Emotion Review

The article considers patterns of reactivity in organ systems mediated by the autonomic nervous system as they relate to central neural circuits activated by affectively arousing cues. The relationship of these data to the concept of discrete emotion and their relevance for the autonomic feedback hypothesis are discussed. Research both with animal and human participants is considered and implications drawn for new directions in emotion science. It is suggested that the proposed brain-based view has a greater potential for scientific advance than the traditional model that emphasizes specific states of mind as mediators or reflectors of visceral action.

In many evolutionary/functionalist theories, emotions organize the activity of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and other physiological systems. Two kinds of patterned activity are discussed: (a) coherence (i.e., emotions organize and coordinate activity within the ANS, and between the ANS and other response systems such as facial expression and subjective experience), and (b) specificity (i.e., emotions activate different patterns of ANS response for different emotions). For each kind of patterning, significant methodological obstacles are considered that need to be overcome before empirical studies can adequately test theories and resolve controversies. Finally, links that coherence and specificity have with health and well-being are considered.

The precise relationship between the autonomic nervous system and emotion has been a topic of intense debate and research throughout the history of modern psychology. The present article considers some of the more influential theoretical frameworks that continue to drive contemporary research on the relationship between emotion and physiological processes. In particular, we highlight the multiple routes through which somatovisceral afference influences emotion and how this relates to the topic of emotion-specific patterns of autonomic nervous system activity.

In recent years, scholars have come to understand emotions as dynamic and socially constructed—the product of interdependent cultural, relational, situational, and biological influences. While researchers have called for a multilevel theory of emotion construction, any progress toward such a theory must overcome the fragmentation of relevant research across various disciplines and theoretical frameworks. We present affect control theory as a launching point for cross-disciplinary collaboration because of its empirically grounded conceptualization of social mechanisms operating at the interaction, relationship, and cultural levels, and its specification of processes linking social and individual aspects of emotion. After introducing the theory, we illustrate its correspondence with major theories of emotion construction framed at each of four analytical levels: cultural, interactional, individual, and neural.

We point out that constructionist models from experimental psychology account for the sociocultural, psychological, and neural levels of analysis in emotion. Individual constructionist models form a “metamodel” that integrates the levels of analysis important to a science of emotion. By clarifying the multilevel nature of constructionism, we hope to help lay a strong foundation for future cross-disciplinary collaborations.

Affect control theory posits that emotions are constructed by social and cultural forces. Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve (2014) introduce affect control theory as a conceptual and methodological “hub,” linking theories from different disciplines across levels of analysis. To illustrate this further, we apply their framework to cultural priming, an experimental technique in cultural psychology and neuroscience for testing how exposure to cultural symbols (e.g., words and pictures) changes people’s behavior, cognition, and emotion. Our analysis supports the use of affect control theory in linking different levels of analysis while leaving some opening questions for improving such a framework in future research.

This comment identifies and elaborates three assumptions that underlie the proposal made by the Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve (2014) article. First, our theories of emotion need to take into account, and be consistent with, supported theories of social outcomes and processes. Second, a thorough understanding of affective processes requires investigation at multiple levels of analysis, which in turn requires multilevel theories—or single-level theories that interact well with theories at other levels. Third, our broad understanding of emotion will be served best when we cultivate a field of intersecting and interacting theories of emotion.

Affect control theory (ACT) is a sociological theory developed for modeling and predicting emotions and social behaviors in social interaction. In this commentary, I identify a few potential problems in the theory, as presented in the target article (Rogers, Schröder, & von Scheve, 2014) and elsewhere, and in its suggested compatibility with other major emotion theories. The first problem concerns ACT’s capacity to model emotion generation insofar as emotions have nonconceptual content. The second problem focuses on the limits of modeling interaction on the basis of fixed affective meanings of identities. Finally, ACT has problems with explaining the dynamic change of affective meanings, given its tenets that people seek to maintain the established affective meanings of social roles and situations and deflections are not expressed in behavior but compensated by identity-confirming behavior.

We are pleased that all the commentators seem to agree that a theory-driven integration across disciplines is a worthwhile endeavor to better understand the social constitution of emotion. In our reply, we first take up the idea of relating affect control theory (ACT) to cultural priming and suggest links to an ACT-inspired constraint satisfaction explanation of priming. Second, we address reservations concerning ACT’s capability to account for emotions with nonconceptual content and to explain stability and change in affective meanings. Third, we clarify the relation of affect control theory to psychological constructionism, in particular with regard to conceptualizations of culture and society. Finally, we suggest that computational models are an adequate tool to address multilevel issues in the study of emotion.

According to legal tradition, the ideal judge is entirely dispassionate. Affective science calls into question the legitimacy of this ideal; further, it suggests that no judge could ever meet this standard, even if it were the correct one. What judges can and should do is to learn to effectively manage—rather than eliminate—emotion. Specifically, an emotion regulation perspective suggests that (a) judicial emotion is best managed by cognitive reappraisal and, often, disclosure; (b) behavioral suppression should be used sparingly; and (c) suppression of emotional experience is rarely helpful. We argue that the dispassionate-judge ideal presents a barrier to achieving the flexibility necessary for adaptive judicial emotion regulation. We suggest a new ideal, that of the emotionally well-regulated judge, and propose several directions for future research to strengthen ties between law and psychology, with particular attention to the study of emotion.

This article offers a conceptual analysis of the implications of the sociology of emotions for the restoration of social order in failing states. The authors mainly draw on ritual theories of emotions, but also use insights from dramaturgical, power and status, and exchange theories. It is argued that social order emerges from interactions among human individuals developing and internalizing emotional beliefs about their place within a wider social environment in the form of a social contract. Examples from states such as Afghanistan and Somalia illustrate the authors’ thesis that macro-level restoration of order is possible through change agents’ efforts at restoration of emotion-generating interaction ritual chains.

Characterizing how activity in the central and autonomic nervous systems corresponds to distinct emotional states is one of the central goals of affective neuroscience. Despite the ease with which individuals label their own experiences, identifying specific autonomic and neural markers of emotions remains a challenge. Here we explore how multivariate pattern classification approaches offer an advantageous framework for identifying emotion-specific biomarkers and for testing predictions of theoretical models of emotion. Based on initial studies using multivariate pattern classification, we suggest that central and autonomic nervous system activity can be reliably decoded into distinct emotional states. Finally, we consider future directions in applying pattern classification to understand the nature of emotion in the nervous system.

The recent introduction of the concepts of tenderness, vulnerability, and parental care in the field of moral emotions has brought us closer to an understanding of the underlying mechanisms, but has not yet resulted in a systematic evolutionary and proximate analysis. Applying such an analysis, the present article proposes a hypothetical care mechanism that produces different motivational states or moral emotions (e.g., tenderness, sympathy, guilt, moral anger) in response to individuals perceived as vulnerable. The mechanism consists of a care system automatically triggered by vulnerability cues, a system for defense and aggression, and a process of causally attributing changes in the vulnerable object’s well-being. The mechanism may also be useful in explaining moral responses in domains other than harm prevention.