Will failed insurrection lead to terrorism in the United States?

Abstract

The following discussion outlines the attractions of a strategy of terrorism and its implications for political order. It also argues that a body of knowledge has been built up over time that provides a foundation for explaining current events. Research has shown that terrorism can be an effective substitute for the mobilization of large numbers when that mobilization is thwarted. Terrorism can sustain an illusion of power, provoke official over-reaction and community counter-mobilization, and deepen political polarization. Studies also suggest that if a broader movement dissolves, the followers who remain strengthen their commitment and become more inclined to violence. The future threat environment is most likely to be multidimensional, with multiple groups cooperating and competing along with individual actors who perceive themselves to be part of an ideological collectivity.

Keywords

democracy legitimacy right-wing extremism social mobilization terrorism violence

Before 11 September 2001, most American foreign policy makers as well as academic experts in foreign affairs and international relations did not regard international terrorism as a serious threat to US national security (Crenshaw, 2004). Similarly, before 6 January 2021, far right violent extremism was rarely considered to be a noteworthy security risk, much less a profound challenge to domestic law and order and democratic constitutional processes. Now the United States has been surprised again, even though the warning signs of violence from white supremacist, neo-Nazi, accelerationist, militia, and other far right extremist groups were more open than were signs of danger to the American homeland from Al Qaida in the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. As recently as fall 2020, the Department of Homeland Security issued clear warnings about the threat (US Department of Homeland Security, 2020). In the aftermath of the assault on the Capitol, much of the nation’s attention has focused on “why did this happen”—a familiar refrain from the post 9/11 debate (Hoge and Rose, 2001). But another question is equally important. What comes next? The peacefulness of the inauguration of President Joe Biden showed that mob violence can be suppressed with sufficient show of force, but moving forward will public displays of loosely coordinated collective violence be transformed into hardened underground terrorist conspiracies?

The field of what is now known as “terrorism studies” developed incrementally from the 1970s on. The 9/11 attacks and the launching of the global war on terror by the Bush Administration provided a substantial impetus to research and the development of expertise. Over these four decades of accumulating research much has been learned about the conditions under which campaigns of terrorism, a form of concentrated and targeted clandestine political violence, develop after periods of large-scale mobilization and social movement activism (Della Porta, 2013; Wieviorka, 2003). Lessons from past research and experience and comparisons with other manifestations of terrorism can help answer questions about why and how terrorism could result from the thwarted effort to overturn the results of the 2020 US presidential elections. The argument is not that terrorism is a predetermined outcome but that it is a foreseeable possibility for which practitioners and scholars should be prepared. There is still widespread sentiment among members of the Republican Party and far right extremists that the election was “stolen” from former President Trump; as Andrew Kydd (2021: 17) explained in this journal, “The structural conditions predisposing the United States toward political violence may persist for some time.” What would be the likely effects of a turn toward terrorism?

What follows is not intended as a comprehensive assessment of lessons to be learned, but as a guide to older explanations that are pertinent to the present situation. For example, it has been known for decades that domestic terrorism can result from crises of democratic legitimacy that developed gradually over time. Research has shown that terrorism can be an effective substitute for the mobilization of large numbers when that mobilization is thwarted. Technology also advantages otherwise weak non-state actors in conflicts with the state, although the state counters with powerful resources of its own. Terrorism can sustain an illusion of power, provoke official over-reaction and community counter-mobilization, and deepen political polarization. As a tactic, it is compatible with the far right accelerationist strategy of instigating wider social conflict. Studies also suggest that if a broader movement dissolves, the followers who remain strengthen their commitment and become more inclined to violence. Over time terrorism may appear to them as essential to the survival of the group on which they depend for psychological support. Much analysis has focused on individual processes of radicalization, but organized groups are important drivers in shifts to violent extremism. The future threat environment is most likely to be multidimensional, with multiple groups cooperating and competing along with individual actors who perceive themselves to be part of an ideological collectivity. Constantly evolving relationships among groups will complicate the government response. Looking forward, however, some gaps in knowledge persist. In particular, further research is needed to explain the effect of both news media and social media on the development and escalation of terrorism. It will also be critical to find a balance between punitive and conciliatory counterterrorism policies that discourage violence but do not provoke a backlash.

The attractions of terrorism

Terrorism has historically been known as a “weapon of the weak,” a substitute for the mobilization of large numbers of supporters: “Like all violent tactics, terrorism can be interpreted as an effort to create more disruption without mobilizing more people” (De Nardo, 1985: 229). It is improbable that the organizers and instigators behind the January 6 assault will be able to draw such impressive masses of anti-government enthusiasts into the streets again. The circumstances were unusual and unlikely to be repeated—a sitting American president calling on supporters to march on the nation’s legislature, promising to accompany them to prevent the certification of the electoral victory of his opponent. For reasons that are under investigation, security at the Capitol was dangerously inadequate, thus adding opportunity to motive (US Senate, 2021). In addition to the absence of similarly propitious circumstances, casual followers of the movement are likely to be intimidated by the very real prospect of punishment (which seems to have come as a surprise) or disillusioned and chastened by failure. According to the US Department of Justice, by early July 2021, 6 months after the event, 535 individuals had been arrested for their roles in the assault (US Department of Justice, 2021). Three well-known far right groups figure prominently: Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. The chaotic assault on the Capitol and its aftermath may have exceeded the bounds of tolerance of even the most ardent “Stop the Steal” loyalists. Their fervor may dissipate, especially if those elites in power who called for confrontation switch course or are silenced through restrictions on their social media presence. Since there is as of yet no sign of such a shift in attitude, discontent and frustration will likely persist, fed by streams of disinformation and conspiracy theories, such as those propagated online by QAnon.

Terrorism is a tactic well-suited to small numbers because it requires only a modest deployment of effort and resources to achieve a disproportionate psychological and political shock effect. Terrorism has long been defined as a form of violent communication, a way of publicizing a political cause to a watching audience and heavily dependent on news media attention (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). The act itself communicates a message because of its timing, form, location, and target. Terrorism has aptly been described as “theatre” for over four decades (Jenkins, 1975). The concept of “propaganda of the deed” dates from 19th century anarchism, at which time messages were advertised through pamphlets and newspapers. In the 21st century, technology enables instant mass electronic communication, much of it unmediated, thus expanding the terrorist echo chamber and increasing the speed of dissemination of information as well as disinformation (Cronin, 2020). Both mass media and social media make it easier for “weak” actors to advertise a cause. “Propaganda of the deed” can resonate even more.

The January 6 assault can be interpreted as a demonstration of the power of the “Stop the Steal” movement. If demonstrating power was indeed one of the objectives of the groups and individuals responsible for the January 6 attack, then terrorism could be an appealing substitute for such insurrectionary spectaculars. Indiscriminate terrorism against “soft” or civilian targets (which is easier to pull off than more precise terrorist attacks against better-defended or “hard” targets) can deepen insecurity and distrust in government. An immediate uptick in reputation for the perpetrators of such attacks is more important to them than long-term consequences, even if those include alienating the general public. Like riotous assaults on Members of Congress who are carrying out the duties of their offices, terrorist attacks can show that the government cannot protect itself, never mind its citizens.

Terrorism is also potentially advantageous for extremists as a strategy of provocation, a form of costly signaling (Crenshaw, 1978; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Terrorism can serve not only to provoke an over-reaction from the government but also to drive counter-mobilization by opposing groups and communities. It is a divisive and polarizing tactic, pitting “us” against “them” or “the other.” A government response of indiscriminate repression is likely to erode public support and confirm extremist warnings of malign government intentions. Counter-mobilization and resort to violence by targeted groups and communities will fulfill the expectations of many right-wing extremist groups, who seek to incite civil conflict. Atomwaffen, for example, now reorganized as the National Socialist Order, is a neo-Nazi white supremacist group that advocates the “accelerationist” doctrine of working to foment violent revolution and a race war.¹ Hughes and Miller-Idriss (2021) argue that accelerationism is a strategy rather than an ideology, and as such it serves to unite the otherwise fractious and divided US far right. The aim is to destroy the existing liberal-democratic order; what comes after is a matter of conjecture or fantasy. In the view of these scholars, the January 6 assault on the Capitol provided an important impetus and encouragement to accelerationism. Provocative terrorism could fit neatly into such a strategy.

Moreover, in themselves small numbers are not necessarily a tactical disadvantage for challenging the state. They can help solve the problems highlighted by principal-agent theory, problems that stem from the fact that underground groups are torn between the imperatives of maintaining security and controlling violence (Shapiro, 2013). Leaders, or principals, must delegate some authority to lower-level operatives—to local branches of a national organization like Oath Keepers, for example—but the measures required to ensure that orders are carried out expose the organization to the risk of discovery by the authorities. The larger the group and the less disciplined it is, the greater the risk of loss of control from the top as well as susceptibility to infiltration and informants. The moral hazard problem is exacerbated when cadres think that there is little chance of punishment for disobedience. For example, in its formative days, the IRA had a fairly open membership policy, but its leaders discovered that lack of control over targeting impeded effectiveness. Civilian casualties were especially damaging. When the numbers were pared down to a hard core of disciplined members, operations became more discriminating, which was essential to the accomplishment of the IRA’s goals. The problem of informants, however, was never resolved.

Implications of a transition to terrorism/clandestine violence

When a social movement dissipates or is blocked, the true believers who remain are likely to grow even more intolerant, rigid, and inclined to see traitors at every turn. This tendency suggests that the smallest compromise with the Biden agenda will be interpreted as selling out. A noted book by Leon Festinger and his colleagues, When Prophecy Fails, published in 1956, explained how the reaction of an end-of-the-world cult to the abject failure of their predictions was not to alter their beliefs according to the reality in front of them but to reinforce their convictions by proselytizing. Festinger and colleagues argued that this group resolved cognitive dissonance by convincing others to join them in their belief. Other researchers studying a different but similar group found instead that dissonance was resolved by claiming that the original predictions of impending disaster were not wrong: they had only been misinterpreted due to human fallacy (Hardyck and Braden, 1962).² In neither case was the group willing to abandon prior beliefs when challenged by facts. Interestingly, Hardyck and Braden found that increased social support, or the perception of social support, made it unnecessary for the group members to overcome cognitive dissonance by converting others to their beliefs. This finding suggests that there is theoretical support for the supposition that mainstream adherence to the claim that the 2020 election was fraudulent, a claim still advanced by a number of high-profile political figures, will encourage members of violent far right undergrounds.

Among the diehards who remain convinced both that the 2020 election results were falsified and that overthrowing the government by force is morally justified, indeed imperative, militants who are experienced in violence are likely to take the lead. Scholars who analyzed the terrorist groups that emerged in the wake of left-wing, anti-war, and student protests of the late 1960 and 1970s (such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany) pinpointed the role of individuals who had gained experience during increasingly violent protests or who tried to defend themselves from arrest by fighting back (Della Porta, 1992). Violence was an important part of their political socialization and of the radicalization process. It is well known that past white supremacist groups recruited members with military experience. Many of the groups leading the charge at the Capitol are already well acquainted with violent tactics, the Proud Boys being a case in point. The Oath Keepers group attracts individuals with military or police training. Along with various militias, Three Percenters, The Base, The Rise Above Movement, and other far right radicals, these organizations also come to the fight already well-armed. In the past, terrorist groups in democracies usually scrambled to find weapons. Today’s American far right does not face this constraint.

Research has shown that when militant groups move underground under pressure from security forces, compelled to become more clandestine, by necessity cut off from contact with the outside world, they enter a subjective reality, much like a cult (Crenshaw, 1988). They become paranoid about security, trust fewer people, and come to rely on each other for psychological support and reassurance. As underground groups become more cohesive and more tightly structured, their capacity for violence is strengthened. Small groups are also more prone to “group think” and to the acceptance of risk, hence recklessness.

Political scientist Ian Lustick once described certain forms of terrorism as “solipsistic,” meaning that violence was meant to excite, invigorate, and unify the faithful, not so much terrify or intimidate the enemy (Lustick, 1995). Research has also shown that terrorist groups are like other organizations: they want to maintain themselves, which requires action and visibility (Crenshaw, 1985). Over time self-maintenance can become the main goal, eclipsing pursuit of a long-term political objective. Terrorism can be a path to relevance and organizational survival by keeping the conflict alive through tit-for-tat reprisals and demands for vengeance. It can attract both recruits and resources.

In pre-internet days, researchers analyzed the psychology of groups whose members lived in physical proximity, interacting through face-to-face contact, and this circumstance shaped assumptions about small group behavior. In today’s far right and conspiracist world, internal group dynamics are shaped by the medium of the internet. Technology has made it possible for them to communicate remotely through social media and, increasingly, encrypted channels that are difficult for the authorities to monitor. Whether these virtual connections are strong enough to produce the conformity and intense group identification conferred by inter-personal links is a matter of debate. Can individuals be radicalized exclusively through the internet rather than through face-to-face communication? Von Behr et al. (2013) found that the internet provides an “echo chamber” but does not replace the need for individuals to meet in person, but the question remains open.

In addition, recent research into jihadist group internet behavior has shown that extremist groups are well aware of the risks of communicating through open access social media channels (Mitts, 2021). For example, ISIS sympathizers on Twitter responded to government efforts to prevent extremism through public community engagement activities by moving to encrypted channels such as Telegram in order to avoid detection. Individuals engaged in these closed online communications may be at greater risk of radicalization. The fact that many of those arrested for participation in the January 6 Capitol assault were exposed to the authorities due to their social media postings will surely drive similar efforts to reduce public exposure. Whether or not private channels substitute for physical proximity in strengthening identification with and allegiance to the cause, the shift to reliance on Telegram and other encrypted communications reinforces earlier findings that efforts to prevent terrorism can backfire when they force groups underground. Even benign prevention efforts can have this effect.

The contemporary ease of intra-group communication is clearly a two-edged sword for extremist groups of any ideology. Using the open internet can facilitate the cultivation of more extensive networks of supporters, but at the same time it increases the likelihood of distrust and fear of infiltration as well as exposure. Even moving to encrypted channels, it is difficult to know who is genuinely committed, who is just blowing off steam, and who is an informer. The boundaries of groups organized in this fashion tend to be highly porous. Membership is loosely defined. Organizational control is problematic.

Terrorist groups also use the internet to communicate to external audiences with words and symbols as well as images of destruction. Government authorities and private enterprises such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter have responded to online appeals for violence by restricting not only extremists’ ability to communicate with each other but also with their constituencies. There are precedents for suppression. For example, from 1988 to 1994, the United Kingdom banned broadcasting of the voices of leaders not only of a set of violent non-state actors, including the IRA, but the political party Sinn Fein. In addition to Britain, other countries have banned or proscribed particular groups or political parties associated with violent extremism.³ In democracies, such restrictions come up against rules and norms protecting freedom of speech, association, and assembly, so countermeasures that restrict access to communication or outlaw particular groups are predictably contentious. According to the Senate report on Capitol security, one reason for the absence of warning from the FBI and DHS was difficulty distinguishing between the exercise of free speech in social media postings and calls for violence, or incitement (US Senate, 2021). When does discourse constitute a threat? The result of this dilemma is that democracies find it difficult to combat disinformation, much of it deliberately spread by extremist groups, and to dampen recruiting and fund-raising (e.g., through GoFundMe drives). Of course, public postings on social media also make it easier for governments to exercise surveillance. Finding the right policy has proved elusive, and future research should contribute to finding a balance between preserving freedom of speech and preventing violence.

The risk of creating martyrs is another pitfall in the practice of counterterrorism, especially in democracies. The exploitation of the death of Ashli Babbitt in the Capitol takeover is an example (Hughes and Miller-Idriss, 2021). Researchers understand that the framing of death as martyrdom can motivate violence to avenge the death—and revenge is known to be a powerfully strong emotion. Arrests and prison sentences also spark demands for vengeance as well as efforts to free imprisoned colleagues, such as hostage-taking. This is not to say that mob violence should be tolerated out of fear of inspiring terrorism but that governments should be forewarned of possible consequences. Even some mainstream American politicians on the right describe those arrested for participation in the January 6 assault as “political prisoners.”⁴

Previous studies of terrorism in Israel and Northern Ireland, respectively, have shown that extremely punitive policies toward terrorism are more likely to cause backlash than to deter future offenders (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree et al., 2009). That is, harsh measures as opposed to more conciliatory measures were linked to increases rather than decreases in levels of terrorism. These two historical contexts differ from the contemporary American political situation in many ways, but these examples suggest that responses intended to dampen extremist violence may have the unintended consequence of exacerbating the problem. As noted earlier, the extensive social support behind claims such as a stolen 2020 election is likely to increase sensitivity to potential government over-reach, which would only confirm expectations and sustain extremist narratives.⁵ This is another question that further social science research could help answer.

Related to the risk of backlash is the finding that drives for vengeance are consistent with ideologies that emphasize the protection of identity communities perceived to be in peril. For example, the Proud Boys describe themselves as “Western chauvinists,” protecting white (and male) identity threatened by forces of the Black Lives Matter movement, socialists, liberals, feminists, immigrants, Chinese communists, and other selected enemies. This dynamic is common in ethnic or sectarian conflicts such as the Troubles in Northern Ireland, pitting Catholics against Protestants, each community with its armed self-styled defenders, the IRA on one side, Protestant “paramilitaries” on the other. Political polarization may make the US susceptible to sectarian-like conflict as well. As noted earlier, this is an outcome that “accelerationists” deliberately seek.

Analysts and law enforcement agents also need to be aware of the implications of patterns of interaction among multiple groups. The threat environment is shifting and multidimensional. The contemporary American far right universe is much larger and more ideologically diverse than the left-wing or separatist terrorist waves of the 1960s through 1980s. The problem is further complicated by the fact that authorities must be concerned not just with how domestic groups relate to each other but how they are connected to foreign groups. Atomwaffen and the Rise Above Movement, for example, have transnational ties, as does the Russian Imperial Movement. State connections to ostensibly domestic extremist groups are not unprecedented. Some left-wing groups in Western democracies in the earlier generations were connected to foreign governments; Stasi in East Germany, for example, secretly supported the Red Army Faction (Weymouth, 1990).

Leaving aside the issue of state sponsorship, which can be an important source of funding and logistical assistance, research has also shown that alliances with other non-state actors can strengthen a group’s capacity for destructiveness (e.g., Horowitz and Potter, 2014). There appear to be significant differences between inter-group relationships in far-left, nationalist, and Islamist movements and the contemporary far right violent extremist milieu. Cooperative relationships among the former type of groups can usually be defined as alliances, similar to alliances among states. Connections among groups in the right-wing extremist universe tend instead to be loose and informal, involving sometimes sporadic or occasional connections such as joint participation by members at rallies, protests, demonstrations and disruptive events such as the January 6 assault on the US Capitol. Individual members may attend the same training camps or conferences or follow the same websites or social media channels. Although these connections are at the individual level, they are not coincidental but part of the group’s strategy. Such cooperation is not the result of a chance meeting of likeminded adherents to a cause but a deliberate promotion of interaction by leaders that strengthens inter-group ties. One precedent from history is the role of Palestinian training camps in aiding German and Japanese radical left groups in the 1970s. There are also instances of deliberate strategies of cooperation and alliance-building. The Russian Imperial Movement in particular emphasizes networking at conferences and paramilitary training of other groups (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2021). It was a co-founder of the transnational World National Conservative Movement.

Despite this contrast, the differences between organizational evolution and patterns of interaction among groups in different ideological sectors and historical periods should not be exaggerated. The shift to decentralized organization is not necessarily new or unique to the far right. Marc Sageman, for example, has described the jihadist universe as a rather haphazard collection of “bunches of guys” rather than a real alliance involving structured collaboration (Sageman, 2008). Sageman argues that over time Al Qaida and its affiliates became more fluid and unpredictable, thus harder to counter. On the other hand, it is also the case that the American far right pioneered the concept of “leaderless resistance” (Berger, 2019).

But research has shown that the opposite inter-group dynamic is also dangerous. Inter-group rivalries can drive competition to outdo each other in violent tactics, known as outbidding in extremism or competitive escalation (Della Porta, 2013; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Appearing more ruthless and daring than a rival might be considered attractive to funders and recruits and help maintain unity in an otherwise fractious and impatient organization. At a minimum, struggles for power within the far right, white supremacist/nationalist, neo-Nazi milieu would intensify the volatility and unpredictability of the threat.

What researchers call contagion effects constitute another facet of the terrorist threat that the US faces—also a consideration that is scarcely new (Midlarsky et al., 1980a, 1980b; Nacos, 2009). Put simply, terrorist attacks, especially terrorist spectaculars, attract copycat imitators, typically because of media coverage. Contagion through inspiration is more likely when a tactic is relatively easy to implement and the originator and adopter share similar ideological convictions. This trend is related to so-called “lone wolf” terrorism—when individuals act without the direct logistical support of a group. It may not be appropriate to call these terrorists “lone” because they perceive themselves as members of a group or identity community, act in the name of a shared global ideology, and encourage others to follow their example. Over the past decade such a chain of linked or copycat mass-casualty attacks emanating from the far right extended from Norway (2011) to the US (2015 and 2018) to New Zealand (2019) and again to the US (2019). If it becomes harder to coordinate small group violence, inspirational terrorism may become more prevalent, and individual attacks pose more of a problem for prevention than group-organized violence.

Countering the threat of domestic terrorism while preserving democratic institutions, rules, and norms is not unique to the United States or other democracies at this moment in history. There is a long history of scholarly concern with the implications of terrorism from within for liberal democracy (e.g., Furet et al., 1985; Wilkinson, 1977). The United States has had its own experiences with groups like the Order, Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nation, and the militia movement, which resulted in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 25 years ago last spring. It is worth recalling that the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, which killed 168 people, including 19 children, was the deadliest terrorist attack in US history before 9/11. Other well-established democracies have also faced internal threats from radical left, right, and separatist groups—Italy, Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, among others.

Since 9/11, the US has been so preoccupied with the Islamist and jihadist threat that the danger of far right extremist terrorism may have been overlooked. How to react when the terrorists are not “other” but part of us? When they claim to be loyal patriots, not followers of an imported ideology? Decades ago Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak wrote about a “crisis of legitimacy” at the heart of domestic terrorism (Sprinzak, 1990). He pointed to a long and gradual process of delegitimation of governing structures and prevailing social and political norms that precedes the resort to terrorism. The process begins when confidence in existing political institutions is eroded, resulting in challenges to and confrontations with the authorities. Next comes questioning the legitimacy of the entire political system and proposing a new ideological framework as replacement. Disappointment with the results of earlier challenges often precipitates this “conflict of legitimacy.” The culminating crisis stage is reached when extremists believe that the world is divided between “us” and “them,” with all those associated with the existing political order relegated to an existentially threatening “other.” The end result, in Sprinzak’s view, can be extreme radicalization and strategic terrorism. This conceptual framework could be applied to explaining the historical development of the structural conditions that have produced the current state of acute political polarization, instability, and propensity for violence.

Although Sprinzak was writing about the Weathermen of the 1960s, a crisis of the legitimacy of democratic institutions is what the United States faces now. The crisis is real and pervasive but it need not culminate in terrorism. Policy makers must resist demands for massive, rapid, and all-encompassing solutions. What is required is thoughtful and objective consideration of response options in light of the evidence, including accounting for the likelihood of unintended consequences. Actions taken in the immediate aftermath of a systemic shock are often driven more by emotion than by rational calculation (Crenshaw and LaFree, 2017). Once implemented, such quick reaction measures are hard to reverse. The present crisis developed over an extended period of time. It is related to deep societal and political fissures. Resolution will not be quick or easy, but it can be productively informed by applying what is already known about the paths to extremist violence and the consequences of terrorism.

Footnotes

Author’s Note

This analysis originated in my short essay ‘I’ve Studied Terrorism for over Forty Years: Let’s Talk About What Comes Next’, New York Times Opinion, 10 February 2021. . I also want to thank Iris Malone and Gary LaFree for helpful comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Martha Crenshaw is a senior fellow emerita at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and professor emerita in the Department of Government at Wesleyan University. She taught at Wesleyan from 1974 to 2007 and at Stanford from 2007 until 2019. She published her first article on terrorism in 1972. She was a Guggenheim Fellow and is a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. She has served on several committees of the National Academy of Sciences. Recent publications include Countering Terrorism with Gary LaFree (Brookings Institution Press, 2017) and “Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach,” United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks Report, 2020. A collection of her previously published articles can be found in Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences (Routledge, 2011). She is Principal Investigator with NCITE, a Center of Excellence for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security based at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. From 2005 to 2017, she was Principal Investigator with START and DHS Center of Excellence at the University of Maryland. She is also the director of the Mapping Militants Project.

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