Abstract
This short piece examines how generative AI is becoming embedded in far-right propaganda ecosystems, drawing on examples from the 2023 Dublin riots and the 2024 Southport unrest. Using a media experiment, it traces a re-generative pipeline in which extremist images collected from Telegram and X are first converted into text prompts and then re-created through commercial image models. The results suggest that AI systems do not simply neutralize hateful content: they often sanitize its most explicit markers while preserving, displacing or rearticulating underlying ideological bias. The article argues that this affinity between far-right visual culture and generative AI is not accidental, but rooted in the biases and aesthetic logics built into contemporary commercial models.
Introduction
The Dublin Riots on 23 November 2023 were the most serious public disorder incident seen in Ireland in modern times. The riot followed a stabbing attack by an Irish citizen born in Algeria that left three children and a woman seriously injured (BBC News, 2023). On the evening of the riots, Irish MMA celebrity Conor McGregor tweeted on X, ‘You Reap what you sow’ (McGregor, 2023). Minutes later, a generative AI image of McGregor standing in front of a burning bus was shared by an account on X (Outspoken, 2023). The image was reshared by Paul Golding, leader of the far-right political party Britain First, and went on to have more than 20 million views on X (Golding, n.d.). Having seen the popularity of McGregor's burning bus image, Britain First began to post more AI content, even running into X's limited moderation efforts (Simon, 2024).
In July of 2024, another mass stabbing incident occurred; this time in the UK. Three children were killed at a dance studio in Southport (Sinmaz, 2024a). The civil disorder that followed was the worst the UK has seen in the last decade (Sinmaz, 2024b). Within three hours, X facilitated the circulation of an AI-generated image laden with charged symbolism: bearded men in traditional Muslim dress positioned outside Parliament, one brandishing a knife, behind a crying child in a Union Jack T-shirt. The account responsible, ‘Europe Invasion’, had been consistently disseminating far-right content since 2010, but now wielded new technological tools (Europe Invasion, 2024). The images created by these actors were not ‘deep fakes’. Rather, they were incitement propaganda laden with conspiracy messaging, such as the Great Replacement.
The technological sophistication of these campaigns has only increased since then, extending beyond static images into AI-generated video and music across mainstream platforms. The situation is complex: generative AI has become a powerful new instrument in the far-right's propaganda arsenal, not merely enabling the rapid production and viral dissemination of increasingly sophisticated extremist narratives, but also regurgitating and entrenching inscribed normative biases, culminating in the incapacity to recognize and mitigate hate.
In this short piece, we propose a media experiment that explores the role that bias in AI systems plays in facilitating their use as propaganda tools. The goal is to suggest that the productive synergy between radical right-wing ideologies and generative AI is not an innocent unintended consequence of new technologies (Parvin and Pollock, 2020), but a structural feature emerging from the deep-rooted biases embedded within the training data and algorithmic architectures that power these systems. In other words, the apparent flaw is in fact part of the system's design. By creating a sort of generative AI loop, we take images circulated in far-right circles we study, and ‘sanitize them’ through commercially available models by creating textual descriptions. Afterward, we used other commercially available models to produce a new set of images based on these descriptions, paying attention to how, in the process, biases may shift in form but do not entirely disappear. We believe that our re-generating experiment highlights that the true peril of this media lies not in their potential for deep deception, which is the traditional concern about ‘deepfakes’. It is rather their potency as vehicles for ideological transmission that makes them concerning, particularly given how the sanitation effects we often encounter in genAI outputs still reproduce problematic visions of society. Given the short form of the media experiment, we leave for future exploration the synergistic role that the platform itself plays in the production of such polarizing media. Whether content follows affective platform dynamics or vice versa is beyond our scope since we do not collect likes, retweets, replies, or any contextual metadata. Our focus, instead, is set exclusively on the AI pipeline, which, at the same time, is a more attainable process to reproduce.
Methods
The initial images were collected by combining manual curation of relevant Telegram channels and X accounts and an automated data pipeline. These accounts included far-right political parties, individual party leaders and influencers, and a single Generative AI Telegram account operating as a bot. For Telegram data extraction, we leveraged Cisticola, a Bellingcat-developed framework built on top of Telethon, which allowed us to interface with Telegram's API through an authenticated account. Our Twitter dataset, though more selective, was carefully curated to capture key actors within the far-right digital ecosystem, including leadership accounts of a prominent British far-right political party, an influential British far-right figure and an Irish far-right organization. Given Twitter's increasingly restrictive data access policies, we employed the Digital Methods Initiative's Zeeschuimer tool to scrape tweets, one of the few remaining viable options for systematic data collection from the platform. The resulting corpus comprised 256 images: 236 from Telegram and 20 from Twitter. All of the images were submitted to an automated generative pipeline. For image generation, we developed a pipeline within a Jupyter Notebook, where each image was submitted to Replicate Methexis Inc's Img2prompt model to transform it into text prompts. We chose Img2prompt for its zero-shot capabilities, low cost, and open-source status, and because it has been specifically developed for image-to-text tasks. The model simply takes an image and returns a text description. It cannot be guided in any way and can be seen as a raw view of the Img2prompt model itself. These text descriptions are independent of the original context and tend not to report race or ethnicity. Img2Prompt has been run (at least) 2.6 million times (Methexis Inc, 2024). Next, these prompts were fed to Stability AI's sdxl model. Sdxl was chosen given its status as the successor to Stable Diffusion, the model we believe was used to generate most of the original images. Sdxl is also quite popular, having been run over 77 million times (Stability AI, 2024).
Results
In this section, we present a selection of images resulting from this pipeline. The selection was curated based on its common 1950s Americana aesthetic (Table 1).
Image R.
Conclusions
Considering the media we used as a point of departure, our re-generative pipeline shows some surprisingly sanitized results. However, these sanitized images are also infused with a perhaps no-less problematic 1950s Americana aesthetic, which would arguably align with current imaginations of the last time the USA was perceived as doing great by its current president. This aesthetic seems to be independent of the textual prompts, pointing to a bias of the model itself. The model used to describe images tends towards blandness: none of the resulting prompts consider ethnicity relevant (Figures 6, 7, and 8 in Table 1), and anti-Semitic imagery is not recognized (Figure 9). On the other end of the pipeline, many of the images produced by sdxl (and specifically the curated images included above) also show that the image generation model initially tends towards blandness. For instance, the transformation in Figure 9 – morphing the middle finger into a V for victory sign – does interesting political work that needs to be acknowledged: contentious content is not removed, but reconfigured into subtler ambient cues (Pilipets and Geboers, 2025) that still hold considerable meaning for those in the know.
Generative images like these will continue to spread and influence the dynamics of online sociality across platforms. The sophistication of the technologies involved increases faster than any attempts to identify them. As we suggested at the start, we believe our re-generating experiment shows the potency of these images as vehicles for ideological transmission. Concern about how these images can be used to subvert truth through deep fakes, we would suggest, is misplaced. Instead, their power resides in their ability to crystallize and amplify conspiracy theories, to render abstract hatred in visceral, shareable forms, powered by your commercial model of choice.
Footnotes
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
