Reimagining the environment-migration-conflict nexus

1. Introduction

Migration is a critically important policy issue that has received considerable global attention in recent election campaigns, news cycles, op-ed pieces, and social media posts. It has also been the subject of much misinformation and disinformation. This is not surprising. We are living in a time of rampant misinformation and disinformation across multiple media outlets that is having an enormous impact on public perceptions of key challenges such as climate change, violent conflict, and public health (Aïmeur et al., 2023; Berinsky, 2023; Hassan et al., 2024; Mashamaite, 2023; Muhammad & Mathew, 2022). Globally, trust in news media is low and decreasing in many countries, such as the United States (Brenan & Saad, 2025; Nielsen & Fletcher, 2024). But while information varies in quality and public trust in it is generally declining, mainstream and alternative news outlets continue to shape public perceptions and affect public behavior (Mach et al., 2021).

In this context, the role of evidence-based, logically consistent, peer-reviewed research has a special salience and importance. In fact, a recent survey conducted in 67 countries suggests that around the world, trust in science is high and publics believe science should play a larger role in policymaking (Wong, 2024). In this spirit, this special issue of Environment and Security brings together five carefully researched perspectives on the complex relationships among the environment (especially climate change), migration, conflict, and peace. This is clearly an area in which understanding is imperfect, citizens are divided in their views, mobilizing support and resources around fair and effective policies is challenging, coordination across countries is important, action to date has been inadequate, and—given current trends—the need for a robust approach is growing globally.

In this introductory article, we provide brief overviews of (a) current trends, patterns, and relationships; (b) the existing international frameworks for managing migration related to climate change; and (c) the other articles included in the special issue.

2. Current trends, patterns, and relationships

In the past decade or so, rapid advances in data science using a range of powerful remote and portable sensors to collect data, employing vast and rapid data storage and processing technologies, digitalizing interoperable archives, and building data analytics around tools such as artificial intelligence and machine learning have transformed most knowledge domains, including the field of population studies (Kashyap, 2021). In spite of these technical advances, significant concerns—some old, some new—remain regarding the ability to fully model and understand complex processes of human movement. How important and how well captured, for example, are cultural contexts, lived experience, and contingency? Nevertheless, while acknowledging that migration science is imperfect and evolving, it is also revealing important trends, patterns, and relationships that are accessible and ought to be carefully considered in public discussion and policymaking. In this regard, the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) World Migration Report 2024 is an especially valuable resource (McAuliffe & Adhiambo Oucho, 2024). The report is explicit about its limitations, noting that “statistics to support our collective understanding of international migration patterns and trends are not as well developed as those available in other domains” (p. 122).

These limitations notwithstanding, according to IOM, in 2020, about 281 million people (3.6% of the world population) lived outside the country in which they were born; 169 million of these were labor migrants. These numbers have increased each decade since 1970, when IOM reporting began, and migrants constituted 2.3% of the world population. One striking change that has occurred over the decades is the extent to which migration has become increasingly defined by the movement of labor among developed countries. In 1970, the top 20 origin countries included 7 that ranked high or very high on the Human Development Index (HDI, a measure of health, education, and income); 6 were ranked low on this index. By 2020, no low HDI countries were in the top 20, which today is dominated by 16 high or very high HDI-ranked states. The shift is even more explicit in terms of destination countries—in 1970, 13 of the top 20 were high and very high HDI states; by 2020, 19 of the top 20 were in these categories. In other words, in large measure, international migration appears to be concentrating among the world’s more developed economies.

Alongside the movement of labor, a process driven mainly by the lure of economic opportunity as developed economies wax and wane, a starkly different pattern is emerging related to the 45 million people who have been forcibly displaced by violence or disaster out of their homelands and into other countries. It is worth noting that an additional 71 million people are displaced for these same reasons but have remained within their countries of birth, and while monitored, are not counted as migrants. These numbers have increased dramatically since the 1950s, when they totaled about 2.1 million people out of a global population of approximately 2.75 billion (O’Neill, 2024). Here, the drivers include the escalation of violent conflict and the extensive and growing impacts of climate change, such as more frequent and intense droughts, floods, and heat waves.

In short, there is strong evidence that more advantaged populations are migrating to take advantage of promising economic opportunities, while disadvantaged populations are being driven from their homes and livelihoods by war and climate change. Moreover, a 2024 report by IUCN underscores the fact that climate change and conflict are also driving many non-human species to migrate, species that often share migration corridors with humans, bringing the conservation community into much-needed discussions about migration, humanitarian action, conflict, and peacebuilding (Hsiao et al., 2024).

While the interactive pathways between climate change and conflict, conflict and migration, and climate change and migration are complex and controversial, a growing body of research suggests they are important and interconnected (Ash & Obradovich, 2020; Balsari et al., 2020; Barnett et al., 2008; Beine & Jeusette, 2021; Bosetti et al., 2021; Chesler, 2024; Conca & Dabelko, 2024; Hoffmann et al., 2024; Hsiao et al., 2024; Ide et al., 2020; Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Koubi, 2019; Lama et al., 2021; Leal Filho et al., 2023; Mach et al., 2020; Morales-Muñoz et al., 2020; Nagle Alverio et al., 2025; Piguet, 2022; Reuveny, 2007; Salik, 2023; Vinke et al., 2020; Wiederkehr et al., 2022).

In an article reviewing historical evidence and responding to a surge of policy interest in these relationships linked in part to the IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report, Reuveny (2007, p. 657) argued “that severe environmental problems play a role in causing migration, which, at times, leads to conflict in receiving areas.” A decade later, a review of quantitative research on climate change and conflict by Koubi (2019, p. 355) concluded that while theories are still underdeveloped, it is clear that “climate change acts as a threat multiplier in several of the world’s regions.” A recent Viewpoint piece (Hendrix et al., 2023) also focused on climate change and conflict concurs that these relationships are robust but complicated and diverse. This sentiment is clearly echoed by Wiederkehr et al. (2022, p. 9): “Our findings challenge deterministic and one-sided narratives of migration, resource scarcity and conflict, and corroborate previous claims on the complex and multi-scalar contexts driving violent resource competition in receiving areas.”

While acknowledging the complexity of these relationships, some interesting findings are emerging. For example, through a rigorous analysis of the recently compiled Environmental Displacement Dataset (EnDis), Chesler (2024, p. 15) concludes that the evidence demonstrates that “displacement caused by sudden-onset natural hazards triggers political instability by increasing the incidence of armed attacks by non-state actors and violent riots.” Similarly, Koubi et al. (2020, p. 28) argue that “Our results show that climate-induced migration can indeed result in an increased potential for urban social disorder.” They identify a pathway from environmental displacement through social mobilization for migrants affected by urban conflict.

While research clarifying the relationships is fraught with caveats, countries, international organizations, and civil society actors are nonetheless starting to develop policies and interventions to address their perceptions of the climate-migration-conflict nexus (and the environment-migration-conflict nexus more broadly). A review of the literature on the efficacy of interventions to alleviate resource conflicts in communities hosting climate migrants showed the importance of multi-scale and cross-sectoral innovations and underscored that there is no single solution (He et al., 2023). It also highlighted the need to better understand the evolution of adaptive capacity in the context of multiple threat factors; approaches by which climate migrants might be able to gain long-term access to resources; and a lack of community-based evaluation metrics. Similarly, a review of climate change projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations found that many addressed the interactions between climate, migration, and conflict (Bergman, 2025). And a review of national security agendas found a number—including those of Belgium, North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia—addressed the intersection between climate, migration, and conflict (Wik & Neal, 2024).

This set of connections—environment/climate change, migration, conflict—is of special importance to this journal and to the policy community as they are increasing, not easily addressed through existing policies, and often linked to public concerns that migration will erode cultural values and practices, create economic burdens, and pose human and national security challenges. The pressure on national migration policies and multilateral approaches is mounting. In the following section, we describe the policy tools in place today and suggest directions in which policy needs to evolve.

3. Existing legal framework

While international law governing migration is centuries old, the current international legal framework governing migration is fragmented and contested (Chetail, 2014; Opeskin et al., 2012). It is administered by the UN agencies responsible for refugees (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), migration (IOM), labor (International Labour Organization [ILO]), and human rights (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR]).

One of the challenges is the only a few international legal instruments governing migration are ratified by more than 140 countries: the 1951 Refugee Convention (146 states parties as of March 2025) and its 1967 Protocol (147 states parties), 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol (153 parties), and the 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol (192 states parties). Other notable international agreements governing migration include the 1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention (No. 97) (54 states parties as of March 2025); the 1975 ILO Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143) (30 states parties); the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers (56 states parties); 1990 Migrant Workers Convention (60 states parties); and the 2011 ILO Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189) (38 states parties). In addition to these global treaties, there are numerous regional and bilateral treaties. While some of these regional and bilateral treaties focus on migration, many include migration provisions in broader frameworks around regional integration, economic trade, and security. These different instruments reflect both the complexity of migration (including but not limited to the reasons for migration, the different stages of migration, whether it is international or internal, and the numerous harms that migrants suffer) and the political sensitivities regarding migration.

With respect to climate change, migration, and conflict, the international legal framework is extremely limited. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol only offers protections to a person meeting the definition of a refugee, that is, a person with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (art. 1(A)(2)). As such, its protections do not apply to people who are moving due to climate change, environmental degradation, or poverty. In instances where climate change and environmental degradation drive conflict, and people are fleeing the conflict, they can seek refugee status due to the conflict (rather than the drivers of the conflict). Similarly, the various international instruments protecting people traveling internationally for labor can invoke the various ILO conventions that may apply, but those instruments do not generally apply to people moving for climate change or environmental reasons.

Migration is complicated, and climate-related migration is even more complicated (McAuliffe & Adhiambo Oucho, 2024; Singh et al., 2023; Woodworth, 2024). People often have multiple reasons for migrating, many of which are not protected under existing international law. Research into motivations for Pacific Islanders—many of whom are from islands most vulnerable to sea-level rise and climate change—migrating to the United States highlights that the primary reasons expressed for migration are usually education, health care, jobs, and family (Drinkall et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; Van der Geest et al., 2019). This research also shows that climate change is often a consideration, if not the leading consideration.

In many instances, the most useful international legal frameworks are the ones that do not focus on migration. For example, citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau can enter the United States with no visa, no quota, and no delays. This is due to Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) between the United States and their countries. The COFAs are international agreements by which the United States has preferential military access to the territories of these Pacific island nations (located strategically in the vast Pacific Ocean), and in exchange, the United States provides financial aid, free movement of its citizens, and other benefits. There are other similar international arrangements, often between former colonial powers and former colonies, that provide ongoing freedom of movement. Examples include Portugal and Cabo Verde, the United Kingdom and its former colonies, and France and its former colonies.

Numerous regional and subregional economic integration agreements enable freedom of movement among the parties to those agreements (Burkett & Sancken, 2020; Dorn & Zweimüller, 2021; Lavenex et al., 2016; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). Examples include the European Union (EU), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Southern Common Market (MERCOCUR), and Central America (SICA). The freedom of movement within these regions varies; sometimes there is free movement, sometimes it is freer (but not free) movement. Generally, though, the freedom of movement does not depend on whether the person is migrating for climate change reasons, for jobs, or other reasons.

There have been many calls for an international agreement on “climate refugees” or “climate migrants” (Biermann, 2018; Biermann & Boas, 2008; CRIDEAU & CRDP, 2008; Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Environmental Justice Foundation, 2021; Plano, 2023; Sciaccaluga, 2020; Sussman, 2023; Wyman, 2013). While OHCR, IOM, and other international organizations have developed programming to support climate migrants, to date, however, there has been no meaningful progress toward a binding agreement. Literature has increasingly focused on utilizing existing provisions of international law (Atapattu, 2020; Behrman & Kent, 2018; Li, 2024; McDave & Dagadu, 2023).

Acknowledging the need for more comprehensive approaches to managing migration, including climate-related migration, two international processes have sought to articulate principles based on provisions largely found in existing international law. Recognizing the fact that migration and the reasons for migration have greatly expanded beyond the scope of the international legal regime, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration is a non-binding intergovernmental agreement that seeks to provide a comprehensive approach for comprehensively addressing international migration. As noted, though, the Global Compact is non-binding, so it represents a vision for how states can more effectively and humanely manage migration.

The second approach is the Migration with Dignity Framework (McClain et al., 2022). It draws upon the established framework for dignity rights, founded in international human rights law and comparative constitutional law (Daly, 2020), and then applies dignity rights to the context of migration. The Migration with Dignity Framework is important for three key reasons. First, it is based largely on rights already found in international human rights instruments and national constitutions; so, most of the rights are already binding on states. Second, because the provisions are based on human and constitutional rights, they apply broadly to a range of migration contexts and motivations—including climate migrants. Third, and again due to their nature, they apply not just to the process of migration (i.e., transit and entry) but also to migrants once they have settled in a host community.

4. Overview of articles included in this special section

Recognizing that the literature on the nexus between environment (and particularly climate change), migration, conflict, and peace is substantial, this special issue seeks to advance the literature in discrete ways. It features four original research articles and one practitioner insight. The first two articles examine the environment-migration-conflict nexus in specific contexts: rural-to-urban migration (Nagle Alverio et al., 2025) and refugee camps (Cavanagh, 2025). The remaining three pieces focus on specific conceptual, legal, and operational measures to more effectively navigate the nexus: community resilience (Casano, 2025), the Migration with Dignity Framework (McClain et al., 2025), and a decision framework to inform long-term climate responses in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement (Borgomeo & Jägerskog, 2025).

In “Climate Change, Conflict, and Urban Migration,”Nagle Alverio et al. (2025) examine how climate change and conflict-related migration from rural to urban environments affect urban environments. They identify key pathways by which climate change and conflict drive migration. Much of the rural-to-urban migration is driven by climate hazards—especially droughts, floods, and hurricanes—that erode and undermine rural livelihoods and agricultural productivity, with conflict and violence interacting with these pressures to further drive migration. The article highlights specific challenges for urban planning and the provision of public services, as well as the need for context-specific policy measures that proactively address the climate change-migration-conflict nexus.

In “Environmental Peacebuilding in Protracted Refugee Situations: The Camp, Refugee–Host Conflict and Pathways to Peaceful Co-existence,”Cavanagh (2025) challenges previous arguments that refugee-host community conflicts over degraded and scarce natural resources are inevitable. Calling for an understanding of the spatial effects of refugee camps, Cavanagh (2025) posits that the environment and natural resources can be a pathway to peace during protracted refugee situations. He considers a range of potential environmental peacebuilding interventions to illustrate how environmental cooperation can benefit both refugee communities and host communities.

In “Community Resilience Placed at the Service of the Climate-Migration-Conflict Nexus Understanding,”Casano (2025) addresses a gap in the substantial literature on the climate-migration-conflict nexus—namely, the lack of clarity regarding community resilience in the climate-migration-conflict nexus. Drawing upon the existing literature on community resilience, Casano (2025) offers an operational definition of community resilience that can be applied in the context of the climate-migration-conflict nexus. In doing so, he advocates for a broader conceptual approach that moves from the linear cause-effect approach frequently utilized to consider a broader range of geographic, political, social, cultural, demographic, and economic variables that can advance both theoretical understanding and on-the-ground programming.

In “Resilience through Migration with Dignity: Pathways for Addressing Complexities in Climate, Migration, and Conflict,”McClain et al. (2025) explore the ways that the Migration with Dignity Framework can enhance resilience, protect human dignity, and guide laws, policies, and practices addressing climate change, conflict, and migration. Noting the lack of effective international legal frameworks protecting the rights of climate migrants, as well as the numerous challenges around identifying who is a climate migrant, the Migration with Dignity Framework offers a particularly promising conglomeration of largely established rights under international law and constitutions from around the world. They argue that the Migration with Dignity Framework provides a resilient path to addressing threats to stability and security posed by climate change. Moreover, they argue that it could mitigate conflicts arising from climate change-related migration.

In “Pathways to Respond to Climate Change, Forced Displacement, and Conflict Challenges,”Borgomeo and Jägerskog (2025) propose a decision framework to inform long-term climate responses in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. Noting that most of the literature on the climate-migration-conflict literature focuses on causal links, they shift attention to the need to provide effective guidance regarding how to construct and implement actual policy interventions and responses, particularly to support climate-resilient development. Their proposed decision framework identifies a sequence of interventions necessary to reduce climate risks in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. They also offer an opportunity for aligning climate change adaptation interventions with peacebuilding and stabilization initiatives.

The articles in this special issue highlight a few key points. In many instances, they reinforce and advance thinking reflected in the broader literature (cited above). First, they highlight the multiple ways that environmental change (and climate change in particular), migration, and conflict interact. Environmental change can drive migration and conflict; migration can drive environmental degradation and conflict; and conflict can drive migration and environmental degradation. Second, and related, migration is complicated, with many motivations and pathways. As such, it can be problematic to identify “climate migrants” (or “climate refugees,”“environmental migrants,” or other similar terms).

At the same time, there is growing thinking and action to address the environment-migration-conflict nexus. These measures increasingly take a holistic, integrated approach. They often draw upon existing international law, policy, and practice, re-packaging them and applying them to the context of environment and migration, or specifically, climate change and migration. Of note, there is growing use of international law outside of that governing migration and climate change, particularly international human rights law. In addition, there is growing attention not only to conflict prevention but to efforts to use shared interests in the environment to build peace.

5. Conclusion

This special issue seeks to advance thinking and practice regarding the intersection of environment and climate, migration, and conflict and peace. It does so in two specific contexts (rural-to-urban migration and refugee camps) and in four specific ways (environmental cooperation, resilience, migration with dignity, and a decision framework to inform long-term climate responses in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement). Further thinking and innovation are needed, both on the issues that are the focus of this special issue and on numerous other dimensions of the environment-migration-conflict nexus. In particular, evidence-based analysis is needed to improve policies and practices. We hope the articles collected in this section stimulate much-needed discussion, particularly regarding potential pathways forward.