European Journal of Political Theory

Revisionists have reclassified fascism as an autonomous revolutionary force based on the power of myth. Yet despite attempts to close the gap between materialist and culturalist readings, theories of fascism as the future-oriented projection of a mythic past overlook the point that, though intrinsic in the subjectification and deautonomization of the individual in collective-type societies, myths cannot be revolutionary because they derive their significance by projecting an idealized past that originates outside the emancipatory-developmental trajectory of modernity. Myths constitute a generic feature of human societies, idealized narratives which synthesize historical events, values and ideals into all-encompassing and enduring social intuitions; myths cannot be criticized because they are ‘untrue’ but because they exhibit an intrinsically speculative and particularistic nature which is unable to provide an objective basis for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist social relations. As a violent rupture of incendiary modernism, the mythic narrative of interwar fascism dramatized the experience of modernity in a new and scandalous form, confronting but ultimately reaffirming the conformism and disavowal in bourgeois culture. Unable to rise above the powerful yet imaginary ideal of ‘manifest destiny’ – an imperial ideal shared by non-fascist European powers, fascism offered a beguiling glimpse into the transgressive power of the modern postdemocratic corporate state, pointing towards a social structure of accumulation based on an appropriation of the cooperative capacities and democratic potential of society by capital. Emphasizing the accumulated or ‘constituted’ violence of modernity, the fascist mythologization of power led to the functionalization of reason, the demoralization of socially motivated action, and the suspension of objective moral standards as grounds for civic association.

Roger Griffin’s paper points towards the importance of historical time when discussing fascism. Walter Benjamin’s Theses, the discussion of which informs Griffin’s paper, engages with the topic of historical time at several points, especially in its discussion of the theory of progress that Benjamin found in German Social Democracy, to which the Theses was directly opposed. Revisiting sympathetically a theory of progress akin to that of Karl Kautsky and other Marxist writers enables us to add substance to the key Marxist concept of fascism as a reactionary movement. Combining this idea with an emphasis on the autonomous, mass character of fascism enables us to grasp the dynamics of fascism as a contradictory whole: a future-orientated and activist politics without revolutionary content.

In this article I respond to the important questions raised by Roger Griffin and David D. Roberts by asserting the following points. First, that there is no justification to the position that the historical function of fascism was to establish the political hegemony of finance capital, as Marxist-Leninist scholars have maintained without providing a shred of evidence in support of their position. On the contrary, fascism was an epochal phenomenon which occured on several continents and had features which point to a declaration of war against bourgeois society, its power structures, its values and its way of life. It was a revolt generated by disgust for a world dominated by those whom Hitler called ‘the worshippers of Mammon’. Second, that fascism was not at all an alternative modernity, but a violent and radical reaction which rejected all the values and institutions of the modern world, from individual freedom to the rights of man and citizen, from pluralist democracy to secularization. Third, that the history of fascism, like the history of communism, has shown that ideas are no mere fantasmagorical reflexes of the socioeconomic structure, as Marxist sociology claims. This was demonstrated by its political ideology, which was intent on revolutionizing the foundations of society and producing a new man, diametrically opposed to the ‘bourgeois’.

Marxist theory has always maintained that a strict continuity exists between liberalism and fascism, and has even proclaimed that there is a causal connection between the two. Therefore fascism comes to be portrayed as the ‘armed wing’ of the bourgeoisie. The Marxist thesis is weak for two reasons: first, because the connection between liberalism and fascism, though it doubtless exists, is considerably more complex, mediated and contradictory than it suggests; and second, because it axiomatically denies the revolutionary nature of fascism, which despite what Marxists claim, represents a rupture with the liberal tradition and demonstrates a relative autonomy from it. In the case of Italy, this autonomy arises from the fact that Fascism was born from the turmoil surrounding the genesis, the course and the outcome of the Great War, and was fed by fragments of philosophies and political theories radically opposed to liberalism, democracy and Marxism (though not to socialism) which arose in Europe at the turn of the 19th century. A birth in such a turbulent cultural and political climate could not give rise to an internally consistent and coherent ideology. The theoretical works of philosophers such as Giovanni Gentile encouraged liberalism to fool itself into seeing in fascism an unruly brother who could be put to good use by opposing socialism. This delusion enabled the rise to power of Mussolini. The revolutionary side to Fascism could draw on Italian populism’s latent revolutionary tradition which developed in the 50 years following unification as a transfiguration of ideological currents which contributed to the Risorgimento but which had been defeated by Cavourian liberalism. These included Mazzinianism and a particular type of radical anti-monarchism.

If one looks at the controversial premises of analytical approaches to fascism according to Roger Griffin, it is not surprising that a yawning distance has opened up between Marxist and non-Marxist schools of interpretation. In this situation whereby two camps are mutually ignorant of one another, it is certainly suggestive that the liberal British theoretician of fascism should put himself forward to play the role of a ‘mediator’, even if he faces the danger of significant criticism from both schools of interpretation. But Griffin’s attempt takes place on a predominantly theoretical level. The author of this essay instead places the notion of revolution in historical-empirical perspective, in order to distinguish it from the account associated with (liberal) representatives of the ‘new consensus’. He then examines, in particular, whether National Socialism represented a utopia which satisfied revolutionary aspirations. The author further asks whether fascism could separate itself from its (early) conservative support to an extent that would permit commentators to meaningfully identify a revolutionary breakthrough. And finally he clarifies what the modernizing achievements of fascism during its time in power actually were. Against this background, there does seem at least the possibility of a dialogue between the two approaches that would advance each of them.

In challenging Marxist theorists to confront the radical rebirth at the core of the fascist revolution, Roger Griffin has carried fascist studies to a new and valuable plateau. Likewise, David D. Roberts’s elaboration of Griffin’s model offers a provocative and fruitful avenue to rethink fascist political culture. This article seeks to advance the dialogue to the next level by considering what an international approach can add to these primarily nationalist interpretations of generic fascism. Drawing on examples from the history of the United States, I argue that fascism is a fundamentally cosmopolitan process and that it needs to be placed on a broader continuum with the histories of slavery, racism and nationalism.