Youth employment amid successive crises and the low-carbon transition: The case of Εurozone coal regions

Abstract

Over the last decade, the EU has entered a phase of transition to a low-carbon economy, which has led to a decline in the competitiveness of coal. Despite efforts to restructure their energy sectors, coal regions continue to struggle with the lingering effects of the 2008/09 Global Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, which affect their economies and decarbonisation trajectories. In this context, the paper examines the role of youth in the local labour regimes (LLRs) of Eurozone coal regions. Drawing on perspectives of Geographical Political Economy and Political Ecology, the transition from coal to renewable energy is conceptualised as a new socio-ecological fix, reflecting capitalist mechanisms seeking novel avenues for profiting while maintaining established power asymmetries and inequalities. The study employs a mixed methods approach to examine the exacerbated structural challenges faced by youth. Firstly, by analysing secondary macroeconomic, (youth) employment and demographic data, key differences between the LLRs of the coal regions of six Eurozone countries are highlighted. Secondly, a qualitative analysis of Western Macedonia in Greece, one of the most lagging coal regions, is carried out. The analysis is based on primary data collected in focus groups and interviews with key informants, energy workers and locals in the period 2021-2022. Findings suggest that uneven development, labour flexibilisation, and lack of economic diversification hinder the entry of young people into the labour market and contribute to their out-migration from coal regions, thus the latters' role in shaping the changing energy landscape remains marginal.

Keywords

Socio-ecological fixes local labour regimes youth labour markets just transition Western Macedonia,Greece

Introduction

Over the last 15 years, European labour markets have undergone significant transformations due to the 2008/09 Global Crisis effects and the Covid-19 pandemic, with youth being particularly affected (e.g., Avagianou et al., 2022). Concurrently, efforts to tackle the climate crisis have led to the implementation of the European Green Deal (EGD; European Commission, 2019), which is enshrined in legal frameworks such as the European Climate Law and the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package. Specifically, these frameworks set the decarbonisation of energy production, i.e., the reduction of carbon emissions, and the transition from coal to renewable energy (RE), as the most important processes aimed at making the European Union (EU) the first carbon–neutral continent by 2050. In this context, coal-dependent regions that undergo a low-carbon transition experience profound consequences on their (youth) labour markets.

Against this backdrop, the paper examines the intricate relationship between the successive crises and the energy transition, and their impact on labour, with a particular focus on youth. Specifically, it investigates how the Great Recession, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the ongoing energy transition have affected local labour regimes (LLRs), focusing on the current position and future prospects of youth in coal regions’ labour markets. To shed further light on the above, the paper uses Western Macedonia (WM) in Greece as a case study. Drawing upon Geographical Political Economy and Political Ecology perspectives, we use the concept of LLR as a means to delve into labour shifts within broader governance and control systems, taking into account the particular organisational framework, including formal and informal rules, cultural norms and social practises (Hadjimichalis, 2017; Peck, 2022). In the following, we theorise the current energy transition as a new socio-ecological fix, which offers capital new ways to convert resources into profits, while seeking temporary solutions to impending crises and maintaining established power relations (McCarthy, 2015; Ekers and Prudham, 2017). A mixed methods approach is used to operationalise the research. Secondary macroeconomic, (youth) employment and demographic data are analysed for all coal regions of the Eurozone, focusing on the period 2009–2022, while primary data collected between 2021–2022 through focus groups and interviews with key informants, energy workers and locals are scrutinised.

Despite the growing body of literature on the unequal impacts of the green transition, many approaches fail to critically theorise the impact of established power dynamics and hegemonic transition plans on vulnerable communities (Sovacool et al., 2021). This is a significant limitation to a just transition, particularly considering the lingering effects of the Great Recession and the Covid-19 pandemic. To address this lacuna, our study aims to provide a unique comparative perspective on the varied decarbonisation trajectories of the Eurozone coal regions. It also addresses the often-overlooked impact of the above factors on young people. The research findings show that LLRs in Eurozone coal regions were affected differently by these crises, depending on their specific structural vulnerabilities and capabilities. Despite these differences, all regions have experienced notable losses of their younger population over the past decade, while their fragmented labour markets do not offer good employment prospects for young people (Jestl and Römisch, 2023).

In what follows, we start with a conceptual framework of decarbonisation as a socio-ecological fix with important implications for coal-related LLRs. We then set out our methodology, which is followed by the empirical part. For this, we present a secondary analysis on the coal regions of the Eurozone and continue with a primary analysis on the complex characteristics of youth labour markets within the evolving LLR of Western Macedonia, Greece. The paper concludes with a detailed discussion of the main findings within the relevant literature and the identification of potential areas for future research.

Energy transitions, labour, and crises: a conceptual framework

Decarbonisation as a socio-ecological fix

Energy transition is not a mere process of technological substitution or innovation, but rather a complex socio-spatial phenomenon. Various approaches have been proposed for this phenomenon, ranging from structural and transformative to market-orientated and managerial (García-García et al., 2020; Moore, 2016), with the latter being more prevalent in public policy at all levels (local, national and transnational; Jeknic and Cop, 2022) leaving the profitability imperative undisputed (Bouzarovski, 2022). In fact, supported by international agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty, certain companies have taken legal action against governments pushing for the energy transition when this posed a threat to their investments (Kreibiehl et al., 2022). These examples reinforce our view that decarbonisation is a socio-ecological fix serving two purposes. Firstly, to create the socio-economic and environmental conditions for profitable investment through technology-driven energy production methods and the extraction/utilisation of new resources (Ekers and Prudham, 2017), and secondly, to avert impending crises in this way. The dual nature of socio-ecological fixes implies a direct theoretical lineage from Harvey's (1981) ‘spatial fix’. Thus, decarbonisation has become an ideological mechanism that favours existing power relations (Carton, 2019; Fearn, 2023; Swyngedouw, 2023).

After the coal crisis of 1958, some early efforts to phase out coal emerged, particularly in countries like Germany and the Netherlands, where demand for coal was declining (Herpich et al., 2018; Krommyda et al., 2022). Currently, the EU is pursuing decarbonisation to mitigate the effects of climate change, the energy crisis caused by the ongoing geopolitical crisis in Ukraine and the disruption to supply chains caused by the pandemic (Osička and Černoch, 2022). In material terms, however, decarbonisation consolidates technologically enabled ‘regimes of accumulation’ while building on previous fixes established during the extensive and prolonged dependence on fossil fuels (Eckersley, 2020), meaning that it reproduces their imperatives of competition between market participants and continuous expansion (Jeknic and Cop, 2022). As several scholars point out, decarbonisation in its current form exacerbates existing spatial and labour inequalities (Kalleberg, 2011), as in the case of (brown) energy peripheries, which, due to abundant space, low land values and limited political influence, receive capital inflows that consolidate new sites for renewable energy production (McCarthy, 2015; Golubchikov and O'Sullivan, 2020). However, the need for large-scale renewable energy infrastructure is leading to the dismantling of existing production structures and mining sites, as well as extensive conversion of their agricultural land (McCarthy, 2015; Krommyda et al., 2024). Despite being prime locations for renewed capital accumulation, their GDP is shrinking and their labour force is becoming idle, while many of their young and skilled workers are out-migrating (Ruppert Bulmer et al., 2021). Such a contradictory and uneven development means that decarbonisation can only postpone approaching crises instead of tackling their causes (Ekers and Prudham, 2017).

Furthermore, current decarbonisation efforts in the Global North are closely linked to increased resource extraction and deforestation in the Global South (Franquesa, 2022; Boateng et al., 2023), as technologies like wind turbines, photovoltaic cells and batteries require critical raw materials extracted in countries of the global periphery (World Bank, 2020; Clarke et al., 2022). This neo-colonial dynamic, referred to as ‘green extractivism’, subvertsactual decarbonisation goals (Franquesa, 2022), with decarbonisation instead being used as a narrative that depoliticises the environmental crisis and promotes greenwashing practises (Swyngedouw, 2023; Almeida et al., 2023). To this end, the fairness of decision-making processes is emphasised at the expense of the outcomes. For instance, the success of examples of low-carbon transition, such as in Feldheim (Brandenburg, Germany), is attributed to the perception of fairness in implementation, which subsequently enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the outcomes despite the unequal power dynamics maintained (McCauley et al., 2019). At a deeper level, the decarbonisation narrative is viewed by many as an attempt to restore legitimacy of profit-driven practises, the state and the overarching neoliberal paradigm, by portraying them as environmentally conscious (McCarthy, 2015; Fearn, 2023). At the centre of this is the concept of just transition, which was originally formulated by US trade unions in the 1970s and is currently influencing global debates (García-García et al., 2020; Stevis and Felli, 2020). Although the ILO (2015) has taken up this controversial concept and attempted to mould it into a plausible goal, relevant policies and practises that do not address and eliminate power asymmetries cannot be considered just in either the natural or social realm (Stevis and Felli, 2020).

New socio-ecological fixes in the local labour regimes of coal regions

The material and geographical conditions of resource extraction and energy production have myriad effects on labour and its social reproduction, while new socio-ecological fixes are linked to emerging forms of labour organisation. We argue that LLRs are a valuable theoretical concept that can help us to better theorise the multi-scale processes and the complex dialectical relationship between capital and (youth) labour in the context of socio-ecological fixes (as in Figure 1). At an abstract level, LLRs are historically evolved schemes of crystallised class conflict, labour control and political negotiation. Specifically, they encompass mechanisms in production (e.g., wage patterns, social benefits, surveillance methods), consumption (e.g., housing, recreation) and reproduction (e.g., welfare, education) that maintain a balance between labour, capital and the state (Baglioni et al., 2022; Gialis and Herod, 2015). Scale is crucial in this context, as the aforementioned relationships and mechanisms transcend space. In particular, LLRs themselves are formed as locales, but are influenced by the distant imperatives of corporations within global production networks (Jonas, 1996) as well as dominant narratives – such as decarbonisation.

The LLRs of coal regions have many common and unique characteristics. In principle, mining takes place where the primary source is located, so both labour and capital are relatively 'fixed in place’ (Ellem, 2003). Among other things, this leads to a high degree of unionisation and a diachronically strong bargaining power for workers employed in large mining sites and power plants (Mitchell, 2011). In addition, there is a significant cultural identity associated with mining that extends beyond the workforce to entire communities, including a unique attachment to place on the one hand and to health and environmental impacts on the other – epitomised by coal workers who view their habitus as a ‘sacrifice zone’ (Bouzarovski, 2022). Another key feature of LLRs in coal regions is the scarcity of employment opportunities in sectors other than resource extraction (cf. the ‘resource curse’, Wen et al., 2021), which leads to highly skilled labour fleeing these regions (Baran et al., 2020; Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020; Ruppert Bulmer et al., 2021; Jestl and Römisch, 2023). This results to a polarisation within local labour markets between a secure core of prime-age male wage workers and a ‘periphery’ of precarious workers lacking welfare benefits and unionisation (Ruppert Bulmer et al., 2021; Vetta, 2022). Importantly, this duality fosters unequal power relations among workers themselves and in the context of industrial restructuring often leads to conflicts (Warren, 2019).

For its part, youth employment in these LLRs and the coal industry in particular has historically been limited and is usually overlooked in the relevant literature. Typically, the labour force in coal-related sectors consists of prime-age people (Baran et al., 2020; Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020) for several reasons. Firstly, coal mining and energy production are highly competitive sectors in which it is difficult for young people to gain a foothold. While the level of education that is required is low, the level of skills required is high and is acquired through experience. Notably, coal workers are often characterised as possessing ‘unique, transgenerational knowledge’ (Bouzarovski, 2022). Secondly, the gradual decline of the coal industry in recent decades and the short- and long-term health hazards associated with mining and power generation discourage young people from entering the sector, even when such an opportunity exists (Carley et al., 2018). Third, young workers in energy regions have limited access to secure jobs, as labour markets there are polarised and most jobs are precarious, as mentioned above (Vetta, 2022). Therefore, the exodus of young people from coal regions is not new (e.g., Ruppert Bulmer et al., 2021; Jestl and Römisch, 2023); at the same time, unemployment is widespread among those young people who choose to stay (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020).

The current transition to low-carbon economies is associated with immense challenges and risks, most of which concern the labour force directly (European Commission, 2019). Historically, decarbonisation has been associated with labour underutilisation and precariousness (Bouzarovski, 2022), while in recent years the efforts to tackle climate change have often justified the proliferation of low-quality jobs in an emergency context (Kalleberg, 2011). At the same time, the introduction of new technologies in energy production reduces the demand for labour. For instance, once solar parks are built, only a few workers are needed to operate and maintain them (De Bruyn-Szendrei et al., 2019). Nevertheless, many analyses tend to be optimistic and emphasise the growth of green jobs and entrepreneurship, while overlooking the complexity of addressing existing skills gaps, either by retraining the current workforce or by bringing in new workers who have up-to-date competences and skills (García-García et al., 2020). As a result, even advanced economies suffer from severe labour shortages (Alves Dias et al., 2018; Cedefop, 2019). For example, foreign specialised workers are required for the construction of solar parks in the Netherlands (De Bruyn-Szendrei et al., 2019). More importantly, whether regions can benefit from the green transition largely depends on their industrial composition and the availability of highly skilled labour (OECD, 2023), with low- and medium-skilled workers being more vulnerable to displacement as new jobs may not be sufficient to absorb them (Kapetaki et al., 2020; OECD, 2023).

Amid the green transition, youth labour is crucial for several reasons. For one, young people are more motivated to acquire new skills (Baran et al., 2020), they are more familiar with new technologies (Tian et al., 2022) and their skills are not yet obsolete like those of older workers (Cedefop, 2019). Moreover, as increased labour mobility is considered a prerequisite for adapting to new socio-ecological fixes (García-García et al., 2020), it is important that younger workers are generally more mobile than prime-age workers (Hromada et al., 2021). Therefore, retraining and green education programmes are primarily aimed at young workers, while at a more abstract level, the green economy is presented as a solution to the diachronic problem of youth labour's underutilisation (Jeknic and Cop, 2022).

Methods and data

As already mentioned, our study follows a mixed methods approach. The empirical part consists of a quantitative secondary analysis of the 18 coal regions¹ of the Eurozone (see Figure 2) and a qualitative analysis of fieldwork data and policy documents for Western Macedonia (WM). For the secondary analysis, regional data (at the NUTS-2 level) are drawn from Eurostat ², aiming to outline the economic and demographic profile of the regions studied and to understand how the successive crises have affected their decarbonisation trajectories. The data used are: total and youth³ population⁴, sectoral employment in NACE codes B and D⁵, total youth employment⁶, NEETs⁷, gross value added (GVA) and gross fixed capital formations (GFCF) in NACE sectors B, D, and E.⁸ The analysis covers the years 2009–2022 and is divided into three sub-periods: 2009–2014 refers to the Great Recession following the 2008/09 Global Crisis, 2015–2018 to the years of anaemic recovery, and 2019–2022 to the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing energy crisis. The data is analysed by (a) using the Location Quotient (LQ) index, which relates regional rates to national rates in order to place each region in its national context⁹ (Figure 3), and (b) examining diachronic changes in absolute volumes for the above sub-periods (Table 3).

Our decision to focus on the Eurozone rather than the EU coal regions is based not only on space limitations, but also on the differences between them in terms of energy-related fiscal and financial policies¹⁰. However, despite their common characteristics and being parts of a single energy market, the six countries studied also show considerable differences when it comes to their decarbonisation trajectories (see Table 1). This is highlighted by Renou-Maissant et al. (2022), who find that EU countries present different decarbonisation trajectories over the last decade, influenced by economy, trade, innovation and policy mix. The different energy landscapes mentioned above, combined with the distinct labour and education policies implemented across countries/regions, mean that the experiences of young people entering the labour market vary in each region. This is documented in the literature of school-to-work youth transition regimes that draw a broad categorisation of European countries based on the quality of these regimes (Eurofound, 2014; Hadjivassiliou et al., 2016; see Table 1).

Table 1.

Basic characteristics and clusters of coal regions in Eurozone.

Countries	NUTS2 ID and name	Economic prosperity^a	Decarbonising Employment Potential^b	Coal phase out deadline and transition performance	Energy market share and dominant energy mix	School-to-work youth transition regimes
Germany	DE40 [Brandenburg]	Transition region	High	2038 [poor performer]	Divided in multiple companies [coal and wind]	Employment-centered dual system [secure, mostly smooth, and stable school-to-work transitions based on apprenticeship schemes]
	DEA1 [Düsseldorf]	More developed	High
	DEA2 [Köln]	More developed	High
	DEA3 [Münster]	More developed	Slow
	DEC0 [Saarland]	More developed	Slow
	DED2 [Dresden]	Transition region	High
	DED5 [Leipzig]	More developed	High
	DEE0 [Sachsen-Anhalt]	Transition region	Slow
Greece	EL53 [Western Macedonia]	Less developed	Restricted	2028 [on path to decarbonisation]	Dominated by a single company [gas and wind]	Mediterranean cluster [youth transitions can be prolonged and with uncertain outcomes]
Greece	EL65 [Peloponnisos]	Less developed	High	2028 [on path to decarbonisation]	Dominated by a single company [gas and wind]
Spain	ES12 [Principado de Asturias]	Transition region	High	2025 [on path to decarbonisation]	Divided in multiple companies [gas and wind]
	ES21 [País Vasco]	More developed	(no data)
	ES24 [Aragón]	More developed	High
	ES41 [Castilla y León]	Transition region	High
	ES42 [Castilla-la Mancha]	Less developed	High
Italy	ITG2 [Sardegna]	Less developed	High	2027 [on path to decarbonisation]	Divided in multiple companies [gas and hydropower]
Slovenia	SI03 [Vzhodna Slovenija]	Less developed	High	2033 [on path to decarbonisation]	Dominated by a single company [nuclear power]	Eastern European cluster [lack of secure youth transitions]
Slovakia	SK02 [Západné Slovensko]	Less developed	High	2025 [on path to decarbonisation]	Dominated by a single company [nuclear power]	Eastern European cluster [lack of secure youth transitions]

Source: own elaboration based on Pilati and Hunter (2020), Beyond Fossil Fuels (2024), Kapetaki et al. (2020), Eurostat (2023), IEA (2024), Ritchie and Rosado (2020), Renou-Maissant et al. (2022), Hadjivassiliou et al. (2016), Eurofound (2014).

Regional clustering based on EU Cohesion Policy 2021–2027: More Developed regions - GDP per capita > 90% of the EU average; Transition regions - GDP per capita between 75% and 90% of the EU average; Less Developed regions - GDP per capita < 75% of the EU average.

Decarbonising Employment Potential: results from regional employment in the coal industry, the anticipated development of clean energy technologies and energy efficiency projects.

For its part, the case of WM, which has been the most important energy centre in Greece for almost seventy years and where most lignite mining and power generation activities are concentrated (Krommyda et al., 2022), is in turn examined through primary research. The fieldwork consists of online focus groups and interviews conducted in the lignite phase-out areas of WM. The research participants were approached through chain referral (snowball) sampling (see Table 2).¹¹ Participants’ attitudes towards the energy transition vary depending on their age, gender and profession. The participants in focus group 1, who are representatives of academic and (central and local) government institutions, have very different views on the conditions of the energy transition and its efficiency. Focus group 2 participants and category C interviewees, who are local key informants from the Public Employment Service and local government respectively, focus on employment and development policy and have specific knowledge of the LLR due to their professional position. The interviewees in group interviews 1 and 2 are mainly senior-aged villagers who live near the mines, from which the young and middle-aged residents have largely migrated due to the mining-induced resettlement. Category A interviewees are directly affected by decarbonisation as their jobs are at stake, while the shrinking regional economy also affects Category B interviewees, many of whom have family ties to PPC workers.¹²

Table 2.

Basic details of the fieldwork in WM.

Method	Anonymised coding of participants	Sample	Period of fieldwork
Interviews	A1-A9: Workers in the energy sector (4 subcontractor workers, 5 PPC workers) B1-B10: Residents in the area C1-C6: Local key informants (local government administration and social partners)	25 interviewees [Young: 6, Middle-aged: 15, Senior-aged: 4], [Women: 1]	August 2021
Group Interviews	GI-1: Residents in a village under mining-induced resettlement (wives of retired energy workers)	10 interviewees [Senior-aged: 9, Middle-aged:1] [Women: 6]	June 2022
Group Interviews	GI-2: Residents in a village under mining-induced resettlement (retired male energy workers)	10 interviewees [Senior-aged: 9, Middle-aged:1] [Women: 6]	June 2022
Focus Groups	FG-1: Government and Academia stakeholders	15 participants [Middle-aged: all], [Women: 4]	June 2021 & November 2021
Focus Groups	FG-2: Employment Consultants located in WM	15 participants [Middle-aged: all], [Women: 4]	June 2021 & November 2021

Source: authors’ elaboration.s

The research outlined above is subject to certain limitations. Snowball sampling can lead to selection bias (Schuster et al., 2023). Despite efforts to the contrary the sample is not diverse in terms of sex and age, although this reflects actual inequalities within the workforce, particularly the underrepresentation of young people and women. Also, the fieldwork results are interpreted within a spatio-temporally constrained context, i.e., amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, shortly after a prolonged lockdown (from November 2020 to May 2021), and the initial phase of decarbonisation in Greece.

Youth in the labour markets of eurozone coal regions

Cross-regional analysis: emerging patterns

Most coal regions in the Eurozone show a diachronic overconcentration of GVA from mining and energy production, reflecting the importance of coal in their regional economies (see Figure 3). However, following the 2008/09 Global Crisis, sectoral GVA contracted in most regions, particularly in Düsseldorf and Sardegna (losses of over 20%; see Table 3). In contrast, the Greek and Slovenian coal regions recorded significant growth in sectoral GVA of over 40%. This trend can be attributed to the structure of their energy markets, as in the latter cases the market is dominated by a single vertically integrated company that acted as an economic safety net (IESEE, 2020; Eurostat, 2023). In the recovery phase (2015–2018) that followed the Great Recession, most coal regions recorded an upturn in sectoral GVA, with Münster recording the largest increase (over 40%); in contrast, WM stood out with losses of around 25%, followed by Západné Slovensko with 10%, indicating the onset of the delayed economic effects of the Great Recession (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020). During the pandemic crisis (2019-2020), sectoral GVA fell again in most coal regions, with WM recording the sharpest decline (over 20%). As expected, with few exceptions (i.e., País Vasco, Sardegna, and Západné Slovensko), the majority of coal regions exhibit a diachronic overconcentration of fixed capital investments related to mining and energy production (GFCF). Interestingly, however, the changes in sectoral investments during the Great Recession varied significantly, suggesting that decarbonisation trajectories manifested at a different time in each region/country, a process that dates back to Decision, 2010/787/ EU to support the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. Indicatively, Západné Slovensko, Peloponnisos, Düsseldorf, and WM recorded great losses; in contrast, Sardegna recorded a 270% increase, due to the policy-driven significant investments in wind and photovoltaic farms in the early 2010s (Osti, 2018).¹³ In the following period (2015–2018), Münster stood out with an 80% increase, earning the title of the first fossil-free German city (Fossil Free, 2015). Despite the pandemic crisis (2019-2020), many German coal regions in particular recorded an increase in sectoral GFCF; indicatively, Dresden recorded an increase of 50% and Brandenburg over 25%. This is mainly attributed to investments in RE technologies (Renou-Maissant et al., 2022). Overall, Germany stands out from the other Eurozone countries with an increase in sectoral GVA and investments. However, although it has the profile of a pioneer of the energy transition, especially after the cessation of coal subsidies in 2007, it is still dependent on coal (WRI, 2021; Renou-Maissant et al., 2022). In the remaining Eurozone countries, fixed capital investments in energy production and/or mining have decreased, probably due to the fact that they are struggling to decarbonise their energy sector in an already disadvantaged economic environment (Renou-Maissant et al., 2022), as most of them are peripheral economies struggling with debt (e.g., Italy, Greece and Spain) (Botta and Tippet, 2022). All the above are also reflected in employment in mining and energy production, as most coal regions show overconcentration, with WM and Principado de Asturias consistently standing out. Again, the Great Recession has led to a decline in employment in these sectors in many coal regions (as well as in the EU as a whole), but many others have deviated (e.g., Sardegna recorded a 25% increase due to RE projects; Osti, 2018). A similar differentiation between the Eurozone coal regions continued in the subsequent period (2015–2018), with some German coal regions such as Sachsen-Anhalt and Münster losing 50% of their sectoral employment, while Sardegna and Castilla-La Mancha recorded an increase of around 50% and 30% respectively. Apart from the abandonment of coal mining (i.e., many coal mines were closed in Germany from 2014 to 2017; Alves Dias et al., 2018), employment losses can also be attributed to the decline in other mining activities. In 2016, for example, the oil company BP announced redundancies throughout North Rhine-Westphalia (i.e., West Germany, including Münster) due to falling oil prices (see Eurofound, 2016). On the contrary, although coal production in Sardegna and Castilla-La Mancha ceased in the same period, leading to a decline in mining jobs (Kapetaki et al., 2021), jobs in electricity generation, which are also related to grid expansion to accommodate RE projects, have increased (Osti, 2018). For most German coal regions and País Vasco, the downward trend reversed in the period 2019–2022, while Západné Slovensko, WM and Vzhodna Slovenija recorded significant losses. The former trends are attributed to the expansion of the RE industry, especially after COVID-19 (see e.g., Kurmayer, 2024), while the latter trends point to the challenges of decarbonising the energy sector in coal regions where economic diversification has not yet been achieved. As a result, this decline is linked to decarbonisation plans such as the layoff of miners in Západné Slovensko and the voluntary redundancy programme initiated by PPC in WM (see Eurofound, 2021, 2022; European Commission, 2023a).

Table 3.

Change of GVA, GFCF, employment, young population, NEETs, and youth employment, Eurozone coal regions, 2009–2022.

NUTS ID	GVA (sectors B, D, E)				GFCF (sectors B, D, E)				Young Population				ΝΕΕΤs				Employment (sectors B, D)				Youth Employment (all sectors)
NUTS ID	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2020	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2020	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2022	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2022	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2022	2009–2014	2015–2018	2019–2020	2009–2022
DE	−2.56%	21.10%	−0.35%	25.99%	16.33%	15.96%	7.21%	57.74%	−4.28%	1.17%	−4.07%	−7.81%	−26.95%	−5.98%	8.55%	−30.45%	−3.64%	−7.14%	10.97%	−0.60%	−1.56%	2.99%	0.47%	2.89%
DE40	10.09%	27.76%	−2.88%	46.72%	30.78%	19.83%	25.83%	84.51%	−22.66%	−4.38%	−2.35%	−31.10%	−38.82%	−7.52%	−1.28%	−57.12%	3.84%	4.12%	24.76%	11.79%	−21.55%	−25.73%	−31.43%	−63.27%
DEA1	−25.03%	23.37%	−4.22%	−8.00%	−43.23%	10.06%	8.38%	−21.36%	−2.72%	2.19%	−3.91%	−4.98%	−18.16%	−2.42%	0.66%	−24.21%	−13.18%	−20.84%	21.57%	−24.65%	2.05%	6.17%	5.88%	15.44%
DEA2	14.55%	13.63%	−2.74%	35.68%	46.03%	−12.16%	16.01%	31.24%	−0.99%	2.67%	−3.48%	−1.16%	−23.45%	−8.24%	10.34%	−26.87%	−12.55%	−16.14%	2.50%	−15.20%	1.07%	5.86%	−20.44%	−9.43%
DEA3	−15.88%	42.45%	3.79%	23.75%	−19.55%	80.35%	12.45%	24.75%	−1.19%	1.14%	−4.03%	−5.14%	−22.53%	−4.44%	20.74%	−22.53%	−16.15%	−47.03%	27.58%	−46.07%	2.70%	7.66%	−50.36%	−43.18%
DEC0	−0.21%	−4.78%	−9.26%	−12.42%	26.48%	−13.33%	−7.96%	44.34%	−6.29%	−1.41%	−5.59%	−15.09%	−18.75%	−18.60%	:	:	:	:	:	:	−36.02%	−30.10%	:	:
DED2	7.34%	21.30%	−3.66%	41.55%	−31.53%	−4.54%	50.56%	5.40%	−18.29%	−6.56%	−4.61%	−30.63%	−40.21%	−18.54%	:	:	16.77%	29.48%	:	:	−18.43%	−42.15%	:	:
DED5	−2.75%	25.00%	−0.04%	14.79%	26.21%	21.68%	−5.70%	60.36%	:	1.98%	−1.73%	:	:	−27.88%	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	−33.52%	:	:
DEE0	9.35%	22.30%	−0.04%	45.89%	17.51%	1.39%	10.76%	48.46%	−22.01%	−5.63%	−5.90%	−35.30%	−36.75%	−27.13%	9.96%	−55.12%	14.39%	−47.58%	−12.82%	−18.06%	−21.71%	−30.54%	−33.26%	−65.17%
EL	1.02%	−1.14%	0.96%	−0.25%	−17.60%	−5.03%	−1.52%	−10.13%	−15.67%	−2.96%	−5.21%	−24.74%	41.63%	−21.49%	−17.52%	−27.10%	−9.38%	13.76%	5.89%	3.65%	−44.89%	2.03%	6.29%	−37.14%
EL53	45.94%	−24.77%	−22.78%	−38.33%	−42.47%	−34.46%	−32.08%	−68.41%	−12.42%	−4.69%	−8.21%	−26.05%	36.05%	−0.84%	−31.78%	−15.12%	−21.97%	10.79%	−37.46%	−45.78%	−39.71%	−17.37%	24.56%	−41.54%
EL65	39.93%	16.38%	8.00%	115.55%	−44.62%	18.20%	5.14%	11.57%	−13.61%	−5.01%	−6.25%	−25.77%	36.95%	−30.12%	−27.52%	−46.80%	20.66%	−15.39%	:	:	−37.49%	−2.67%	35.81%	−30.49%
ES	7.06%	9.73%	−6.57%	15.25%	−12.26%	−5.43%	−11.55%	−29.21%	−15.73%	−1.06%	4.01%	−13.79%	−12.34%	−21.97%	−11.35%	−44.98%	0.59%	−9.66%	−1.93%	−3.02%	−37.14%	11.90%	5.37%	−23.15%
ES12	−4.89%	3.73%	−8.75%	−6.80%	−14.18%	−48.68%	6.67%	−44.78%	−20.37%	−7.32%	0.68%	−29.06%	−18.21%	−19.21%	−22.28%	−46.05%	−9.85%	−5.53%	−22.73%	−40.67%	−41.27%	−11.93%	−2.37%	−50.65%
ES21	18.25%	−6.58%	−2.64%	11.30%	21.13%	12.01%	3.94%	−8.56%	−17.63%	0.86%	6.84%	−10.58%	−13.26%	−35.47%	6.67%	−40.87%	25.23%	−15.69%	47.06%	9.57%	−41.53%	17.68%	13.26%	−20.09%
ES24	−1.55%	0.79%	−5.47%	−8.33%	−10.44%	3.24%	1.04%	7.26%	−15.92%	−3.23%	3.75%	−15.97%	0.00%	−33.23%	−11.82%	−49.08%	1.17%	−13.38%	−17.15%	−9.35%	−37.91%	13.94%	4.21%	−21.32%
ES41	−0.54%	−0.23%	−10.28%	−12.71%	−23.61%	−4.74%	−25.68%	−45.01%	−17.25%	−6.69%	0.03%	−25.62%	−10.68%	−24.38%	−4.21%	−48.15%	−9.90%	−13.54%	−8.88%	−40.75%	−39.38%	6.79%	−3.95%	−36.72%
ES42	10.02%	6.24%	−9.22%	4.57%	−30.28%	:	−2.47%	−26.67%	−14.24%	−5.47%	1.83%	−19.94%	−4.46%	−32.51%	−15.16%	−50.12%	−18.48%	30.90%	1.20%	8.32%	−43.50%	15.92%	4.53%	−32.49%
IT	4.61%	11.24%	−1.10%	13.82%	−21.95%	23.97%	−12.82%	−18.35%	−0.88%	−1.03%	−2.45%	−6.11%	26.69%	−9.89%	−16.51%	−12.97%	−0.36%	−9.46%	8.44%	1.78%	−22.56%	6.87%	2.93%	−12.55%
ITG2	−21.74%	−9.02%	−9.43%	−20.55%	270.40%	−16.92%	−3.03%	197.44%	−9.98%	−4.62%	−7.23%	−24.22%	12.66%	−16.97%	−28.34%	−40.63%	24.78%	49.93%	28.25%	−0.08%	−28.48%	4.60%	−4.77%	−29.22%
SI	7.52%	3.46%	6.54%	25.89%	−3.10%	10.46%	−0.20%	−21.04%	−12.45%	−7.00%	−0.36%	−21.81%	21.25%	−33.41%	−3.68%	−28.61%	16.50%	−8.23%	−22.64%	−9.62%	−26.96%	5.87%	−9.83%	−29.06%
SI03	5.71%	0.55%	5.93%	18.35%	52.26%	−0.11%	0.74%	−12.05%	−15.06%	−8.14%	−1.85%	−27.03%	:	−34.02%	−10.76%	:	6.89%	−4.60%	−28.46%	−16.25%	:	4.13%	−10.00%	−28.57%
SK	−7.99%	−8.01%	1.08%	5.83%	−0.87%	−41.82%	−12.62%	−28.54%	−12.00%	−8.85%	−8.55%	−30.87%	−7.43%	−22.63%	−22.42%	−50.83%	−13.42%	15.35%	−10.59%	−19.02%	−14.78%	−0.90%	−13.09%	−27.56%
SK02	−8.02%	−10.48%	−0.07%	2.24%	−74.83%	−45.38%	20.48%	−79.10%	−14.22%	−10.65%	−9.82%	−35.71%	−12.74%	−30.97%	−14.71%	−58.90%	−13.29%	0.14%	−41.37%	−44.76%	−16.04%	0.78%	−58.39%	−66.06%
EU27	7.07%	7.37%	−0.82%	17.79%	8.85%	4.91%	−3.96%	13.93%	−6.50%	−5.95%	−4.17%	−12.14%	−1.40%	−6.87%	−17.50%	−30.67%	−4.97%	−3.63%	1.18%	−8.50%	−12.16%	4.10%	0.35%	−8.21%

Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Eurostat.

The limited role of young people in the above-mentioned coal regions is verified here by particularly low LQ values for total youth employment, with some German regions showing values as low as 0.50. Absolute numbers fell sharply in most study regions during the Great Recession (2009–2014) and partially recovered in the subsequent period (2015–2018), with the exception of some coal regions in Germany such as Brandenburg, Saarland, Dresden and Leipzig, which recorded steady and significant losses. During the pandemic crisis (2019–2022), there were different trends in youth employment in the coal regions. For example, Západné Slovensko in Slovenia and Münster in Germany recorded losses of over 50%, while the Greek regions recorded a significant increase of around 30%. In Germany, the declining trends are due to the fact that most apprenticeship schemes (which maintain the country's dual training system) were discontinued during the lockdowns (Kinkartz, 2021), while young people in Slovenia faced unemployment and precarious employment (European Commission, 2023a). In Greece, the ‘Special Transitional Program 2020–2023 for a Just Transition in Greek coal regions’ was enacted by subsidising companies for short-term jobs, targeting former coal workers and up to 2000 people aged 18–29, while counselling and training programmes were set up for those affected by decarbonisation (Public Employment Service, 2023). However, the development of youth employment in the period 2009–2022 provides a clear picture, as almost all coal regions in the Eurozone recorded significant losses, well above the corresponding decline in the EU. The exception of Düsseldorf (15.4%) is due to its well-established, diversified and innovative economy (Iotzov and Gauk, 2020) and the implementation of initiatives such as the ‘Cooperative Training at Coal Sites – Training in Mining Regions for Young People’ in North Rhine-Westphalia, which started in 2008 and is based on apprenticeship schemes and in-company training programmes (Wuppertal Institute, 2022). Another interesting case is Brandenburg, where sectoral employment increased by 12% between 2009 and 2022, while youth employment decreased by 63%. This could be related to the fact that the German coal industry (especially in Brandenburg, Düsseldorf and Köln) has a high ratio of indirect to direct jobs, with most indirect jobs being created outside of the region (Mandras and Salotti, 2021). Hence, this trend suggests that sectoral employment increase does not lead to more opportunities for young people or the creation of indirect jobs locally. Apart from low youth employment rates, most coal regions show a persistently high concentration of NEETs, with Düsseldorf and Sachsen-Anhalt in Germany and WM in Greece standing out (see Figure 2), although youth disengagement has decreased from 2009 to 2022 (see Table 3). In Greece and Italy in particular, the number of NEETs increased significantly during the Great Recession (2009–2014). During the period of anaemic recovery (2015–2018), the phenomenon was (relatively) brought under control almost everywhere, and the downward trend continued in the subsequent period (2019–2022). Paradoxically, there was a sharp increase in youth disengagement in the German coal regions, which is due to the interruption of apprenticeship programmes (Kinkartz, 2021). The declining NEET figures should indicate the positive effects of subsidised employment programmes. However, in conjunction with the declining figures for youth employment, this indicates an expansion of precarious employment (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020; European Commission, 2022a). Particularly in Mediterranean countries, which have segmented labour markets with high entrance barriers, the relevant policies promote greater labour market flexibility as a remedy (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2016). Furthermore, the above should be seen in the context of an overall declining youth population. In particular, almost all coal regions in the Eurozone showed consistently low concentrations, with only the regions of North Rhine-Westphalia (i.e., Düsseldorf, Köln, Münster), Castilla-la Mancha and Sardegna close to their respective national rates. The outflow of young people can be traced particularly during the Great Recession (2009–2014), when some regions (e.g., Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Principado de Asturias) lost more than 20% of their young population.

For the Greek region of WM in particular, as one of the most coal-dependent regions, the Great Recession (2009–2014) had a significant impact on sector-specific investment and employment, although the sectoral GVA increased significantly, suggesting that power generation provided some temporary economic resilience (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020). However, in the following period (2015–2018), the regional economy began a sharp decline that continued after 2019. This is directly related to the privatisation of PPC as a means to meet the requirements of a common energy market, a process that has profoundly changed the material conditions of coal mining and coal-based energy production (Vetta, 2022). Overall, WM lost more than 45% of its mining and power generation jobs in the period 2009–2022, with accelerated decarbonisation plans leading to large-scale layoffs (e.g., Eurofound, 2021). In terms of young people, WM has similar characteristics to most other coal regions: They are significantly underrepresented in the labour force, are often unemployed or not in education/training, and often migrate.

A qualitative approach to the LLR of WM

The secondary analysis has shown that WM is an outlier among Eurozone coal regions, as its economy and labour market are highly dependent on mining and energy production and thus its dependence on PPC is significant. WM is not only part of a country considered peripheral to the euro area (Botta and Tippet, 2022; European Commission, 2023b), but is also a geographically isolated border region characterised by mountainous terrain and inefficient transport infrastructure (European Commission, 2022b). Greece is dependent on WM as an important hub for meeting its national energy needs from lignite (IPTO, 2024). Historically, this can be traced back to the 1970s, when WM's mines supported the gradual electrification of Greece (PPC, 2010a) and the regional economy transitioned from agriculture to industrialisation. As a result, PPC has been the main employer in WM for decades and is still often referred to by locals as ‘mama-PPC’, as they consider this (formerly public) company to be their main socio-economic pillar (A5, subcontractor energy worker; A7, young woman, energy worker; GI-1; GI-2). Proof of this are the social benefits that PPC has been obliged to offer to local communities. These include a special tax of 0.5% of PPC's annual turnover to cover local needs (IEA, 2023), the development of an affordable district heating system (Just Transition Development Plan Government Committee, 2021), and substantial financial compensation for land expropriation (PPC, 2010b). More importantly, many PPC workers have gained considerable wealth through high wages in the 1980s (Α2, former subcontractor worker; see also Kovatsi, 2020). However, people who witnessed this period first-hand emphasise that this was only able due to long-term union struggles and that a side effect of PPC's high wages was socio-economic inequalities and intra-class tensions, as other workers in the labour market were not paid equally (GI-2). This is still evident as there is a significant wage gap of more than 1000 euros between permanent and temporary workers in the regional power generation sector (Krommyda et al., 2024). This type of inequality has disrupted social cohesion and segmented the regional labour market into those who work for PPC (permanent employees) on fair terms and those who work for PPC's subcontractors on poor terms (A3, subcontractor worker; Vetta, 2022; Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020). The above illustrate how PPC's monopolistic dominance during the lignite era shaped the power dynamics within WM's LLR as a whole. After 2005, the peak of lignite production (PPC, n.d.), the region entered a critical phase that was directly influenced by significant changes in energy policy at EU and national level (FG-1). Especially after 2010, lignite began to lose its comparative advantage. As indebted countries such as Greece increased the denomination risk of the Eurozone, economic adjustment programmes were enacted, which included reforms of the energy sector (Ioannidis, 2022; Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2023). This led to disinvestment in PPC (as evidenced by the sharp decline in GFCF), a process that coincided with high carbon prices and EU pressure on Greece to reduce ‘monopolistic access to’ lignite through PPC (Hadjimichalis, 2017; European Commission, 2021; Vetta, 2022). As a result, shortly after the 2008/09 crisis, PPC undertook a major reorganisation, cutting both temporary and permanent jobs and reducing wages (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020; IESEE, 2020). As part of its cost-cutting measures, PPC has resorted to outsourcing, a practise that, according to many interviewees, has resulted in the majority of energy workers in the region being employed by PPC subcontractors (Α5, subcontractor worker; Α1, subcontractor worker; GI-1; GI-2; see also Vetta, 2022). Locally, it is widely recognised that these workers work under exploitative conditions, such as low wages, fixed-term contracts and limited social benefits, and that they have minimal union representation and little bargaining power (C6, former mayor; Α5, subcontractor worker; PLAS, 2020).

In such a highly fragmented LLR and influenced by an intergenerational imagery that PPC offers the path to a prosperous future, local young people have been shaping their life plans in terms of education and training for decades (B3, young university student; GI-1; Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020; PLAS, 2020). Indicatively, the educational level of most workers in the region is upper secondary/post-secondary (almost 53% of the labour force in 2022), while the share of those with tertiary education is gradually increasing (30% in 2022; ELSTAT, 2023a). However, many of those who returned to WM after their studies ‘remained either inactive or underemployed, or worked in temporary PPC jobs for two or eight months’ (C4, municipal counsellor). Indeed, youth unemployment in the region peaked at 62% in 2013 and fell to 34% by 2022. This rate remains one of the highest in the country and is consistently 10–15% higher than the respective national rates. Similarly, the NEET rate also peaked at 36% in 2013 and fell to 20% by 2022. The LLR imbalance is also illustrated by the fact that PPC, the largest employer in WM, reported in 2021 that more than half of its employees are over 50 years old (52.58%), 47.14% are between 30 and 50 years old, and only 13.63% are women (PPC, 2021). Against this backdrop, youth employment policies such as the Youth Guarantee Initiative have not facilitated labour market entry, while their top-down design and implementation has prevented effective adaptation to local conditions and needs (Petkovic and Williamson, 2015). This is also highlighted by the Public Service Employment Consultants, who point out that the subsidised employment programmes have not created permanent and decent jobs, but rather reproduce existing precarity (FG-2). In WM, this precarity relates to temporary work (almost 22% of the workforce in 2022) and self-employment (almost 27%), both of which exceed national figures by almost 8% each (ELSTAT, 2023a). Field research has shown that many young people, especially after the Great Recession, were dependent on precarious temporary jobs and became unemployed for short periods of time while trying to find temporary employment with PPC (C4, municipal counsellor; FG-2). This back and forth between unemployment and temporary jobs was often only possible thanks to the support of their family (B2, senior-aged resident; PLAS, 2020). Many parents are deeply concerned about their children's future prospects and either try to keep them at WM by providing them with the necessary financial support (A9, senior-aged PPC worker) or, those with a more pragmatic attitude, favour migration (PLAS, 2020). As recession and stagnation limit employment opportunities for young people, many find it difficult to stay in the region (Α5, subcontractor energy worker; B3, young university student; GI-2), resulting in a shrinking young population, as noted in the previous section (see Table 3).

In fact, this situation deteriorated further after 2020, when decarbonisation efforts coincided with the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the president of one of the largest unions in the region, even highly-educated people are struggling to find a job (A9, senior-aged PPC worker). Most job offers in the energy industry are related to construction activities for RE plants (FG-2), which amount to temporary employment of less than 3 years (B6, young resident/entrepreneur; B8, young engineer). This lack of long-term perspective is illustrated by the recent case of the construction of a large photovoltaic park near Kozani, where a maximum of 150 jobs were to be created for locals, but for no longer than 18 months (ELPE Renewables, 2020). Added to this is the high fluidity of the entrepreneurial environment in WM (PLAS, 2020), which emphasises the difficult decision to migrate as the most viable coping strategy (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020; PLAS, 2020). Overall, two fundamental factors hinder the integration of young people into the changing LLR, namely the skills mismatch (many of the highly skilled/educated people only have access to low-quality jobs) and limited future employment prospects (due to low wages), which hinder family planning (PLAS, 2020). During this period, top-down policies were developed and combined targets (e.g., gas as an intermediate fuel, diversification of the economy, digital transformation) were set for the energy transition and the pandemic (see Just Transition Development Plan Government Committee, 2021; Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023; National Recovery and Resilience Plan, 2023). However, the lack of social dialogue and excessive support for large companies instead of small and medium-sized enterprises (WWF, 2021) led to frustration and strong reactions from local communities (C6, former mayor; Pantelia, 2022; Eurofound, 2023). As the number of energy communities increased significantly in 2021 and 2022 (see Figure 4), a more community-led approach to energy production and consumption seemed to emerge. However, due to limited grid capacity and the prioritisation of large private RE investments (Ecopress, 2023), it has failed to create jobs and economic opportunities for local people. Furthermore, RE investments only relate to the construction of RE parks, while the upstream labour of the RE supply chain is located elsewhere, so local demand for labour is low (see also Kapetaki et al., 2020). This construction-driven turn to RE projects is also mentioned by our interviewees (B6, young resident/entrepreneur), while Figure 4 shows this dynamic (production licenses for RE projects increased from 17 [2015–2019] to 459 [2020–2023]; RAE, 2023). This surge in large-scale RE investments worries locals and local government representatives, as they cannot compensate for all employment and income losses in the region (C2, mayor; GI-1; GI-2).

Apart from the energy industry, employment in the primary sector has always been a common alternative for young people who did not want to leave their homeland. Indicatively, WM produced almost 70% of the national production value of rye and wheat in 2021 (ELSTAT, 2023b). However, according to locals trying to gain a foothold in this sector, the lack of start-up capital remains an insurmountable obstacle to entering viable commercial agriculture and livestock farming (A7, young female energy worker). Consequently, only those whose parents are employed in PPC or retired — and thus have economic stability — can explore these options, perpetuating the inequality of opportunity for young people (A7, young female energy worker). To overcome these barriers, recent ventures are mostly small-scale and relate to ‘beekeeping, growing walnut and almond trees or even cherry cultivation’ (A6, engineer subcontractor worker). Nevertheless, most of them cannot economically support an individual or a household (A6, engineer subcontractor worker). The expansion of informal labour and occasional cash-in-hand work in the primary sector (by 22% from 2009 to 2020; ELSTAT, 2022) is a direct consequence of this.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the recent geopolitical crisis have exacerbated the uncertainty that individuals face when entering the labour market. As has been analysed in depth in recent literature, global energy supply networks have been disrupted, leading to significant fluctuations in energy prices (Su et al., 2022; PPC, 2023). In Greece and WM, this has increased competition between imported fuels and domestic lignite (A9, senior-aged PPC worker; FG-1), raised concerns about increasing dependence on fuel imports (FG-1; A5, subcontractor energy worker), hindered the realisation of investments in the energy sector (PPC, 2023), and led to widespread energy poverty (C3, regional counsellor; PPC, 2023). In fact, WM was already particularly vulnerable to energy poverty before the pandemic, as the local population had a lower disposable income, a higher risk of poverty, and a higher annual energy consumption than the other Greek regions (Boemi et al., 2017). Given the turbulent energy landscape and unfulfilled aspirations for economic diversification, there is a recognised need to provide training and reskilling opportunities for the workforce (Just Transition Development Plan Government Committee, 2021). However, Employment Consultants emphasise a lack of coherence in employment policy, which even affects their own work in advising the unemployed (FG-2). This is related to the fact that the skills currently required for construction-related jobs in RE projects are already present in the local workforce, which means that the short-term need for reskilling is low (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2020). In the long term, however, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (2020) assumes that there will be a need for highly skilled labour and that almost half of the current workforce will need to be retrained. This is also in line with the objectives of the Digital Transformation Strategy for the Just Development Transition (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2021) (i.e., digital innovation and entrepreneurship, digitisation of communities and digital skills development), which prioritise young people. However, although the green transition emphasises the importance of youth-focused retraining and entrepreneurship programmes (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2021; ILO, 2023), only 2% of the Just Transition Fund is allocated to initiatives targeting this specific group (Krithari, 2023). Furthermore, the insufficient and short-sighted planning of decarbonisation has left the regional economy unprotected, as many participants of FG-1 highlighted (FG-1; FG-2; C2, mayor).

Discussion: emerging landscape of youth precarity in ex-coal regions

Delving deeper into the findings, we assert that the performance of coal regions in the Eurozone varies according to national path dependencies, overall productive prospects and the variatingdecarbonisation trajectories. Despite these differences, most coal regions suffer from the out-migration of young people, making it difficult to implement measures to reskill and upskill their shrinking and ageing labour force. In this context, WM is a compelling case study that highlights the main challenges faced by peripheral coal regions.

Specifically, the cross-regional comparison offered insights into the heterogeneous effects of decarbonisation in coal regions that share a common macroeconomic and energy policy perspective. However, the differences in development and (uneven) power dynamics, exacerbated by the Great Recession and the pandemic, highlight the varying degrees of vulnerability to the restructuring of the energy sector (Bouzarovski, 2022; Loewen, 2022). German coal regions in particular, with their rich history in the coal and steel industry, benefit from long-standing restructuring policies and subsidies that make Germany a leading nation in promoting RE initiatives (WRI, 2021; Krommyda et al., 2022; Loewen, 2022). Specifically, North Rhine-Westphalia has developed into a knowledge-based economy with strong innovation and economic diversification (Harrahill and Douglas, 2019; Iotzov and Gauk, 2020), which has led to higher youth employment and lower youth out-migration. This is particularly true for Düsseldorf. Nevertheless, Germany is considered a poor example of a coal phase-out, as its efforts to reduce emissions and meet climate objectives have been hampered by the low cost of coal and high carbon prices (Renou-Maissant et al., 2022). For their part, Spanish mining companies were severely affected by the 2008/09 Global Crisis and many went bankrupt or were liquidated (Spanish Ministry for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge, 2023). This downturn is reflected in the overall decline in investment and employment in the sector, except for regions such as País Vasco, which diversified their electricity generation sources early on; see Basque Energy Agency, n.d.). With the cessation of mining activities, regions such as Aragón became major players in the wind energy supply chain in the EU (Almond, 2023; Kapetaki et al., 2020). Similarly, electricity companies in Sardegna, Italy, also turned to RE in the early 2010s, albeit meeting strong opposition from coal miners (BBC, 2012) and persistent structural problems such as poor connectivity to the central Italian electricity grid (OECD, 2019). As for Slovakia, its coal region Západné Slovensko was hit hard by the recessionary 2010s particularly in terms of energy-related investments, and has recently entered an energy transition phase after a long period of subsidising coal (Karatayev et al., 2023). On the contrary, Vzhodna Slovenija in Slovenia has not been as severely affected in economic terms, but sectoral employment has declined significantly in the period 2019–2022. This could be related to the overall macroeconomic stability Slovenia has shown, although progress in the energy transition is still limited (European Commission, 2023a; Todorović, 2024). As for Greece, WM showed temporary economic resilience during the 2008/09 Global Crisis due to PPC's dominant position in the energy market, but retreated into long-term disinvestment after 2010 due to austerity measures, leading to a sharp decline in employment in the energy sector. WM has been particularly affected by decarbonisation due to low economic diversification and the paternalistic relationship between the state as represented by PPC, and local communities, which has hindered alternative employment prospects. In addition, the RE industry has not yet introduced new value chains, and the temporary construction-related jobs associated with the development of RE sites have not effectively replaced the lost coal-related jobs.

Despite the considerable differences between coal regions in the Eurozone and the overall gap between developed countries like Germany and underdeveloped ones in Southern and Eastern Europe, a common feature is the low level of youth employment and the significant decline of young population. Remarkably, almost 10 of the 18 coal regions lost more than a quarter of their young population between 2009 and 2022, with the Great Recession playing the main role in this decline. With all regions undergoing decarbonisation in their power sector, the position of young people in the emerging labour markets has become a pressing issue. Until today, they had a limited role in the segmented coal-dependent labour markets (Ruppert Bulmer et al., 2021), which are furthered characterised by class inequality (Vetta, 2022) and insufficient job supply, young people typically relied on their families for economic support, as the example of WM shows. Mainstream narratives assume that the RE industry can improve these precarious labour regimes by creating employment opportunities for young people, who are more familiar with digital technologies, have higher mobility, and are generally more willing to acquire new skills (Alves Dias et al., 2018; Tian et al., 2022). However, new jobs related to the RE industry are often not situated in coal regions (Kapetaki et al., 2020). In the meantime, increasing labour flexibilisation —as in the case of subsidised temporary jobs in WM, Greece, or in Slovenia (European Commission, 2023a)— may boost youth employability in the short term, but it will not solve the long-term problem of youth out-migration (Cedefop, 2019). In other words, increasing precarity for youth cuts across different LLRs and entails a progressive deterioration in the quality of school-to-work transitions (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2016). In this context, the disadvantaged position of young people is reproduced through skills mismatch, persistent barriers to entering the labour market (in several sectors, including agriculture), and uncertain future prospects stemming from job insecurity and low wages. On the contrary, efforts to diversify the economy in coal regions should prioritise retraining and social assistance programmes (Christiaensen and Ferré, 2020) as well as access to quality employment opportunities to shape the future prospects for young people.

Ultimately, we emphasise the validity of theorising decarbonisation as an emerging socio-ecological fix that temporarily remedies the accumulation crisis by investing in green energy, while exacerbating power asymmetries and socio-spatial inequalities. Mainstream efforts to tackle climate change through globalised RE value chains that maintain capital accumulation without the need for systemic change, are at odds with the dominance of vertically integrated coal companies in regional economies to date. As outlined above, this transition is driven by energy market liberalisation strategies, national and regional path dependencies and economic competitiveness based on regional inequalities (Loewen, 2022). In essence, a new socio-ecological fix is emerging, building on pre-existing inequalities and shifting the already polarised LLRs of coal regions towards more flexible accumulation processes. Strong inter- and intra-regional power imbalances and ‘cheap labour’ are pervasive inherent characteristics of the new fix (see Moore, 2016; Ekers and Prudham, 2017; Eckersley, 2020; Jeknic and Cop, 2022). This process occurs not only when the sites of coal extraction or the companies that control the process are dismantled, but also when the mechanisms of labour control change. In the case of WM, for instance, the devaluation of labour, particularly through outsourcing and precarisation, was exacerbated after the 2008/09 Global Crisis. Additionally, the adoption of mainstream socio-technical approaches and top-down decision-making processes with a market-orientated approach excludes local communities and especially the youth who have to adapt their lives to these policies, further blurring the incentives to stay in the coal regions. As a result, youth, once a latent labour reservoir for the coal sector, now plays a central but largely untapped role in the evolving RE landscape. This untapped potential is particularly pronounced in regions such as the WM, where RE value chains are nascent and economic diversification remains elusive.

The vulnerability of young people, who are often forced to migrate or suffer persistent precarity in their communities (European Commission, 2022a), emphasises the need for further examination of the injustices associated with the transition to RE, which must also extend to other marginalised populations such as indigenous communities and older people (McCauley et al., 2019). Considering just transition tenets (ILO, 2015; McCauley et al., 2019) can provide a framework for assessing the effectiveness of the energy transition. Specifically, the distributional, procedural and recognition aspects can elucidate current geographical and intergenerational inequalities, decision-making processes, and identities of the groups most affected by the green transition, and improve them in the long run. Ultimately, however, the ways in which new socio-ecological fixes (re)shape LLRs depend on the negotiation between capital and labour. Although these are often characterised by unequal and hegemonic power relations, such dialectical interplay harbours the potential for substantive political transformations and emancipatory outcomes that transcend the boundaries of the sphere of production (Bouzarovski, 2022; Boateng et al., 2023). Exploring this emancipatory potential, especially with regard to the struggles for the future prospects of youth in energy regions during the low-carbon transition, is an important avenue for future research.

Highlights

The paper examines decarbonisation trajectories of Εurozone coal regions in the 2010s using a mixed methods approach focusing on youth

Transitioning from coal to renewables is conceptualised as a socio-ecological fix that builds on business-as-usual approaches and maintains power asymmetries

Cross-regional comparison shows the uneven effects of the successive crises, but a common trend is the marginalisation of youth

Western Macedonia, a periphery of Eurozone that lacks economic diversification, helps to illustrate the particular structural challenges faced by youth

Youth, a latent labour reservoir for the coal sector, plays a pivotal but underutilised role in the changing energy landscape

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Dimitris Psarologos and Akis Kanelleas for their help with data processing, all research participants for their valuable feedback, and the three reviewers whose constructive comments improved the paper significantly.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: this article has been prepared within the framework of the project ‘Collaborative and Sharing Workspaces: Policies for Youth in EEA Peripheral Regions [Cowork4YOUTH]’, which is funded by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the EEA and Norway grants ‘Unlocking Youth Potential’. Part of the first author's research was funded by a PhD scholarship from the Special Account for Research Funding (E.L.K.E.) of the National Technical University of Athens (N.T.U.A.).

ORCID iD

Vasiliki Krommyda

Notes

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