Barriers and constraints to young people's political participation
3.1 When considering young people's relationship with politics it is insightful to consider the dominant conception of young people's ontology. In the modern, western view, young people largely do not inhabit civic or public spheres and hence are unable to tell adults anything valid about the political world. Young people, and children in particular, are associated with the world of family and the personal or private sphere which is sharply differentiated from the public-political sphere (Elias, 1978 [1939]). Wyness et al., among others, have described this as part of the ‘privatisation of childhood’ (2004, p. 83). Here, family is supposed to act as the ‘incubators for citizen potential’ (Roche 1992: 94), helping children along a seemingly linear (and chronological) path towards competent, complete citizenship and adulthood. This conceptual and spatial separation/segregation of children and young people (see Vanderbeck 2006) is part of a second obstacle to understanding young people as being of the political world.
3.2 Young people and children are routinely understood as being on a developmental path and hence, incomplete, incompetent and lacking legitimate knowledge of the world. Children and adults are positioned as polar opposites, with the aforementioned social apprenticeship model used to usher children into adulthood. Following this view, adults are of the political world by virtue of their adult status and their participation is dictated by ‘adult’ concerns: choice, circumstance, inclination. In contrast, children are denied political inclusion as they are entrenched in the private sphere ‘and at best viewed as political animals in potentia’ (Wyness et al. 2004: 86). This polarised understanding of children and adults creates the intermediary group of ‘youth’ who are subject to concern and anxiety over their political participation as they are caught betwixt and between - no longer children, but perhaps not fully adult and of the political world. While there has been concern about the declining participation of citizens
writ large
(Holmes and Manning 2013, Dalton 2004, Civics Expert Group 1994), the focus of concern remains fixed on the allegedly vulnerable group, ‘youth’, who may not have formed an attachment to the polis. These factors help frame the anxiety and public concern that has been generated over young people's political participation (or perceived lack thereof).
3.3 In recent decades, the ‘transition’ from youth to adulthood has become more complex, prolonged and increasingly non-linear. Various markers of adulthood, for example, completion of education, leaving home, full-time employment, home ownership, marriage/cohabitation, and childbirth are occurring at later ages (or not at all) and these social changes undermine established notions of citizenship and young people's full incorporation into civic and political life (Furlong and Cartmel 2007). Coupled with the prolongation of youth is the displacement and weakening of powerful forces and structures which previously marshalled political participation (Webb et al. 2002). Membership of trade unions and political parties has declined substantially in recent decades, undermining the grassroots basis of electoral politics and key mechanisms of political socialisation and participation. The nexus between social class and voting has also been undermined (Achterberg 2006). Taken together, these broad social changes disrupt and undermine young people's integration into the polity (see also Kimberlee 2002).
3.4 A number of scholars have described various other ways in which young people's political participation is denied or curtailed - young people's perceived exclusion from politics and decision-making, gender, ethnic and class inequalities, and the tokenism of attempts at including young people. We explore this literature below.
3.5 Young people are typically under represented at all levels of government, which works to further the perception of politics as separate from the daily lives of young people. Research from numerous countries over many years highlights a palpable disconnect between young people and electoral politics. In work comparing data collected in 2002 (the year the UK introduced compulsory citizenship education) with 2011, Henn and Foard (2012) found young people continue to feel marginalised and unfairly treated by governments and think they have little say in its decisions. They also found sustained high levels of distrust for politicians and feelings of political powerlessness, suggesting that 10 years of compulsory citizenship education has done little to ameliorate young people's cynicism and sense of exclusion from electoral politics. Feelings of alienation from electoral politics have also been identified amongst young people who think the political system is exclusionary, holds little meaning for them and prioritises the interests of older voters at the expense of younger ones (Fahmy 2003; Harris et al. 2010; Henn et al 2002; Kimberlee 2002; White et al. 2000). Several influential reports from the UK have found young people feel isolated or excluded from a self-interested political system (Power 2006; Russell et al. 2002; Electoral Commission 2002; YCC 2009). Political parties appear indifferent, complacent or uninterested in issues influencing young people and often overlook how young people are affected by policy proposals or legislation (YCC 2009). In addition, research consistently finds young people to lack trust in politicians and regard politics with a good deal of cynicism (Fahmy 2003; Mellor et al. 2002; Print et al. 2004; White et al. 2000).
3.6 Despite these strong feelings of alienation, exclusion and cynicism, young people continue to show interest in politics and political issues. Henn and Foard's (2012) work, comparing data collected from nationally representative youth samples in 2002 and 2011, found in contrast to the democratic deficit discourse that a majority of young people in both samples showed an interest in politics with the 2011 group showing increased interest and almost two-thirds saying they were interested in the UK General Election of May 2010, compared with just under half for the 2002 sample. The 2011 cohort articulated a clear youth oriented agenda of concerns, focused around higher education and employment. Similar levels of interest are reported by Furlong and Cartmel (2012) in their analysis of the British Election Survey. Young people report lower levels of attention to politics, but the difference between younger and older generations was only about one point on an 11 point scale. A majority of young people also indicated that they were ‘very or somewhat’ interested in the May 2010 general election, with only six percentage points separating the oldest and the youngest generation. Earlier work by Henn et al. (2002) showed that over 70 per cent of young people surveyed had some or more interest in politics. Beresford and Phillips (1997) have reported similar levels of political interest amongst Australian young people.
3.7 This body of research helps to map the contours of the disjuncture between young people and politics and suggests that a lack of participation cannot be explained by the claim that young people are apathetic. Rather, young people feel politics is not responsive to their needs, is unlikely to deliver change and holds little relevance for their everyday lives. These views may not be an accurate reflection of what electoral politics offers young people, but it does help explain their lower levels of participation.
3.8 Some young people are more alienated from politics than others, and the evidence clearly shows that this alienation follows predictable patterns of gender, ethnicity and class. Gender inequality and barriers to participation persist and continue to undermine and curtail the political involvement of young women. Women are seriously under-represented in parliaments across the world, which bolsters the view that politics is peripheral to the everyday lives of young women. Furthermore, feminist work has drawn attention to the masculine bias of public discourse (Pateman 1990) and the gendered nature of the public spaces in which debate and deliberation takes place (Fraser 1992). In contrast, citizenship curricula rarely address the gendered dimensions of citizenship (Arnot 2009).
3.9 The availability of time for civic/political participation is gendered and distributed unequally (Lister 1997). Pursuing this line of inquiry in Australia, Vromen (2003) found private sphere commitments are indeed gendered and have a profound effect on mothers’ perceived time constraints for participation. Amongst non-parents, men and women's perceived time constraints were roughly equivalent. In contrast, ‘Nearly all female parents (98 per cent) see their family commitments as a constraint on participation, but only 77 per cent of male parents do.’ (Vromen 2003: 289) Hence, public policy may have gone some way to remove the barriers to young women's participation, but the sustained undemocratic sharing of responsibilities in the private sphere, particularly when young people become parents, continues to hamper women's participation. Gordon's ethnography of teenage social movement participation (Gordon 2008) highlights similar gendered dynamics. She found gendered patterns of activism arise from boys’ greater relative freedom from parental control and their greater mobility to attend meetings, events and protests, while girls were constrained by greater parental concern and family commitments and the desire to maintain family harmony.
3.10 Other work highlights the way discourses of neoliberalism shape the civic/political participation of young women. Levac (2012) argues that the discourses of ‘meritocratic neoliberalism’ and crisis and power work to marginalise young women from politics and mask the effects of gender inequality on participation. Meritocratic neoliberalism works to deny gender and on-going gender inequalities by positing individuals as free, rational actors, thereby couching women's constrained participation as part of individual choice and preference (see also Harris 2004; Mcrobbie 2007). And the twin discourse of crisis/power either cast young women as vulnerable, particularly to sexual violence, or highlight young women's academic and professional success. These polarising discourses position women as ‘undesirable and/or incapable civic participants, or able but disinterested in participating.’ (Levac 2012: 3; see also Edwards 2009)
3.11 There is a dearth of data regarding the political engagement of ethnic minority young people because analyses rarely disaggregate by both age and ethnicity. Instead, policy debates and studies of black and minority ethnic young people tend to be couched within a context of crisis about issues like ethnic masculinity and identity, delinquency or social integration (see Back 2002; Bhattacharyya and Gabriel 2004). Nonetheless, several qualitative studies of ethnic minority young people have found participants feel frustrated in their efforts to engage politically and think political institutions are unrepresentative, exclusory, unresponsive and that the issues of interest to them are denied a public forum (Gillespie and O'loughlin 2012; Marsh et al. 2007; Mythen 2012). Other work has noted how the language of citizenship curricula exclude ethnic minority youth (Battiste and Semaganis 2002; Joshee 2004).
3.12 Edwards (2009) details a range of ways in which Australian electoral legislation works to disenfranchise marginalised young people. She argues that electoral participation has social welfare and social policy predicates, and that many young people face barriers such as lack of access to housing and a stable address from which to enrol. For others, simple survival is a priority. Further, in a neoliberal policy environment, the welfare concerns of marginalised young people are problematized and young people are chastised for not participating in a system that marginalises their concerns and which, to some degree, holds them responsible for their own disadvantage.
3.13 When young people do engage in civic/political participation, the forms of engagement available and the very experience of participation itself can promote cynicism and disengagement. Attempts to include young people in the policy making process typically take the form of consultative bodies. Such strategies have sustained heavy criticism on a number of fronts. Vromen and Collins (2010) report the failure to engage with young people's existing forms of participation, instead favouring structured, formal participation mechanisms. Numerous researchers have noted the tokenism of attempts at fostering youth participation (e.g. Fahmy 2003; Hart 1997; Saha et al. 2005). Tokenistic strategies can mean cynicism and disengagement are brought about by
actual
experiences of participation. Bessant (2003) and Marsh et al. (2007) go further and, adopting a governmentality approach, argue that participation agendas are a strategy for controlling and prescribing the ways in which young people should participate.
3.14 This section has highlighted the breadth and depth of factors which curtail young people's political engagement. These constraints underscore the inadequacy of policies claiming to increase normative political participation through civic education. Young people's (dis)engagement with normative politics continues to be shaped by notions of youth, the character and systems of electoral politics, gender, ethnicity, and class. As such, young people are not the disembedded individuals of much contemporary individualization theory (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1991), but rather, embedded social actors navigating the intersections of youth, gender, ethnicity, and class in their (dis)engagement with politics. Notwithstanding the impact of social structure, young people must be understood as having the agency to creatively engage with and create politics. The following section describes the changing nature of politics and the new and creative ways in which it is practiced.
The changing nature of politics
3.15 Since the 1970s democratic politics has undergone a series of profound changes. One of the key shifts has been the displacement of class and nation as
the
means of organising politics (Wagner 1994). The increasingly important role of identity politics and the emergence of new social movements has reopened questions of what counts as politics and seen a raft of ‘private’ or once peripheral issues become politicised (see Seidman 2008) - even though they continue to be subordinated within electoral politics. In his writing on these changes, Beck (1992) sees the unintended consequences and risks produced by industrial societies as creating a realm of sub-politics which operates beyond the bounds of democratic politics. In a similar way, Giddens (1991) has argued that ‘emancipatory’ politics is increasingly outstripped by ‘life politics’: a mode of political expression which is more individualised, tends to blur public and private, and makes politics a feature of self actualisation. IngleHart's (1997) research has also argued for a shift from traditional social cleavage voting towards a ‘value cleavage’, reflecting the move from a politics based on material needs to a new politics characterised by post-materialism. Recent research has challenged the polarisation of ‘emancipatory’ and ‘life politics’ (Sörbom and Wennerhag 2013), but an augmented political repertoire continues.
3.16 In the US, Dalton (2008) has shown that young people are more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of participation (such as signing a petition, protesting or boycotting) and less likely to participate in electoral politics. Martin (2012) has recently found these results to hold when applied to Australian data. These findings suggest that young people's preference for non-electoral engagement reflects generational change rather than lifecycle effects.
3.17 As part of the opening up of politics, youth researchers have argued that apathy and cynicism should not be conflated. In contrast to apathy, cynicism requires a level of political analysis and critique, and hence
engagement
with politics (Bhavnani 1991). As such, non-participation can be arrived at through deliberation and engagement with politics, and unlike apathy, cynicism may be the spur
for
political engagement. This view problematizes the status of disengagement and credits young people with the ability to deliberate about their relationship with politics and make judgements about the value of engagement under particular circumstances which, as described above, are often viewed as exclusionary and irrelevant to daily life.
3.18 The 1990s saw the emergence of DIY (do it yourself) culture which had a significant impact on young people's political practice. This counter-culture was youth and led and based on direct action which included radical environmental groups and others like Reclaim the Streets, and an ethic of pleasure expressed in new music and partying. Harris found that the production of ‘zines’ - print newsletters/magazines or websites - were a means for young women to discuss feminist politics (1999) and challenge dominant narratives about youth citizenship (2001: 183). Harris (2004a) has also explored the practice of ‘adbusting’ or ‘culture jamming’ which creatively subverts the meaning of products or advertisements, confounding commercial space and creating the potential for political space.
3.19 Hartley's work (1999) describes ‘DIY citizenship’ and media (p 179), which involves consumers co-creating media content and interpreting media products in various unintended and public ways. Hartley highlights the shift from DIY culture to Do-It-With-Others (DIWO) and the sharing, contributory and communitarian ethic facilitated by new technologies. Examples of this kind of ‘consumer productivity’ and ‘silly citizenship’ can be seen in the homemade spoofs and parody of election materials found on internet sites like YouTube which have been extremely popular and featured in recent elections in a number of countries (see Hartley 2010: p. 241). These activities operate in addition to the way the internet and social media has been used in electoral campaigns to engage young people - Barak Obama's 2008 presidential campaign being a high profile example (e.g. Kushin and Yamamoto 2010).
3.20 These examples suggest the increasing importance of new information technology as a means of engaging in politics and activism and performing local and global citizenship which may or may not engage with local or national politics (Loader 2007). Van Zoonen et al's (2010) work on the YouTube response to the anti-Islam film
Fitna
- made by a Dutch member of parliament - shows the multiple forms of citizenship the film provoked. The film associated Islam with violence and terrorism and used images and statistics to suggest the Islamification of the Netherlands and Europe. There was an energetic and creative critique of the film via the internet. Young people engaged in collective and individual media production which articulated their religious and political identities, performing an ‘unlocated citizenship’ which helped constitute and address a ‘placeless public’ about issues of transnational relevance.
3.21 New communications technology is also used in conjunction with older and ‘offline’ techniques for mobilisation and organising. In 2010 thousands of students across the UK were involved in peaceful protests against proposed government cuts to higher education and a dramatic increase in tuition fees, which involved over 35 universities. Theocharis (2012) has shown how the student occupations that took place in universities used a variety of online tools to organize and mobilise young people. Moreover, he found older technologies were used in conjunction with newer interactive forms; and in at least one instance new technology was created to aid effective mobilisation and protest. Significantly, e-tactics were used alongside extensive offline political activity.
3.22 The recent global response to the Occupy movement underscores the view that young people are not simply apathetic or disinterested in politics (Gitlin 2012). Indeed, the Occupy movement showed that in contrast to Gidden's and Inglehart's emphasis on post-materialist politics, young people can still be mobilised around an agenda of material needs and inequality. The uprisings that formed the ‘Arab Spring’ were also youth led and have brought real and significant change to several countries.
3.23 Research on the intersection of ethnicity and young people's political participation is limited, but O'loughlin and Gillespie's (2012) recent research with young British Muslims, found them responding to the context of increased securitization amidst the ‘war on terror’ by critically engaging with mainstream politics and the media, rather than disengaging. The authors describe the participants’ response to the frustrations of a stigmatising media and politics as ‘dissenting citizenship’; innovative participation which implies a belief in the system, but is oriented to future improvements. The exclusion and lack of trust young people in general feel for politics, identified above, can be contrasted with this belief in the system.
3.24 Increasingly, various socio-political causes and movements have harnessed the market as a tool for political activism, taking advantage of a permeable public/private divide and melding consumer/citizen identities. This has taken a range of forms including boycotts or ‘buycotts’ of particular products (Stolle et al. 2005), the anti-sweatshop movement (Young 2003), and calls for ethical trade, investment and finance (Smith and Barrientos 2005; Carter and Huby 2005). Significantly, recent scholarship has argued for the need to move beyond conceptions of fair-trade as involving consumers individually invoking their ethical/political considerations, instead viewing it as operating within diverse social networks which frequently involve collective forms of activism as well as more individualised activity (Clarke et al. 2007).
3.25 All of this is not to suggest that new forms of participation have neatly replaced older forms in a direct exchange. Our view is that the political has been cracked open and young people now face myriad ways of being political. Recent research has highlighted the everyday dimensions of young people's political engagement and citizenship. Manning (2013) has highlighted the way some young people live out their political views through everyday practices like vegetarianism and energy and water conservation. Similarly, Harris et al. (2010) point to young people's involvement in mundane, uncontroversial and individualised forms of everyday participation like recycling, donating money to a cause, signing a petition or discussing social/political issues. It was forms of political expression like these which the systematic review suggested might be increased by civic education. Given the breadth and depth of barriers young people encounter when trying to participate politically, it is not surprising that more individualised and everyday forms of political engagement are sought. In contrast to voting or other involvement with electoral politics, these forms of participation are immediate, routinely accessible, sometimes even aimed at young people, and frequently are not overtly associated with ‘adultness’ and electoral politics. These behaviours may not have been the key target of the push for civic education, but they are important elements of political engagement and citizenship. Young people's clear preference for more ‘direct’ and everyday forms of political participation should be nurtured by civic educators while public policy should be crafted to address the raft of barriers to young people's political participation.