European View

The EU’s integration history is closely linked to economic challenges, particularly hardship. Over the course of more than 70 years, the economy has played a central role in both the narratives of the integration project (as a source of legitimisation) and its various episodes, from the Schuman Declaration to the Green Deal Industrial Plan. This article evaluates the importance of the internal market’s promise of ‘prosperity’ and describes some of the main responses to economic hardship, both failures and successes. Based on these, it concludes with a list of internal and external factors that always seem to be part of the way that further European integration offers answers in times of economic hardship. Given the crucial need to protect the internal market, the role of the EU is to look for (and beyond) what is necessary to supplement and to empower (but not to replace) the role of the member states. If opposing views are channelled towards a synthesis that strengthens the common good and integrates the interests of all stakeholders, economic hardship could ultimately strengthen the EU.

This article tries to give an overview of the challenges which the European youth faces regarding the rising cost of living and how the centre–right agenda can respond to this problem. The concerns of young people were identified in European surveys both after the 2019 elections and more recently during the European Year of Youth. The article suggests that there is an alignment between these concerns and the political proposals of the European People’s Party. In addition, the article explores the potential of young voters to be game changers at the ballot box, underlining how important it is to attract them as voters in the 2024 European Parliament elections. The article concludes by offering suggestions in two main areas: how to reach young citizens and gain their trust and votes, and how communications to them regarding the 2024 elections should be managed.

In 2022 the EU made remarkable progress in drastically reducing its energy dependence on Russia. However, serious challenges remain. Europe still buys a significant amount of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Russia. Furthermore, most of the alternatives to Russian LNG come from authoritarian countries. The EU’s planned green energy transition is challenged by its dependence on supplies of critical raw materials from China, Russia and other autocracies. This article suggests practical ways to minimise the EU’s energy dependence on authoritarian countries. These range from boosting the production of indigenous offshore natural gas to supporting projects in democratically inclined countries outside Europe, with the aim of increasing the production of LNG and the critical minerals required for the green energy transition.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and manipulation of the gas flow have revealed Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s malicious intentions and the EU’s weaknesses in the energy sector and related policies. As time has gone by and the initial shock has faded, it has become obvious that the EU’s policies need reform. Both the workings of the internal energy market and the fundaments of current energy policy have shown themselves to be unfit for the increased geopolitical tensions that the EU is facing. This article takes stock of what led to the crisis, assesses these policy flaws, and suggests possible solutions for the functioning of the internal energy market and policymaking.

Inflation began to increase rapidly all around the world towards the end of 2021, and it remained elevated throughout 2022. Higher energy prices contributed significantly to the increase in inflation. However, core inflation, excluding the direct contribution of energy prices, was also significantly above the European Central Bank’s inflation target, which was partially due to the highly expansionary monetary policy implemented during the pandemic. Drawing on historical evidence, this article discusses how the European Central Bank should respond to the increase in inflation. Higher interest rates are necessary to counteract the Bank’s previous expansionary policy. However, when the economy faces significant headwinds, a monetary policy that is too tight may cause a severe recession. Lessons from earlier periods of inflation suggest that, from a long-term perspective, contractionary monetary policy is preferable despite the short-term pain. To limit the negative consequences, this contractionary policy should be coupled with supply-side reforms aimed at stimulating economic growth and increasing the resilience of the European economy.

Whether fighting inflation or deflation, it has been a decade since the European Central Bank (ECB) managed to successfully attain its Treaty-mandated objective, that is, price stability. This is defined by the Bank itself as maintaining an inflation target of ‘below but close to 2% over the medium term’ and, since 2021, as ‘2% over the medium term’. The further reality has veered from policy, the more attention has been brought to the redistributive choices, both implicit and explicit, in the ECB’s pursuit of price stability. The current article analyses this debate in the context of the legal terms stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, conceptualised as a function of monetarist theory. It claims that the ECB’s failure to deliver on its price stability objective has contributed to intensifying the re-politicisation of monetary policy, cast doubt on the presumed legitimacy of foundational monetarist theory and caused a legal struggle within EU constitutionalism to sustain a stable distinction between economic and monetary policy.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely welcomed as it can improve the standard of living in the recipient country. However, depending on the target sector and/or the nationality of the investor, FDI may pose a risk to national security; this is why some countries have adopted screening procedures. Since 2020 the European Commission has coordinated its member states in screening FDI, but not all EU members have national screening mechanisms in place. Moreover, those mechanisms that do exist are not homogenous, for example, in their identification of protected sectors. This incompleteness and heterogeneity are weaknesses that undermine the security of the EU due to the high level of integration within the single market.

In navigating the currently troubled waters of inflation and the rising cost of living, politicians are tempted to treat the symptoms—offsetting the increasing expenses with subsidies and expanding welfare programmes. But one should also treat the cause. The cause is not Russian aggression towards Ukraine. That is also a symptom—a symptom of the weakness of Europe and the West, either real or perceived. This weakness should be addressed. In 2022 power politics made a comeback. It has become clear that a world in which prosperity is spread by innovation and trade is not a given but has to be protected by real power. In 2022, with war once again on European soil, the EU woke up to a world it thought only existed in the history books—where power rests on the pillars of demography, energy security, food security and military strength. To maintain its borders, its prosperity and its prestige in the world, the EU will need to be stronger. It will have to work harder, work smarter, improve productivity, innovate more and build alliances. Digital innovation is an important talking point, but one needs to look at the fundamentals first. The time is past for resting on one’s laurels, lecturing the world on European values and enjoying the American guarantee of safety for free.

The 2020s have got off to quite a rocky start globally, and especially for Europeans. The ongoing crises, beginning with the Covid-19 pandemic, and followed by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, rising inflation and the energy crisis, have created an atmosphere of continual instability and uncertainty for European citizens. The Western Balkans region, in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and geographically close to Ukraine, has also been affected by all these challenges. This article examines the current most pressing issues in the region and the possible outcomes of them. As the countries in the region (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo,¹ North Macedonia and Serbia) are all aspiring EU members, this piece seeks to explore the possibility of addressing the current challenges and the role of the EU as a catalyst in this process.

Germany’s role as a security actor has evolved considerably over the past decades. While in the twentieth century neighbouring countries feared a resurgence of German militarism, in the twenty-first century the country has come under increasing pressure to adopt a more proactive military posture. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered the European security architecture, many hoped for a groundbreaking reorientation at Europe’s economic centre. However, it is unlikely that the historic turnaround announced by Chancellor Scholz will become a reality, as the Russian war will not fundamentally change Germany’s international status, nor the key domestic factors that have historically determined its approach to security and defence policy. As Germany’s historical baggage continues to weigh heavily, it seems that reforms will not go beyond a better equipped Bundeswehr and a more power-political approach to the defence industry, which already poses a costly challenge for current and future decision-makers.

The EU’s foreign policy is currently focused on supporting Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression and on dealing with the consequences of the war, particularly in terms of energy security. But Europeans also face many challenges in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), from countering extremism and tackling Iran’s expanding nuclear programme to addressing widespread social and economic fragility. The problem is that European foreign policy towards the MENA region has often suffered from disunity among the member states and a lack of assertiveness, particularly in dealing with security issues. Still, Europeans cannot insulate themselves from what happens in the region. They will have to devote more political attention and resources to tackling its economic and security challenges.

Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine calls into question the future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative on two levels. First, the war challenges the very geopolitical premise that underpins the Partnership. Second, the EU’s granting of candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022, while postponing its decision on Georgia’s membership application, undermines the main rationale of the EaP: to keep the door to EU membership closed. This article argues that while the war in Ukraine may lead to a reshaping of the EaP, its fundamental features will remain for some time.

The Berlin Process offers the most significant and institutionalised roadmap for the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU. The direct involvement of EU institutions and member states, especially Germany and France, in the Process has transformed it into a trustworthy path to integration. The countries of the Western Balkans are still facing many difficulties and need to undertake serious reforms, especially in the fields of the fight against corruption and enforcing the rule of law. In this regard, the involvement of Croatia, Slovenia, Czechia, Poland and Austria in the Process should act as a catalyst for reform. The aforementioned states will become an important obstacle to increased Russian interference in the region as they have a clear mandate from the main driving forces of the EU, namely Germany, France and the Brussels-based EU institutions.

Disinformation represents a danger to the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. From our research based on the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections, we introduce a model for measuring the resilience of citizens to disinformation. This model is then used to draw conclusions about the impact of disinformation on their voting behaviour. We argue that it is important to understand this impact in the context of pre-existing beliefs and opinions, and therefore in terms of disinformation reinforcing rather than changing existing views. In particular, we demonstrate how feeling disappointed with one political party can make people more inclined to endorse disinformation that targets it.

The EU’s green transition started with the establishment of long-term goals but now requires short-term actions. It is a constant balancing act to achieve these goals while also responding to new problems and challenges. The time frame for reaching the ambitious climate target is short in terms of undertaking a deep transformation but long enough to expect unforeseen events. Europe’s green transformation must include intermediate steps, with the most important short-term deadline being 2030, when CO₂ emissions are expected to have been reduced by 55%. This goal cannot be achieved without a thorough industrial and economic transformation. However, the funds available for the transformation are limited and diluted by more pressing immediate needs: Russia’s war against Ukraine has increased global economic uncertainty, value chains have been distorted and EU–US policy divergences are increasing. In other words, Europe needs to reduce its emissions at a time of economic uncertainty, geopolitical tensions and increasing energy pressures.