Collaborative cross disciplinary research.
3.1 Despite the fact that working in teams is now an expectation of
various funding bodies, little academic literature exists about the practicalities
of collaborative work. In fact, Barry et al. suggest that “teamwork appears to be
one of the taken-for-granted aspects of research” (Barry et al., 1999:27). Teams are
collectives that share a common purpose or goal, and a commitment to it (Fisher and
Fisher, 1998:39-40) – in a social research context these may be groups of
individuals including Chief Investigators
[4]
from various disciplines, institutions, and sectors,
together with various research assistants and research students. Normatively teams
are seen as the best method of producing knowledge or materials (McCabe, 2000; Walt
et al 2002). The aphorism that two heads are better than one suggests that the study
of complex phenomena may be beyond the capacity of a single individual. Teams are
assumed to enhance creativity by enabling cross disciplinary thinking, and enable
differences in expertise, skills and knowledge bases, to be utilised. They also
potentially ensure efficient use of resources from different institutions. Barry et
al. (1999) argue that teamwork is a valuable way to tap creativity, intellectual
rigor, morale and job satisfaction, producing improved methodological design and
richer analysis (1999:26). Teams of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are argued to be
highly effective, bringing differences in experiences, broadening perspectives, and
maximizing potential interpretations of phenomena, thus enhancing the validity of
the data collected and providing greater insight in the analysis process (Thomas et
al., 2000).
3.2 Where collaborative teamwork is expected across institutions such as
the academy and industry, difficulties do exist, however, particularly in terms of
conflicts of style in approaches to research, publication, and administrative issues
such as communication and management. Many of these challenges are best understood
by considering the place of the contract researcher in social research teams.
Contract researchers (CRs) are increasingly being used to undertake social research,
reflecting the trends outlined above, and casualisation resulting from calls for
flexibility in the labour market (Collinson, 2004; Johnson, 2003; Crawshaw, 1985;
Bryson, 1999). This is one aspect of change in the culture of research at
universities over the last two decades which has produced an environment where
academics (and the various bodies set up within universities to seek out and obtain
external funds) are required to not only externally fund their own research, but to
actually design research around the interests of funding bodies, so that external
money is brought into the institution (Walt et al, 2002; Tight 2000; Coady, 2000;
Hazelkorn, 2005; Cooley, 1981). The irony is that once academics secure funds they
cannot then cease the money-chase and proceed with the research, but must hire
others to undertake it (Collinson 2004). This is particularly the case in Australia
where research productivity is measured primarily by research income (rather than
outputs) (Marginson, 2000). The ethical dilemmas academics face in trying to
determine the extent to which one should continue to attempt to be an active
producer of one's research (i.e. undertaking the design and writing of the proposal,
collecting the data, transcription/inputting, analysis, statistical manipulations,
and writing up) have yet to be explored adequately, as is their ambivalence at being
forced into being ‘managers’ of research projects, or being themselves ‘managed’ by
research centres of which they are a part. However, for the current paper, it is the
position of the hired underlings employed to undertake the research which is under
examination.
3.3 CRs, or ‘hired hand researchers’ (Roth, 1966; Lloyd, 2000), are
employed specifically to do other people's research for them. They tend to be young,
at the stage of developing their research skills, perhaps after PhD completion, and
are often working on transitioning into an academic career. Contract researchers in
academic institutions are disadvantaged in a number of ways, including lack of job
security, career development opportunities, entitlements, accommodation, and pay.
Concerns are beginning to be raised about these issues (Bryson and Barnes, 2000;
Johnson, 2003; Goode, 2006). The CR is at the bottom of the research hierarchy, not
being a grant holder, and being employed to operationalise funded research
proposals. However, the CR tends to have a single focus on the given research
project, whereas the grantholders often have a variety of other roles as part of
their jobs, such as lecturer, service provider, bureaucrat or administrator. As a
result, as Jackie Goode notes in her discussion of the research identity of a CR,
despite their position at the bottom of the pecking order, their role often entails
taking charge of the research activities themselves, specifically undertaking the
data collection, analysis and writing up. It also involves being responsible for
team process aspects such as ensuring team communication, negotiating ownership,
responsibility, and intragroup rivalries, dealing with personality issues, and
perhaps most difficult, negotiating paradigm conflicts at both the theoretical and
institutional levels. Each of these aspects is now discussed with specific reference
to the author's experiences as illustration.
Ownership
3.4 The issue of ownership, in terms of sense of responsibility, of
collaborative research projects goes to the heart of their success or failure.
Collaborators must be willing to own the research at all points in the research
process, from the development of the idea, to the writing of the proposal, to
the conduct of the research including analysis and writing. This is often not
the case however, with collaborators keen to ‘own’ ‘CV-relevant’ research
outputs, such as publications, but reticent to ‘own’ the work involved in
producing those outputs. The general issue of commitment to the research, as
well as some specific aspects of ownership are explored below.
3.5 I wish to spend some time on the issue of commitment, as this is
perhaps the crux of the question of ownership. Traditionally, ‘hired hand’
researchers were employed to undertake a small section of the research such as
quantitative data collection. Roth (1966) argued that this results in a lack of
sense of ownership by the CR, and in the worst cases, cheating or fabrication of
data to give the chief investigator what they want. Research assistants will
succumb to the ‘hired hand’ mentality, he argued, when they realize their
suggestions are ignored, they can not use their imagination or creativity, and
they will not receive any credit for the final product. Contract researchers
therefore cannot be trusted: “When a researcher hires others to do the
collecting and processing tasks of his [sic] research plan, we often assume that
these assistants fit the ‘dedicated scientist’ ideal and will lend their efforts
to the successful conduct of the over-all study by carrying out their assigned
tasks to the best of their ability… .I doubt that hired assistants usually
behave this way even when they are junior grade scholars themselves. It becomes
more doubtful yet when they are even further removed from scholarly tradition
and from the direct control of the research directors (eg. Part-time survey
interviewers)” (Roth, 1966: 191).
3.6 Roth's vision is out of touch with current reality - while it
may have held true for situations of piecemeal research assistance provided in
the past, the changed context of research means that it is far less common that
the CR disavows responsibility (see Goode, 2006). Rather, due to the funding
imperative, it is much more likely that the CIs will. Indeed, Hubbard et al
(2001: 133) note that while “the mode of working in qualitative research is
increasingly that of a ‘team’, … this does not necessarily entail grantholders
carrying out any fieldwork or having the same level of in-depth involvement with
the data as that characterizing the work of the research fellow to the project”.
In fact, Collinson (2004) found that many CRs are motivated by ‘social justice’
objectives, and therefore feel a sense of obligation to the research and
participants. In the social sciences, and in the current research climate, it is
extremely difficult for the CR to disown the research, or to care so little
about the results being collected that one is willing to manipulate them.
Perhaps ironically for the CR, as Goode has noted (2006), since one is ‘on the
ground’ one tends to ‘feel’ the research: to connect with participants; to feel
attached to the process of research; to ‘invest’ in the outcomes; and
consequently put in more time and effort than the CIs.
3.7 A number of examples illustrate this sense of commitment. In one
situation the author, CR on a project which involved conducting focus groups of
disadvantaged minorities, was rebuked for driving participants home after a
focus group
[5]
. In
another, assistance provided by family members was not acknowledged as a
contribution to be grateful for, but as a service to be ‘invoiced’ for (without
any mention of thanks at all)
[6]
. This level of commitment to a project, and to the
people participating in it, which is as much emotional as anything else, is a
common ‘hazard’ of qualitative research, and is often seen as something needing
to be ‘managed’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Bourne, 1998). CIs, because of their
distance from the research work, are not at risk of this particular research
hazard. However, rather than seeing it as something needing to be overcome,
emotional commitment could be seen as a positive instinct, useful, even
necessary, for the progress of the project. Such an approach is, however,
incompatible with the current instrumentalist neo-liberal approach to research.
The very name ‘contract researcher’ belies this commitment.
3.8 Contrary to the social loafing/free rider effect of team work
mentioned earlier, the CR often takes ownership of the project, feeling
responsible for ensuring the data gets collected, analysed and written up
(Goode, 2006). Those at the top of the research hierarchy, even where it is in
their interests to participate, may simply ignore requests for guidance and
feedback. For instance, the author has been waiting a number of years for the
three chief investigators/grantholders on one project to read/approve papers,
let alone provide feedback. These are papers for which the contract researcher
collected the data, analysed it, and wrote the articles. The CR in this instance
is constrained from submitting the papers under her own name, for ethical
reasons, but is also loathe to submit the papers with the CIs names as
co-authors, given their lack of involvement, even at the minimal level of
‘signing off’. Such an outcome is negative for both the intellectual community
deprived of the knowledge, and for the early career researcher unable to
publish.
3.9 It is important for collaborative teams to try to collectively
resolve some of the issues identified above, as early as possible in the
project. Ideally, the details of each Chief Investigators’ responsibilities
should be included in the initial funding proposal. Individual objectives and
goals should be identified, and individual roles and responsibilities made
clear. These need to be quite detailed, and include general principles as well
as specific tasks. At the first meeting of the team, after having received the
funding, the group should determine the consequences if team members do not
fulfil these obligations. It is vital not to let the excitement and goodwill
generated by the funding win stop the team from being ‘hard-nosed’ and pragmatic
about these issues.
3.10 This includes team members being absolutely honest in terms of
their time commitment. Researchers should not be tempted to promise things that
they cannot deliver, in the research proposal and in early meetings. This can be
difficult, because funding bodies appear to reward promises of unrealistic time
commitments and superlative framings of participation by CIs. High levels of
participation by CIs are becoming increasingly difficult with increased demands
on academics’ time – it may be inevitable that (actual) research is pushed to
the periphery of academics’ activities, in the current climate. Cooper suggests
that it is a commonly held view that “the move towards large scale projects
involving collaboration with academic and industrial partners involved a
disproportionate amount of administrative effort” (1998:23). Recognition of such
demands on academics’ time, and more realistic expectations from universities
about the number of research projects any individual can contribute to, would
enhance their ability to engage with the research appropriately.
3.11 Additionally, time relief for principal researchers must be
acknowledged as an important part of external research funding, rather than just
money for infrastructure, materials, travel and research assistance (Marginson,
2000:211). This is necessary in a context of rising teaching and administrative
workloads. The result would be more effective collaborative teamwork, ensuring
CRs feel supported.
3.12 Improved external monitoring processes may also be needed, to
ensure recalcitrant CIs can be brought into line. Funders have surprisingly
ineffective methods for monitoring the activity of Chief Investigators. While
quarterly, or in some cases, annual, reports are required, in practice, these
are often written by the CR and simply signed by the CIs. No mechanisms exist to
monitor CIs’ actual participation or ongoing commitment, and CRs are constrained
from ‘telling it like it is’ by their dependence on the goodwill of the CIs for
their livelihood. One solution would be for the CR to be invited to provide
confidential reports directly to the funder, providing an opportunity for honest
feedback. On one seriously mismanaged project, the author attempted to
informally advise the funder of specific concerns, but was encouraged by the
funder to make a formal complaint, without which no action could be taken. For
the CR to take on a whistle-blower role, however, is extremely difficult, given
that they do not have security of tenure. While such a suggestion could be seen
as another imposition of the ‘audit culture’, the suggestion is made more for
the protection of the CR than ‘punishment’ of the CI.
3.13 As well as the general issue of commitment, three specific
aspects of ownership in team projects have the potential to be problematic – the
representation of the research to others; intellectual property issues; and
ownership of the findings.
3.14 Researchers often have to ‘present a face’ of their research,
both literally and figuratively, to a particular audience (Goffman, 1963).
Obvious examples include presentations to communities involved in the research,
government bodies, funders, the media, and at academic and practitioner
conferences. Various candidates come to mind for presenting to each of these
audiences - it may be appropriate for the CR who has collected the data to cover
community feedback and conference presentations, and for CIs or grantholders who
have relationships with government bodies and the funder to cover these groups.
The most media-savvy or articulate person would be ideal to deal with the media.
Thus, it may be appropriate for different ‘faces’ to be presented in different
contexts. However, if senior team members are more interested in ‘empire
building’ than ensuring widespread access to results, they may insist on their
name/face appearing in all contexts which have the potential to enhance career
capital, causing problems within the team. Chief Investigators may, for example,
maintain gate-keeping relationships with funders, effectively presenting
themselves as the ‘face’ of the research, and excluding the other CIs and
CR.
3.15 An example of the difficulties of presenting a ‘group’ face
comes from a project on which the author was CR, which involved dealing with the
media. The three CIs and the funding body insisted that, in any media coverage,
all parties (individuals and institutions) be named. However journalistic
conventions require reporters to identify a single speaker, not a team of
people. Thus the demands of standard media practice fundamentally conflict with
the desire of all parties to be recognized.
3.16 Another aspect of this difficulty is in the very practical
instance of identification of the research to others. When asked ‘Who do you
work for?’, for one project on which the author was the research coordinator,
the accurate answer was: “I am working on a research project funded by
Healthwise, which is a collaboration involving the West Timbuktu Public and
Community Health Unit, part of the Queen Elizabeth Timbuktu Hospital, and the
psychology and sociology departments of the Degrees-R-Us University.” Such a
description is confusing, but was required by the organisations and individuals
involved to ensure their ‘face’ was acknowledged in all contexts.
3.17 The question of intellectual property is a significant one for
any research project (Barry et al, 1999; Goode, 2006), but the more
collaborators involved, and the more the actual work is done by one individual,
in this case the contract researcher, the more complicated the situation. Such
problems are partly the result of what Marginson has identified as fundamental
differences in the traditional versus the management models of research:
“Research that is auto-driven by the desires to know and to make – with rhythms
of work sustained by disciplinary traditions rather than money and management,
with loosely defined work programs and power relations often opaque, and with
research findings freely exchanged – has little in common with corporate
organisation and the protection of legally codified intellectual property”
(2000:191). Competition is intensified in the corporate model, he argues, and
industry and academic norms of intellectual property ownership are at odds.
3.18 One might well ask: does the information produced in the
collaborative funded research (i.e. the data, the analysis, the synthesis,
argument and write up) ‘belong’ to the grantholders whose names appear on the
funding application, regardless of their actual input; to their various
institutions; to the researcher/s who carry out the work; or to the funding body
who paid for it? An example of the difficulties of providing simple answers to
such questions comes from a project which produced a range of outputs, or
‘intellectual property’. Outputs included qualitative data, community based
intervention strategies, radio scripts and programs, conference papers and
journal publications. One CI on the project felt that the data belonged to the
project, so anything produced from it should include all the ‘researchers’ names
as authors (rather than simply as acknowledgements) — including the Chief
Investigators/grantholders whose entire contribution, apart from participation
in the grant-securing process, was to attend occasional administrative meetings.
Thus all publications and conference papers should include all CIs names,
regardless of the fact that the data had been collected and analysed, and the
paper entirely written by, the CR. This CI felt she was being generous allowing
the CR's name to be included, as the CR had been ‘paid’ for their intellectual
and material contribution, whereas the CIs had not (apart from their normal
income). Another CI, however, felt that only those who had actually worked on
the particular ‘product’, be it a paper or radio script, could claim ownership
of it, and therefore be named as authors. A further complication arose because
one CI left the country before the project began, and another left before the
project was completed – it was unclear how to deal with their contributions.
Clearly such problems should be discussed and decisions made about intellectual
property before any property is developed (Barry et al, 1999). However it is
often impossible to predict beforehand what the property will be, what actual
contributions the various actors will make to it, nor what ownership claims they
will make. Likewise, although institutions often have intellectual property
guidelines, these may conflict across institutions, and interpretations may
differ. Team members’ different conceptualisations of each other's roles and
responsibilities necessarily need to be clarified as these conflicts arise. Even
better, early discussion may flag the expectations of others, and that ‘bad
practice’ in terms of lack of participation, will not go unchallenged.
3.19 Another issue closely related to questions of liminality, is
the use of students to undertake discrete sections of the research. The use of
students is often a selling point for funding bodies within a discourse of the
provision of ‘training opportunities’. It also reduces their costs. The question
of who owns such students’ contributions to the intellectual property of a joint
project is a moot point - the student, the supervisor and student, the
university, the research team, the institutions to which the research team
belong, or the funding body. Using a traditional hard sciences model, students’
work is often presented as the work of the entire research team, but such an
approach may be inappropriate in a social science context, where certain
partners may have little to do with the student's work. From an academic point
of view, there is also the problem that postgraduate students should be
supervised by an academic in a relevant discipline area, not by a team of people
who may have little knowledge of the particular discipline within which the
student is working. Additionally, in practice, it is often the CR who has a
significant supervisory role to play for such students, although this role is
seldom acknowledged in their job description, or pay.
3.20 Finally, looking more closely at the CR's position and the
question of ownership, there is often some fuzziness about the boundaries of the
CR's job. Some CIs think they ‘own’ the CR, and have been known to use CRs to do
photocopying and other menial tasks for their own work, or to undertake
literature reviews (as opposed to just searches) for work marginally related to
the research project, and even to have CRs give lectures for them. Because of
their liminal position, the CR may undertake such work without complaint in the
hope that it will improve their promotion/permanency prospects, but it adds to
their sense of liminality by blurring their role.
Communication
3.21 A key factor, vital for the smooth progress of a project and to
ensure all participants feel ownership of the research, is communication.
Without regular communication team members’ understandings of the research
goals, tasks and activities are likely to diverge, and perceptions of the
activities of other team members may be incorrect. This can lead to
conflict.
3.22 Communication can take various forms. Interaction and
information sharing are fundamental elements of teamwork, particularly
maintaining regular contact, even when long distances divide researchers (West,
1994; Barry et al., 1999). In the current climate, busy schedules, rather than
long distances, mean gathering all team members for meetings is difficult.
Although this is a rather pragmatic concern, inability to meet regularly may
seriously affect the viability of the team (and therefore the research itself).
It is difficult to get academics who work on the same campus together, between
busy teaching and research schedules, let alone team members from outside
organizations with other demands on their time. This causes real problems for
the progress, and sense of ownership, of the project. The author has observed
situations in which scheduled fortnightly meetings were delayed for several
months at a time, due to rescheduling and last minute apologies for double
bookings. Such problems have most effect on the CR who must ensure the project
progresses during these periods. In another project, one CI frequently cancelled
due to personal problems, leaving the two remaining Chief Investigators to meet
much more regularly, resulting in their being able to keep a much closer finger
on the pulse of the project. The result was the third CI feeling somewhat
excluded, and the research assistant not understanding why, on a project with
three grantholders, she was only apparently working with two of them.
3.23 One solution is to communicate using technologies such as
email. A team ‘nickname’ in the email address book facilitates sending email to
all members, and ensures the CR does not waste time consulting with each Chief
Investigator/Grantholder independently at different sites about details of
activities, problems encountered or the minutiae of practical aspects of the
research (and then engaging in a form of ‘Chinese whispers’ in reporting back
what each said). An interesting feature of such emails to groups, however, is
that the recipients feel less obligation to respond — an instance of the ‘social
loafing’ effect (also called the ‘free rider’ role by Chesla, 2000:133) where
the invisibility of one's contribution, or lack thereof, results in groups
working less hard. Email is also a much less ‘information rich’ form of
communication than face- to-face interactions where facial expressions, body
language and gestures as well as tone of voice, transfer meaning (West,
1994:27). Using email as the main form of communication can result in team
members second guessing the tone of each others’ communications and getting
offended where no offence is meant. Thus email should not be seen as a complete
solution for communication across sites and disciplines. Face-to-face
interactions allow for questions to be asked, meanings clarified and issues
explored – where some team members have frequent face to face interactions and
others do not, this can lead to closer relations between those members.
3.24 Another necessary, taken-for-granted aspect of communication in
research undertaken in teams is feedback. Constructive feedback improves the
work of any team, and provides positive reinforcement, improved self-esteem and
energy (Chesla, 2000). In multidisciplinary teams, feedback can indicate
synergies and complementarities between the different elements, and also
pre-empt difficulties. Where positive feedback is common, research groups work
more effectively - workers are more likely to work to capacity and be committed
to the project, and team managers are highly respected. Where no feedback
occurs, workers become disillusioned, feel unappreciated, and can become
distressed by the lack of guidance, leading to inertia. For example, the author
observed a research assistant do no work for eight months after completing some
analysis, while waiting for feedback from the CIs. The CIs, feeling guilty about
their own lack of commitment, did nothing to encourage the research assistant to
get back to work. Ultimately, the CIs simply did not renew the CR's contract,
rather than provide the feedback he was waiting for.
3.25 In sum, the lack of regular face to face opportunities to
communicate may result in a lack of feelings of ownership, lack of interest, and
an assumption that others are doing the work. This leaves the CR trying to
progress the research with little or no guidance or encouragement, producing
feelings of resentment, at best, and at worst, complete inertia.
Rivalry
3.26 While the rhetoric of teamwork assumes that individuals will
leave their sense of personal importance and associated competition behind when
joining an interdisciplinary research team, in practice this is rarely the case.
Personal conflicts in the form of professional rivalry can jeopardize real
collaboration. The author has observed such rivalry in the context of constant
arguments about the order of names for authorship of papers. This is partly the
result of differences of standard practice between discipline areas, but also of
personal rivalries. In one project, criticisms of ‘ivory tower academics with
their heads in the clouds’, versus ‘public health bureaucrats selling
technologies of self-governance’ were aimed at different partners. Such
accusations are generally not levelled directly at the partners but to the
humble CR, caught in the middle between CIs. In another instance of this
rivalry, where occasional urgent decisions were made by one party, the other
felt affronted that the project was being taken over. One CI commented to the CR
that ‘not everyone has to have a PhD’, indicating feelings of inadequacy, and a
concern that one institution or person might become associated with the project
to the detriment of the ‘kudos’ of the other.
3.27 The likely causes of such rivalry are to some extent located in
the personalities of the individuals involved, and in the traditional tension
between ‘action based’ organizations (such as industry, government bodies,
service providers, public health units) and ‘thought based’ institutions (such
as universities). The result is that the already liminal CR can easily become
the ‘piggy in the middle’ managing her bosses’ professional rivalries.
Personality
3.28 While the focus of this paper has necessarily been on
structural factors which affect the success of ‘team’ research, it is important
to acknowledge that individual personality also plays a role. Personality is
both an obvious and an invisible factor in the success or failure of
collaborative research undertakings. Referring to core characteristics of
successful teams, Harris (2003) suggests integrity, trust, forgiveness,
mutuality, freedom, respect for the individual and playfulness, are paramount.
These are team characteristics insofar as they are produced out of particular
contexts and social interactions, but they are also aspects of individual
personalities. Individuals who bring these characteristics to a team are more
likely to (re)produce these in an organizational sense. Other positive
characteristics which might be beneficial in a collaborative research situation
include: humility; responsibility; commitment; dedication; compassion;
inquisitiveness; inclusiveness; responsiveness; cooperation; trustworthiness;
tact; respect; self-discipline; reliability; helpfulness; generosity;
determination and courtesy. These have been framed in the positive, so as to
identify factors likely to lead to positive collaborative relationships, but the
reader will be able to recognise the negatives likely to ensure not only
disastrous interpersonal relationships between researchers, but the failure of
the research itself.
3.29 The reader can infer from earlier examples the ways in which
individual personality factors entered into the dysfunction described, therefore
a single example will suffice here. The author was ostensibly the ‘Research
Coordinator’ on a qualitative research project involving a number of ethnic
minority communities. At an early meeting the three Chief Investigators declared
that they would all attend all of the focus
groups, rotating responsibility for facilitation and coordination of
refreshments. This demonstrated their commitment to hands-on involvement in the
project, and acknowledgement that the CR was not to do all the work. Ultimately,
however, one CI attended one focus group, and the other CIs attended two and
three groups respectively, leaving the CR to cover the remaining twenty six
alone. From the list of personality traits above it is possible to identify a
lack of responsibility, commitment, dedication, trustworthiness, respect,
courtesy, reliability and determination in the CIs’ actions.
3.30 In terms of the liminality of the research officer, this
phenomenon manifests itself partly because the contract researcher is in a
subservient position to the CIs or grant holders. Where the team is truly
collaborative, such personality factors could be overcome with open and honest
discussion. But where collaboration is merely token, and the CR is in a
subservient relationship to the CIs, s/he may feel s/he has no voice with which
to articulate such concerns, nor to insist on their being dealt with.
Paradigm conflicts
3.31 Gibbons et al (1994) have identified a trend from what they
call ‘mode 1’ to ‘mode 2’ research – homogenous academic work with clear
disciplinary boundaries is giving way to heterogenous, multi or
transdisciplinary and applied research. Mode 2 research is driven by the need
for knowledge to be of use to someone, usually industry or the state, and
therefore requires cross disciplinary/sector collaboration. However, there are
clearly challenges involved in research with teams from different disciplinary
backgrounds and the resulting paradigm conflicts (Goode, 2006; Barry, 1999;
Mass, 2000; Groger et al, 1999; Cooper 1998; Lloyd 2000; Walt et al, 2002). Some
have argued that it is impossible to share understandings across disciplines.
For example, Masse (2000), in a paper attempting to reconcile qualitative and
quantitative approaches to understanding psychological distress, concludes that
there are ‘ontological and teleological incompatibilities’ in trying to mesh the
different approaches preferred by public health agencies compared to
universities. He argues that there is a fundamental “incommensurability of the
ultimate goals of research, which are to understand instead of to demonstrate,
to interpret instead of to objectify or measure, to reveal the plurality of the
dimensions of reality instead of to look for consensus and norms. In fact, ‘we
operate within a constructivist research paradigm, while our public health
colleagues operate within the framework of logical empiricism’ (Coreil, 1997 pp
252-255)” (Masse, 2000:419). Groger et al. (1999:833) also note the
“irreconcilable tension between certain institutional requirements, particularly
the premise of qualitative research which emphasizes emergent design and an
exploratory approach”. Similarly, Lloyd (2000) has described the difficulties of
graduates of post-empirical sociology working in empirical research contexts.
Specifically, he suggests that postmodern challenges to the idea that research
can be value- and theory-neutral, and the idea that science can and should be
pursuing deductive-type laws, leaves the academic and the public health
practitioner fundamentally at odds.
3.32 While writers have identified these difficulties, funding
bodies continue to push researchers from different paradigms to work together
(Walt et al, 2002). The mismatch between funding requirements, the approach of
most ‘industry’ and government partners, and post-positivist approaches favoured
by some academics, therefore means that academics ‘bluff’ when writing funding
applications. They write research proposals using a positivist paradigm, based
in the presupposition that one knows the course and outcomes of the research,
and hope that on receiving the funding they will be able to pursue their
preferred approach. However, this becomes a problem not for the CI but for the
contract researcher to deal with, as they try to operationalize the research,
adapting it from proposal to reality, while straddling different institutional
and theoretical paradigms.
3.33 Jackie Goode (2006) describes the challenges of combining two
methods, in-depth interviews, and conversation analysis of telephone
interactions, suggesting that “The fact that the issue of combining these two
kinds of data was never fully resolved, on a funded project which brought all
the attendant pressures of delivering ‘outcomes’ on time, perhaps constitutes
another ‘lie’ to add to Fine's list – that of ‘mixed methods’ being the new
orthodoxy, at least as far as common understandings of how the mixing can/should
be done are concerned.”
3.34 Similar concerns arose from a project of which the current
author was a part, where team members hailed from fundamentally different
disciplines. One group were public health practitioners. The public health
approach is to develop more effective ways to promote ‘health’, as defined by
health promoters, and to encourage individuals to take responsibility for their
own ‘health’. Their goal in research is to develop and test health promotion
messages or interventions. Success is measured in ‘client uptake’. The other
group were academics from sociological and critical psychological disciplines,
strongly influenced by the Foucaultian approach. From this perspective, illness
is a social construction, the function of which is to pathologise difference.
Diseases are labels used to identify those who do not commit to society's norms.
The labelling gives society, through the medical profession, warrant to control
elements which might be disruptive to ‘normal’ society. From this perspective,
‘public health’ is simply an extension of the ‘medical gaze’, another technology
of control and self-governance, a ‘helping profession’ designed to induce
individuals to conform to ‘normal’ social roles (White, 2002:6).
3.35 This fundamental paradigm conflict was evident in the original
funding proposal, but was not picked up by reviewers (who had been recommended
by the applicants). The first paragraph, obviously written by the critical
psychologist and the sociologist, referred to figures such as Foucault, Szasz
and Rose, all immediately recognisable as critics of the public health approach.
The second paragraph, in line with the public health partner's paradigm,
referred to the ‘highly disabling worldwide pandemic of depression’, buying into
the very discourse the first paragraph critiqued. The final paragraph actually
referred to people as ‘consumers’, in line with the current marketplace ideology
applied within the health system. The result was an odd combination of critical
and managerial discourses. One of the proposed outcomes of the project also
illustrated this dilemma, promising a particular type of intervention as a
‘deliverable’, based on an assumption about the necessity and appropriateness of
that form of intervention, when the point of the research was to determine what
kinds of interventions were necessary and appropriate.
3.36 The paradigm conflicts, which are fundamentally associated with
differences of ‘core business’ (see Marginson, 2000, on research as a managed
economy), also spill over into differences of workplace culture, including
different understandings of what is meant by project management and being a
chief investigator, and issues of accountability and independence. In this
project, culture conflict between the public health workplace which had adopted
overtly ‘teamworking’ practices and the (slightly) more traditional approach of
the university led to difficulties as the CR negotiated differences in levels of
autonomy (eg. having to keep a time chart of one's whereabouts at the public
health unit versus complete freedom at the university site), expectations and
obligations.
3.37 How do paradigm conflicts affect the CR's sense of liminality?
Firstly, it is the CR who is tasked with operationalising the research,
undertaking it, and producing the deliverables, including reports and papers,
which ultimately are designed to conceal such conflicts. Secondly, the CR bears
the brunt of being caught between two (or more) sets of researchers with
fundamental differences in their understandings of the project, and the various
territoriality issues which accompany this situation. The CR ultimately must
negotiate these issues if they are to progress the project.
3.38 To deal with paradigm conflicts, it makes sense to begin with
an attempt to outline each team member's perspective - the intellectual and
practical paradigms which they bring to the project. In an ideal world this
would be done before the proposal has been written. The key ultimately is that,
difficult as it may be to resist, it is best not to be tempted to ‘get into bed’
with those with whom it is unlikely that one will be able to reconcile
perspectives. It is impossible to address the incommensurability of
institutional and epistemological agendas once funding has been granted, and the
result is alienated research assistants, fragmentation of the project, and the
risk of alienating the researched population (Lloyd 2000). Another pragmatic and
partial solution is for team members not to attempt to reconcile paradigms but
to work separately - writing separate articles, using different forms of
analysis, for different audiences/journals. While such a solution does not lead
to the integrated approach Morgan (2007) recommends, and which interdisciplinary
research is supposed to engender, it does allow work to proceed.
Practical and Emotional Liminalitv
4.1 Building on the work of Jackie Goode (2006) regarding the
negotiation of the fragile contract researcher identity, I have spent some time
outlining some of the realities of team research work across disciplines and the
difficulties of the in-between-ness of the contract researcher. The awkwardness of
working between two institutions, and the practical and emotional aspects of
liminality are now explored.
4.2 It is recognised that when reporting research, issues to do with
emotion are systematically excluded from academic discussions, although work in
anthropology and feminist research methodology is beginning to correct this
(Kleinman and Copp, 1993; Hovland, 2007). The feelings of researchers, about their
own professional identities, their relationship to the research and to those being
researched, as well as to their co-researchers, necessarily influence their sense of
job satisfaction, but also the quality of the job they do, in terms of data
collection and analysis. Foregrounding such issues might improve research outcomes,
particularly once research teams develop strategies for ‘managing’ emotion and for
using ‘emotionally-sensed knowledge’ (Hubbard et al, 2001: 119).
4.3 Earlier, the sense of emotional commitment to participants and to
the research was mentioned, in relation to issues of ownership. The main emotion
relevant to the CR in relation to their identity as CR is the sense of alienation
from not having designed the research or having power over its direction and
outcomes, and, for the CR who works on projects coordinated between institutions,
the loneliness, disconnection, lack of belonging and liminality resulting from
having multiple work places and bosses. This emotional liminality is best
illustrated by considering the practical issues involved in working at two sites
such as the challenges of maintaining two offices with computers, emails, files,
etc. The need to be organized and self-disciplined to ensure that necessary
documents exist at both sites is clear. Working at two sites causes difficulties for
others associated with the research, such as participants, who may have to seek the
CR on two different phone numbers at which she can be reached on different days of
the week (and not at all on other days because such jobs are necessarily part-time!)
– leaving the researcher feeling guilty for her lack of availability. Then there is
the question of the social and bureaucratic aspects of working within two
institutions - two sets of staff to meet and greet and share weekend stories with,
two regular staff meetings to attend, two quality assurance procedures to
participate in, two sets of professional development programs to be involved with,
two sets of birthday and farewell celebrations to contribute to, two sets of
pigeonholes — and so the list goes on. One necessarily makes pragmatic compromises,
choosing to attend some but not all of the above. But at a personal level this is
often at the cost of feeling neither a full part of one organization nor the other,
and being seen partially as an outsider, or as aloof in terms of choices not to
participate in some activities. This sense of inferiority and exclusion has been
noted by others researching the identity of contract researchers (Collinson, 2004:9;
Johnson, 2003).
4.4 It is therefore vital to provide the necessary support for the
Contract Researcher. Chief investigators/grantholders must recognise the
difficulties the CR faces in working liminally, and ensure that systems are put in
place to make sure they feel supported. This includes appropriate methods of
communication, acknowledgement of emotion work and intellectual work, and so on, but
it could also include material support, for example through the provision of
administrative support so that time-consuming tasks such as arranging meetings can
be undertaken by appropriate administrative staff.
4.5 The issue of practical liminality is difficult to get around. The
most realistic option is to designate one institution as the primary host for the CR
(which does not resolve the problem of rivalry between institutions). The
consequence, unfortunately, is losing the possibilities for creativity and
opportunities generated through ‘being in two places at once’. Another option for
the liminal researcher is to see oneself as administering between institutions i.e.
to not expect to be working for one or the other. This involves an acceptance of
being ‘in-between’ as producing creative possibilities, and a degree of independence
(but does not solve the issue of confusion for those outside the project). In fact,
Collinson (2002) notes that some CRs see the difficulties they face, when looking
back retrospectively on them, as a ‘rite of passage’, giving them the personal and
professional qualities useful for future careers; and Goode (2006) offers her
experience of 14 years continuous employment as a contract researcher and the
various skills and opportunities she has gained as a result, as evidence that there
is a positive side to contract work. Victor Turner (1967), who developed Van
Gennep's notion of liminality, would approve this positive ‘spin’ on
‘in-between-ness’ as an opportunity for creativity and development.
4.6 The key is the need for CIs to develop a sympathetic and aware
stance to the difficulties CRs face, and a willingness to attempt to address these.
However, much more rigorous examination of the social organization of research
within and beyond the academy is also vital.