Introduction
1.1 The concept of trust has become a feature of recent political
discussion and theorisation of the nature of modern society, especially with regard
to civic organisation, social integration and social order. While it is treated in a
relatively simplistic manner in political discussion, the process of trust is also
subject to more subtle academic considerations. In this article we address the
process of trust through an analysis of the accounts of people who are in a
situation where they are explicitly placing often crucial aspects of their lives in
other people's hands – people who speak little or no English and thus need
interpreters in order to access services.
1.2 Our aim is two-fold. Firstly, and mainly, we are concerned with an
empirical and in-depth demonstration of the contingent and situation-specific
processes of trust in the face of theories about the nature of trust that are often
discussed in conceptual and allegorical terms only. In particular, we are making a
contribution to discussions of trust that attempt to move away from a functionalist
approach to its properties towards the actual ‘doing’ of trust in social and
political context. Moreover, we are undertaking this in relation to a substantive
field that has received little attention and yet involves a considerable exercise of
trust. This brings us to our secondary aim, which is to show how functionalist
assumptions about the nature of trust permeate developments in the field of
interpreting service provision that bear only a partial relationship to its
expression in people who actually use interpreters.
1.3 There is a specific backdrop to this particular exploration of the
process of trust, itself concerned with trust in society as a whole. Concerns about
the exclusion of some minority ethnic groups from mainstream services and society,
and the ability to speak English, have become a highly politicised issue in Britain.
Language use currently forms one of the primary targets in the government's rhetoric
around ‘citizenship’, ‘community cohesion’ and the extent of social trust in public
institutions (see, for example, the Denham Report 2001). The ability to speak
English has become a key feature of government efforts to ensure shared social trust
in public institutions and civic organisations. Where previously ‘mother tongue’
competence was seen as an integral part of the maintenance of positive minority
ethnic community identity, the current policy emphasis is on English language
competence and the provision of English language classes as part of integration into
British society (Crick Report 2003).
1.4 Linked to this shift are notions that there is a connection between
the (non)integration of minority ethnic groups into mainstream society and a
breakdown of social trust. The Home Office Strength in Diversity
consultation document (paragraph 5.1, 2004) states that:
The evidence gathered following the disturbances in Northern English towns in
2001 showed that communities in those places had become segregated, in housing,
education, employment and how they spent their leisure time, and that this was
one of the factors that had contributed to the breakdown of trust and
cohesion.
In response, there have been a plethora of initiatives and policy announcements from
central government that centre on ‘social cohesion’ among people of different
races/ethnicities around shared values (Back et al. 2002; Schuster and Solomos
2004).
1.5 Some commentators have taken this argument further. David Goodhart,
for example, has argued that the solidaristic, mutual obligations and shared values
involved in citizenship are at threat from a ‘tipping point’ of minority ethnic
immigration to the UK, not least because ‘the “thickest” solidarities are now found
among ethnic minority groups themselves in response to real or perceived
discrimination’ (2004: 5). In a similar vein, Robert Putnam's recent work on social
capital has been concerned with showing how levels of trust and economic equality
are lower in communities with greater ethnic diversity. He argues that ethnic
diversity is correlated negatively with both inter and intra racial trust, trust and
co-operation with neighbours, and trust in local government (2003). Within these
views on the state of contemporary society, minority ethnic segregation from
mainstream society, into distinct physical, cultural and linguistic enclaves, is
seen simply as a choice made by these groups themselves. To use Putnam's terms, they
are ‘bonding’ too much ethnically, and must ‘bridge’ themselves into social
integration and the requirements of citizenship, including through learning to speak
English.
1.6 Conceptually, the issue of trust draws our attention to the quality
of social relationships between people and the obligations inherent in them (Misztal
1996), here specifically between people who need to access services and the
interpreters who they require in order to do so. Trust involves belief about the way
that others are likely to behave. In the case of people who need interpreters,
trusting someone to act as an interpreter for them involves the belief that the
person will understand and correctly translate what they say to someone else and
what that third party says back to them, and will keep the information involved in
the interaction private. This entails the assumption that the person acting as
interpreter is both technically competent to carry out the interpretation and that
they are morally committed to the obligation to carry it out and treat it as
confidential. Trust also involves an element of uncertainty, however. People who
need interpreters take the risk that the person who is interpreting for them may not
be able or want to undertake a correct representation of their and other people's
words, in circumstances where they may have little ability to monitor the accuracy
of the interpretation. They also take the risk that private information will be made
public. People may well, therefore, trust some individuals or sorts of people to act
as interpreters for them more than others in order to reduce uncertainty and risk.
Indeed, as we discuss below, rather than being entirely opposed to each other, risk
is part of the constitution of trust in that it is overcome through the process of
trusting.
1.7 We begin by looking at some of the relevant features of academic
discussion about the functions and constitution of trust, before outlining our
research focus and process. We then turn to the accounts of people who need
interpreters. We address the issue of the extent to which they are ‘trusting’ or
‘distrustful’ people generally, in the light of the posited solidarity/diversity
tension noted above. Following this, we move on to our specific exploration of the
process of trust in using interpreters to access services. We look at the way that
interpreting provision is becoming increasingly professionalised, which contains
underlying functionalist assumptions about the qualities that engender trust. We
then return to the accounts of people who need interpreters to explore their
experiences of using both family and friends, and professional interpreters to
access services, using case studies. We also look at the strategies that they employ
for managing situations where they do not trust their interpreters. Finally, we draw
out our conclusions on the process of trust on the basis of our data.
Trust: Functions and Constitution
2.1 What exactly constitutes ‘trust’ and captures its process is a
debated issue. As Fran Tonkiss comments, the concept ‘frequently operates … as an
analytic shorthand – catching at certain social relations and social norms’ (2004,
p. 17). As we noted in our introduction, it involves the belief that a person or
organisation is capable of, and will act in, a certain way. It is the means of
mediating risks in an uncertain situation. There is more to trust than this,
however. A key conceptual element of trust is that it can never be complete; it
always involves an element of contingency, risk and incomplete knowledge. Complete
trust becomes something else conceptually – a habitual expectation of certainty that
is termed confidence (Misztal 1996; Tonkiss 2004). In addition, theorists in the
field distinguish between different sorts of trust in an effort to pin the concept
down. A distinction is often made between the specific trust engendered in
relationships between individuals in their private or personal relationships, and
the generalised trust invoked by professionals, public institutions and contract
relationships (including Fox 1974, Frankel 1977, Zucker 1986). In this vein – and
important for our discussion of people who need interpreters to access services –
Anthony Giddens (1994, 1998) refers to ‘personal trust’ and ‘abstract trust’. In
relationships that are based on personal trust, comprising bonds such as family or
friends, people are assuming that they can rely on these familiar others’
consideration of, and stable commitment to, their own needs, interests and
preferences. Abstract trust is called upon when a person is not familiar with
another party but is reliant on them for their expert knowledge and competence. It
is based on impersonal belief that a representative or member of a given expert
group or institution will conventionally act according to particular principles,
duties and requirements, which are laid down in codes and training for professional
groups, rather than their own personal interests.
2.2 Giddens also describes a change in the process of trust in
contemporary society, towards people having to exercise ‘active trust’. Because
contemporary society is characterised by contingency, uncertainty and social
differentiation (with the latter regarded as the keystone for the
solidarity/diversity tension), our assumptions about how the social world works are
increasingly short-lived and constantly subject to change. Such social complexity
means that trust has to be actively constructed and experimental, rather than
relying on a solid and durable base of social rules. People can no longer just
passively exercise trust; rather, they have to actively take a risk and evaluate
whether or not to trust (see also Bauman 2000; Beck 1999). Thus, personal trust has
come to supplement trust in abstract systems. Yet, as Barbara Misztal points out
(1996), there is an increasing need to rely on such systems in a complex modern
society.
2.3 Guido Möllering (2001, 2002), however, argues that conceptualisation
of trust needs to go further than these sorts of preoccupations with its functional
properties, (that is a focus on expectations about people's behaviour), or its
interpretive foundations, (that is the reasons why people hold those expectations).
Developing Georg Simmel's ideas about a ‘further element’ in trust
[1]
, he posits a space between
the two –between interpretation
[2]
and expectation; it is
the space itself that constitutes trust. There is no automatic logic connecting
interpretation (reasons to trust – for example, this is a
trained interpreter, or this is my longstanding friend) and expectation (outputs of
trust – for example, I trust this person to interpret for me). Trust is the mental
process, which Möllering refers to as ‘suspension’, that allows people to move from
interpretation to expectation; that is, a leap of faith that
‘brackets out uncertainty and ignorance, thus making interpretive knowledge
momentarily certain and enabling a leap to favourable (or unfavourable) expectation’
(Möllering 2002, p.2). In both abstract trust (which Möllering refers to as
‘institutional trust’) and personal trust (or ‘traditional trust’ in Möllering's
terms), familiarity forms the basis for this suspension or leap – in the first case,
familiarity with the generic validity of the principles, duties and requirements of
the system and the categorical role within it, and in the second, familiarity with
the qualities of the specific person/people involved. In both cases, suspension
involves habitual and automatic leaps of faith, and risk is thus subjectively low.
This is akin to Giddens’ passive exercise of trust.
2.4 In situations where there is a lack of familiarity, as Giddens
argues is increasingly the case for fluid and ever-changing contemporary society,
Möllering takes Giddens’ concept of ‘active trust’ further to describe it as
entailing suspension across a far greater gap of doubt between
interpretation and expectation. A footing is provided for this
momentous leap in attempts to become familiar with, and create reference points for,
the unfamiliar (Child and Möllering 2000): ‘the most important skill in practice is
to find and reinforce a glimmer of familiarity in the unfamiliar context’ (Möllering
2002, p.9). Julie Brownlie and Alexandra Howson (2005), in their exploration of
Möllering's ideas in relation to reasoning about MMR vaccination, also note
relations of familiarity as a basis for trust. Similarly drawing on Simmel's work
however, they argue that suspension has to be understood as part of social relations
occurring in particular social, political and institutional contexts.
2.5 Conceptually, in itself Möllering's
interpretation/suspension/expectation argument poses a challenge to
the simplistic cause-response political treatment of trust in an ethnically diverse
society. Methodologically, it also poses a challenge to the dominant form of
research on trust. In order to realise his conceptual framework empirically,
Möllering calls for a move away from the trust inventories and survey-based research
that characterises much work on the topic, towards an open-ended focus on
meaning:
trust research's specific concern should be to find out
whether a state of expectation towards other people's actions and intentions
(the ‘end’ product) is favourable or unfavourable. Functional consequences are
secondary (though important) to more general considerations … trust
research should aim to study instances of trust assuming
idiosyncratic praxis and paying attention to the fine details of interpretation
… the starting point is the subjective ‘reality’ (context) as interpreted by the
trustor; in other words ‘good reasons’ are extracted from rather than imposed on
interpretation. (2001, pp. 415-416 – original emphasis)
2.6 Our discussion here takes this approach but it also places it within
the relevant wider political and institutional situation. Our study was not ‘trust
research’ as such, in the sense that we did not have a focus on trust as a specific
and prior aim of our exploration. Rather, trust and its process emerged as a key,
recurring feature in the accounts of our interviewees, as well as forming a
preoccupation of the political context that places such people as a ‘problem’ for
trust in society generally. Our research participants’ accounts, in effect, provide
us with empirical demonstrations of the ‘doing’ of trust that allow us to reveal the
process of ‘active trust’ in a specific socio-economic context.
The Research Focus and Process
3.1 The starting point for our research was an exploratory interest in
the understandings of people who need interpreters in order to gain access to, and
use of, health, legal, welfare and other services, in a situation where there has
been little work that looks at this issue.
[3]
Our narrative approach involved a focus
on the meaning that people give to the stories that they tell about events, and was
organised around placing people's experiences in the biographical, cultural and
political context of their lives as a whole (see, for example, Gubrium &
Holstein 1998; Riessman 1992). Mark Robinson (2002) has argued that research into
user views of interpreting services requires just such a context-sensitive
methodology in order to address both structural and processual issues in
communication. The advantage of our approach is that it enables the open-ended focus
on meaning advocated by Möllering in exploring the process of trust, in particular
linking structural inequalities in society with everyday interactions with formal
and informal interpreters.
3.2 Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 50 people,
comprising 10 interviewees from each of the following groups in their first language
and dialect: Chinese and Kurdish people living in Greater London, and Bangladeshi,
Gujerati Indian and Polish people living in Greater Manchester. These ethnic groups
represent a variety of experiences of migration to and settlement in Britain around
length of presence and levels of integration or marginalisation. The profile of each
of these groups shapes their interaction with mainstream and community institutions
(discussed further in Alexander et al. 2004, 2005). The Bangladeshi population in
Greater Manchester have a highly localised concentration which has been adversely
affected by a long process of deindustrialisation and social marginalisation – the
focus of the political concern about ethnic segregation and low social trust in the
wake of the disturbances of 2001 (see the Denham Report 2001). In contrast, the
long-established Polish and Gujerati populations in Manchester have strong economic
and community infrastructures and high levels of trust in these structures. The
Polish population, however, has recently been augmented by Polish Roma arrivals, and
they can be distrusted by the majority Polish group (as well as vice versa), and
marginalized from economic and community infrastructures. The Chinese population in
London represents another long settled minority ethnic group, but again differences
are apparent between the established population of Hong Kong origin and more recent
arrivals from mainland China, with different levels and types of economic and
community infrastructure available within these groups. The Kurdish population in
London represent recent arrival and settlement, despite attempts at dispersal, but
do not have extensive local economic and community infrastructures, with particular
trust concerns about the political allegiances of community provisions.
3.3 We were helped in our study by bilingual research assistants, who
accessed research participants through a mix of channels – their own personal
networks, a range of statutory and voluntary services, and community
organisations.
[4]
Our research assistants were themselves members of particular local ethnic
communities, and a couple of them also worked as professional interpreters.
Nonetheless, they often had to put much time and effort into establishing a trusting
relationship with potential research participants and persuading them to be
interviewed. While the resulting sample was not, of course, a demographically
representative group, they covered a range of gender and age profiles. The sample
also covered a range of social class profiles, albeit that this is a knotty issue in
this context. While some of our research participants came from a poor material and
educational background in their countries of origin and remained in deprived
circumstances in Britain, others had been educated professionals and business people
who found themselves downwardly mobile after arrival in Britain – their material
capital diminished and their cultural capital not being convertible. Overall, our
sample provides an illustrative depth of the kinds of experiences of people who need
and use interpreters.
[5]
3.4 The interviews encompassed a brief life history, addressing people's
lives in their country of origin as well as their experiences in Britain. They then
concentrated on encouraging a ‘story telling’ approach to instances when
interviewees required interpreters in order to gain access to various services,
drawing out specific issues concerning the implications of a lack of English
language competence; locating and accessing interpreters from both formal and
informal sources; who and what type of interpreter and interpreting they felt best
served their needs; and their self-positioning and perception of others within this
relationship. Our grounded analysis of the resulting material, after translation and
transcription into English, was built around a thorough reading of each interview as
a whole, and induction of recurring narrative themes and preoccupations within and
across the accounts, rather than searching for issues that we had identified in
advance. One of these recurring inducted themes was the issue of trust in people's
understandings and experiences of needing and using interpreters. (A full report of
the research findings and recommendations is in Alexander et al. 2004.)
The Socio-Political Context for Trust
4.1 As noted earlier, the concept of trust has featured with growing
prominence in discussions about the state of modern society, related to concerns
about social cohesion and order. There are arguments that lack of a routine trust in
people generally and a sense of an unpredictable social environment results in a
lack of abstract trust in experts and institutions, an undermining of general trust
in local communities, and a retreat into personal trust in family and friends
(Misztal 1996). Indeed, the British government has attempted to measure levels of
trust in society and its relationship to social integration and co-operation, and
civic participation (Home Office 2004; Performance and Innovation Unit 2002). There
are also counter arguments, however, suggesting that a generalisable rationality for
trust is a technocratic illusion, and indeed misses the point (Möllering 2001).
These arguments about levels and processes of generalised trust map onto the
political context concerning inverse links between ethnic diversity and social
trust. In a situation where minority ethnic groups are posed as living ‘parallel
lives’ to mainstream society (Denham Report 2001), it is notable that trust research
has tended to overlook the views of the very people who are seen by some to comprise
‘the problem’ of decreased social trust.
4.2 Across the various minority ethnic groups participating in our
research, people tended to hold different views on the trustworthiness of the
society and particular communities in which they lived. These ranged along a
continuum of generalised distrust, through contingent distrust and trust based on
group membership or familiarity, to a more generalised trust.
4.3 Some of our interviewees expressed a great deal of general distrust,
whether of the same ethnic group as themselves or not. They felt that their life
experiences had led them to question the stability of society and the motives of
others:
I think there is no safety and trust at all in the world. In Iraq, Saddam took
the safety and trust. England is safe, no war, but you can't leave your children
alone, there are too many problems. (Nisime, Kurdish woman);
I don't keep any friends. Everyone is deceiving, everyone is too smart, nobody
gives any respect … I only keep my children's company, that's it. (Shyamal
Kotecha, Gujerati man).
4.4 For most others, however, trust – and therefore distrust – was
contingent. This contingency could be organised around someone's membership of a
particular ethnic category, but it could also be based on personal knowledge of
someone:
I don't trust any of my neighbours because since I came here I tried to create
friendships with them but all of them are bad and they don't show me any respect
… Sometimes I go to the Kurdish community centre and chat with my people and I
feel like I was in my own country. Everyone speaks Kurdish and really I feel
proud of myself and confident … I can't mix with English speakers because they
don't respect me. (Nedim, Kurdish man);
Trust is one thing you cannot understand by looking at people's face. Unless you
interact and communicate with a person, you cannot possibly understand them.
There are people who are good and bad in society, there are good and bad people
around. (Maroof Khan, Bangladeshi man).
4.5 A few of our interviewees did evidence a generalised trust, however.
These people often rejected ethnic group membership as a contingent basis for trust,
and one cited the institutional ‘codes’ associated with abstract trust:
My near neighbour is White, also there are Pakistanis, and across the road there
are Gujeratis. I can trust them all. (Suraj Gangani, Gujerati man);
I trust my neighbours and I don't feel unsafe in this area because I believe that
[in Britain] democracy and human rights are above everything. (Hasan, Kurdish
man).
4.6 For the people we interviewed, however, there did not appear to be
any easy, deterministic relationship between a general sense of trust or distrust of
the society and communities in which they lived, and the tendencies towards personal
or abstract bases for trust in interpreters that we go on to explore in the rest of
this article. For example, those who felt that they could trust people generally did
not stand out from others in placing more faith in professional interpreters.
Nevertheless, the contingent positions on trust in particular herald the qualities
of familiarity in personal trust with interpreters, and attribution of particular
characteristics to members of a group as a feature of abstract trust in professional
interpreters. Before exploring these views in more detail, however, we turn to the
functional conception of trust implicit in formal interpreting service
provision.
The Institutional Context: Professionalisation of Interpreting
5.1 Alongside the current national policy emphasis on English language
competence, the need to provide interpreters in order to address communication needs
is increasingly being addressed by service providers. Several statutes are
accompanied by explanatory memoranda and codes of practice that recommend this
(Department of Health 2004, Saunders 1994). Interpreting services are located within
local authorities, health services, the criminal justice and immigration services,
the voluntary sector and the private sector, or partnerships of these. Within this
provision, interpreters mainly work peripatetically, whether employed full-time,
part-time or sessionally. In addition to face-to-face provision, telephone services
have been set up, and there are also experiments with tele-video links and touch
screen kiosks. Despite such developments, formal interpreting provision is often in
short supply (Baxter 1997; Netto et al. 2001; Yu 2000). People who need interpreters
in order to access services often provide their own interpreters from among their
informal networks.
5.2 There is a growing emphasis on professionalisation of the
interpreting role, with recognised training and qualifications for interpreters. A
key feature of this is the drawing up of codes or guidelines for standards of
behaviour and ethical good practice in which the interpreter needs to be trained and
accredited. For example, a National Register of Public Service Interpreters has been
set up, and those registered are required to hold a qualification and follow a code
of conduct. The Institute of Linguists Code of Professional Conduct includes:
avoiding showing religious, racial, political or sexual prejudice; honesty about
linguistic and specialist competence; carrying out work with complete impartiality;
fidelity to meaning and register in interpreting; intervening only for the purposes
of clarification and to correct misunderstanding; accountability for the work
carried out; and a duty of complete confidentiality. Professional interpreters’
knowledge of service structures and procedures, and written and spoken competence in
specialist and informal terminology, and language transfer skills, are contrasted
with the ignorance, incompetence and bias of untrained interpreters such as family
and friends (Corsellis 1998; Shackman 1985).
5.3 Underlying the professionalisation of the role of interpreter is a
functionalist assumption about the nature of trust, and so of ‘trustworthy’
interpreters. Trust in interpreters is best achieved and evidenced through an
objective, specialist, regulated role. In other words, it assumes the efficacy of
abstract trust, based on impersonal belief in the ability, intention and obligation
of an expert or institution to perform the function that they are supposed to. This
assumption about the functional potency of professionalisation is not, however,
based on knowledge of what engenders trust for people who need interpreters
themselves. Indeed, when researchers have addressed the issue, they have concluded
that service users’ preferences are uninformed and inappropriate, largely for
linguistic technical accuracy concerns (for example, Rhodes & Nocon 2003). There
has been no work that focuses on the issue of trust in interpreters for people who
need them, or the context for its particular expression. We will now explore this
articulation in detail through four individual case studies. As we will show,
professional constructions are not a complete match with the process of trust
evident in the accounts of people who need interpreters
Individual Case Studies of Trust in Interpreters
6.1 From the 50 interview accounts available to us, we have selected
illustrative case studies that represent the range of views across our sample. Such
cases allow a demonstration of the ‘idiosyncratic praxis’ of trust in relation to
accessing services with interpreters in people's accounts. They show the complexity
of the social phenomena of trust, focusing in particular on the process of trust in
contrast to confidence, and familiarity as the articulation of the ‘suspension’
between interpretation and expectation that Möllering indicates is
involved in both personal and abstract trust, as well as the process of active trust
when familiarity is absent. The case studies also provide us with the means for
analytic generalisation, in order to re-engage both with conceptual discussion of
trust and with its political context.
Case 1: Dipon Ghosh, a Bangladeshi man
6.2 Dipon had lived in Britain for around 40 years, since he came
from Bangladesh in his mid-teens. He had brought his wife and daughter over from
Bangladesh and, although he still felt strong emotional links with his family of
origin, regarded himself as settled in Britain and in his local community. He
generally trusted people in his area, and felt ‘comfortable’. Dipon spoke only
‘basic’ English and mainly relied on his friends, who had previously been his
source of finding employment, to act as interpreters for him. He felt that an
interpreter was someone who had bi-lingual ability:
[They] must understand what I am saying and explain my explanation. This is
my opinion. There is no need to have a preference about whether it is a man
or a woman or to look at their religion. It should be whoever understands
and is capable of doing it.
6.3 Dipon acknowledged that service providers ‘select capable
people’ as interpreters. But, for him, his friends offered him more than
linguistic skill. When his friends interpreted, his trust in them was based on
their depth of understanding of him as a person, arising out of familiarity with
each other and the continuity of their relationship:
It helps me a lot and it gives me confidence … I think if I take [a friend]
then he or she will understand my feelings, and if [a service] gets someone
he or she will outline the questions and answers and will not understand
everything.
Nevertheless, Dipon did value the confidentiality that would be provided by using
a professional interpreter: ‘I can't say everything to my friends, if something
is private and very personal.’
6.4 Dipon's case illustrates the distinction between trust and
confidence in the case of personal trust. While he generally trusted people and
felt that his friends had a crucial depth of understanding of him that inspired
trust and went beyond what a professional interpreter (however capable) could
offer, he still felt that there were risks in relation to confidentiality.
Nonetheless, it was this perception of a depth of understanding as an aspect of
familiarity that allowed him to cross the space between
interpretation and the outcome of trusting these people to
act as interpreters for him, suspending or putting aside the risks to his
privacy. And it was the lack of that familiarity that meant that he often could
not suspend himself from interpretation (capable people) to
expectation (trustworthy people) in the case of using professional
interpreters.
Case 2: Di Wu, a Chinese man
6.5 Di Wu had left China in his mid-teens to come to Britain, and
had been in the country for three years. He shared a house with a group of older
Chinese men who came from the same village as he did, and said that he had many
friends also from his area of origin, including through his membership of a
Chinese church group. He found employment through these networks, and his
friends acted as interpreters when he needed them as he only spoke basic
English:
We are very close friends and we always help each other when needed … My
friends are good enough, they will interpret for me … During work, sometimes
speaking English is unavoidable, or I may need help to buy something or
solve some problem. Normally I take them out to tea in return … The
advantages [of using friends as interpreters] is that my friends will treat
me sincerely and they will always tell me the truth and provide good
suggestions.
While Wu preferred to rely on his friends as interpreters because of their
emotional commitment and loyalty to each other, he had some concerns about
confidentiality:
It is hard to handle the situation when I need to talk about private matters.
I am shy about talking about private matters in front of my friends.
6.6 He also acknowledged that, for some occasions such as legal
matters, his friends did not have the requisite knowledge and professional
interpreters were necessary:
On the occasion of applying for identification, [my friends'] knowledge is
not good enough to make things clear, so I have to pay professional
interpreters … When I go to the Home Office, I need lawyers to help me to
get identification. Then I need interpreters since the lawyers are all
British. The interpreters work for the lawyer's office.
Wu had not, however, found such professional interpreters as satisfactory as his
friends because they lacked commitment to him as a person:
They give me a one sentence interpretation and it's usually hard to
understand. They don't care whether you understand what they say. Even if I
ask them, they won't repeat something or give me any further explanation … I
still prefer friends … Professional interpreters have too many clients each
day, they do not have the time and energy to please everyone.
6.7 Wu's case demonstrates a strong belief in personal trust. He
cited commitment and loyalty, and a concern with his own best interests, as
aspects of familiarity that were reasons for trusting his friends to act as
interpreters. This was, nonetheless, tempered by his embarrassment about
revealing private matters to them. While familiarity with his friends largely
enabled him to suspend across to the expectation of trusting them to interpret
for him, in some situations it did not allow him to cross from
interpretation to outcome. When it came to facing formal
systems involving expert knowledge, and where his future was at stake, Wu felt
that he needed to trust to the skills of a professional interpreter. In such an
instance, it was the expertise of a category of person that enabled the crossing
of the space – albeit that he had to suspend personal commitment as an aspect of
familiarity, and this lack rendered the experience unsatisfactory.
Case 3: Jie Chun, a Chinese woman
6.8 Chun had lived in Britain for around 20 years, arriving as a
young woman to join her husband, and lived with him and their three, now adult,
children. She had spent her childhood years in China, before moving to Hong
Kong. Chun spoke very little English, and found employment and access to
facilities within the Chinese community. She relied on being able to access
Chinese-speaking health service personnel:
Someone told me that there is a Chinese doctor in the GP surgery, so I could
go and register with him … He speaks Chinese, but he is Malaysian. There are
some Chinese, they're Chinese looking but they can't speak Chinese. Once I
went to a hospital, a Chinese doctor talked to me. I told him ‘no English’,
but he couldn't speak Chinese either! … Now there are many Chinese staff in
the hospital. Sometimes I ask a nurse to interpret for me, they are all from
Malaysia.
6.9 Failing this, Chun sometimes had to rely on her friends or her
daughter to act as interpreters for her. She trusted them personally, but not
their skill and expertise, so she preferred a professional interpreter:
[My friends and daughter] do not know how to interpret some medical words
since they do not study medicine. Because of this, I always ask my family
doctor to ask for the interpretation service for me and when I go to the
hospital the interpreter can do the job for me. The interpreter is more
professional. Their language ability is better. I prefer these professional
interpreters.
6.10 The main drawback to professional interpreters, though, was
that she was unable to establish a continuous relationship with them, involving
depth of knowledge, and this had an impact on her trust:
The interpreters are normally very busy and I do not have many chances to
chat with them. Normally an interpreter can only work an hour for each
appointment. If the time is up, they will rush to the next appointment. I
have never had a chat with them. They are normally late for the appointment
because they need to take a bus or other transportation … I am telling you
one thing. I have been to hospital many times but the interpreter is a
different person every time. They do not know my situation, they do not know
what disease I have. Even if I met an interpreter who I had met before, they
would not remember me. The reason is that they go to different hospitals
every day and work for many people, they cannot remember each individual.
I've been to hospital more than ten times and there is only one interpreter
who has worked for me twice. So it is impossible to make them friends … I
have to trust the interpreter [when I don't know them], there is nothing I
can do.
6.11 Chun represents another case of strong abstract trust. She
first sought to furnish herself with a health care professional who spoke her
language, and she trusted these people to do their job because they were
professionals. If this was not possible, she was more trusting of a professional
interpreter in the context of her health care than she was of her friends or
family. It was the specialist role of professional that provided a reason for
trust, and their expertise allowed her to cross from
interpretation to expectation. But this is not confidence,
because Chun was unsure about the time that the professional interpreter would
arrive and, more importantly, these people had no continuous knowledge of her
and her case. Thus the suspension was not passive trust; it was a case of
actively ‘having’ to trust. A smaller leap or suspension would be provided if
Chun could build a more personal relationship with her professional
interpreter.
Case 4: Mrs. Topolska, a Polish woman
6.12 Mrs. Topolska had been living in Britain for about three years.
She had come with her husband and three young children, but her husband had
recently moved out of the household and she felt that particular people from the
local Polish church and club were supporting her through a difficult time. Mrs.
Topolska worked with English people in a job found through her Polish networks,
but said that her ability to understand and speak English was limited. She had
Polish friends who spoke good English, who she had called upon, and were happy
to help her out with interpretation. Nevertheless, perhaps because of her
personal situation, Mrs. Topolska was very concerned about confidentiality in
trusting someone to interpret for her, and in this respect she said she
preferred a professional interpreter who was not a member of her local Polish
community. She also felt that the quality of objectivity in a professional
interpreter was important:
There are people who only interpret so that they can gossip about people, but
there are people who want to help… I know what people at the Polish club are
like. I know from day-to-day who I can ask and who I can't. I know that. I
stay away from those people … I think that on a day-to-day basis it is
better that the interpreter should not be someone you know. No-one you know,
so that they can be objective, so that he can interpret. So if it was
someone I knew, she would interpret everything from my point of view. It is
better to use someone you don't depend on, who is neutral, and that he
interprets honestly. So that he did not take sides. I think on a day-to-day
basis that the Polish interpreter should start from zero, so that we did not
know him … All my friends will always take my side, and it has to be someone
objective who sees you for the first time. She would come and interpret and
then say goodbye.
6.13 Mrs. Topolska did know a professional interpreter who she had
used over several years, and whom she trusted, but believed - somewhat
wistfully, it seems - that this familiarity could compromise the interpreter's
professional status in her particular circumstances:
The interpreter who was with us all the time knew me and my husband very
well, even to the extent that we became friendly. So when I mentioned I had
these problems, marriage problems, I mentioned it to her. I don't think she
would want to take sides. I know she likes me. She likes my husband. She
does not want to get involved in this. I know she could because she is
registered everywhere … She wants to remain neutral and not take sides. She
said she was too close to us … I trust her and never came across a situation
where I did not. She knew everything. She never said anything she shouldn't
have and she is an honest kind of woman.
6.14 Mrs. Topolska's case involves an in principle adherence to
abstract trust. She strongly stated that professional codes of confidentiality
and objectivity were reasons for trust, and further that it was a categorical
(definitely not a personal) relationship that allowed her to cross to
expectation. In contrast, the familiarity and bias of friends did not provide a
firm footing for suspension (although familiarity did allow her to identify
those in her local community who she could not trust). Yet there is an
ambivalence here. While the codes and skills of abstract systems still reduce
the space and engender trust, Mrs. Topolska has in fact had a personal, not
merely categorical, relationship with a professional interpreter. One cannot
help thinking that Mrs. Topolska would really like her professional friend to
fling objectivity to the winds, and that she would be just as enabled, if not
more so, to cross from interpretation to expectation.
Discussion of the Process of Trust
7.1 It is important to bear in mind that most people who need and
use interpreters are in a position of relative powerlessness – both in relation
to particular situations and in relation to the wider ‘host’ society – and this
sense of dependence and disadvantage will be an important factor in underpinning
the relationship between individuals and interpreters, and in the articulation
of trust. Within this, some of our research participants were in a more
disadvantaged position than others. For example, some could draw on family,
informal and formal community networks made up of well-educated professional and
business people who spoke fluent English and were used to dealing with services
and systems, while others had no such resources. Furthermore, women often relied
on immediate and extended family or community institutions, such as church or
temple, for social networks, interpreting and other support, while men tended to
have more fluid and wider networks of friends (Alexander et al. 2005).
Nonetheless, all the people who took part in our research expressed feelings of
powerlessness, marginalisation and dependence in needing to rely on someone to
interpret for them.
7.2 Most of the people in our research had used family and friends
as interpreters at some time so that they could access services, and most
preferred and trusted them over professional interpreters. In other words, there
was a marked tendency towards exercising personal trust. In this sense, while
our foregoing case studies are representative of the range of
possible views to be found across our sample, two of them (Mrs. Topolska and Jie
Chun) are not characteristic of the predominant perspective on
who to trust to act as an interpreter among the sample (though they are
representative of the minority who demonstrated abstract trust). Nonetheless,
they are typical of the processes of trust in terms of the relationship between
interpretation (reasons) and expectations (outcomes), and
of what fills the space between them (the process of trust) in the case of
needing interpreters to access services.
7.3 From people's accounts of the reasons for personal trust – for
trusting family, friends and other known members of their community to act as
interpreters for them, across the different ethnic groups – we can identify a
number of interlinked reasons forming the basis for this trust. These are that
the person acting as interpreter has a relational status as family member or
close friend, that there is familiarity with the person and continuity of
relationship with them; that they are felt to have an in-depth of knowledge of
each other; and that they have an emotional commitment and loyalty to each
other. These reasons do not become confidence, however, as we saw for Dipon
Ghosh. Further, they do not always allow for risks to privacy and risks from
linguistic lacks to be suspended, and the leap from
interpretation to expectation in terms of the outcome of
trusting that familiar person to act as an interpreter. This was the case for Di
Wu in facing formal legal procedures. Familiarity as part of personal trust
cannot always enable suspension.
7.4 Even if our sample overall did not prefer to use and trust
professional interpreters, people identified several qualities they expected of
them, which formed reasons for trusting those who fill the role. In particular,
they referred to professionals’ adherence to codes of good practice, including
confidentiality; to their skill and expertise, including bi-lingual competence
and exactness, knowledge of systems and jargon; and to their lack of bias, in
the sense of holding no hidden personal or institutional agenda. In other words,
people could draw on expectations that a professional interpreter would act in a
trustworthy way, exercising their skill and expertise in a fitting and
confidential manner, because of the standards of conduct associated with their
role. Both Jie Chun and Mrs. Topolska illustrate that these are reasons that
enabled them to cross the space between interpretation and
expectation, suspending other sorts of risks. They still hankered after elements
of personal trust to be involved, notably familiarity, in order to alleviate
their sense of the risk that they were taking in relying on a professional
interpreter to fulfil their obligations.
7.5 Our case studies, and indeed everyone in our sample,
demonstrated ‘active trust’ in needing to suspend across a large gap between
interpretation and expectation. They were taking crucial
risks and evaluating who, and whether or not, to trust in a range of situations
where they needed interpreters in order to access services. Ironically, in the
light of such arguments, our interviewees are themselves both part of the risks
perceived to be posed by ethnic diversity to generalised trust within British
society, and subject to high degrees of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge in
this context in not being fluent in the dominant language of English and needing
to trust others to communicate. From a marginalised position, they have to
struggle far more to find a ‘glimpse of familiarity in the unfamiliar context’
than the majority of British society. Indeed, active trust is not necessarily
the mark of the supreme agentic actor; it can be a feature of its lack. Fran
Tonkiss remarks that ‘having to rely on trust is an index of a relative lack of
… social or economic power’ (2004, p. 22). The people taking part in our
research did not have the choice whether or not to rely on an interpreter, and
sometimes not even who to trust to act as an interpreter. Jie Chun's comment
that ‘I have to trust’ is salutary. Distrust is active too, and as Niklas
Luhmann (1979) argues, it can be a healthy and functional alternative to
trust.
Strategies for Managing Distrust in Interpreters
8.1 Accounts of negative experiences of professional and other
service-based interpreters were not unusual in our research. The people we
interviewed had a number of ways of managing their uncertainties about whether or
not someone was trustworthy and evaluating the risk that they were taking in
trusting them to act as their interpreter. For the most part, people attempted to
monitor the situation using evaluation of qualities that respectively form part of
personal trust and abstract trust.
8.2 In terms of the qualities underlying personal trust, people
attempted to assess their interpreters’ emotional and non-verbal signals as the
interpretation took place:
For instance, when I speak or try to ask someone something, if the interpreter
smiles at me then I feel that he doesn't hate us, so I gain confidence. But if
the interpreter looks at me badly, then I understand that he doesn't like us.
(Tuncer, Kurdish man).
Interpretation over the telephone could cut across attempts to monitor the
interpretation and assess its trustworthiness on this visual basis, and the two
people in our sample who mentioned that they had used telephone interpreting
services both found the process unsatisfactory.
8.3 In terms of the qualities underlying abstract trust, people could
attempt to draw on any limited English language skills they had to evaluate the
interpreter's expertise in this respect. If they could not do this form of
monitoring themselves, then the people we interviewed might enlist their family or
friends, or check one interpretation against another. A good example of this is
Hasret, a Kurdish man, in talking about his experiences in applying for asylum. His
distrust of his interpreter during the court hearing had been aroused when he had
said ‘September’ and heard it interpreted into English as ‘November’. He had
corrected this misinterpretation and, from then on, suspected that the interpreter
had turned against him and had not represented his situation correctly:
After I received the refusal [of my asylum application] one of my friends
interpreted my verdict to me. I found many things were the opposite of what I
had said. This is very important. I can tell you a tragic story and you can
interpret it as a comic story … I lost my trust in [interpreters]. Now if I have
a letter or something, I ask two different people to interpret it for me.
Because the interpreter can finish your life if he is bad. Like me, I got
refused because of the interpreter.
8.4 Hasret's lack of trust in professional interpreters meant that he
preferred to turn to relatives and friends, rather than rely on professional
interpreters, despite some misgivings about confidentiality. In this sense, reasons
for distrust were just as important in the suspension involved between
interpretation and expectation, as were reasons for trust.
Concluding Issues
9.1 This paper has provided an in-depth examination of the process of
trust through praxis, in a context where trust emerged as a key feature in the
accounts of people who need interpreters in order to access services. In essence, we
found that the embodiment of trust in an interpreter is either a family member or
friend who has professional skills and expertise, and adheres to professional codes
of good practice, or a professional interpreter who fulfils the obligations inherent
in their role and is a familiar person. In the case of needing interpreters in order
to access services, it is indeed the case, as Giddens (1994; 1998) has argued, that
personal trust involving aspects comprising familiarity is required as a supplement
to abstract trust. Ironically, however, the very qualities that might have moved
people's abstract trust closer to confidence are eschewed by the trends involved in
the professionalisation of the interpreting role. Professionalisation is being
developed functionally around training and codification. While many of the features
of this professionalisation chime with interpretations that can be
called upon to cross the constitutive space of trust to expectation, such as
specialist competence, fidelity to meaning and confidentiality, other features
provide a potential collapse into a void of distrust. In particular, impartiality
does not provide a firm suspension for trust, in contrast to
interpretations that the person who needs the interpreter is
having their interests put first. The familiarity and commitment that most often
provided a firm footing for suspension for the people in our research is not part of
the impersonal process of trust invocation in the professionalisation of
interpreting, and this is compounded by the peripatetic structure of service
provision.
9.2 There are caveats to this overall thrust of the process of trust in
interpreters in order to access services, however. Just as there is no easy
relationship between generalised trust and specific trust, familiarity and
commitment as interpretation do not always allow the suspended
crossing to the outcome of trust in the familiar and committed person. Trust is
contingent and subject to individual context. But in the case of people who need
interpreters to access services, it is also a praxis that takes place in a distinct
socio-political context, articulated by people who are positioned in particular ways
in relation to their (non)membership of society as a whole. Like Brownlie and Howson
(2005), we argue that a focus on
interpretation/suspension/expectation in understanding trust is
helpful but it is crucial that it is situated in the social relations of its
political and institutional context. In particular, asymmetrical social
differentiation and specific issues of power need to inform trust research. It is
ironic that the people who are required to risk the crossing of the constitutive
space of trust in interpreters in order to use the mainstream services provided by
society – with little attention to their views on the best means of achieving this –
are the very people who are regarded as putting wider social trust at risk through
their ‘self-induced’ marginalisation from citizenship practices.