Abstract
This article explores how transnational jurisdiction influences cities’ sustainable development in view of providing access to justice in SDG 16. While cities are often regarded as administrative units within a State, effective jurisdictional designs can promote transnational access to justice on city-level, providing efficiency, transparency and predictability, which in turn attracts people, capital and technology required to advance the sustainability objectives embodied in SDG 11. By analysing China's jurisdictional framework, this article examines both general jurisdictional rules and special jurisdictional arrangements that impact cities. The revised monistic approach of the 2023 Civil Procedure Law indirectly affects cities by determining how foreign-related cases are allocated, while special jurisdictional arrangements, such as China International Commercial Courts and local International Commercial Courts, directly strengthen selected cities’ dispute resolution capabilities. Additionally, the evolution of China's centralised jurisdiction system demonstrates the importance of adapting jurisdictional strategies to economic development and judicial expertise.
Introduction
In the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘city’ describes a municipality as being large in size or population or having great status. 1 It is used to describe a certain kind of area where 56% of the world's population (approximately 4.4 billion inhabitants) live, according to the World Bank figures. 2 Cities drive economic growth, provide essential goods and services, and serve administrative purposes, making them fundamental to modernisation and crucial in shaping contemporary society. Consequently, supporting cities’ development has become an important concern for the international community. Therefore, in September 2015 the United Nations General Assembly introduced Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (hereinafter ‘SDGs’); 3 among these, SDG 11 specifically focuses on cities, aiming to ‘make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable’.
How can law support the sustainable development of cities? In fields like environmental or administrative law, the answer is clearer: the former subject might focus on city-level environmental protection, while the latter could address central-local dynamics to foster urban potential. However, for scholars of private international law, the question is more complex. As scholars noted, despite the global recognition of the SDGs, the role of private international law in achieving them remains largely unexplored. 4 Particularly regarding SDG 11, this specific goal appears to have a less direct connection to private international law values due to a ‘mismatch’ of focus. 5 Does this imply that private international law makes no significant contribution to promoting cities’ sustainability?
This article challenges such an implication. Indeed, there is a local-national mismatch when linking private international law to cities, as private international law typically addresses national-level issues such as international jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, whereas cities are hierarchically subordinate units within a State. However, a potential connection emerges when SDG 11 is considered in conjunction with SDG 16, particularly the phrase providing access to justice for all. One of private international law's core functions is facilitating transnational access to justice. Could this be applied at the city level? If so, this could establish a connection between private international law and cities’ sustainable development. To explore this possibility, the article will examine jurisdictional rules in private international law to assess whether they can produce sustainable effects at the city level.
The article is structured as follows. Following Section I, the Introduction, Section II will provide a brief retrospect of the development of cities’ jurisdictions, along with an analysis of the rationale of how jurisdictional regimes support modern cities’ sustainability. After that, to concretise the legal discussion, Sections III and IV will focus on the foreign-related civil and commercial jurisdiction system in Chinese Mainland (hereinafter ‘China’). Section III will introduce China's foreign-related civil jurisdiction system, based on the provisions of the newly amended 2023 Civil Procedure Law (《民事诉讼法》, hereinafter ‘CPL’), and evaluate its indirect influence on facilitating transnational access to justice for cities. Section IV will examine special jurisdictional arrangements at the city level, specifically focusing on the jurisdiction of the China International Commercial Courts (国际商事法庭, hereinafter ‘CICCs’) established by the Supreme People's Court (最高人民法院, hereinafter ‘SPC’) and the centralised jurisdiction systems.
To illustrate the potential connection between private international law and urban development, China serves as an intriguing example. On one hand, since its Reform and Opening Up, China has experienced substantial economic growth, leading to the rise of multiple major metropolises. In 2024, five of the world's 20 most populous cities—Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou—are located in China. 6 On the other hand, alongside this economic expansion, there has been remarkable progress in the rule of law, particularly in private international law and its transnational civil and commercial litigation framework. Analysing the evolution of China's private international law regime (including jurisdictional rules) and the rapid growth of China's cities, offers critical insights into how private international law can facilitate transnational access to justice at the city level. This, in turn, underscores the broader role that legal mechanisms can play in advancing cities’ sustainability.
Rationale: How Transnational Jurisdiction Promotes Cities’ Sustainability
A Retrospect on Functions of Cities’ Jurisdiction
When examining the city-level impact of (transnational) jurisdictional rules, it is essential to recognise that, historically—before the emergence of sovereign States—many European cities exercised independent jurisdiction, distinct from other political entities. By the fourteenth century, Bartolus of Sassoferrato famously declared civitas sibi princeps (‘the city is its own emperor’), asserting the independent jurisdictional authority of city-states and distinguishing their legal autonomy from that of the Holy Roman Emperor. 7 By contrast, cities’ jurisdiction in ancient China was derivative rather than autonomous: cities functioned under the authority of higher sovereign powers and enjoyed much less independency of their own. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770–221 BC), cities were conceived mainly as instruments of military defence and administrative control. Rulers fortified cities with walls to secure their territories, and treated them as administrative units through which to consolidate and extend centralised authority. 8
The emergence of sovereign States progressively curtailed the autonomy that European cities had historically enjoyed. Between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, countries like England, France, Spain, and Portugal gradually coalesced into what we now recognise as modern nation-States 9 —a transition further solidified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established sovereign States as the principal actors in international law. As a result, most cities were transformed from independent political entities into administrative units, effectively surrendering their legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the authority of the State. Exceptions, however, do exist. For instance, under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (一国两制) arrangement, Hong Kong and Macau retain distinct judicial systems independent from the rest of China. Meanwhile, modern city-states like Singapore and the Vatican may be discussed either as fully sovereign entities or as cities, depending on political and geographical context.
Besides the autonomy, jurisdiction over foreign matters of cities was one of the earliest focal points in the development of legal systems, predating the rise of the modern State. In ancient times, Roman State and Hellenic city-states had the authority to exert universal jurisdiction over aliens. 10 For European cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they not only enacted their own legislation but also exercised considerable jurisdictional autonomy, often extending their authority to geographically adjacent areas. 11 In 971 AD, during the Chinese Song dynasty (宋朝), the Office for Maritime Trade (市舶司) was established in Guangzhou to regulate maritime commerce with South-East, South and West Asia, exercising jurisdiction over the entry and clearance of vessels and controlling the custody, transport, sale and inspection—or, where warranted, seizure—of cargo. 12 By the fifteenth century, specialised courts had emerged to regulate cross-border commercial activities. In England, courts of piepowder were established in cities during market days, hearing disputes arising from trade. 13 Similarly, prominent port cities developed courts of admiralty to adjudicate maritime disputes, demonstrating the enduring role of urban jurisdictions in facilitating transnational commerce. 14 These historical examples illustrate that, before the centralisation of legal authority within sovereign States, cities played a crucial role in shaping jurisdictional rules governing transnational interactions.
The brief historical retrospect demonstrates how cities gradually evolved from autonomous political entities to subordinate units within sovereign States. Throughout this process, cities’ once-separate jurisdiction—exemplified by Bartolus’ assertion—was largely absorbed into the broader jurisdiction of States. Still, it would be an overstatement to claim that cities completely relinquished their jurisdictional roles. A more nuanced view involves a two-tier analysis that distinguishes between the political and economic dimensions of municipal jurisdiction.
A Two-tier Analysis: Political and Economic Functions of Cities’ Jurisdiction
Political Functions
Historically, the political functions of municipal jurisdiction were instrumental in fostering cities’ development. Through the exercise of jurisdiction, cities solidified their political independence and institutional integrity. Horizontally, jurisdiction helped delineate city boundaries, expand the territories under a city's control, and extend local customs and regulations to surrounding areas. Vertically, it enabled city-states to protect themselves from imperial interference. These functions typically manifested in exercises of territorial public law jurisdiction—such as policing powers, administrative governance, and criminal enforcement—that, in turn, maintained internal stability and bolstered external autonomy. In contemporary terms, these political dimensions of urban jurisdiction contributed to making cities ‘safe’ and ‘resilient’, aligning with the aspirations of SDG 11.
In modern times, however, the political functions of municipal jurisdiction have largely been subsumed under the authority of sovereign States. While cities retain powers to enact local regulations, manage administrative affairs, and even engage in foreign relations, and their emerging roles in contemporary international law are receiving increasing attention, 15 their role as independent jurisdictional actors is seldom recognised in international or domestic law. This is because jurisdiction, at the international level, is traditionally understood as a derivative competence of sovereignty—something modern cities typically do not possess. Consequently, cities lack the standing to be regarded as full subjects of international law, nor do they bear international responsibility in the same way States do.
This absorption can be understood by examining the transformation of ‘territoriality’, a core concept in both political geography and international law. 16 Territoriality typically involves three fundamental elements: power, space, and boundaries. 17 While both cities and sovereign States exhibit these elements to varying degrees, the key distinction lies in the locus of ‘power’. While modern cities still occupy relatively stable space and maintain distinct boundaries, jurisdiction as power is the sole prerogative of sovereign States under international law. Although municipal authorities retain certain administrative powers, these differ fundamentally from the jurisdiction recognised in the international legal order. Consequently, cities lack the sovereign authority to exercise transnational jurisdiction, which in contemporary international society remains an attribute of State sovereignty. This shift also clarifies the previously noted ‘local-national mismatch’, particularly in fields like private international law, where cities’ territorial scope and scale differ from those of States, and where international law conventionally focuses on the national level. Even in the case of modern city-states such as Singapore—where the physical extent of the city overlaps entirely with the sovereign State—international law chiefly regards them as States rather than mere cities. Nevertheless, private international law's jurisdictional concerns retain significant relevance when viewed through the lens of cities’ economic functions.
Economic Functions
As Benedict Anderson observed, States are ‘imagined communities’, which is more like an artificially constructed concept. 18 By contrast, cities are rooted in human activity, where production and trade occur. Even though the political functions of cities’ jurisdiction have largely been absorbed by States, they continue to perform essential economic functions through different mechanisms. In earlier eras, municipal jurisdiction over private disputes was not always distinguishable from public law jurisdiction. Today, while cities rarely exercise fully independent jurisdiction in the context of a sovereign State, they often serve as venues for transnational disputes. In other words, cities still play important roles in a State's international jurisdiction framework.
Historically, a city's economic strength often dictated its role in national—and even international—jurisdictional systems. Cities with well-established courts and legal infrastructures attracted litigants seeking efficient dispute resolution, 19 thereby drawing in more people, capital, and legal services. As previously stated, mediaeval commercial hubs and port cities offered specialised courts (such as courts of piepowder or courts of admiralty), which proved effective and expedient for foreign merchants and traders. This tradition persists in the modern globalised world: in an era of extensive cross-border economic activities, a city's judicial capacity is a critical component of its overall business environment, particularly for globally significant metropolises. Drawing upon the concept of the ‘global city’ proposed by Saskia Sassen and the ‘global private city’ by Janne Nijman, one can see how global cities with robust legal systems can guide and control far-reaching commercial networks from a market-based perspective, thus influencing global economic flows. 20
Economic functions of cities’ jurisdiction are more likely to attract the attention of private international law side, as cities with a strong outward orientation are frequently seen as more attractive venues for resolving cross-border disputes. 21 As Klaas Hendrik Eller stated, private international law contributes to providing an adequate forum for transnational dispute resolution. 22 A State's transnational jurisdictional system, as well as its special jurisdictional arrangements made for cities, are crucial factors for private entities in deciding whether to conduct business there. The openness and inclusiveness engendered by well-designed jurisdictional frameworks are pivotal in drawing the interest of foreign investors and businesses, who carefully evaluate whether jurisdictional rules in these cities are transparent, whether access to justice is streamlined, and whether dispute resolution processes are convenient and efficient. Such considerations directly impact a city's capacity for sustainable development in a globalised world by helping private entities determine if it offers a ‘stable and business-friendly institutional environment’. 23 In that sense, these economic dimensions align closely with the ‘inclusive’ and ‘sustainable’ aspects of SDG 11: by fostering international participation, efficient transnational legal regimes attract capital and advanced technologies that contribute to a city's long-term growth trajectory.
The next question is how exactly jurisdictional designs in private international law can enhance a city's sustainable development. It relies on the transnational access to justice secured by jurisdictional rules. Such access determines whether private parties can effectively protect their rights through transnational litigation in the places where they reside or conduct business, thereby shaping a city's connectivity with the wider world—most notably in terms of capital mobility, population flows, and technology transfer. Jurisdictional rules are therefore no longer solely a matter for States, they are closely intertwined with a city's financial revenues, the diversification of its industrial structures, and its capacity for innovation. 24 Strengthening these factors is, in turn, essential to achieving the housing, transport, and urban-management targets embedded in SDG 11. Ideally, a ‘positive cycle’ can be formed to facilitate cities’ sustainable development via jurisdictional designs. First, a State's transnational jurisdictional rules must clearly allocate international cases to the correct venues—often located in major cities—and do so with sufficient transparency and predictability that litigants trust the legal framework. Second, such transparency and predictability not only attract foreign capital, labour, information and technology, but also promote private entities’ confidence that the institutional design for transnational jurisdiction is stable and business-friendly, promoting cities’ long-term sustainable development potential, which in turn encourages legislators to continually refine private international law jurisdictional provisions. 25 This process reflects how private entities indirectly influence and shape private international law rules to boost cities’ sustainable transformation. 26
Two main factors influence whether such a positive cycle can be realised. First, a State's general jurisdictional regimes. Transnational jurisdiction rules of a State should clearly guide litigants to the correct venue for dispute resolution, avoiding situations where, even though the determination of transnational jurisdiction is clear at the national level, inconsistencies arise when deciding which local court should hear the cases over the dispute. Second, special city-level jurisdictional arrangements. Special jurisdictional arrangements are often made for economically developed cities with strong foreign-related judicial expertise. This is evident in various ways, including the trend of establishing international commercial courts with flexible jurisdictional rules, 27 the emergence of specialised courts for disputes such as intellectual property (hereinafter ‘IP’) and finance, and the implementation of centralised, cross-regional jurisdiction systems that consolidate cases before more experienced judges. These arrangements could also enhance jurisdictional efficiency and contribute to the city's growth. These two factors will be separately discussed in Sections 3 and 4 based on China's foreign-related jurisdictional rules.
The above discussion reveals certain influences of jurisdictional rules on cities in terms of sustainable development: they help cities provide adequate transnational access to justice as one of the essential goals of SDG 16, bridging cities and SDGs. That can also explain why economic jurisdictional functions are not entirely absorbed by States: despite the ‘local-national mismatch’, the role cities play in resolving transnational civil and commercial disputes differs from that of States. After all, for private entities, the choice of venue for litigation is part of their business decision-making. Cities that strive for outward economic prosperity not only attract business capital but also wield a stronger influence, as their jurisdiction extends far beyond their administrative boundaries when they hear transnational cases. For global cities like New York, London, and Singapore, their jurisdiction can even extend globally. As a result, SDG 11.3 (enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries) and SDG 16.3 (promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all) are connected through transnational jurisdictional rules: cities provide private entities with transnational access to justice, while the resulting influx of economic activity contributes to their sustainable development.
Observation 1: Indirect Influence of General Jurisdictional Regime
The Structures of CPL's Jurisdictional Rules
Section 2 identified two key jurisdictional factors that potentially influence a city's ability to facilitate transnational access to justice: a State's general jurisdictional framework and special city-level arrangements. This section focuses on the first factor—China's foreign-related civil and commercial jurisdictional design—and assesses whether it provides the necessary transparency and predictability to enable cities to effectively exercise jurisdiction in cross-border disputes. To examine this issue, it is essential first to outline the structural framework of China's foreign-related jurisdictional rules.
China's judicial system is hierarchically structured into four levels of courts. At the highest level sits the SPC, followed by the High People's Courts (高级人民法院, hereinafter ‘High Courts’), then the Intermediate People's Courts (中级人民法院, hereinafter ‘Intermediate Courts’), and finally the Primary People's Courts (基层人民法院, hereinafter ‘Primary Courts’). 28 The presence of these courts in a city depends on the city's administrative rank. Intermediate Courts generally operate at the municipal level. Primary Courts serve districts or counties of the city, making them the most accessible level of adjudication for disputes. High Courts are situated in provincial capitals and centrally-administered municipalities, 29 where they handle complex and high-value cases. Additionally, the SPC has established six circuit courts in Shenzhen, Shenyang, Nanjing, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, and Xi’an, while the SPC itself is headquartered in Beijing, the national capital.
Vertically, the provisions on hierarchical jurisdiction in CPL empower all the aforementioned courts to hear foreign-related cases. More specifically, Article 19 of CPL stipulates that Intermediate Courts are responsible for ‘major’ foreign-related cases. 30 In 2023, the SPC implemented the Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues concerning Jurisdiction over Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Cases (最高人民法院关于涉外民商事案件管辖若干问题的规定), wherein Article 2 sets thresholds for what constitutes ‘major’ cases based on the region's economic development. Intermediate Courts in the four centrally-administered municipalities and five economically developed eastern provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong) have jurisdiction over foreign-related cases where the disputed amount exceeds RMB 40 million (approximately USD 5.70 million); for other Intermediate Courts, the standard is 20 million (approximately USD 2.85 million). Article 3 of the 2023 SPC Provisions also establishes a baseline of RMB 5 billion (approximately USD 712.62 million) for cases under the jurisdiction of High Courts. It suggests that the CPL assigns major foreign cases to cities, where Intermediate Courts, High Courts, or even the SPC are located.
However, the vertical jurisdictional framework alone does not fully capture the mechanisms by which China's general jurisdictional regime shapes cities’ ability to facilitate transnational access to justice. The horizontal dimension—the territorial allocation of jurisdiction among different domestic courts—plays a more significant role in determining how foreign-related cases are adjudicated at the city level. The following section explores this aspect in further detail.
Potential Influence of China's General Jurisdictional Regime
An Inverted Reasoning to Ascertain Transnational Jurisdiction
While vertical jurisdictional structures define the allocation of cases across different court levels, it is the horizontal dimension—what CPL refers to as ‘territorial jurisdiction’—that exerts a more direct influence on transnational access to justice in Chinese cities. A crucial distinction must be clarified here between ‘jurisdictional rules’ and ‘venue rules.’ In simplified terms: jurisdictional rules establish jurisdiction at the national level, while venue rules determine which specific court should hear the case. 31 In CPL, the term ‘territorial jurisdiction’ (地域管辖) refers to the set of venue rules that determine which local court(s) have the authority to hear a particular type of case. It is important to note that it in fact differs from the concept of ‘territorial jurisdiction’ in international law, which refers to a State's national jurisdiction based on the principle of territoriality.
China has adopted what Chinese scholar Zaisheng Xiang describes as a ‘monistic approach’ in determining transnational jurisdiction: Xiang noted that the legislative practices for transnational adjudication can be categorised into two approaches: the ‘monistic’ and the ‘dualistic’; In those States that adopt a monistic approach, domestic and transnational litigation share the same set of rules; therefore, jurisdiction for transnational cases can be determined by applying the same rules for domestic cases; in contrast, States that adopt a dualistic approach have separate sets of rules for domestic and transnational litigation, with each governed independently by its own jurisdictional framework. 32 Xiang argues that China adopts a monistic approach because the rules for deciding which court has jurisdiction over domestic and foreign cases are in principle the same, only different when there are several special rules for foreign cases. 33 In the current CPL, the rules concerning domestic territorial jurisdiction are all venue rules. In such cases, Chinese courts may resort to domestic venue rules in the absence of international jurisdictional norms to determine their competence in adjudicating transnational disputes. This practice effectively presumes Chinese courts’ transnational jurisdiction at the State level through the application of local-level domestic venue rules.
This article suggests that China's civil jurisdiction system falls somewhere between these two approaches (a ‘revised’ monistic approach): the Fourth Section of the CPL (the Foreign-related Section) contains seven foreign-related jurisdictional rules that take precedence as special provisions. 34 Only when these rules cannot be applied, other general provisions, including those in the previous three Sections (the Domestic Sections), are referred to. 35 Other than that, a single set of domestic venue rules will apply to both domestic and transnational cases.
This approach produces an ‘inverted reasoning’ mechanism: instead of first determining national jurisdiction and then identifying the proper venue, Chinese courts may directly apply venue rules to ascertain the appropriate local court and determine the national jurisdiction. Given that a State typically has multiple venues, a conventional logical sequence in private international law for courts hearing a case should be to first determine whether domestic courts have jurisdiction over the case, followed by an assessment of the venue. For instance, the Japanese Civil Procedure Code clearly illustrates this reasoning method: Article 3, which divides jurisdiction into 11 categories, first establishes the jurisdiction of Japanese courts, and only then do Articles 4 to 22 outline the rules for specific domestic venues. In the EU Brussels regime, the Brussels Regulation determines jurisdiction, while member State laws determine venue. This reasoning is also adhered to in some of the SPC's rulings: for instance, in the case of Oppo v Sharp, the SPC first clarifies whether Chinese courts have jurisdiction, then assesses the proper venue. 36 However, the revised monistic design in the CPL incorporates a different reasoning method: courts will directly apply venue rules to determine their own jurisdiction in foreign-related cases when the Foreign-related Section does not specify corresponding jurisdictional rules. If this results in a positive conclusion, the national jurisdiction of Chinese courts is presumed. This reasoning can be termed ‘inverted’, as it reverses the abovementioned conventional logic of jurisdictional determination.
Although this method deviates from the ordinary reasoning, it has practical benefits for providing access to justice. In particular, it simplifies the process for litigants by making it easier to identify the appropriate court in transnational cases. This method also streamlines the litigation process at the local level: instead of requiring courts to undertake a two-step process—first determining whether Chinese courts have jurisdiction at the national level and then allocating venue—the system allows for a more direct route to case allocation.
Absence of Corresponding Venue Rules?
Despite the efficiency of the inverted reasoning method in determining transnational jurisdiction, its application lacks consistency among different provisions in CPL. The Foreign-related Section includes venue rules (e.g., Article 276(1) 37 ) and jurisdictional rules (e.g., Articles 276(2) 38 and 279 39 ). In most cases, the CPL's inverted reasoning approach functions effectively, allowing courts to infer national jurisdiction based on venue rules. However, in certain situations, jurisdictional rules exist without corresponding venue rules. This gap creates uncertainty in determining which specific court has jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes. A notable example arises following the 2023 revision of the CPL, which introduced four new territorial jurisdictional rules under the Foreign-related Section. These provisions, which establish jurisdiction at the national level, include:(1) situations with appropriate connections to China (Article 276(2)), (2) exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from the formation, dissolution, or liquidation of legal entities or other organizations formed within the territory of China, or the validity of resolutions made by such entities (Article 279(1)), (3) exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning the validity of IP rights examined and granted within the territory of the China (Article 279(2)), and (4) exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from contracts for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, or cooperative exploration and exploitation of natural resources within the territory of China (Article 279(3)). 40
Despite the national jurisdiction can be presumed by venue rules, jurisdictional rules could not provide a certain venue. For example, among the four abovementioned provisions, the CPL fails to specify corresponding venue rules for Articles 276(2) and 279(2). 41 Consequently, this situation might leave litigants without clear guidance on which local court is competent to hear such disputes. There is also the possibility that a court may find itself incompetent to hear the case even if the national jurisdiction has been established, requiring the litigant to seek another venue to file a new suit, which is both time-consuming and money-costly. This issue highlights a direction for improving the CPL's revised monistic approach: even when venue rules primarily determine jurisdiction in principle, Chinese legislators should ensure that jurisdictional rules are linked to specific venue rules to provide clear guidance to litigants. Otherwise, the absence of corresponding venue rules inevitably creates uncertainty for parties regarding the appropriate city in which to file a lawsuit, thereby undermining the predictability of the jurisdictional system.
As a result, with the above observation, we can see that the general rules indirectly influence cities’ jurisdiction, affecting their capacity to provide transnational access to justice. Although the relationship between national jurisdiction and local venue is not city-specific (as there are other types of administrative units, such as districts and counties, that are related to the hierarchical arrangement of Chinese courts), within the context of private international law, most transnational cases are heard in cities rather than other areas in a rural-urban imbalanced State such as China. 42 Since cities generally have higher levels of economic development and engage more frequently in foreign transactions, they are more likely to handle cross-border legal relationships. Positive impacts may enhance efficiency and predictability for litigants, while negative impacts can lead to the undervaluation of cities’ dispute resolution functions, which, in turn, reduces their appeal to foreign businesses and ultimately undermines their inclusiveness and sustainability.
Observation 2: Direct Influence of Specific Jurisdictional Arrangements
If the impact of jurisdictional regimes on cities’ sustainability is somewhat indirect, then establishing specific jurisdictional arrangements in certain cities can directly affect their capacity for transnational access to justice. In recent years, States around the world have been leveraging the advantages of cities to create preferred venues for transnational litigation or, as Matthew Erie puts it, ‘new legal hubs’ 43 . Cities can reflect these advantages through their geographical location as major transportation hubs or their industrial structure as regional or global financial centres or clusters of high-tech enterprises. The attempts to establish preferred venues for litigation aim to facilitate the fair, convenient, and efficient resolution of disputes for the industries concentrated in these cities. Meanwhile, these cities also seek to leverage the benefits of transnational dispute resolution to further promote their own development. Efficient dispute resolution mechanisms reduce the time and financial costs for businesses in contract performance and dispute resolution, lower transaction risks, adjust resource allocation, and prevent resources from stagnating in disputes, thereby enhancing productivity. These advantages brought about by transnational litigation are fundamentally rooted in jurisdictional issues. In China, enhancing the level of foreign-related adjudication has also been placed on the agenda.
CICCs: Promote Cities’ Competitiveness via Jurisdictional Flexibility
The SPC established two CICCs in Shenzhen and Xi’an in June 2018, following the approval of the Opinions on Establishing a Mechanism and Institutions for the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes under the Belt and Road Initiative by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. This document served as the foundation for the creation of this specialised institution and underscores the importance of upholding the principles of fairness, efficiency, and convenience, highlighting the broad acceptance of dispute resolution institutions within the international community. 44 One of the most notable attractions of CICCs lies in their jurisdictional foundation, which is based on parties’ choice-of-court agreements; as long as the parties agree to submit to the SPC and the amount in dispute exceeds 300 million RMB (approximately USD 42.76 million), the CICCs can exercise jurisdiction. 45
However, the effectiveness of this jurisdictional arrangement has been less than satisfactory. According to news coverage, as of September 2021, the two CICCs had accepted a total of merely 18 cases over more than three years and concluded only nine cases. 46 While the COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly impacted this caseload, the limited number of cases can also be attributed to the provisions concerning jurisdiction based on parties’ agreement. At a work meeting on the construction of a foreign-related rule of law in Guangdong Province in July 2023, a judge of the First Circuit Court of the SPC pointed out that one important reason for the low case intake at the first CICC is that China's jurisdiction based on parties’ agreement requires a case to have ‘actual connections’ to China. This issue remains linked to the previously mentioned revised monistic CPL approach.
Before the 2023 amendment, the foreign-related section of the CPL contained no specific rules on jurisdiction by agreement. Chinese courts had to rely on domestic rules, specifically Article 34 of the CPL (2017) and Article 35 (2021) 47 , which stipulated that the court chosen by the parties must have actual connections to the dispute. Scholars have argued that this requirement for jurisdiction by agreement is unnecessary and contrary to international trends. 48 Consequently, in a 2022 explanation, Qiang Zhou, President of the SPC, emphasised that ensuring a fair, efficient, and convenient resolution of foreign-related commercial disputes was one of the primary motivations for amending the CPL. 49 As one of the results, the 2023 amendment to the CPL explicitly addressed this issue by introducing a new Article 277 in the foreign-related section, removing the requirement for actual connections 50 —a change that has been supported by recent scholarly commentary. 51 Accordingly, the SPC eliminated the need for actual connections and revised the CICCs’ jurisdiction based on parties’ agreement.
After the SPC established the two CICCs, China successively set up local International Commercial Courts (hereinafter ‘local ICCs’) in different cities, 52 intending to further promote the experiences gained from Shenzhen and Xi’an. However, unlike the CICCs established by the SPC, which have jurisdiction over global disputes, the local ICCs set up in Intermediate Courts function more as ‘tribunals’ rather than ‘courts’. Specifically, they can be divided into two categories: the first category focuses on internal allocation, reallocating foreign-related cases from different courts within one city to a specialised court; 53 the second category centralises foreign-related cases from provincial level to a specialised court of a city (mostly the provincial capital, such as Chengdu, Changchun, and Nanning).
Local ICCs indeed expand CICCs’ advantages, such as efficiency, procedural flexibility, to a wider range of Chinese cities. It should also be noted that several local ICCs have published their jurisdictional guidance in English on the Internet, such as those in Beijing 54 , Shanghai 55 and Suzhou 56 . Nevertheless, Chinese scholar Qingjiang Kong also noted that, in the context of ‘one-stop’ dispute resolution (“一站式”纠纷解决), 57 local ICCs tend to align themselves with arbitration and mediation institutions situated within the same region. Such preferential collaboration risks constraining parties’ freedom to choose their preferred arbitral or mediation institutions. 58 Furthermore, a city's jurisdiction might extend beyond its administrative boundaries under the arrangement of local ICCs, which relates to the design of centralised jurisdiction, discussed further below.
Centralised Jurisdiction: The Arrangement that Change with Time
China's centralised jurisdiction (集中管辖) refers to a mechanism by which courts expand their original geographical jurisdictional scope. This system emerged in the early twenty-first century, when China had just joined the WTO and was anticipating a significant increase in international trade litigation. At that time, most Primary Courts lacked the professional capacity to handle such cases, leading to the establishment of the centralised jurisdiction system. In 2002, the SPC introduced the Provisions of the SPC on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil and Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements (《最高人民法院关于涉外民商事案件诉讼管辖若干问题的规定》, hereinafter the 2002 SPC Provisions), which aimed to reallocate foreign-related cases from Primary Courts to Intermediate and High Courts. Consequently, the majority of foreign-related cases would be heard in cities.
The centralised jurisdiction system has been controversial since its inception, particularly regarding whether the 2002 SPC Provisions, as a form of judicial interpretation, can revoke the jurisdiction granted to Primary Courts by the CPL. On the positive side, over two decades of implementation have established a framework in which foreign-related cases are handled by professional judges, significantly improving the quality of adjudication. However, several issues have also emerged, as noted by the SPC itself. Firstly, centralised jurisdiction is no longer as efficient as intended, as concentrating simple contract and tort disputes in higher-level courts may contradict parties’ choices, leading to an inappropriate allocation of adjudication resources. Meanwhile, the absorption of foreign-related cases has increased the workload of Intermediate and High Courts. Secondly, courts have developed inconsistent interpretations in characterising cases. For instance, there is no consensus on whether loan disputes and personal injury compensation claims fall within the scope of centralised jurisdiction. 59 Lastly, as judges’ professional competencies have improved, the adjudication capabilities of Primary Courts have also significantly increased, calling into question the necessity of strict centralisation.
Consequently, the SPC abolished the 2002 SPC Provisions and issued a new version in 2022, restoring jurisdiction over foreign-related cases to Primary Courts while further clarifying the jurisdictional boundaries between Primary and Intermediate Courts. At the same time, it retained the authority of High Courts to designate Primary and Intermediate Courts for cross-regional centralised jurisdiction. As a result, new arrangements have emerged under the authorisation of the 2022 SPC Provisions, such as the allocation of foreign-related cases to Primary Courts in Guangzhou. 60 Other arrangements have been implemented through the establishment of specialised courts. For instance, the Guangzhou IP Court, established in 2014, not only hears IP disputes within its jurisdiction but also exercises cross-regional jurisdiction over cases related to certain types of IP rights across Guangdong Province. 61 The abovementioned local ICCs can also be categorised within this framework.
Dynamic Jurisdictional Strategies: Adapting to Evolving Needs of Cities
The above analysis of CICCs, local ICCs, and centralised jurisdiction reveals two methods by which a State broadens cities’ capacity to hear transnational cases. One approach is to increase the city-level caseload by expanding jurisdiction, removing unnecessary restrictions on jurisdiction based on parties’ agreement, as exemplified by the establishment of CICCs and local ICCs. The other approach involves expanding the geographical scope of cities’ jurisdiction, reflecting the re-territorialisation of their judicial authority by extending the space governed by such power. Regarding whether the effects are positive or negative, the assessment should be conducted from two perspectives.
From a positive perspective, promoting access to justice through special city-level jurisdictional arrangements contributes to their long-term development goals. Taking Shenzhen as an example, the establishment of the first CICC has been recognised by Chinese commentators as having a significant impact: The establishment of the first ICC in Shenzhen… facilitates Shenzhen's efforts to create a world-class market-orientated, international, and rule-of-law business environment, transforming it from an economic support point of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative into a comprehensive support point, accelerating its evolution into a globally influential innovation-driven city.
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The term ‘comprehensive support point’ suggests that Shenzhen is not solely pursuing economic prosperity but is also expected to enhance the integration and innovation of its industries and services through the institutional advantages provided by the first CICC as a preferred forum.
However, there are two sides to every issue. Under China's revised monistic system, creating exceptions to general jurisdictional provisions often raises concerns regarding transparency and predictability. For instance, the establishment of local ICCs, as discussed above, is largely based on ‘response letters’ (复函) from the SPC—documents issued to address requests from lower courts and provide guidance. These replies are generally not made public and are even more difficult to access in English. As a result, foreign parties, unless well-versed in local procedural issues, may struggle to gain accurate procedural expectations regarding those courts that have not published English jurisdictional arrangements, thereby undermining the competitiveness of local ICCs in the international dispute resolution market.
The key point, therefore, is to expand the benefits while mitigating the drawbacks. Achieving this requires aligning the jurisdictional system with cities’ development. Why have the flexible jurisdictional rules of the first CICC contributed to Shenzhen's innovation? Because they have laid the groundwork for exploring new institutional designs. Shenzhen is known as China's ‘Southern Gateway’ and a ‘Pioneering Area’ for the Reform and Opening-up. It has served as a key centre for cross-border dispute resolution and has become a testing ground for integrating international legal practices, benefiting from its geographic proximity to Hong Kong and Macao. These conditions enable it to explore a more open and convenient jurisdictional system that aligns with international standards.
Another insight from the historical evolution of the centralised jurisdiction system is that a static institutional design cannot sustainably enhance access to justice for cities. A transnational jurisdictional system must evolve with the times, continuously adapting to the changing needs of cities as they develop. In the early years of the Reform and Opening-up, cities were granted broader jurisdictional powers and handled the majority of foreign-related cases. This not only contributed to the development of cities’ outward-orientated economies but also helped cultivate judges’ expertise in foreign-related adjudication. However, as economies grow and judicial expertise improves, the previous centralised approach may place excessive pressure on city courts while also affecting the efficient resolution of disputes for the parties involved.
Conclusion
Transnational jurisdiction plays a crucial role in promoting transnational access to justice for cities by directly shaping their legal environment, economic competitiveness, and international reputation. As centres of economic activity and dispute resolution, cities benefit from jurisdictional rules to facilitate efficiency, predictability, and inclusivity in transnational litigation. The capacity of cities to serve as hubs for cross-border dispute resolution strengthens their attractiveness to foreign investors, businesses, and legal professionals, contributing to their long-term sustainability. In this regard, jurisdictional design is not merely a procedural or technical matter; it is a strategic tool that determines whether cities can effectively engage with the global legal and economic order. A jurisdictional framework that enhances cities’ capacity for transnational dispute resolution fosters legal certainty, attracts international commercial actors, and aligns with the broader objectives of sustainable development, as outlined in SDG 11 and SDG 16.
The study of China demonstrates how general jurisdictional frameworks, and special jurisdictional arrangements influence transnational access to justice at city-level. On the one hand, China's general jurisdictional rules, particularly under the revised monistic approach of the 2023 CPL, have indirectly affected cities by determining how foreign-related cases are allocated. The application of venue rules to infer transnational jurisdiction has streamlined the litigation process at the local level, reinforcing cities’ roles in the dispute resolution framework. However, gaps remain in the form of unclear venue rules, which could create uncertainty and reduce legal predictability. On the other hand, special jurisdictional arrangements, such as the establishment of CICCs and local ICCs, have directly strengthened certain cities’ legal functions. The CICCs in Shenzhen and Xi’an, along with the local ICCs, represent efforts to enhance cities’ competitiveness as transnational dispute resolution centres. Similarly, China's centralised jurisdiction system, while initially designed to improve adjudicatory efficiency, has evolved over time to reflect changes in economic development and judicial expertise. The 2022 reform signals a shift towards a more flexible and dynamic approach that aligns jurisdictional rules with cities’ evolving needs.
Nevertheless, these jurisdictional arrangements are not without challenges. The lack of transparency in how local ICCs operate creates obstacles for foreign litigants seeking to navigate China's judicial landscape. Meanwhile, the static application of centralised jurisdiction in the recent past placed burdens on certain courts while limiting access to justice at the local level. These issues highlight the need for a jurisdictional framework that is both adaptable and transparent. Cities must not only offer flexible jurisdictional mechanisms that cater to transnational litigation needs but also ensure that such mechanisms are publicly accessible and clearly defined. Without these safeguards, jurisdictional reforms risk undermining the very goals of efficiency and predictability that they seek to promote.
Looking ahead, jurisdictional strategies must evolve in response to cities’ dynamic roles in global governance. The success of transnational legal hubs such as London, New York, and Singapore suggests that cities thrive when their jurisdictional frameworks are designed to accommodate cross-border legal demands. China's recent reforms signal an awareness of this reality, but further refinements are necessary to fully align its jurisdictional design with international best practices. As cities continue to drive economic and legal integration, future jurisdictional strategies should focus on enhancing cross-border cooperation, promoting procedural transparency, and ensuring that judicial resources are effectively distributed. By doing so, cities can strengthen their positions as sustainable centres for transnational access to justice, reinforcing their economic and legal significance on the global stage.
In conclusion, the relationship between jurisdiction rules and city-level transnational access to justice is dynamic rather than static. Jurisdictional rules must be continuously reassessed to ensure they support—not hinder—cities’ development goals. A well-calibrated jurisdictional framework fosters efficiency, transparency, and legal certainty, reinforcing the broader objectives of private international law and sustainable urban development. In this sense, promoting transnational access to justice is not merely a legal imperative but an important component of cities’ long-term prosperity.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article is one of the mid-term results of the major project funded by the National Social Science Fund of China, titled ‘Research on the Institutional Construction of the Extraterritorial Application of Chinese Law from the Perspective of Private International Law’ (project approval number 20&ZD202). The author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments from both external reviewers, and sincerely thanks Professor Ralf Michaels for his valuable feedback on the earlier version.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the major project funded by the National Social Science Fund of China, titled ‘Research on the Institutional Construction of the Extraterritorial Application of Chinese Law from the Perspective of Private International Law’, (grant number 20&ZD202).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.