Abstract
This article reports on a study of teachers at one reforming high school. Though it is not their task to debate No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the authors locate their investigation inside the current policy context to which NCLB is attached. Specifically, they present their analysis through the organizational behavior lens of threat rigidity to discuss the ways that current federal and state policy contexts influence schools and how those affected schools in turn adopt corresponding reforms that influence teachers’ work. The analysis demonstrates that on both levels, such influence occurs in similar ways: by centralizing and restricting the flow of information, by constricting control, by emphasizing routinized and simplified instructional/assessment practices, and by applying strong pressure for school personnel to conform.
Teaching is a job with a lot of contradictions in it, and I think it requires a lot of perseverance and idealism. Without the idealism, you know, why would you be there?
—One of the teachers interviewed
The current education policy climate in the United States is controversial and complex. After decades of allegiance to decentralized state and local control of schools, the recent movement toward school accountability, standardization, and federal control began in the 1980s as response to A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983); it gained momentum during Bill Clinton’s 1990s administration, and it burst open with George W. Bush’s appointment of Rod Paige as education secretary and with the subsequent enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; McGuinn, 2006; Rowan, 1990; Sleeter, 2007). NCLB has become a lightning rod for concentrated attacks, defenses, punditry, and sweeping education reforms in our country’s public schools. Although it is not the task of this article to debate NCLB, we locate our analysis inside the influential policy context of which NCLB is considered the pointed and public face.1 Over the last several years, the policy culture in education writ large has engendered significant changes in how schools operate. For example, how to define and measure “highly qualified” teachers has affected teacher preparation and licensure; at the same time, it has also increased the scrutiny of and support for various “backdoor” alternative paths and internships into the profession (Ingersoll, 2002; Peyser & Costrell, 2004). Most public schools now focus on and oftentimes fear annual school scores based on aggregated results of state-developed indicators (Elmore, Abelmann, & Furhman, 1996; McDermott, 2007). Many teachers and administrators contend with not only increased public scrutiny of their practice but also concerns about job security and state receivership of their schools. Numerous states and city school districts require strict adherence to purchased curricula, prescriptive teaching methods, and mandated textbooks. Finally, heated rhetoric has gathered around the topic of whether public education is flawed beyond repair or able to improve if left to its own devices (Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Will, 2006). For better or worse—and perhaps it is both—the policy landscape of education in the United States has been turned inside out.
This article reports on a qualitative study of six teachers at one reforming California high school. The research question that we set out to answer was twofold: First, how does a school’s reform climate (influenced by local, state, and federal education policy cultures) affect teachers and their careers? Second, how do these teachers in turn affect the school’s reform climate? The study was designed to examine reciprocal relationships among teachers’ perspectives on their work as situated within the school and larger education policy reform climates. Because all parts of the equation—teachers’ views, work, and careers; school contexts; larger policy climates and pressures—are not discrete but inextricably connected, we adopted an ecological research design.2 Utilizing an inductive analytical method, we first studied the collected data through two related research frames: school reform implementation (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Fullan & Pomfret, 1977) and school restructuring (Elmore, Peterson, & McCarthy, 1996; Rosenholtz, 1991). We then conducted a fuller, fine-grained analysis of the data through the lens of threat rigidity effects in organizational behavior (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). We discuss these research lenses and introduce threat rigidity as our theoretical frame after first presenting our study design.
Study Design
To examine the interrelationships among teachers, current reform approaches, top-down policy pressures, and the school context, we selected six teachers from one academic department (English) at one large underperforming high school in Southern California.3 The school was selected partly because its demographic and student performance details make it the kind of school current educational reforms target and partly because its recent site history is steeped in multiple active attempts at school reform. Teacher selection was guided by our desire to represent a range of professional experiences, including teacher preparation, multiple roles within teaching, and years in the profession. The resulting stratified random sample included English teachers who attended various teacher preparation programs (undergraduate, graduate, and intern) at public and private universities. Furthermore, all participants had taken on different leadership roles as teachers, and the sample varied in number of years teaching, from 3 to 25, which we grouped into early-career teachers (n = 2), midcareer teachers (n = 2), and later-career teachers (n = 2).4 Additional teacher information is included in Table 1.
We met with each teacher in the fall, winter, and spring of 2005–2006 to conduct audiotaped, hour-long semistructured interviews. Interview protocols focused on uncovering teachers’ personal and professional histories; past and current education practice; perspectives on teaching, their school, and various education/policy reforms; and career plans. The school principal declined our two interview requests. We also collected documents and artifacts about the federal, state, district, and school contexts: published reports, Web site data, news articles, and teacher materials.
Choosing Our Analytical Frame: School Reform Research
Contours and consequences of modern school reform have been well documented in research on school reform implementation in the 1970s and on school restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s. Our own data analysis began with those research frames. School reform implementation as a research domain resulted from an investigation into why the first modern federally mandated school reform programs failed: the so-called Sputnik reforms of 1958 (i.e., the National Defense Education Act) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Sarason, 1982; Twight, 1994). Berman and McLaughlin (1978), Fullan and Pomfret (1977), and Sarason (1982) found the implementation of school reforms to be its own active force. Implementation is not an inert, simple process of putting into practice some chosen educational change. Instead, it carries its own influences and effects that become intertwined with and work to alter both school and reform. This research lens allowed us to examine ways in which the reform implementation process mediated the reforms being implemented and the teachers’ perspectives on their work.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the school restructuring movement and its accompanying research picked up on active roles of reform implementation; yet, it also foregrounded the ways in which the school context is an active variable in reform (Little, 1982; Osborn & Broadfoot, 1992; Rosenholtz, 1991; Sisken, 1994; Woods, Jeffrey, & Bayle, 1997). Considering that a school’s history, its administrative culture, its teaching staff (i.e., the characteristics of), and its contextual details mediate how or if reforms take effect, school restructuring advocates called for implementing school reforms carefully and holistically. The school restructuring movement held that reform implementation is a fragile, complex, site-specific phenomenon and that any reforming school or district should match its program of reform implementation to the specific contours of its context. This research frame enabled us to investigate how the school’s history, culture, and staff characteristics affected its reform process.
Both analytical phases illuminated how teachers were affected by school change attempts and how the change attempts were affected by the teachers; yet, we believed that there was a deeper, more novel phenomenon inside our data. Preliminary analysis had identified a pattern whereby the federal and state education policy climate appeared to be pressuring the local school administration and school board in ways that produced an identifiable kind of threat mentality. We found that from the school administration and teaching staff came rigid defensiveness, coupled with a psychological myopia, that sabotaged the reform attempts and created a hostile work environment for the teachers whom we studied. To better understand this phenomenon, we turned to sociological research regarding how organizations cope with adversity. Specifically, we took up the concept of threat rigidity.
Organizational Behavior and Threat Rigidity
Threat rigidity as an analytical frame emerges from the sociological field of organizational behavior, and it can be located inside the natural systems perspective on organizations and the new institutionalism theory. The natural systems perspective focuses on the relationship between an organization and its goals, to highlight how organizations are guided by not only their stated goals but also their inherent desire for continued existence (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Scott, 2003). This perspective holds that it is an organization’s survival that becomes the primary task for those involved and that the organization’s stated goals become eclipsed by its desire to sustain itself (Scott, 2003). For example, a preschool created to serve children from the community over time becomes a place focused on keeping itself afloat, with the staff’s working in part to ensure its continued employment. Natural systems theory treats individuals within an organization not as mere group members solely committed to the goals of the organization but as “more expansive, social, and motivationally complex [actors]” (p. 87) with sometimes-competing loyalties.
Complementing the natural systems perspective, the new institutionalism theory explains the safeguarding of organizations through institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rowan, 1982). The underlying premise is that organizational forms and behaviors reflect prevailing societal beliefs that, over time, become taken-for-granted norms. Meyer and Rowan (1977) refer to this as myth and ceremony, where an organization’s external structures and internal activities are loosely coupled so that the organization can appear legitimate despite possible inconsistencies: “To maintain ceremonial conformity, organizations that reflect institutional rules tend to [be able to] buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical activities by becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between their formal structures and actual work activities” (p. 341). For example, as a public organization supported through tax revenue, a school earns external legitimacy when its visible structures resemble what society expects a successful school to look like: a recognizable architecture, a U.S. flag out front, knowledge demarcated by class periods with familiar names, teachers with official credentials. This societal validation seals off and protects the school’s core work (i.e., learning and teaching) from outside intrusion or suspicion. Within this perspective, then, recent wholesale attacks on the legitimacy of schools as effective learning organizations (e.g., the current press for accountability, teacher quality concerns) compel different levels of the organization to respond in particular ways because the “forces maintaining the structure are themselves activated by forces threatening the equilibrium” (Scott, 2003, p. 61).
We combined these two perspectives to understand how actors, as complex individuals within a school, responded to multilevel attacks on their legitimacy and their school’s legitimacy. As such, we turned to Staw and colleagues’ work (1981) on threat rigidity.5 We applied threat rigidity, as created by Staw et al. and as derived from business management studies, to examine how the current federal education policy context influences schools and how those affected schools in turn adopt corresponding reforms that influence teachers’ work. We found that on both levels, threat rigidity occurs in a number of similar ways: by centralizing and restricting the flow of information, by constricting control, by emphasizing routinized and simplified instructional/assessment practices, and by applying strong pressure for school personnel to conform. These adaptations, or threat rigidity effects, created in the teachers the very responses that Staw et al. identified in business organization members: psychological stress, intergroup and intragroup difficulties, defensiveness/resentment, a desire to hide one’s practice, and a move to replace the first-tier leadership. We describe threat rigidity in detail later, but first we introduce the school context.
The Context: Hawthorne High School
The school, which we call Hawthorne High School, is located in Southern California. Hawthorne is a large, comprehensive high school located in a rural, agricultural community. The community has a long history of drawing in members of various minority groups (Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Mexican) for agricultural labor. The school has roughly 3,500 students, of which more than one third are classified as English learners (predominantly, Spanish speakers). About two thirds of the students qualify for free or reduced-price lunches. The majority of the students are Latino (93%), with the balance comprising White/other (5%) and Asian American (2%). The mostly White teaching staff is experienced, with an average of 14 years of teaching. Situated at the nexus of contested ideas about achievement, Hawthorne is considered underperforming by the teachers in this study and the community, even though according to the state and federal achievement markers (academic performance index and adequate yearly progress), Hawthorne met its performance goals for the 2005–2006 school year.6
During the year of data collection, Hawthorne was engaged in several schoolwide reforms: establishing small learning communities (SLCs), creating and implementing departmental curricular maps, adopting a new block schedule, and inserting into the beginning of the school day an “advisory” period for all students. Adoption of these reforms was met by mixed, mostly negative response by teachers. One reform in particular (the move to SLCs) was reportedly adopted—or “steamrolled though,” as one teacher put it—by the administration through means that some teachers considered underhanded. Additionally, in spring the school was having its accreditation reviewed by the Western Association for Schools and Colleges (WASC) for the third time in 9 years; this was treated as a very high-stakes event. According to the teachers, this eventual WASC review did not go well. Not only was Hawthorne granted only a 3-year accreditation period (essentially, a probationary stamp of disapproval), but during the weeklong review, Hawthorne teachers shared school rumors, complaints, and other “dirty laundry” with the review team and resented the artificial nature of the “dog and pony show” that they were being asked to perform.
Largely because of these school reform efforts and WASC pressures, during this year Hawthorne experienced considerable friction between administration and faculty and among faculty subgroups and individual teachers. Dominating our interviews was teacher-initiated talk about school tensions and frustrations that affected teaching practice and teacher perspectives. A group of 20 teachers (not in our research sample) who opposed the changes implemented by the principal led a campaign of resistance against him, resulting in his departure at the end of the year. As the school year came to a close, tensions had polarized groups of teachers and increased hostilities between teachers and administration. Three of the four assistant principals at Hawthorne were offered early retirement or were transferred. Several teachers at Hawthorne left, including one of the six in our sample. Two more in our sample said that they were preparing to leave after the following year; one said that she was considering leaving; and another said that he was ready for retirement. We found that the content of the school reforms, the manner of their implementation, the generally hostile personnel climate, and the attitudes and career perspectives of the six teachers were all related. Understanding this emic reality—what we call “the Hawthorne situation”—became our analytical task and so constitutes the remainder of this article.
Threat Rigidity and Survival Responses to the Hawthorne Reforms
In the relatively besieged work environment at Hawthorne, dysfunctional patterns of communication, leadership, and staff behavior arose that, rather than move reform successfully along, hindered and even sabotaged initial reform efforts. We believe that this maladaptive response phenomenon fits precisely with what Staw et al. (1981) termed threat rigidity effects in organizational behavior. Threat rigidity is the theory that an organization, when perceiving itself under siege (i.e., threatened or in crisis), responds in identifiable ways: Structures tighten; centralized control increases; conformity is stressed; accountability and efficiency measures are emphasized; and alternative or innovative thinking is discouraged.
These organizational adaptations, or threat rigidity effects, result in a set of threat rigidity responses by the individuals and subgroups of the organization. Psychological stress emerges and so limits the cognitive ability of organization members to discriminate unfamiliar stimuli and think flexibly or innovatively. Groups within the organization quarrel over power, resources, and support for their solutions to the threat. The group that typically prevails (often temporarily) increases its intragroup relations; overall, however, intergroup ties lessen, and the losing group suffers a marked decrease in intragroup cohesiveness. Conformity, efficiency, and standardization measures decrease individuals’ perceptions of their value to the organization. Finally, the first-tier leadership of the organization is replaced, whereas the second-tier leadership gains power. These are the maladaptive phenomena that Staw et al. (1981) found to occur when organizations find themselves in a kind of survival mode. This model fits our data perfectly.
We found threat rigidity at play in two ways: one federal/macro and the other one local/micro. Because our study focused on local effects of threat rigidity, we center our analysis on those micro-dimensions of threat rigidity dimensions. However, to situate our localized analysis inside the larger context, a brief introduction to threat rigidity at the federal level is helpful. The macro-minded manifestation of threat rigidity is that the current educational policy zeitgeist in the United States can be seen as a threat rigidity effect of recent social and political views of education—namely, that public education is failing. These views are often referred to as “the crisis of education.” They were ushered in by A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), and they were intensified in recent calls for increased accountability, high-stakes standardized testing, and “teacher-proof” instruction (Berliner & Biddle, 1995; McGuinn, 2006). The thumbnail analysis goes like this: Since the early 1980s, factions in society have concluded that U.S. public education is failing and/or has become a threat—to national security, to individual social mobility, to economic dominance abroad, to performance on various international indicators (such as literacy rates and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study), and so on. Concluding that education is in crisis, those factions enacted a set of reforms as response: high-stakes accountability, an emphasis on standardized testing, new frames of teacher professionalization, the NCLB, and an embrace of scripted curricula and prescriptive pedagogies in many K–12 districts.7 This response corresponds to precisely the kinds of responses that Staw et al. (1981) discuss: restriction of information, constriction of control and centralization of authority, inability to discriminate unfamiliar stimuli, a reversion to simplistic routinized behaviors, eroded group cohesion, increased attention to fiscal efficiency, and increased emphasis on conformity and uniformity.
Almost any look at the current policy culture in education would reveal it to be a textbook threat rigidity effect. Such a view is consistent with studies that have found that most policy aspirations do not match achievement results (McDermott, 2007). Threat rigidity characteristics also fit analyses faulting the oversimplified rigidity of NCLB’s accountability mechanisms—what Popham (2005) calls instructionally insensitive achievement tests—for being ill-suited to the complex contours of teaching and learning. Popham points out that under NCLB many states, including California, have felt pressured to use diagnostic student tests for school evaluation purposes: an example of the kind of self-defeating misalignment that follows from pressures to overprivilege conformity, standardization, and efficiency.
There is, however, a second, more localized way in which Staw and colleagues’ organizational theory (1981) illuminates the situation that our study investigated: This is our micro-minded view of threat rigidity effects and, thus, the primary concern of our study. We found that the situation at Hawthorne High School during 2005–2006 was itself a next-level effect of the national policy culture. In other words, if national education and political perceptions were the first-level threat that led to the first-level effect (i.e., NCLB and its connected policy cultures), then we can view the local pressures on and perceptions of Hawthorne as an underperforming school as a Level 1 effect (on the national and state stage) and a Level 2 threat in the local Hawthorne community. The visual representation depicted in Figure 1 displays this two-tiered effect.
Specifically, various Hawthorne stakeholders and administrators felt pressure to respond to the external threat of its school as a failing one—for example, its being maligned by local media in relation to policy benchmarks, its posting merely satisfactory academic performance index and adequate yearly progress scores, its being considered deficient by parents and students, its scoring badly on past WASC reviews. As such, the school board and administration initiated changes and effects that caused threat rigidity at Hawthorne; that is, Level 2 threat → Level 2 effect. Viewed by community members and education boards through current accountability lenses, Hawthorne was considered a school in crisis. For example, the local newspaper carried multiple stories that were critical of controversial decisions by the school principal and that reported friction among teachers, administration, and the community.8 The visible structures of the school as an effective organization had crumbled, which eroded societal support for the legitimacy of the school. As we demonstrate, the school principal’s response to the threat was to initiate school changes that—sometimes inadvertently and sometimes intentionally—centralized and restricted the flow of information, constricted control, emphasized routinized and simplified instructional/assessment practices, and applied strong pressure for school personnel to conform. These adaptations exacerbated or created, in many of the Hawthorne teachers, the very responses that Staw et al. (1981) had identified: psychological stress, intergroup and intragroup difficulties, defensiveness/resentment, a desire to hide one’s practice, and a move to replace the first-tier leadership. As individual actors in the school organization, the teachers reacted by privileging their individual perspectives over their organizational commitments. Below, we discuss these maladaptive responses inside three categories, which we developed to capture the effects of threat rigidity: intergroup and intragroup tensions; cognitive and structural inflexibility; and professional autonomy, isolation, and visibility.
Intergroup and Intragroup Tensions
The various school changes and surrounding professional climate at Hawthorne included many kinds of tension among teachers and school leaders. We found evidence of tensions between teachers and administration, between some late-career teachers and newer teachers, and among teachers inside and across academic departments. Not only were these group tensions a product of threat rigidity, but they also exacerbated it. As such, our data revealed the following: The principal favored the newer teachers; many teachers possessed negative attitudes toward the Hawthorne administration; personnel tensions affected student learning; the teachers interpreted Hawthorne’s reform climate as deprofessionalizing; escalation of tensions caused the leadership change. We take them up individually.
The Principal’s Favoring the New Teachers
Four teachers spoke in ways that suggest that the principal favored newer teachers as
a whole (i.e., who came to the school when this principal was hired). The three most
recently hired teachers in the English department (Melissa, Layla, Sophia)
articulated cooperative, constructivist philosophies of education in their
conversations with us that seemed to align with the contours of the adopted school
reforms. All three—who were recently prepared in university programs—talked about
privileging group learning, student-centered pedagogy, and teaching for understanding
in their classrooms. For example, they viewed the move to block schedules as a useful
constructivist challenge, whereas the later-career teachers in our sample were far
more skeptical. We suspect that the administration considered the early-career
teachers’ constructivist pedagogies as being compatible with Hawthorne reforms. As
well, we suspect that the principal perceived the newer teachers as being more
malleable.9 Regardless of the cause,
the evidence suggests that they were favored over the later-career teachers. Layla
reported that the principal told her, “You’re one of the ones I want to keep.” And at
another point, Layla said, “[The administrators] pretty much know that I’m doing my
job, they like what I do, so they concentrate on those teachers who are—well, the
trouble people, basically.” Likewise, Melissa said, When I learned that the English department is losing five [teacher] spots, and
here I am [without seniority], I thought to myself, “Oh god, I’m going to be in
trouble; my job’s in jeopardy.” But I learned that [the principal] actually had
carved out a little niche for me as being a model classroom next year, one that
showcases SLCs, which is a little overwhelming but great, because it means I
have a job.10
Two early-career teachers suggested that there was a common perception that many of
the later-career teachers inside and outside the English department were reluctant to
change because it would require too much effort and that they resisted collaboration.
One teacher said that many Hawthorne teachers had not changed their practice over the
years as the community and student population had changed from a predominance of
White students to one of students of color—thereby suggesting that the later-career
teachers’ pedagogies did not match the student realities of these
non-dominant-culture students (Ladson-Billings, 1994; Moll,
Amanti, Neff, & Gonzalez, 1992). The following teacher said that many
later-career teachers became alarmed at the move to block scheduling and then
significantly more concerned about SLCs: So [adopting a block schedule] was huge; some people were upset. And then the
small learning communities [decision was made], and everyone got scared. It was
like, “Oh god, we’re going to be moving into small learning communities—that
means I’m going to be stuck with a group of teachers all the time, forced to
collaborate.” A lot of teachers don’t like to collaborate. You know, they don’t
like to go to meetings. They view it as extra work—having to change their
entire curriculum so everything aligns, which [to me] makes so much more sense.
[But] it’s like, you’ve got a teacher who’s been doing the same thing for 35
years, and they’ve been doing a pretty good job. They don’t want to change.
They’re looking at retirement.
Notice how she moves from the specific—these later-career teachers—to what seems to be a more general indictment of “a lot of” and “so many” 35-year teachers. This shift suggests that there may be a subtle process at work by which this teacher is relying on a common stereotype about later-career teachers (parts of which may be true, parts of which are probably false) that affects her interpretation of the Hawthorne situation as it related to teachers’ career-cycle influences (Huberman, 1993a; Olsen & Kirtman, 2002). Another teacher talked about “the old school vets,” telling us that they “don’t like change—they don’t like having to change, having to turn their curriculum upside down, having to create new curriculum.” This same teacher spoke in a later interview about how the administration was “going after them” but that she herself was not worried: “I’ve got an ‘in’ with the principal—he likes how I teach and leaves me alone.”
We found that the more experienced teachers in our sample shared a cynicism toward Hawthorne’s school reforms, although none was in the group of 20 teachers directly involved in the public feud between teachers and administration. The later-career teachers in our sample revealed a kind of “been there, done that” response to school reform. They shared both a weariness and a wariness toward school change efforts. Richard said, “This is the thing that we do in education: The pendulum swings, we try new programs, we get rid of new programs. Sometimes they work, most of the time they’re just new programs.” This perspective confirms research around later-career teachers’ becoming cynical and embittered, given their multiple generations of school reform experience (Hargreaves, 2005; Huberman, 1993a; Little, 1996).
Whatever the causes, we found tensions between newer teachers (who, intentionally or not, put some of the later-career teachers on the defensive) and later-stage teachers (who may have felt misunderstood, slighted, or fatigued by cycling reform attempts). We think that these already-existent tensions flared up largely because of the frustration, loss of professional autonomy, and other threat rigidity effects that the administrative climate and school reform culture engendered. Teachers quarreled over resources and interpretations of what was happening to Hawthorne. We heard complaints against former and current teacher leaders, conversations about faculty meetings rife with “yelling,” “screaming” and “BMW—a lot of bitching, moaning, and whining.”
Teachers’ Negative Attitudes Toward Administration
All six teachers in our sample believed that the school was suffering from a “leadership crisis.” About this there was consensus. The teachers reported that the administration was “weak,” “in over its head,” and had become “Stalin—doing to teachers things you would never do to your students.” This complaint was sometimes couched in partial sympathy for the administration: The school and district administrators were between a rock and a hard place in terms of external policy pressures on the one side and the interests of students and teachers on the other. This explanation suggests that the administration was forced to make these school changes and thus act callously toward teachers. With a softening of tone, some of the English teachers told us that the administrators were good people at heart but underexperienced and overwhelmed. This perspective connects to the two-tier model of threat rigidity introduced earlier: From the perspective of these sympathetic teachers, Hawthorne leaders were caught in the place where the macro-level effect of threat rigidity (NCLB policy culture as response to education in crisis) becomes the micro-level threat (local pressure to respond to the larger sociopolicy response).
In other versions of this complaint, however, there was less sympathy and more
hostility—less of a sense of administration as victim and more that it constituted
malevolent leadership: [When the new principal came in], nobody expected a dictator. . . . And when
you have that—when you have this “shoot one of the soldiers to keep the others
in line” kind of philosophy . . . it’s not right. The stage we’re at right now
is the hatred, the development of hatred [by teachers toward administration].
People are hiding their heads. People are just “whoosh!” You know? Do your
eight [hours of work] and hit the [school] gate. Don’t get involved in
anything.
Within this perspective, the fault lies less in the federal policy climate and more in inept school leadership. Here, there were three primary complaints against the administration: One is that the chosen and implemented school reforms were not good ones; the later-career teachers were more likely than newer teachers to level this complaint. The second concerned the manner in which those reforms were decided and implemented—that is, how the administration mandated restrictive changes while preaching democratic reform, teacher buy-in, and consensus building. Most teachers in our sample shared this perspective. And the third complaint was that the school administration generally had “clamped down” on teachers and students in such draconian ways as to lower morale and anger teachers; all six teachers voiced this position.
Deriving from these complaints were the psychological stress, narrowed thinking, and
group power struggles consistent with that of previous threat rigidity research. We
found significant unease, intergroup and intragroup fighting, and defensiveness
toward the administration, which combined with other threat rigidity maladaptations
to produce the Hawthorne situation. For example, the ways in which the English
department chair pressured teachers to follow the administration’s emphasis on
standardized teaching exacerbated teachers’ ill feelings toward the administration
and thus created interdepartmental tensions. Melissa believed that these pressures
were antithetical to engaging students in the passion and power of literature: The worst thing about it is that so many teachers are forced to focus on
teaching to the test. We’re not teaching literature, not having fun with it.
We’re not teaching kids to love poetry and books. I feel the hair on my back of
my neck raise when I’m doing To Kill A Mockingbird with my
accelerated class and the department chair asks me, “Well, what standard are
you teaching to with that?” I’m like, “Oh my god, what standard am I
not covering?!” To Kill a Mockingbird is
one of the greatest pieces of literature. They’re learning about dialect, and
they’re learning about theme and character as well as the world.
Sophia spoke of a similar pressure: “Our department chair passes the administration’s information to us. And so, because of her and the administration’s opinion about how our teaching should look, there’s more pressure than I have felt in years.”
Interpersonal Tensions as Negatively Affecting Student Learning Opportunities
Not only were the complaints and group tensions both an effect and a cause of the Hawthorne situation, but they were also reported to affect student learning. We found evidence that these tensions among educators spilled onto students in various ways. For example, teachers talked about how the constricted flow of communication meant that multiple kinds of school information never got to students correctly, on time, or sometimes at all: Administrative messages were not relayed to teachers; class and roster schedules changed without notice or explanation; frequent intercom messages to teachers and students interrupted class time. The teachers told us that student learning suffered as a result—specifically, in the form of breaks in student concentration; significant class time being squandered on sharing, clarifying, or correcting school information; and student and teacher stress over having insufficient information.
Three teachers talked about how they could not help but bring their schoolwide
frustrations into interactions with students. Near the beginning of the school year,
Melissa prophetically told us, [At the beginning of the school year, administration] looked at the master
schedule, got rid of all of our long-term subs, reassigned a few teachers, some
of us had to move rooms, some of us had to actually change teaching
assignments. Everything kind of shut down, and it was a really ugly process,
and people were very, very angry, and that was kind of the start of this whole
snowballing—just rage, really, among a group of teachers that is really, I
think, probably going to play out ultimately in some kind of ugly way. But I’m
just kind of trying to stay out of it. . . . Most of the time, I can come in
and just focus on my class and be fine. On the days I have to attend a meeting
before school, [my frustration at the meeting] affects me as a teacher. And I
really became aware of it one day when I came in after meetings, and I just
yelled at a student. There was shock on the little faces around me. I said, you
know, “I’m really sorry. I was just in a meeting that made me really mad, and I
think I’m still just kind of in a bad mood.” And then I just realized, “Wow,
this is really getting to me and I don’t want it to.”
Three themes in this passage are worth noting. First, Melissa suggests that most of her time with colleagues was unpleasant—and we heard this sentiment from four of the six teachers in our sample. This finding further confirmed one effect of the Hawthorne rigidity—namely, that collegial relations among teachers were seriously strained. A second theme is that the unpleasantness occasionally affected interactions with students, although that seemed to be rare and something quickly addressed by Melissa. A third theme is that, in this passage, Melissa represents the classroom as a kind of safe place—a refuge from the school complications and a place where she can do what she entered teaching to do: work with students. As Sophia commented on “hiding in my classroom” and Susan described her classroom as a “fake world, [where] you just create whatever world you want,” Melissa invoked the theme of teacher isolation and invisibility as a buffer against the Hawthorne hostilities; we discuss this theme later in the article.
Teachers’ Interpretation of Hawthorne’s Reform Climate as Deprofessionalizing
We found that threat rigidity made teachers believe that neither the larger education policy climate nor the Hawthorne administration respected their professional practice. Specifically, all six teachers in our study were disheartened by the deprofessionalization and decreased trust: It made them resentful; it led them to isolate themselves in their classroom (“put my head down, focus on the students, and just teach)”; and it sometimes pushed them into leaving, or considering leaving, Hawthorne. The teachers spoke about how the macro-policy climate of standardization, conformity, and high-stakes testing—all threat rigidity effects—ignored the teachers’ training, talent, artistry, and skill as educators. They acknowledged that the school administration was responding to federal and state pressures in these areas, but they believed that it was not doing it well. So there were two targets of their displeasure: their school and the larger policy climate.
When asked about the new textbook series that Hawthorne administrators adopted and
expected teachers to follow, Sophia talked about how the book in particular and the
administrative action in general neglected her competence: “I don’t need [the book
publishing company] to tell me how to engage students.” And she went on to talk about
how prescriptive textbooks ignore her professional training, her teaching experience,
and her knowledge of the students in her classroom. Melissa lamented that pushes for
standardization and high-stakes standardized tests conceive of learning as rote facts
rather than deep understandings and learning strategies. Bill said that the tests are
racist for privileging White middle-class cultural literacies. Sophia said that the
Hawthorne reforms made her feel like a worker bee. All the teachers mentioned how
demoralizing it is to have to follow education mandates created by nonteaching
educators, people who have not taught in decades, and/or politicians outside the
education field. When asked if the education mandates around testing and prescriptive
curricula bothered her, Melissa offered this reply: Yes it bothers me. . . . I think it’s fine to have some core pieces of
literature and some core themes, but I also love to supplement that with short
stories and teach other things, poems I want them to read. And if someone
starts telling me I can’t do that any more, I’m not going to like that. It
takes the pride out of your work—if you’ve developed a unit or something, I
think being told, “No, you have to do this instead,” is very demoralizing. It
makes me feel like, then, you don’t really need trained teachers; you just need
trained monkeys. It’s disrespectful to teachers.
In the teachers’ words and nonverbal cues, we frequently noticed a strong affective
dimension to the threat rigidity effects around deprofessionalism; the teachers were
filled with more despair than hope. These were teachers who believed that they were
doing well amid difficult circumstances, working as hard as they could, and they took
it personally that they were continually critiqued by their own administrators, who
knew them, and infantilized by the policy culture, which did not know them. Bill
offered an analogy: [It’s like] someone going in to the community hospital and getting all the
doctors and nurses together and saying, “You people! What’s wrong with you? We
have too many sick people coming into this hospital and they’re not getting any
better.” . . . You know, would we punish the doctors or the nurses? No. Because
we understand that it’s a dynamic institution, that you address what comes
through that door in the state that they come to you. There are a lot of
variables. You may have 34 or 35 kids in your classroom, and you can’t just
lecture to them. You have to figure what’s going on with them and reach them in
ways they’ll understand, and, boy, it’s real tiring sometimes. I don’t think
the powers-that-be understand this.
Escalation of Tensions and the Subsequent Leadership Change
Group tensions at Hawthorne had escalated and boiled over by the end of the year. By
late spring, the public feud between a group “of about 20 disgruntled veteran
teachers” and the school principal had surfaced. This feud appeared to have two
related components: one, a personal opposition between the group of later-career
teachers and the principal (i.e., there appeared to be mutual antipathy); two, a kind
of philosophical split (part ideological and part career location) between attitudes
toward school change. Administration was mandating a set of specific changes: The 20
disgruntled later-career teachers actively opposed the school reforms, and the other
teachers opposed the reforms to various degrees in private or were frustrated but
supported the reforms nonetheless. In late winter, Layla told us, I’m starting to feel the lines are being drawn again. Some of the veteran
teachers will start screaming at you in front of people. I feel a lot of
tension, like when we’re in meetings; I feel that tenseness. There’s a sort of
veteran alliance—veterans teaming together—that whole veteran thing
happening.
Sophia bemoaned some of these teachers who were so actively resisting current
reforms: “They get really upset by things, by the changes that are happening. There’s
just a lot of griping.” However, Richard—one of the later-career teachers in our
sample—saw it differently. His perspective was that the group of later-career
teachers was fighting admirably for something that it believed in: The way [that the principal] is handling the situation and the way he’s
treating the staff—I knew that morale was low and a lot of people were unhappy.
[Until recently] I did not realize that it was these [20 later-career] teachers
specifically [who were leading the protest]—they’re all excellent teachers,
teachers whose integrity or care for students can’t be questioned. I can’t
stomach [all the negativity] any more, but I understand them. They’re putting
their jobs on the line and saying [to the principal], “You’ve got to do
something different.”
Near the end of the academic year, the principal left the school for a job in another district, and several assistant principals chose to leave or were pushed out. Of the 20 disgruntled veterans, most remained (perhaps all; it is not clear which). This outcome matches Staw and colleagues’ finding (1981) that in threat rigidity cases, the second-tier leadership (in this case, the 20 later-career teachers) often takes out the first-tier leadership (here, the recently installed Hawthorne administration). Overall, threat rigidity illuminates the brittle dynamics that had emerged among adults at Hawthorne: demarcated battle lines, deteriorating communication, heightened emotions, and increased defensiveness.
Cognitive and Structural Inflexibility
One way to view threat rigidity is as an organizational circling of the wagons—a way that groups tighten up and fixate in response to danger. As an effect of the macro-threat rigidity, NCLB and policy culture can be characterized here as a tightening of educational procedures, outcomes, and teaching models in schools and districts and as a clamping down on alternative thinking or decentralized attitudes toward reform. As an effect of the micro-threat rigidity, the policy culture can be seen as having instigated or heightened various localized school-level inflexibilities at Hawthorne. Teacher interviews revealed the following: First, school structures and personnel policies tightened up, resulting in an increased pressure to standardize one’s practice; second, communication was constricted and made more hierarchical; third, there was increased pressure to conform to the administration’s reform vision, thereby leaving no or little attention to flexible or alternative thinking.
Tightened Structures and Policies and the Pressure to Standardize
School structures and personnel policies tightened up, and the teachers’ felt increased pressure to standardize their practice. Of the multiple reforms taking place at Hawthorne during the 2005–2006 school year, the implementation of curricular mandates took center stage, such as the development and use of curricular maps and the adoption of a new textbook series. We found both tangible and symbolic effects from these mandates. Here, we examine the adoption of curricular maps.
The development of, and unevenly forced adherence to, these maps dominated the
teachers’ work during the year. As well, opportunities for professional growth were
co-opted under the auspice of this reform: Just about all Hawthorne professional
development days were reportedly devoted to curricular maps and the WASC visit, which
disappointed teachers who expected more substantive development opportunities from
their in-service professional days. Sophia said, We had to do a lot of—they weren’t really professional development days but
happened during those times. They were days when we spent a lot of hours
together—days where we had to build the whole curriculum map thing.
Not only did the teachers believe that the curricular maps constrained their teaching
work, but they also believed that their professional autonomy suffered and their
expertise was slighted. Weighing in on this point, Melissa told us, I feel like you need to give kids a broad range of skills, and there are a lot
of classroom experiences that they will benefit tremendously from in life,
things learned in high school that are not necessarily in the standards or the
map. And so I’m certainly not going to limit myself to those [curriculum
mandates]. I’ll do them, and I’m completely willing to be accountable for the
things I’m supposed to teach, but I am in no way going to limit myself to
them—even though that’s what I think this school wants. I shouldn’t have to
justify why I’m having students give a speech or an oral presentation. If
someone can’t see the value in that, then I can’t explain it to them. It’s
frustrating.
None of the six teachers in our study opposed the concept of curricular maps; they all discussed positive aspects of having the maps as a shared resource, and four teachers talked about the value of vertically and horizontally integrating course contents. However, the administration’s reported hypocrisy and contradictory insistence on strict adherence rankled teachers. The perceived hypocrisy was that the administration mandated these maps as a useful way for departments to open up their practice and create useful guides to follow, but the reality—according to the teachers in our sample—was that the maps were used by administration as a way to control and standardize teaching. Sophia said, “If we don’t have the map at hand, we’re made to feel that somehow we’re not doing our job.
In practice, most teachers did not meaningfully collaborate on the development of
these maps; instead, most departments, we were told, treated them as busy work:
perfunctorily filling them in to have something to submit by the deadlines. There was
an unevenness across departments, with some taking it seriously, with some farming it
out to willing volunteers, and with some ignoring the mandate altogether. We were
told that the maps were not used as a guide but as a script for standardizing
teaching. Melissa said, We were told at various times over the course of the year: “This is your bible,
and I [as assistant principal] want to be able to walk into any class English 1
class on a given Wednesday and see all of you on the same page and the same
chapter.”
The second complaint from teachers relates to the administration’s contradictory
insistence on strict adherence. Most of the teachers in our sample resented being
told that they must follow the curricular maps; yet, at the same time, they knew that
Hawthorne administrators were not going to conduct surveillance in teacher
classrooms. None of the teachers with whom we spoke enacted the maps with any
fidelity. They described the school’s use of maps as a temporary reform: Teachers
would use them when they had to, while waiting for the pendulum to swing back. They
considered the maps ill-fitting to the needs of their students. Teachers had no
reason to believe that the mandate would be enforced and so did not take the
development very seriously. In the end, most teachers viewed the maps as merely a
façade for the accreditation review. It was, they reasoned, all about the externally
visible structures of schooling, not the core work of classroom teaching and
learning. Melissa put it this way: This is all about WASC. When WASC comes, the administration has pretty much
said, “You better be where you’re supposed to be on your curricular map.” And
the thing that I hate is you have to pretend to be doing this and generate two
days’ worth of lesson plans, and I think that just beats the whole purpose of
WASC, [which] is supposed to be so that we can reflect and see what’s working
and what isn’t working. We’re all faking for WASC. How are they going to be
able to give us any valuable input? How are we going to grow? So I just think
it’s a sad state of affairs.
The teachers frequently talked about the curricular maps as a failed reform and an unpleasant and simultaneously unfair, unwarranted, and unsuccessful attempt at standardizing their practice. Most spoke in similar ways about the textbook adoption, the advisory period, and the move to SLCs.
Communication Constricted and Made More Hierarchical
Another dimension of the cognitive and structural inflexibility at Hawthorne was that
communication was constricted between administration and teachers and among teachers.
This created a stressful work environment and so limited opportunities for
professional growth. Four teachers complained about not having a clear sense of what
was happening in the school. Sophia said, Just constant lack of communication, and a lot of it just has to do with people
being overwhelmed. There’s too many people. We’ve got a failing technology
system going on, and people aren’t fully informed. There’s no way to keep up on
all of it.
Whereas all six teachers felt uninformed, four of the teachers described frustration
over not having their voices heard within the administration; the perception was that
administration was listening to only a small subset of Hawthorne’s teachers to inform
decision making. Richard told us, “It seems that the principal is listening to a very
small cheerleading section and ignoring everyone else. And that’s the part, I think,
that’s making everybody more upset.” Other teachers, outside our sample, reported
this sentiment to the local newspaper, including one who was quoted as saying that
she felt intimidated by the principal and another administrator and had thus hired a
lawyer to help her avoid reassignment. Susan likened the administration’s leadership
approach to that of a cruel classroom teacher: [Our administrators are] treating their teachers in a way you’d never treat
your students. If you had a large group of students, and you had five who
wouldn’t do their work, who talked and misbehaved all the time, would you take
your smartest kid or your best kid and punish the hell out of them? Hell no,
you wouldn’t do that. You’d go get some perspective. You’d go watch those guys.
You’d make sure they do what they are supposed to do. You’d ride the
trouble-causing ones a bit and compliment the good ones. You would not punish
everybody!
Taken together, the restricted communication and the sense that the administration
was unreceptive to most teacher input elevated frustrations about administrative
decisions. Overall, the teachers complained that the decision-making process had
became less transparent. With increasing frequency, teachers did not know the
rationale behind the reforms being adopted. Teachers felt powerless to offer dissent
or suggest alternatives. We also heard from the newer teachers that they believed
that their jobs could be in jeopardy and that their working environment would be made
more hostile if they voiced opposition to administrative decisions. For example,
Layla said, I’m scared; I’m not going to go toe-to-toe with [the department chair or the
principal] about anything, because the next thing I know, I’m going to get my
[next year’s class] schedule, and I’ll be just like all those other teachers
that are currently being screwed over—teachers who have a miserable schedule:
five different preps in five different rooms.
A reported example of the lack of transparency and the disregard of teacher input
involved the decision to restructure the school around SLCs. These were described as
a school change that had been considered in previous years but repeatedly voted down.
As such, there was anger toward the administration when the proposal to shift to SLCs
was adopted the previous year. Richard told us, We were told the faculty was going to make the decision [about the SLCs]; we
were told teachers were going to vote on it. We were told what the percentage
would have to be: 75% of the voters would have to approve it. But a week before
the vote, or 2 days before the vote, we were told that instead of 75%, it had
suddenly dropped to 50% plus one. And then, at the last minute, somebody
supposedly called targeted groups of parents, and all of a sudden a group of
parents now had a vote. Nobody knows for sure—nobody’s talking about what group
of parents it was or who decided to make the phone calls to bring them into the
equation and what they were told, but it wasn’t every parent in the district or
school. . . . So, of the teacher votes, out of about 130 people, it was
something like 8 or 9 votes more in favor than against. It wouldn’t have passed
under the initial rules. The parent votes came out in favor. And teachers who
were gone on school business that day were not allowed to vote. So it passed.
The whole thing left a sour taste in most teachers’ mouths.
Communication troubles also existed among teachers. As mentioned, we found a general apprehension toward collaboration: Four of the six teachers talked about not wanting to collaborate with others, and the other two spoke generally about how teachers at Hawthorne typically resist working together. The presence of the 20 disgruntled veterans, whose identities were largely unknown, revealed additional evidence of how communication was restricted among teachers. None of the teachers in our study—but for one later-career teacher, who knew of a few of these veterans—could (or would) identify this subgroup, which had amassed so much local power and which had forced the principal out of the school. This finding suggests not only that these 20 teachers felt the need to do their work in the shadows for fear of reprisal but also that lines of communication were so frayed at Hawthorne that no one knew what was happening outside his or her narrow field of vision, and so everyone’s interpretation became its own subjective truth—a kind of Rashomon effect.
Restricted communication was also revealed in how teachers talked about the larger
policy contexts in which the Hawthorne situation was situated. We found that five of
the six teachers knew very little about NCLB—what it was, how it
came about, how it might be influencing Hawthorne. Four of the teachers talked about
NCLB in vague, broad, mostly negative terms: Sophia: I can’t keep the acronyms straight. All I know is that there’s
pressure for me to do certain things and it’s told to me through my admin,
to my department chair, and then down to me. I’m never let in on the larger
picture. Susan: I think [NCLB] is about doing stupid stuff with the money we’re
offered. I see crazy things. . . . You have this money that’s all tied to
[particular school changes]—foundations and grants—and those folks are all
influenced by the legislature. And so then they say things like “Well, we’re
going to pay for, you know, SLCs or something like that. What we want to do
is fund that!” And then your school goes running off and does it . . .
because that’s where the money says you have to go.
When pressed on particulars or asked to say more about NCLB, these teachers typically drew a blank or offered vague or inaccurate information. One readily acknowledged knowing nothing about it. The teacher in our sample who the newest to the profession was relatively knowledgeable about it: She had looked it up online and had read about it in professional journals, she said. Most teachers in the sample used it as a scapegoat on which to blame just about everything that they considered wrong in education. They had been exposed to sufficient anti-NCLB rhetoric in the press and in conversations with others so much so that it acted as a kind of proxy for some Orwellian future in schools: an education bogeyman just around the corner, waiting to pounce on everything that is good in schooling today. Generally, what we found is that the teachers were far more focused on the educational conditions right in front of them. The immediate school events and teaching policies that affected their daily work at school eclipsed any distant, higher-tier policy pressures that may or may not be trickling down.
This scenario makes sense. It is not surprising that people focus most closely on those conditions directly in front of them. But we suspect that it also suggests that Hawthorne’s restricted communication and singular focus on WASC, which dominated school meetings and professional development days, precluded opportunities for administrators to explain, and for teachers to learn about, federal and state policies that factor into the reforms, policies, and climate of Hawthorne. Another school, one not experiencing the effects of a threat rigid environment, may have been freed up to dedicate professional time to learning the policies that shape daily operations and school changes. This open communication might have produced more awareness of the bind that the school was in (and, hence, more sympathy for those affected by it), some camaraderie among Hawthorne staff, and better conditions for shared problem solving. And these effects might have in turn looped back to improve personnel conditions and perhaps even encouraged innovative thinking; we return to this point in the conclusion.
Pressure to Conform to the Administration’s Reform Vision
There was increased pressure to conform to the administration’s reform vision, thereby leaving no or little attention to flexible thinking. That is, the threat rigidity response of cognitive and structural inflexibility is possibly best represented by the increased pressure on the teachers to conform, which left little or no room for attention to divergent thinking. Absent from the collected data was any attention on the part of the administration to encourage teachers to think differently about teaching and learning or about school improvement. Instead, the whole of the reforms, the school climate, and the various actions by the administration appeared to encourage a lockstep emphasis on conformity, which silenced opportunities for creative thinking. School conditions did not encourage innovative ideas; instead, they emphasized managing resources efficiently, controlling teaching, and bracing for attack. Sophia said that she had appreciated, in previous years, teacher meetings and professional development days as meaningful opportunities to think about her work—but no longer: “I am just getting really frustrated by things I hear in all these meetings throughout the year. It’s all about WASC or how we have to follow the maps or adhere to the textbook. Or some administrator’s complaints about us.”
Job security was subtly present in the teachers’ worries. Threats to job security were perhaps more symbolic than direct, but nonetheless, several of the teachers whom we studied believed that people in the administration were intentionally creating a perception that teachers who disobeyed in word or deed might be “pink-slipped” (i.e., released or transferred to another school in the district). Rumors emerged about falling student enrollments, which would lead to a loss of several English teacher positions. Teachers in our sample (especially, the newer ones) took this threat seriously; yet, at the same time, they were angry in their belief that this was a strong-arm tactic. The six teachers reacted in various ways: A few went undercover with their dislike of the situation while publicly maintaining appearances; a few tried to create their own personal niche within the department or with the principal, to secure their place at the school; most developed contingency plans to teach in another district or in another school within the district, if necessary; and Richard transferred to another school.
Going undercover—or, in Bill’s words, embodying some variation of being “a good
soldier”—was evident across the English teachers in our sample. Their general
reaction was to publicly conform to the wishes and mandates of the administration but
privately and carefully say and do what they wanted—both in their comments to us and
in their practice (i.e., their closed-door classroom). There was also a sense that
the more recently hired teachers needed to publicly support the principal so that
their lack of seniority would not be used against them. Layla told us that she said
to him, “‘You’re the principal, you’re the boss. Tell me what to do and I’ll do it.’
I’d rather not lose my job.” As such, Sophia began looking for other jobs within and
outside of education; Richard interviewed at other schools in the district; and Susan
changed departments within Hawthorne and put out feelers for jobs in other districts.
Layla did consider teaching elsewhere. Richard described for us the personal toll
that this year took on him and why the Hawthorne situation motivated him to migrate
to another school: I was going home in a bad mood. My blood pressure was going up. I’d wake up in
the morning and didn’t want to go to work, didn’t want to be there. And I’ve
always loved my job. So when they came out in the spring and said that
enrollment is decreasing and said we’re going to have to eliminate six English
teachers—either through retirement, transfers, or forced transfers. . . . I
don’t enjoy coming here in the morning, and they’re going to force somebody to
move, so I may as well volunteer rather than have somebody who wants to stay
here be asked to move somewhere new. So I did.
Finally, the WASC review not only interacted with existing changes but also acted as
a direct influence on teachers, pushing them to conformity and restricting their
flexible thinking. As we have mentioned, Hawthorne’s recent WASC review history had
not been favorable, and the current year’s accreditation visit was important. The
WASC as an external threat that operated in direct and indirect ways. In a direct
way, WASC promised reviewer walk-throughs in which teachers had to ensure that their
practice was in perfect conformity with school reforms and one another’s classrooms.
In an indirect way, WASC (as it was framed by the school administration) had created
a schoolwide ethos of pressure to conform. Again, the WASC visit was a disappointment
to many. Layla lamented the outcome: We teachers worked our butts off for this—tried really hard to get good scores,
did what we were told to do. So many teachers were into it, involved in the
work, and then we get this horrible report—nothing about anything we were doing
right. Nobody wanted to talk about it or hear anything about it. It was all
very strange.
Melissa characterized how the WASC experience had exacerbated existing tensions all
year long and had blown the disenfranchisement wide open by late spring: We had WASC this year and had to go to all of these meetings that were so
tedious and horrible, and people were really just starting to hate any kind of
meeting time to the extent that I think nobody really feels like what they say
matters or what they want matters in the eyes of the administration. People
feel really disenfranchised and angry. It’s really ugly right now, and it was
never this ugly before, even though there were still problems.
Although the resentment and negativity were taking a significant toll on the attitudes of most teachers, they told us that what happened in their classrooms did not change much. The threat response emphases on conformity and standardization had created an unpleasant and stifling professional climate, but they do not appear to have changed the teachers’ classroom practice. Teachers reported maintaining the appearance of adhering to maps, using the new textbooks, and following the administration’s seemingly rigid rules (including a new mandatory teacher sign-in policy). And it is possible that the WASC review team identified the point that we make here: that there appeared to be a disconnect between how Hawthorne represented its practice and what actually occurred in classrooms. This finding raises themes of visibility and invisibility.
Professional Autonomy, Isolation, and Visibility
A significant phenomenon that links to the two previous sections involves the teachers’ sense of autonomy, their control over their work, and their ideas about professional visibility. At Hawthorne, this phenomenon derived from an interaction between two factors: the threat rigidity effects present at the school and a history of “loose coupling” between classrooms and school policies, common in large public schools (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976). We found that all six teachers expected a kind of autonomy in or control over their classrooms. Our analysis revealed that teachers’ reliance on loose coupling emerged as a defense mechanism against threat rigidity. It acted as a kind of escape valve that allowed them to locate some degree of autonomy and professional freedom in an otherwise constraining organizational environment.
Why Teachers Gravitated Toward Autonomy
The teachers gravitated toward professional autonomy and the freedom to teach as they
desired for several reasons. The way that the teachers conceived of, valued, and
defended their professional autonomy varied according to their professional
preparation experience, their locations on the career cycle, and their individual
differences. Some teachers said that they had been professionally prepared to
diagnose kids and learning situations, design curriculum and plan lessons
accordingly, and react to each class’s unfolding dynamic as they perceived it.
Richard raised the conflict between his professional training and the current climate
of standardization: The emphasis [in my preparation program] was on planning lessons, which now I
do somewhat, but [these days] a lot of things are dictated—more than I thought
they would be. I can’t use what I learned. . . . There was great emphasis
placed in my program on knowing the students—they were the focus. Now it’s all
about what’s in the textbook and what the state standards tell you.
There was also a career cycle factor: The newer teachers were more receptive to peer support and administrative assistance, whereas midcareer and later-career teachers believed that they had earned commensurate levels of control and freedom inside their classrooms. We found that all six teachers equated autonomy in their classrooms with the notion of a high-quality teacher: Autonomy was considered a mark of professionalism. We also noticed that status entered into the equation: There was a sense, on the part of the teachers, that autonomy correlates with professional respect; that is, any teacher who is left alone must be a good teacher indeed.
These teachers’ embedded presumptions correspond in part to a long history of the
isolated nature of teaching (Cuban,
1993; Lortie, 1975) and the
teacher as independent artisan (Huberman,
1993b). The teachers in this study all, to some degree or another, presumed
that such control of their classrooms was part of the job and that each had earned
it. In fact, several teachers referenced autonomy in the classroom as they explained
why they became teachers and talked about their work. For example, Melissa bemoaned
the current policy climate for removing the artistry from teaching: I think that some standardizing of [the curriculum] is fine, [but] I think
trying to have the lockstep—you teach chapter 2 on Day 5—is ridiculous. That
takes all the artistry out of teaching, and I think when you’re supposed to
have a student-driven classroom, some kids just don’t understand things [the
same way]. . . . It’s completely inappropriate to expect teachers to just march
through and expect the kids to get anything out of it.
All six teachers believed that having autonomy in their classroom, with their students, was part of the job, part of being a professional, and that it should only be eliminated if there are clear signs of a teacher’s incompetence or if students are not being well served. Teachers blamed the policy culture in general and the Hawthorne climate in particular for threatening their professional autonomy.
We detected a powerful sentiment: that although these teachers supported the notion of standardizing curriculum to a limited extent and agreed with the general idea of accountability in principle, they found the Hawthorne reforms to be overly prescriptive, misaligned with student-centered instruction, and professionally demeaning. But the teachers told us that no one ever came in to check on them (except during the WASC preparation and visit); as such, no one was sure how to interpret the mixed messages. “So basically you feel like, who’s running this zoo?” Melissa said. Several of the teachers mentioned that if efforts to script their teaching intensified or if unsupportive observers regularly came into their classrooms, they would move to another school. Melissa was one of them, telling us, “If the climate gets so ugly that I’m just miserable, I won’t stay. I just won’t keep doing it. Why be miserable? Life’s too short.”
However, for the most part, the teachers had the autonomy that they wanted, which derived from multiple factors. We describe these factors as existing inside three categories: One is the federal policy climate. Although both its letter and spirit advocate strong standardization and accountability, NCLB as policy focuses more so on the primary grades; that is, its indirect climate effects are weaker in most U.S. high schools. Despite being an under-performing school, Hawthorne had been meeting its academic performance index and adequate yearly progress scores and so was not technically a high-priority target. As Bill described, “NCLB is coming down the pike but hasn’t parked here yet.”
The second category is the local context. As a large, traditional, comprehensive high
school, Hawthorne has a long history of loose coupling and “egg-crate” (i.e.,
isolated) teaching structures (Cuban,
1993; Weick, 1976), which
has meant that for many decades, teacher isolation (and its more attractive
companion, autonomy) has been the norm. Richard, who had taught at Hawthorne for 7
years, said, When I first started here, each teacher within the department was left very
independent, very independent to come up with your own lessons. We were given a
general description of the things we needed to cover during the year, and that
was it.
This school—like many traditional high schools—had enacted a professional culture in which teachers taught how they wanted, avoided “talking shop” at lunch and otherwise steered clear of having deep discussions of practice (especially, those concerning their own weaknesses and challenges), and maintained mostly isolated classroom communities that the teachers in our study variously called their “fiefdoms,” kingdoms,” and “perfect little worlds.”
The third category of explanation is that the Hawthorne administration was
simultaneously focused on so many things that observing teachers seemed a low
priority. This meant that the teachers were rarely observed, evaluated, or pressed to
actually change their practice to align with the intent of the reforms. Bill said, I think most people—what they’ve done before is they close the door and teach
their kids the very best way they can. They try to adhere to the standards, try
to adhere to what we’re being asked to do, but we’re not doing either
slavishly.
Sophia said that for many teachers the response to administrative coercion was to hide: “Teachers would just get upset, and so they would isolate themselves.”
Sophia said that even though the department was required to develop and follow
curricular maps, “I was like, ‘Well, thank you, [but] I’m just still going to do what
I have to do and pick my own [reading] selections.’” When we asked her if there might
be consequences to ignoring the curricular maps, she told us, “In my 3 years of
teaching, I’ve had one 10-minute evaluation. . . . Nobody knows what the heck I’m
doing!” In another conversation she said, “Nobody ever comes in to check up on me. .
. . It’s like, ‘You guys never come to see me! If you really cared, you’d come and
bark at me.’” This connects to the logic of confidence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) coming from new institutionalism
theories that explain loose coupling. As mentioned earlier, education stakeholders
(e.g., district officials, the tax-paying public, state politicians) are convinced
that schools do their job well if they outwardly resemble the public’s image of good
schooling. This perception governs the external structures of schooling, such as the
buildings, the teacher qualifications, and the rhetoric of successful and/or improved
teaching. As long as these visible logics are met, the public remains confident that
good teaching and learning are occurring inside the classrooms. At Hawthorne, this
explains the administrative focus on teacher certification, curricular maps, and
high-profile reforms such as block scheduling and a move to academies within the
school. Such a phenomenon allows a school to appear improved without changing its
classroom instruction much. For these three reasons, then, the teachers still mostly
had the autonomy for which they were prepared, of which they desired, and with which
they had become familiar. Layla said, It’s not like there is anybody breathing down my neck at school, and they
aren’t going to breathe down my neck as long as I—and this is true for the
whole culture at [Hawthorne]—as long as there is a hint that you’re doing your
job, no one is going to bother you. I could be literally locking the door and
showing movies 24 hours a day, and as long there’s the hint that I’m doing my
job, they’re not going to bother me.
In many ways, the WASC review presented an unwanted intrusion into the teachers’ core work. The curricular maps had been implemented a few years earlier, apparently in response to district pressures to standardize and make visible the learning that occurred in classrooms (and perhaps as a threat effect from the previous WASC visit). The curricular maps had been unpopular from the beginning, but teachers reported little previous pressure to actually follow them: As long as the curricular maps existed in folders on shelves, the administration was satisfied. But this past year, because of the impending WASC review, teachers were expected to follow the maps—or at least ratchet up the appearance of following them via written lesson plans, posters on classroom walls, and stacks of color-coded paperwork visible on their desks. This façade annoyed the teachers in our sample.
To different degrees and in different ways, five of the six teachers said that they would move schools if their autonomy in the classroom were eliminated or severely threatened. All teachers reported a positive correlation between classroom autonomy and their commitment to the school and the profession. And throughout our interviews, the teachers shared a perception that the current policy culture was slowly eroding their professional freedom and autonomy in the classroom. Because this was, for them, a nonnegotiable requirement of their work, they were prepared to move or leave if their autonomy disappeared.11 Loose coupling was a structural feature that allowed the Hawthorne teachers to endure this component of threat rigidity, at least to an extent.
The Effects of Loose Coupling on Autonomy and Otherwise
The loose coupling that allowed teachers some autonomy in their classrooms produced
other effects, however. One effect was that of a culture that discouraged
collaboration and honest conversations about teaching, learning, and assessment. The
classroom autonomy meant that few teachers at the school were collaborating in any
substantive way. Layla lamented this sentiment: It’s a bummer because I’m very social. I need to have people to hang out with,
talk to, get ideas from—sort of bounce ideas off of. I have to have a social
circle at work. Just like students need each other to be successful and
motivated, I need to hang out with people who know what teaching is all about,
who know what teaching means.
Melissa shared her dislike of faculty meetings: “The minute I have to go to a meeting after school, I’m just like, ‘Arghh!’ At the end of fifth period, I could have another 8 hours with students, but [meetings] really get me down.” We suspect that this isolated teaching culture at Hawthorne sacrificed potentially valuable opportunities for team teaching, cross-classroom observations, professional development, and authentic conversations about teaching and learning. These teachers reported receiving none or very little feedback on their practice (i.e., feedback from adults), and what they did report receiving was often secondhand (e.g., a fellow staff member said that she had heard from students that a teacher was doing well). The negative pressure of threat rigidity to cope with visibility (Keltchermans, 2006) meant that teachers had to keep up appearances—to talk and act as if everything in the classroom was going well and that the school reforms were being faithfully implemented. We additionally suspect a reciprocal link to the intergroup and intragroup tensions discussed above: Would those interpersonal tensions lessen if teachers were less isolated? Would the teachers become less isolated if there were not these external mandates to conform?
There was a sense, stronger in the newer and midcareer teachers, that visibility was
desirable (e.g., opening up one’s classroom for others to see, building collegial
ties, engaging in collaborative teaching); however, there was also a distrust that
Hawthorne’s present attempts to raise teacher visibility had the teachers’ or
students’ interests anywhere close at heart. Several teachers in our sample talked
about their good work going unrecognized by school and district administrators, and
they lamented that teachers and students were inadequately praised for having raised
schoolwide test scores. Susan said, A couple years ago, we were unhappy with some of the things about the state and
the government; they put a gun to our head a bit. We were pressured and we got
stressed, and what happened was people pulled together, we made our [academic
performance index], we’ve made our [adequate yearly progress] every year. We
pulled that up. We made the reading program work. It happened. People did pull
together. And it wasn’t enough. When you have somebody continuing to say,
“We’re not making it, we’re not making our target,” and we’re like, “We made
it! We did it!” What the hell? Then what are you going to do? Just f—k it!
Forget it! You know what I mean? . . . We should be having marching bands
running through the rooms!
Like the effects of threat rigidity presented thus far, the decrease in professional autonomy and the multiple anxieties around visibility and invisibility not only affected the maladaptive school climate but were also affected by it. Like the other threat responses, it angered the teachers, constrained their work, and intensified schoolwide tensions about the direction of reform at Hawthorne.
Concluding Ideas About Threat Rigidity in Reforming Schools
When we applied threat rigidity as a model onto our data, patterns, responses, themes, and findings came into stark relief. Threat rigidity pushed Hawthorne leaders to adopt school changes whose content emphasized administrative control and teacher conformity and whose design restricted teacher feedback and transparent decision making. In addition, Hawthorne’s manner of implementation created teacher hostility and disenfranchisement. This double-pronged threat rigidity is about the content and the implementation of education reform—the what and the how—and, in this way, it echoes earlier research on reform implementation (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Fullan & Pomfret, 1977). Control, surveillance, constricted communication, no official spaces for dissent or alternative thinking created an us-versus-them dynamic that made teachers feel unsafe and so sharpened opposition between them and the administration. Ultimately, owing to threat rigidity effects, Hawthorne was not an organization whose shared purposes allowed members to work together but a place split into factions competing for control while individual teachers spent considerable energy on self-protection. Fight-or-flight had sabotaged meaningful reform.
Our use of threat rigidity as analysis encourages a view of the current policy culture in education as a kind of toy top exerting its weight on the sharpened tip of local schools. This is how the multilevel policy culture operated on the teachers at Hawthorne High. Federal policy pressures, state reform mandates, political rhetoric, and social perceptions around diminished opportunities to learn have put many public school districts on the defensive, thereby producing at the local level the threatened status that we found at Hawthorne. This organizational behavior corresponds to the discussion at the beginning of this article in that when the external legitimacy of an organization comes under attack, the various subgroups of the organization feel threatened in complex, often competing ways. This threat stance then translates into a series of maladaptive effects and responses that influence the school’s reform approach and organizational climate in the ways that we have presented here.
We do not mean to suggest, however, that the pressures are entirely unidirectional. Teacher resistance (Gitlin & Margonis, 1995; Solórzano & Bernal, 2001), teachers’ mediating reform in individualized ways (Olsen & Kirtman, 2002), and the reciprocal relationships among teachers, school leaders, and policy contexts (Hargreaves, 1995; Little, Dorph, & SB 1274 Research Team, 1998) mark most school situations, and Hawthorne was no exception. Consider that a group of 20 teachers apparently managed to overthrow the Hawthorne leadership! And the current educational policy culture remains hotly contested (Glickman, 2004; Meier & Wood, 2004). But for the purposes of our study, we chose an analytical frame that focuses on how top-down pressures to change create and intensify organizational dysfunction. None of the teachers in our sample, none of the Hawthorne community members, none of the published reports and stories about Hawthorne described things as going well. There was unanimous agreement that Hawthorne’s organizational dynamics were dysfunctional. Threat rigidity offers an explanatory model for why, in part, this context occurred. It also presents an account of why the current top-down, one-size-fits-all policy culture in education (represented by but not limited to NCLB) may be unable to substantively increase teacher effectiveness and improve schooling. Finally, we believe that this model and our corresponding analysis offer the following suggestions for school reform and teacher preparation.
Rethink How to Restructure a School Culture
There are better ways to restructure a school culture. We recommend that policy makers consider and predict threat rigidity effects before initiating reform programs and that school leaders, too, pay special attention to these maladaptive patterns before commencing whole-school reform initiatives. For example, school restructuring researchers might take a look at our data and exclaim, “Did we not learn these lessons already?” Although school restructuring as a systematic reform approach has not fully disappeared, its influence has fallen victim to a different and politically powerful paradigm currently en vogue: large-scale accountability, a focus on quantitative outcomes, and the top-down emergence of a coded disdain for teachers (Cochran-Smith, 2006; King, 2004; McDermott, 2007; Meier & Wood, 2004). Yet, the restructuring movement still offers useful recommendations: Go slowly; that is, implement multiple reforms in integrated or sequenced ways. Foreground school context as an active variable. Scaffold candid conversations among administration, teachers, parents, and other stakeholders about the reforms. Include teachers in all reform phases and treat them like professionals. Use professional development wisely, avoiding one-time, onsite mandatory events and instead offering a network of teacher-chosen, off-site flexible projects and activities that align with reform goals.
Actively Avoid Threat Rigidity
A school that feels threatened by, yet has to abide to, the current policy culture will benefit from consciously striving for exactly the opposite of all threat rigidity effects. We understand that threat rigidity is a natural organizational response to a perceived external threat; therefore, we place partial responsibility for what happened at Hawthorne on federal and state policy pressures. But we also believe that if a school leadership team acknowledges and considers threat rigidity effects beforehand, then it can better respond to a threatening situation and wisely plan its course of reform. This agenda would include school leaders’ discussing case studies like Hawthorne and opening communication, encouraging innovative thinking, supporting teachers, and striving to put forward a climate of cooperation and trust. Essentially, we advocate identifying potential threat rigidity effects and responses and then consciously doing what would prevent them. This kind of threat rigidity attention would not eliminate the perceived threat but position a school to successfully address the perceived crisis and adapt in response to it. Specifically, we suspect that earning the trust of teachers, encouraging innovative thinking, formalizing open lines of communication, and promoting an inclusive reform ethos would eliminate or significantly lessen threat rigidity responses.
Encourage Teacher Education Programs to Acknowledge Current Reality
Teacher education should not neglect current education realities and contradictions. The current policy climate may intentionally or not be creating a professional landscape in teaching in which the creative, daring, and iconoclastic candidates will not enter teaching (precisely those whom we believe education should covet); rather, those who do enter the profession may be predisposed and so primed for conformity, decreased decision making, and passive acceptance. If public school teaching becomes known as a profession of following orders, only those comfortable with this kind of obedience will enter or remain in the profession. We fear that this would lower the quality of and innovations in learning and democracy in the United States.
In addition, the clichéd gap between theories of teaching and learning (held by university teacher education) and practice realities (which teachers confront in K–12 schools) is apt here. Although we find this theory-versus-practice split exaggerated and erroneous, we have noticed a powerful, rarely acknowledged contradiction: Teacher educators often prepare teachers to freely design, enact, and assess student learning, but many K–12 schools require teachers to deliver standardized curricula, follow teaching scripts, and abide by off-the-shelf high-stakes tests. As we found at Hawthorne, it can be pedagogically limiting and professionally insulting for well-prepared student-centered teachers to have to fit into such restrictive didactic teaching roles. If, as it appears, the current policy culture is here for a while, more teacher educators should formally address it as part of the professional landscape. We recommend that teacher education programs consider introducing effects of the policy climate in explicit, honest ways that seek to prepare beginning teachers for what it means to work in “underperforming” or “high priority” schools like Hawthorne. By addressing ways that teachers can interpret and navigate these tensions in today’s mandate-heavy school landscape, teacher education can offer collaborative preservice development around current policy effects. Entering teachers would therefore already have some knowledge of, strategies for, and allies within the policy-related work contexts that they will face in schools. Thusly equipped, they will be prepared to interpret their professional contexts, interact with policy reforms, effectively resist (if they choose), successfully hybridize their practice (if they choose), and actively participate in school improvement deliberations. What this study has examined as threat rigidity might then be reframed by artful teachers and school administrators as transformation opportunity instead.
Limitations of This Study
As in most educational research, there were facets of our case that we were not able to view, and there were places where our methodological choices shaped our findings. Although we were careful to delimit bias, hew to evidentiary warrant, and conduct reflexive research, there are limitations to mention. We consider three such kinds to this study. One is that we were never able to talk with the principal at Hawthorne. We twice requested an interview with him, but our calls were not returned. Without his perspectives on the reform context and the reasoning behind his actions, we were forced to rely solely on the teachers and the newspaper accounts of the year at Hawthorne. Although we tried to be balanced and we made claims only when data were clear and sufficient, we realize that there may be another side to this Hawthorne story.
A second limitation is that there is always the chance of alternative explanations for any phenomenon as complex as this one. We attempted to arrive at the explanation most consistent with the data, and we triangulated findings by way of multiple teachers and published reports about Hawthorne. Yet, we know that there are always mediating circumstances and details that any single study cannot capture. Perhaps the situation that transpired at Hawthorne would have happened even if the school were not inside the throes of a top-down federal push for school reform; perhaps, this is more simply a story of poor school leadership. A longitudinal study might have delineated in more detail the extent to which accountability pressures interacted with preexisting dysfunctions at the school. Our present analysis holds that what happened at Hawthorne derived from an alignment of factors: the national education climate, the concrete pressures and policies affecting Hawthorne, the school’s recent history, and the manner of response put forward by the school principal. However, we realize that nothing within education reform is as simple as it might seem.
The third and final limitation is that our view into the Hawthorne reform situation was primarily afforded by the perspectives of the six participating teachers. Another group of teachers may have viewed Hawthorne in a substantively different way. We tried to protect against this bias in three ways: by employing stratified random sampling to select English teachers that represented a range of professional experiences and views, by conducting most of the interviews off-site, and by taking care to isolate any teacher claims or complaints that resulted from teachers’ personal idiosyncrasies. As well, we were pleased that our teacher sample included two teachers initially unsupportive of the principal, two who were initially supportive, and two who were ambivalent; this balance allowed us to triangulate and confirm/disconfirm various teacher claims. But perhaps another set of teachers would have experienced and reported on the Hawthorne situation differently—for example, some of those 20 teachers who called for the removal of the principal, teachers in another department, or teachers with different racial/cultural backgrounds. That is surely possible and should thus be taken into account.
Footnotes
Figure and Table
1
For detailed discussions of No Child Left Behind, see Meier and Wood (2004) and U.S. Department of Education (n.d.). Although our study focuses on ways that threat rigidity affects schools at the local level, there exists a growing body of research on those large-scale/macroscopic ways that No Child Left Behind and the current educational policy culture appear to constrain education practice. See Glickman (2004), McDermott (2007), McGuinn (2006), Meier and Wood (2004), Popham (2005), and Sleeter (2007).
2
By ecological, we mean to draw on an emerging research paradigm that seeks to capture the broad, integrated webs of influence on any aspect of educational life—that is, the overarching ecology, or ecosystem, in which an educational phenomenon exists (Wideen, Mayer-Smith, & Moon, 1998). Here, we consider the broader ecology that influences, and is influenced by, teachers. As such, it includes multiple levels of educational context; past, present, personal, and professional influences; and emotional, intellectual, technical, and moral dimensions of teachers’ selves and education work. All constitute the ecosystem in which teachers operate and on which we collected and analyzed data.
3
Underperforming is both a technical term used by the state of California and a lay term employed by those who talk about schools. In both cases, its use is a little misleading in describing this school; we discuss this confusion in Note 6.
4
These cutoff points—and, therefore, these career stage categories—are rather arbitrary. As such, we labeled teachers with 3 years of teaching experience as early career; those with between 4 and 10 years, midcareer; and those with 13 or more years as later career.
5
Readers interested in fuller discussions of organizational behavior research and the larger contexts of threat rigidity studies should see Burch (2007), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Rowan and Miskel (1999), Staw (2006), and Weick (1979).
6
As mentioned in Note 3, underperforming is a technical term used by the state to designate schools whose academic performance index is below target levels. Because Hawthorne has been meeting its index and adequate yearly progress targets, it is not—technically speaking—underperforming. But the term is also a common lay term to denote a school that falls below expectations. In that vein, teachers, school district members, and local newspaper writers typically characterized Hawthorne as underperforming. Further muddying the waters is that California offers additional program improvement money for schools that are not technically underperforming but are close and that choose to apply for a quasi-underperforming status. Hawthorne applied for and received some of these funds.
7
Yet, we do not mean to suggest that this is so simple, linear, or coherent. Instead, there are myriad influences, resource struggles, and sociopolitical forces whose collective interactions account for the current policy climate. Examples include the fact that many textbook, curriculum, and testing companies have recently penetrated the public education market (Lemann, 1999; McLaren, 1998) and that there may be a political undertaking to set up public schools to visibly fail and thus increase support for the privatization of schooling (Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Fuller & Elmore, 1996; Meier & Wood, 2004). As well, the resulting set of views and approaches is in no way coherent or tightly aligned. There are always disconnects, contradictions, and competing views and approaches; the U.S. education system remains a very decentralized network. Finally, we do not mean to suggest this is all circumscribed within No Child Left Behind; indeed, the recent movement toward accountability, standardized teaching, and testing existed during the Clinton administration and before.
8
Although we collected multiple published documents and news stories, for reasons of confidentiality we are unable to cite them by name in this article.
9
We have edited interview passages for flow, deleting most pause fillers and false starts, unless they were integral to the meaning.
10
Job security, however, becomes more complicated for later-career teachers, namely, because of their pensions and benefits. The early-career teachers—having logged fewer years, having younger kids of their own (or no kids), and being less concerned with retirement—did not talk about staying, moving, or leaving in terms of employee benefits. However, later-career teachers and the more senior midcareer teacher always discussed their leaving within the boundaries of their employee benefits.
11
We wonder if this situation is similar to current struggles in medicine regarding the lack of spaces for doctors to talk honestly about mistakes that they make. Owing to increased malpractice suits and insurance scrutiny, doctors are facing decreased opportunities for confidential, open conversations about professional practice, called “morbidity and mortality” meetings (Groopman, 2007).
