. Similarly, ‘[S]cholarship on borders also focuses on the culture of local borderland communities’ (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 638). Expanding the canvass of inquiry today, Border Studies, also includes mental borders and boundaries that too divide people.
While Border Studies is evolving, as mentioned in the introductory part, it is mainly confined to the political issues prioritising security over other subjects in South Asia. Therefore, South Asian borderlands are primarily analysed from a state-centric approach. Baud and Schendel define this approach as ‘geographical, legal and political’ (Baud and Schendel 1997, p. 241). This method of studying borders is rudimentary, and it has witnessed substantial changes clearly in regions that bridge the border divides, like in Europe and, to an extent, in North America (Tripathi 2015). For a region like South Asia, the tendency to securitise borders is dominant, and there are concrete reasons for it. As Baud and Schendel reflect, the development of borderland depends on the relationship between two states—their social, political and economic interaction (Baud and Schendel 1997). Within the South Asian region, the persistent border tension shapes the general understanding of these lines, which were largely drawn in the last century by the British. The war and border disputes between India—Pakistan and India–China—make it difficult at times for researchers to take the discussion further from the usual tale of border security. Due to highlighted reasons, safety and territoriality will continue to occupy the central position in South Asian Border Studies; nevertheless, recently, scholars have shown interest in expanding the area of research. Thus, this article is on a borderland community evaluating how heightened security measures by states in conflict zones affect every aspect of human life. According to Martinez, the people who live in the borderlands experience several difficulties. ‘[I]solation, underdevelopment and neglect characterised the lives of many borderlanders around the world in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth’ (Martinez 1994). While this has changed in some parts of the world, in the South Asian region, this statement is still quite valid.
Martinez has also attempted to categorise borderlands based on the level of interaction. For Martinez, the most basic border with the little cross-border exchanges is termed as an ‘alienated borderland’. What makes it different from others is the virtual absence of cross-border linkages due to politically hostile situations. This kind of borderland is militarised, and the movement of people is rigidly controlled. In the case of South Asia, ‘alienated borderlands’ are quite discernible. However, the point in discussion in this article is slightly different, as Changpas—a borderland community getting alienated from their own land in a political process that is shaped by an unresolved border dispute between India and China. The region was once free for Changpas, but now they are forced to change their everyday practices due to factors external to their historical understanding. The alienation of Changpas from their land continues because borders are unsettled in this area, and the movement of people is controlled by state authorities. Changpas, in a way, are forced to compromise their nomadic lifestyle. Unfortunately, as a borderland community, they have no say in high political matters related to territoriality and sovereignty, although they are the ones who suffer socially and economically.
This article is based on the basic assumption that the Changpas are ‘alienated borderland community’ and that this alienation is an unending process that started in 1962. The article also takes into account the fact that Changpas, due to their semi-nomadic way of life, lack political agency to articulate their position.
The Case Under Discussion
There are several sites of ‘complicated borderlands’—like India–Pakistan, India–Bangladesh and also India–China. This article looks into the complications of the India–China borderland in the Ladakh region that remain in world news. The India–China border tension has seen an unprecedented escalation since 2020, and both sides, despite several rounds of meetings, have failed to reach any meaningful resolution.
The Sino-India border entanglement is not new, and there was a full-fledged war between the two in 1962. The war ended in one month, but the border issue thereafter remained unresolved. The 1962 war shocked then-Prime Minister Nehru as he never expected an invasion from the Chinese side. While the Chinese communist party had raised objections to the British demarcating its border with India, they were open to resolving it with the post-colonial Indian state (Bhasin 2021). Few experts are also of the view that India failed to take advantage of a specific situation, primarily when the newly Communist China desperately searched for political support (Joshi 2022). The situation on the India–China border has never improved, and today, even there is no consensus on the length of the border. ‘The Indians put the length of the border variously at 4,057 and 3,488 km, while the Chinese say it is a little over 2,000 km. This discrepancy arises because the Chinese do not include the border with Pakistan, and then, their straight-line border in the foothills of Arunachal Pradesh helps make for that figure’ (Joshi 2022, p. 45)
India and China, contrary to their border contestations, are good trade partners. The volume of trade between the two is nearly USD 100 billion. On a simple observation, in this particular case, we can notice that commercial ties are not enough to cement the political divide. Thus, the border question between India and China may not get resolved soon and will keep the borderland under constant pressure. Therefore, from the perspective of borderland communities of Ladakh, their life will remain in distress. This article is on the Changpas of Ladakh, the semi-nomadic Tibetan people found mainly in the Changthang region of Ladakh in India. It is one community that faced several hardships, albeit some bravely stood their ground.
‘Time has put them through a series of man-made tests: the movement of agricultural people from other areas into Ladakh; the Tibetan, Mongol and Dogra invasions: Indian independence, the 1962 war between India and China; modern communications; the Leh Manali road; the accent on ‘development’ and tourism. Nevertheless, they do what they do, roaming the Changthang with their goats, sheep and yak in much the same way as their ancestors did a millennium ago’ (Chaudhuri 2000, p. 52).
Chaudhuri (2000) underlined the pressures on Changpas from other factors, including social and economic. Due to this, we have witnessed a migratory trend in this community over the years. The most enduring effect on their life was in 1962, after the Sino-India war. ‘In 1962, Chinese troops invaded India along two fronts … while they moved back from the former, a large chunk of Ladakh is still in Chinese hands’ (Chaudhuri 2000, p. 52). The India–China border tension continued from 1962, and so did the troubles of Changpas. Studies conducted by Sarah Goodall (2004), Veena Bhasin (2012) and Padma Dolker (2021) validate the migratory trends among the Changpas, emphasising lack of pasture, healthcare facilities, and education as some of the factors behind the emigration towards the urban areas. However, Bhasin (2012) also foregrounds the economic opportunities the inflow of tourists and troops in the Changthan region provides. During the 2010s, technological advancements have made their space in the lives of Changpas in the form of motorised mobility and access to mobile phones. Tourist influx in the region has provided an additional source of income to their traditional livelihood cycle, but still, there is a continuous trend of migration. Alka Sabharwal (2023) has also analysed the Changthan region from an ecological perspective and foregrounded challenges to the inhabitants of the Changthan region. The above-mentioned factors behind the migrations have been studied to some extent previously, but the border clashes of 2020 have once again drawn our attention to the relationship between borders and the Changpas. These nomads are pretty familiar with their area’s adverse weather conditions and lack of healthcare systems. They have evolved themselves over time with sustainable practices, so what has caused change in their ecosystem is the coming of state borders in their life, which is by far underemphasised and a primordial factor in their migration and alienation.
This article is based on the relevant literature review related to the subject. However, most prominently, the analysis in the article is based on the interviews conducted by one of the authors during the field trip to Ladakh around the village areas of Chushul, Nyoma, Tsaga/Tsaka and Koyul near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The interviews were semi-structured, which included open-ended questions regarding the borders, economic sources and changes stemming from the border contestations, including the clashes of 2020 along the LAC. In order to get a better understanding of their lived experiences around the contested borders, their encampments were visited in March–April 2022. This article covers the responses of members from 10 Changpa families, and the personal narration of the borderland community of this critical region is presented and analysed in this article. In the next part, we will introduce the Changpa community—a unique borderland community of India. After that, we will briefly discuss the history of this region and the coming of borders in the life of Changpas. Later in the article, we will explain how this is an alienated borderland community where Changpas’ everyday distress is not adequately highlighted in discourses.
Changpas: Ethnographic Background
The Changthan region is a wide plateau and a cold desert with an average altitude of 4,500–5,000 meters. Having an arctic-like climate, this region is the home to Changpas, a semi-nomadic tribe inhabiting the Changthan Plateau. Most of the Changthan plateau is located in the Tibetan region of China. Geographically, it is the North-Western Tibet along the southern side of Xinjiang, and some part of it extends to Indian territory towards Eastern Ladakh. In Ladakh, the Changthan region forms roughly the territory between the three lakes, i.e. Pangong Tso, Tso Moriri and Tso Kar, including the area of Rupshu Valley. Changpas can be found moving in and around the village areas of Chushul, Tsaga/Tsaka, Nyoma, Koyul, Hanle, Korzog, Kharnak, Fukche, Rupshu and Demchok, following their traditional migratory routes in search of grazing grounds.
The word ‘Changpa’ means somebody from the northern area or highland, the word has Tibetan origin (Rizvi 2001) and locally they are known as Dokpa. 1 These nomads trace their origins to either Ladakh or Tibet; therefore, some identify as Ladakhi Changpas (Indian origin), and others are of Tibetan origin who moved to Ladakh after China’s invasion of Tibet (1950), but both follow Tibetan culture. Changpa is an elusive tribe with only over two thousand members left as per the 2011 census records of the Indian government, and they practice Buddhism. 2 They speak Changskhat, a mixed dialect of Ladakhi and Tibetan. However, over time, interactions with the populace from various parts of India have helped them understand and speak a little Hindi. Following a semi-nomadic way of life and practising nomadic pastoralism, they migrate according to the seasonal cycle in search of fodder to feed their livestock. Some of the Changpas remain sedentary in the villages of the Changthan plains, while others follow the traditional way of living, which keeps them mobile throughout the year.
The primary source of income comes from the rearing of livestock, particularly the Changra goat (also known as Changthangi, Ladakh pashmina and Cashmere goat) from which Pashmina wool is obtained. Pashmina wool is made from fine fibres obtained from the chin and underbelly of Changra goat. Pashmina wool provides effective insulation against sub-zero temperatures, and it is featherlight. Therefore, it is an exotic product of the Changthan region and has remained in high demand around the globe. Apart from the Pashmina trade, selling yak wool, sheep wool and butter gives them a little extra money. While these products are in high demand and considered high-value products, the Changpas remain at the initial leg of production and face several challenges. Amidst the high altitude and difficult terrain of the cold desert, the survival of livestock remains a primary concern for the Changpas. Stone-walled pens are constructed to keep livestock safe from wild animals and harsh winters in these areas. Changpas practice a bare and rugged lifestyle. They are trying to catch up with technological advancements. However, they cannot match the pace—now upgrading their traditional Yak wool tent (Rebo) to canvas tents, adopting solar-powered LED bulbs over kerosene lamps, having basic mobile phones and using pick-up trucks to translocate their encampment.
However, the availability of motorised transport like cars/pick-up trucks nowadays has reduced the reliance on herds for transportation of goods, but not every terrain is accessible via roads, so animals are still a reliable medium of transportation across the mountains. Even the local troops employ Changpas as porters to translocate their goods wherever motorised transport cannot scale the mountain. Their source of income has been affected adversely in the present day, and their reliance on Pashmina wool as the primary source of income is now more than ever. Largely, they follow the old pattern of seasonal migration in search of grazing grounds, and this search often leads them deep into territory where state control is practically absent. Their movement in non-state-controlled spaces used to be unhindered and unchecked prior to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, due to the remoteness and topography of the region. Moreover, the transborder movements of Changpas earlier were not perceived as a challenge to state authorities, possibly due to the detachment and barren topography of the region, but the coming of stringent borders changed much of their life.
Coming of Borders in the Life of Changpas: Traditional Boundaries Versus State Borders
Since medieval times, Changpas have been crucial for the transportation of goods using beasts of burden in the extremities of cold deserts, facilitating transregional trade among the kingdoms of Ladakh and Tibet (Jina 1999, Rizvi 2001 Warikoo 1990, 2020a, 2020b). Ladakh and Tibet were adjacent kingdoms engaging in trade regulated by the Treaty of Tingmosgang (1684), and this treaty also demarcated the boundary between the two kingdoms (Stobdan 2020). Later, when the Dogra conquest of Ladakh culminated in the Treaty of Chushul (1842), it restored the status quo antebellum by reiterating the Treaty of Tingmosgang (1684) (Huttenback 1961). Therefore, the boundaries fixed during the ninth and tenth centuries continued to divide Ladakh and Tibet (Stobdan 2020) and were treated as traditional boundaries. However, when Maharaja Gulab Singh bought Jammu and Kashmir from the British government through the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), the territory of Gilgit, Baltistan, Ladakh and parts of Tibet also came under Dogra rule (Huttenback 1961, Gardner 2021, Gagne 2017, Stobdan 2020, Dolma 2017). Still, the external security of Jammu and Kashmir was the British subject. The Great Game in the Central Asian region caused geopolitical anxieties, forcing the British to attempt charting out the outer limits of their empire in the northern region of Jammu and Kashmir, for which Ladakh was considered a natural border (Gagne 2017).
Colonial cartography kept shifting the borders of the Ladakh region according to the geopolitical situation. The British claims were primarily based on the water-parting principle. 3 In the Ladakh region, the Indus watershed was considered the demarcation between British India and China, which was not even properly surveyed due to its remoteness and harsh climate (Gardener 2021). Initially, the British claims were based on the Johnson Line that was drawn in 1865, which included the territory of Aksai Chin within the boundary of Jammu and Kashmir (Bansal 2020), although it was a vague demarcation of the Indus watershed (Gardner 2021). Later Johnson-Ardagh Line in 1897, following the Crest of the Kunlun Mountains, suggested excluding the low-lying areas of the Western Tarim Basin. After a few years of discussion to fix the border between China and British India, in 1899, the Macartney-MacDonald Line was introduced, which excluded the territory of Aksai Chin by following the Karakoram range as the separating line (Ranjan 2016; Bansal 2020; Gardner 2021). In the twentieth century, with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the British tried to settle borders with Tibet and China through the Simla Convention of 1914, which proposed the MacMahon line. In 1927, the British again shifted their claim to the Johnson-Ardagh Line and maintained it throughout the Second World War (Ranjan 2016, Bansal 2020, Rao 2021). After independence, both India and China inherited the border dispute as a colonial legacy and claimed territory in Ladakh based on different lines, and since then, the issue of Sino-Indian borders has not been resolved. Further, differing perceptions of the LAC in the Ladakh region have aggravated the complexity of the border situation and disrupted the traditional movement of the Changpas. Despite of the perceived cartographic realities, the Changpas had a different story to tell. Changpas’s plight can be sensed from the following statement recorded during the field visit.
‘I used to wander in the mountains in search of grass and often ended up in the areas which are under Chinese control…. the Yaks do not understand boundaries; they are animals they will go wherever they can find grass or water. Sometimes, we have to search for them to bring them back to our camps, and they have moved deep into the wilderness in Tibetan areas. This used to be very common, but now we have been careful about their movement from past few decades, especially after the 1962 war…’ (Tenzin Chospel, 70, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
‘…we have been living and grazing here for centuries and know our area very well from the mountain ridges to nallas (water streams) it is our home. My forefathers used to move across the territory in Tibet for grass and to collect ‘Shing Ten’ (a shrub used as fuel), but now we are not allowed to do so’ (Kunchok 65, Personal Communication, March–April 2022).
Pointing out to the territory across the river stream, Changpas recollect memories of when they could move across the territory unrestricted. The older ones in their families, before 1962, had been moving across the region, which is now regarded as disputed territory. After talking to the nomads, we realised that their perception towards borders as strict dividing lines was less evident; rather, they were ambiguous and discursively explained their extent of mobility. As our discussion with the nomads continued, they further explained how they used to mark the extent of their territory. The following responses will make it clearer how they view the boundaries.
‘…back in days, we used to have ‘Chortens/ Choten’ (small Stupas), villages and agricultural land, which was a marker of our territory, and we used path along the ‘nallas’ (water stream) for our movement with the herd…now check posts are there to mark our territory…’ (Tenzin Chospel, 70, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
The concept of territoriality exists as one of the crucial aspects of the nomadic lifestyle (Levine and MacKay 2020). Changpas were unequivocal about referring to the regional topography as discursive limits for their movement in the area. It was intriguing to know that unanimity on boundaries was absent; the boundary references were group-specific as they denote mountains and water streams as reference points that were orally passed and followed through the generations. The river streams may change over time, so precision is also lacking. Further, the markers on the mountains are prone to weather, making them questionable. The reference to territory was evident, and they claimed certain areas they had been using for grazing herds as their own. The concept of territory is not alien to Changpas; however, it was not fixed and was not as strict as modern-day borders. The earlier generation of Changpas had followed traditional boundaries which were different from the state borders, and based on these traditional boundaries, the Changpas of Ladakh present their claims. Most of these symbolically accepted markers are based on conventional agreements made between Ladakh and Tibet kingdoms lacking precise demarcations. These historical territorial connections were followed and embedded in their sociocultural understanding, and shaped their consideration and response towards restriction of any kind. Thus, cultural territories became a cornerstone of their social habitus 4 that has been moulded over the centuries through everyday practices. Further, based on the place, they trace their origin and differentiate among themselves, so sociocultural territorial demarcation remains a significant factor in the identity formation of the Changpas. However, the enforcement of sovereignty brought the state apparatus on the ground, which contradicted the territory claimed by Changpas. In the following statement, the grievances of herders like Wogchok are evident; talking about the presence of army check posts, the nomads are worried about their mobility and the reduced extent of their ancestral land.
‘…now the army posts in the region demarcates our area…. but we better know our area and it is way beyond their presence’ (Stanzin Wogchok, 55, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
‘From this mountain, where we are standing right now, till the big ‘nalla’ (big water stream), we used to move freely, but now the situation has changed; we are told not to go deeper towards the border. For centuries, we have been grazing in these mountains, and nobody has ever restricted our movement. Animals often wander and get lost in their way, and we need to find them across the restricted areas’ (Rigzin, 50, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
In short, Changpas are uncomfortable with the lines that alienate them from their traditional conception of borders. Before the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the vaguely defined borders of Ladakh allowed Changpas to move unrestricted, with little or no dispute at all. Enforcement of modern borders in this region is followed by overlapping and exaggerated claims on the land by the contesting states, resulting in simmering conflicts. Notably, prior to the enforcement of state borders and a lack of official state agencies on the ground, the Ladakh–Tibet borderland had free trans-border interaction, including the flow of goods, thereby transforming the area into a zone of cultural amalgamation and convergence. With the arrival of the formal state border, the zone of convergence was bisected by the state, and the identity of Changpas was modified to a borderland community, which was not the case earlier.
Now, the Changpas feel confined within certain limits, and the state’s territorial extent curtails their mobility, which concerns them as it reduces the chances of getting good pastures for their herds. The presence of military personnel on the ground reminds the Changpas of the changes that came along with the formalisation of state control. Although, for them, traditional boundaries included villages and agricultural land and cultural symbols like stupas, which were tiny heaps or mounds used as a place of stoppage for religious offerings (the size can vary). The unique ancient symbols of identifying spaces and limits are now replaced by check posts installed by the state authorities. The Changpas do not fully agree with what the state has defined for them and feel helpless to interferences with their traditional freedom of movement. There is a sense of despair among Changpas due to the loss of their ancestral pasture land and the militarisation of the area that China started.
Caught Between the Lines
Are Changpas pushed in between? This is a big question. There are voices within this community that indicate helplessness. While performing their daily chores and singing some folk songs, the Changpas revealed the awful situation in their area after the border clashes of 2020. The following response will give us a better idea about the situation.
‘Since the Galwan incident of 2020 happened, we are told not to graze on the land which was used extensively for the past few years…the authority stops us from visiting our own land…. also the climate is bad this time there is poor growth of grass and that affects animals… my herd has reduced due to lack of grass… and I had to sell some of them to buy feed in order to sustain others…’ (Peyma, 60–62, Personal Communication March–April 2022)
In this, Peyma makes a relevant point that state authorities are unwilling to allow movement beyond certain points due to the recent tension. For state authorities, it is to ensure the safety of Indian citizens, but it has other repercussions for Changpas. The sporadic greenery in the cold desert is the only available natural resource to feed their large herds. The Changpas started to witness state representatives and their apparatuses in the borderlands only during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, establishing a LAC to mark state control on the disputed land. Although, even after 1962, not every activity was prohibited, the border was permeable until the 1980s, when the border talks between India and China started (Ganguly 1989). Thereafter, Changpas learned about the strict nature of state borders, which they had never experienced before. Territoriality is entrenched in nomadic social habitus, and resonance between state borders and traditional boundaries for Changpas is unlikely due to the perception differential between the state and Changpas. The locals and Changpas followed the territorial arrangement between Tibet and Ladakh and also respected the local consensus on the territorial extent. However, nobody was interested in precisely demarcating the wilderness of the Ladakh region till the Indian and Chinese forces faced each other in 1962, as it became an issue of sovereign control for both states.
Further, Changpas informed about the tussle between the nomads from the Chinese territory and the Indian territory in Ladakh to occupy good pasture land in the contested zone. However, due to the border tension, Changpas are advised by the Indian authorities to keep a distance to avoid confrontation. It has, in turn, reduced Changpa’s chance of securing a good pasture for them. The available natural resources are the only feasible means to feed their large herds. Sometimes, due to adverse climatic conditions, the available grass is less; therefore, anxieties grip the nomads to accelerate their search for whatever is left on grazing lands. This struggle often leads the nomads towards the zones where both contesting states have overlapping claims. Changpas consider those areas to be the rightful claim for their herds. Such views are diametrically opposite to the modern state’s interpretation of borders as absolute and impermeable. For Changpas, moving in search of pastures for their herd’s survival is how they have been living for generations.
Ever since the border clashes of 2020, the state authorities have restricted their movement to areas near the LAC. The agreement between the Indian and Chinese authorities to create ‘buffer zones’ or ‘grey zones’ to maintain the status quo on borders has been detrimental to the socio-economic conditions of the Changpas. The following response provides a glance at the situation along the border areas and foregrounds the issues emanating from the creation of buffer zones along the LAC.
‘… some of the grazing areas across Fukche where Indus River bends is now out of our reach …we are not allowed to come closer to the border area…there is lack of pasture in Koyul (approximately 5–6 km. from LAC), and my goats are dying…’ (Rigzin, 50, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
The areas where both India and China are contesting their territorial claims have been transformed into ‘grey zones’ open for coercive occupation. Every incident of military disturbance by China makes a border in the region more volatile, and it is a new normal. This process leaves Changpas with no choice but to live with it (Hassan and Ellis-Petersen 2020, Aswani 2022, Singh 2024). Changpas have a national identity, which restricts their movement beyond the limit of the state’s sovereignty, and they expect support from the Indian authorities.
There is a disparity in supposed and on-ground situations of the state borders, which is reflected in the current border conflict between India and China. According to India and China, the different perceptions of the LAC have created zones with overlapping claims that engulf the traditional grazing grounds and freshwater streams essential for the Changpas’ survival and livelihood. Changes in the border situation directly affect the Changpas, as mentioned in several reports from civil society (Singh 2021, The Hindu 2020). The Chinese claims in the region are based on Tibetan assertions (Rao 2021). As a part of their strategy, the Chinese PLA adopted the ‘salami-slicing’ tactic to move in piece by piece to gain control in an area wherever it has a border conflict, and this has been the modus operandi for a long time (Chellaney 2021; Burgers and Romaniuk 2021). Even in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) several countries objected to China’s strategy.
Following the escalation of Sino-Indian border tension in 2020 (Galwan Valley clashes of 2020), the Changpas were perturbed by the extra restrictions imposed on them. Without permission to move closer to the LAC for grazing activities, it is difficult for Changpas to save their animals. To add to the worries of Changpas, recent weather conditions were not favouring them, and excessive snowfall in the nearby areas killed hundreds of goats due to hypothermia. Changpas informed us about the lack of grazing grounds, and those usually visited were now under a disputed zone. Some pastures near the LAC under Indian control were too rendered as no-go zones due to security concerns. With the creation of buffer zones, more land is now out of reach for the Changpas.
This is how the Changpa community has lost control of the space they lived in for generations and are now just wandering in between what is permitted by the state authorities. Losing pasture land adversely affects the economic status of the Changpas, as the survival of their herd is directly dependent on it. The consequence of limited pasture is poor health of animals, who ultimately die of starvation and harsh climate. The dying of goats is economically devastating for the Changpas as most of their income comes from the pashmina goats.
The Continued Alienation
While highlighting the people’s troubles, it is very difficult to estimate when the situation will change. Even Changpas are doubtful about a sudden transformation in the region’s politics.
‘…few years back, me and my father had 250 goats and other animals…but we are left only with 150 now…during the good season we made three hundred thousand rupees and now, after Galwan our income has halved … neither the weather nor the circumstances are in our favour …’ (Rinchen Tundup, 55, Personal Communication, March–April 2022).
‘…my son studies in Leh (capital city of Ladakh) he needs money to survive there…my herd is dwindling due to lack of grass…. The grass is good near the borders but the troops stop us from going there and check us every now and then…we only received some ration from the government and sometime the local troops help us…but what about our herds…the goats are dying of hunger. Pashmina collection is also low…it has become difficult to survive…often my brother sends money he earns by driving a taxi in Leh…’ (Phuntchog Jabian, 55, Personal Communication, March–April 2022).
‘…there used to be around four hundred animals in our herd but now only hundred remains…surviving here is becoming very difficult…income has reduced from pashmina because of small herd…’ (Tenzin Chospel, 70, Personal Communication, March–April 2022).
Amidst the ongoing border conflict, the Changpas remain in a precarious situation. The uncertainty on a possible solution to the border dispute complicates things for Changpas. On being asked about their economic situation, the above-mentioned responses clearly point out the consequences of the power struggle at the borders. Further, the relationship between the Changpas and borders is also linked through the herds, which provide the raw materials for sale in the market. Pashmina goats are an inextricable part of Changpa’s existence and character; selling Pashmina wool was their primary source of income, and it is now jeopardised by dying goats. Reduced Pashmina wool shearing directly affected their economy, and the Changpas were quite vocal about this issue.
Tenzin Chospel, Phuntchog Jabian, Rinchen Tundup of Chushul Village and Peyma from Koyul Village were those herders who possessed large herds before Chinese aggression. Possessing herds of more than a hundred goats still, they were anxious about their declining average annual income, which once used to be around ₹500,000–600,000, has now been reduced to ₹250,000–350,000. The figures are based on the average of the interviewed Changpas, which still need to be higher regarding their survival. They are compelled to buy additional animal feed to meet the fodder requirement, which broke them financially. As the prices for the other goods are soaring, it has become backbreaking for already economically distressed Changpas.
Role of the Indian Government
Everyone who knows the area knows about the ongoing crisis. The nature of intricacies is such that it is arduous to manage the livelihood without support from authorities. The government emphasises and encourages Pashmina production, for which Changpas have already focused more on rearing Pashmina goats, albeit they are primarily sheepherders. However, under the current border situation and limitations on grazing, the goats are dying, and the herd size of Changpas is reducing, which ultimately risks the entire economic structure of Changpas. When asked about the role of the Indian government in assisting with any kind of situation, three respondent families received essential ration assistance. Some received solar light bulbs, tents, animal fodder and monetary help from the Union Territory of Ladakh government. Some respondents received tents and special rations from the Indian Army deployed in their locality. Essentially, the herders repudiated receiving any significant assistance from the government. This further brings out the issues with the governance of the border communities.
‘…there are many families like us who are compelled to leave this lifestyle due to economic reasons, mobility issues and lack of pastures…I have known approximately seventy families before 2017 but now only eleven families continue nomadism…people are migrating to villages and cities in search for better opportunities and lifestyle….’ (Peyma, 62, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
The Changpas are now shifting from the border region in search of other sources of income, and this is somewhat like a cultural crisis for Changpas. Thupten (54) of Tsaga/ Tsaka village (approximately 8 km. from LAC) claimed that before 2017, he knew around 70 families of herders in the proximity, but now only 11 remain. The number of families who have migrated to the cities, leaving nomadic pastoralism, varied among the interviewed Changpas. As their population is scattered across the region, the number of migrators can be higher if we consider the entire population of Changpa nomads.
Providing homestays in their areas is another lucrative source of income, but that too comes with additional challenges, including buying land, arranging logistics and the cost of building infrastructure. The renouncing families do not have many options for employment as their skill set is culture-specific. Still, some managed to get employed as porters with the local troops, others settled down in villages as agriculturalists, and a few of them migrated to Leh (the capital city of Ladakh) to drive a taxi or in search for any unskilled labour job. The settlements of Changpas around the urban outskirts are potential sites for labour procurement, and depending upon the skillset, these nomads get specialised or menial jobs.
‘…due to the conflict, my younger brother migrated and now works for a restaurant…. I am also looking forward to driving a taxi…if such situation persists, we will lose our traditional way of living…’ (Tenzing Wogchog, 55, Personal Communication, March–April 2022)
Herders like Tenzing Wogchok (55) are concerned about the evolving situation that is affecting their income; as a result, his younger brother had to work for a restaurant to earn money. Wogchok, himself, was looking forward to driving a taxi in Leh. Such a response is alarming and foregrounds the vulnerability of the herders. Having practised nomadic pastoralism for centuries, it becomes challenging for them to learn new skills and abruptly adjust to a different cultural and economic environment. The migrations are not wilful, and employment uncertainty in the cities further reduces their hopes. The opportunities of driving taxis and working in restaurants are dependent on the tourist influx. Ladakh is a tourist destination, and during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, tourist footfall was negligible. The availability of tourists is variable and is subject to the circumstances in the area. Thus, there is no certainty that herders will get a job when required.
The stringent bordering deprives a community of its cultural identity and forces it to migrate, which is essentially not voluntary. Thus, Changpas are getting more alienated from their land, and it is not easy for them to settle in other places. They are alienated due to the securitisation of the region, where social–cultural contexts are side-lined.
Considering Changpas’ cultural uniqueness and their dependency on the Changthan region, the area of border conflict between India and China, anxieties have dominated the community regarding their survival as they are left with few options. In such a scenario, the migration of Changpas from the border region would deprive their identity as border dwellers and efface their unique cultural heritage. Changpas are inevitably dependent on borders and are troubled by the repositioning and over-securitisation of the borders in the region. The insights gathered from the field visit indicate a drastic change in the availability of grazing grounds for the Changpas, leading to a decline in their average annual income. Restrictions on movement near the contested areas ultimately affect the health of their livestock, and as a consequence, the Pashmina collection suffers. Moreover, the repercussions of the conflicting borders are leading to their migration in search of another source of income for survival. Further, the territory they associate their identity with is being at risk.
Conclusion
This article discussed how the evolution of the territorial border in the Ladakh region deeply impacts a community practically disconnected from the mainstream political processes. The states had drawn lines to curtail the historically free movement of Changpas and gave them a fixed national identity in the process. They are now supposed to limit their Nomadism; however, from a formal state position, the new life for the Changpas appears normal. This is how the nation-states decide on their territorial limits by drawing borders, and sometimes these borders are irrationally drawn. There are lines in the whole of South Asia, like the Durand Line, and each one of them has its own story. While in another context, the borderland communities are vocal and also got much-required attention due to several geopolitical reasons, but the Changpas remain alienated, mostly due to their semi-nomadic lifestyle and their location. The two giants of Asia, India and China, are at loggerheads in a region that Changpas once dominated. While everyone is curiously and rightly talking of India and China, particularly in the context of the border, there is rarely any mention of Changpas. It is because they are alienated, living at the margins and trying to defend the little of their way of life they can. Changpas are a perfect example of borderlanders getting distanced from their social and cultural roots.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to sincerely thanks all the participants in this study, also the local authorities for extending all necessary support.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.