European Union Politics

We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We find that the increased use of codecision gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the European Parliament, because the European Parliament then trusts the Commission more and the Commission is more informative as a result. Thus, we shed new light on the Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission.

This article analyzes how uncertainty about the location of the pivotal actor influences the outcome of Commission proposals. We argue that the Commission is an imperfect agenda-setter and expect that Commission proposals are more likely to fail when uncertainty increases in the bicameral legislature of the Council and the European Parliament. Considering all legislative acts decided under the co-decision procedure proposed in the period from November 1993 until December 2009, we focus on withdrawal of Commission proposals as failures. In the empirical analysis we distinguish between electoral and procedural uncertainty and provide evidence that both types of uncertainty explain withdrawal of Commission proposals.

Political theorists maintain that citizens’ representation through elections is the cornerstone of democracy. However, many analysts claim that a deficit in democratic representation exists within the European Union. This research examines the ideological match between voters and their party using the 2009 European Election Study. Aggregate agreement between voters and their parties’ ideological position is very high, but agreement at the individual level is modest. Barely a majority of partisans favor the party that is closest to them on the Left–Right scale, and vote shifts to another party triples the representation gap. We model the factors affecting the size of this gap and voting for a nonproximate party. The results illustrate the representation gap that individual voters perceive in EU elections with implications for democratic representation.

The European Commission has proposed a refugee distribution key, which yields respective quotas for European Union/European Free Trade Association member states. It is based on four quantities: GDP, population, asylum applications per capita in the past, and unemployment rates. I show that the given distribution key has properties which contradict the European Commission’s intentions. Exemplarily, states with low (high) unemployment may experience a lower (higher) quota when unemployment is taken into account compared to when it is not. These deviations are single-digit percentages. As a remedy, I propose an alternative distribution key, which avoids the undesired properties. It is modeled in the spirit of the European Commission’s proposal and is based on the same four quantities. Deviations between the two distribution keys are up to two-digit percentages.

This study introduces a population-ecological approach to the entry and exit of political parties. A primary proposition of population ecology is that organizational entry and exit depends on the number of organizations already present: that is, density. We propose that political parties mainly experience competition from parties in the same ideological niche (left, centre, right). Pooled time-series analyses of 410 parties, 263 elections and 18 West-European countries largely support our expectations. We find that political parties are more likely to exit when density within their niche increases. Also there is competition between adjacent ideological niches, i.e. between centrist and right-wing niches. In contrast to our expectations, neither density nor institutional rules impact party entry. This raises important questions about the rationale of prospective entrants.

We ask how pro-European parties communicate in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge and how this affects the politicization of European Union integration within a country. We draw on a quantitative content analysis of parties’ press releases issued in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections in seven countries. Our results show that pro-European parties as such put Europe on the agenda, debate issues similar to those voiced by Eurosceptics and defend their pro-European positions: yet, they do so to varying degrees and with major exceptions. It is pro-European catch-all parties with strong internal dissent that silence Europe and choose blurring or adoption strategies. Consequently, the politicization of European integration varies among countries, thereby high topic visibility is accompanied by low levels of party conflict.

The scrutiny exerted by opposition parties in European Union (EU) affairs crucially contributes to the functioning of democratic accountability in the EU. While our knowledge about the extent of control activities has increased, we know little about their content. This article investigates the policy issues that opposition parties address in parliamentary questions about the EU. I argue that Eurosceptic opposition parties follow vote-maximizing strategies and selectively scrutinize very general aspects of the EU. My expectation is tested using a unique data collection of written questions in the Danish Folketing (1973–2013). I find evidence that the content of questions has been broadened over time and that Eurosceptic parties strongly emphasize general EU matters. The results point to the importance of political parties in making democratic accountability in the EU work.

The role of national parliaments in scrutinising their governments in European Union affairs has been at the forefront of debates on democratic accountability in the European Union for the past two decades. Resolutions are the legislative instruments most clearly associated with government control. This article finds that party political strategies, and especially the different constraints and incentives for mainstream/government parties and issue entrepreneurs on Europe, are the most important factors determining the activity of national parliaments in the form of resolutions on European Union affairs. Issue entrepreneurs are parties which are Eurosceptic and for which Europe is salient. Motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are numerous but limited to criticising the government and contain little technical detail, while the resolutions of mainstream government parties mostly support the government’s position. Resolutions and motions in European Union affairs are thus used rather as instruments of ‘position taking’ than as a form of government control, but could still help to foster accountability by bringing European Union issues and government policy to the citizens’ attention.

Why do legislators choose to vote ‘Abstain’ instead of ‘Yea’ or ‘Nay’? Is it because they shy away from taking sides when facing competing demands? We address this question by studying roll-call vote data on the sixth European Parliament. In line with our principal–agent approach, we find that Members of the European Parliament are prone to strategically abstain when torn between different positions of their national party, their transnational party group, and their country’s minister. Abstentions are thus not random but strategic and ignoring them may bias the findings of legislative studies.