What's in it for Me?

A “coalition of the willing” is how President George W. Bush described his grand alliance against Saddam Hussein. But a more appropriate term might be “coalition of the wanting,” according to Jakub Grygiel, the George H. W. Bush Chair in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

In Grygiel's view, Washington's ability to craft and maintain enduring alliances has little to do with shared objectives and ideals. Nations rally to America's side because of its unique status as a great power–a modern-day “empire”–that can bestow considerable economic, political, and strategic benefits. “The United States, in other words, only has allies because of what it is and what it can offer, not because of what it pursues,” he writes in the Spring 2006 issue of Orbis. Countries “joined the United States [in Iraq] because they wanted to achieve their own local or regional objectives.”

For instance, South Korea's decision to commit more than 3,500 troops to assist in Iraqi reconstruction was not born out of a noble desire to promote democracy in the Middle East. Rather, Seoul saw it as a political opportunity to solidify its strategic relationship with Washington and gain leverage in seeking a more accommodating policy with North Korea. Likewise, most European coalition members, such as Spain and Italy, supported Washington as “a way to balance against the increasing haughtiness of Jacques Chirac's France.” Tiny Macedonia, which Bush publicly thanked last October for its “strong support,” contributed a grand total of 30 troops to the war effort because it wanted Washington's backing in squabbles with neighboring Greece.

Grygiel warns that these alliances are fickle and last only as long as the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. In Spain, growing domestic opposition to the war made it politically untenable for Madrid to remain in the coalition. The Polish government grew increasingly antsy because its support for the war did not lead to a much-desired visa waiver program with the United States. Poles wondered aloud why they were still required to obtain visas, while citizens of antiwar countries such as Germany and France could visit America freely. Confronted with Polish griping, the United States sought to smooth things over with a $33 million increase in military aid in early 2005.

Owing to the unpredictable–and often ephemeral–nature of these relationships, Grygiel concludes that grand, multilateral alliances, such as NATO, are increasingly relics of the past. In the future, U.S. policy makers will need considerable diplomatic dexterity to sustain a dizzying array of bilateral alliances. “This puts a great deal of stress on the U.S. ability to follow the political mood of each potential and actual ally, from Poland to South Korea, from Uzbekistan to Macedonia,” he writes. Success will require “strong emphasis on language skills, regional knowledge, and cultural sensitivity–talents that have been neglected over the past decades.” Nobody ever said that running an empire was easy.