Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

This special issue celebrates 25 years of the Sage journal Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. In this article, we use examples of the current sociopolitical climate to highlight the importance of the scientific inquiry into group processes and intergroup relations. Ingrained identities that arise from groups are responsible for causing wars, protests, community clashes with law enforcement, violence, climate change, major public health crises, and societal change. However, just as blame goes to groups, collectives can be harnessed for solutions. This special issue contains 13 articles that showcase the diversity of research in Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, all of which contribute to theory advancement and the application of science to real world issues.

Virtual communities are online groups organized around a shared interest within which members exchange information and socio-emotional support. Some virtual communities are positive (e.g., cancer support groups) or at least neutral (e.g., cooking groups). Others, like extremist virtual communities, focus on spreading misinformation and supporting violence. Theory and research have not adequately addressed the creation, maintenance, and face-to-face consequences of pro-social, neutral, or extremist virtual communities. One reason is because the research relies on a definition and model of sense of community for which empirical validation is deficient. Following examples in the organizational sciences and social psychology, I revise the sense of community construct to focus on its core meaning: literally, a person’s perception that a group is a community. Then using entitativity and social identity theories, I develop a new model of sense of community and propose theoretical boundaries (e.g., membership, identity, and self-categorization) to explain why prosocial and extremist virtual communities differ. I end with the challenges facing a research program studying extremist virtual communities.

The 3N model of radicalization posits that radicalization results from the confluence of the need for significance, the narrative, and the network. The network validates the narrative and rewards with significance those who adhere to it. Thus, it is critical to the radicalization process, leading scholars to suggest that no violent extremist truly acts alone. Similarly, understanding the role of the network is crucial to understanding and facilitating deradicalization, for one who is disillusioned with a violent extremist ideology may not leave their group if they lack an alternative group to replace it. This article discusses the power of the network in radicalization and deradicalization and proposes a novel theory of distinguishing between violent extremists who are more versus less influenced by their network, leading them to perpetrate violence in groups or on their own, respectively.

This article addresses two questions: (a) why do Americans believe that they need guns to defend themselves and their families and (b) why has the number of Americans who share this belief increased dramatically in recent decades? To address the first question, we describe a model of defensive gun ownership that assumes that Americans’ perceived need of a gun for self-defense is not only determined by their perceived lifetime risk of being assaulted (PLRA), but also by some diffuse belief in a dangerous world (BDW). In attempting to identify the dangerous world feared by high BDW gun owners, we review evidence that gun ownership is often associated with racial prejudice and concerns about groups that are stereotypically associated with safety threats (e.g., Black Americans, illegal immigrants). We identified three environmental changes that might exacerbate social threat perceptions: the proliferation of intergroup threat narratives such as the great replacement theory (that White Americans will be replaced by non-White minorities), the COVID-19 pandemic, and a change in the way the American gun industry advertises their products (praising the quality of their guns to emphasize the usefulness of guns for self-defense).

Whiteness in the US is often conceptualized largely as the absence of a meaningful cultural identity. Research from my own lab suggests that overlooking the nuances inherent in White identity (e.g., differences between ethnic groups) can induce feelings of threat and backlash against multiculturalism among dominant group members. Based on this research, I argue that conceptualizing Whiteness as multifaceted—for example, by acknowledging not only interethnic but also religious and socioeconomic differences—may mitigate dominant group members’ threat perceptions and increase their comfort amidst growing discussions of diversity, equity, and inclusion in institutions and organizations. Further, attending to the complexities of White identity may produce more positive intergroup outcomes, such as reduced racial/ethnic prejudice and greater perceived personal contributions to diversity, and may benefit groups that are classified as “White” on demographic forms but often do not perceive themselves as such (e.g., Middle Eastern and North African Americans, Hispanic/Latino[a] Americans).

Collective narcissism is a belief that the ingroup deserves but is denied special treatment and recognition. It is a projection of the narcissistic need to be recognized as better than others on the social level of the self. It is an aspect of ingroup identification, one of the ways group members favour their ingroup. National narcissism is associated with collective narcissism of advantaged national subgroups (e.g., Whites, men). National collective narcissism and collective narcissism of advantaged groups similarly predict discrimination of disadvantaged national subgroups (e.g., racial minorities, women) and legitimization of group-based inequality. Members of disadvantaged groups who endorse national narcissism internalize beliefs legitimizing inequality. Ultraconservative populists propagate national narcissism to undermine the political system that does not sufficiently serve the interests of advantaged groups. National narcissism predicts patriotism and nationalism. Once the three forms of national favouritism are differentiated, it becomes clear that patriotism does not come at the expense of nationalism, discrimination, societal polarization, or erosion of democracy. Instead, it may be a remedy against them.

By assuming that a group of nefarious actors collude to harm a perceiver’s ingroup, conspiracy theories are an intergroup phenomenon. What are the group-oriented motivations underlying belief in conspiracy theories? This contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are associated with both symbolic, identity-based motivations and realistic, harm-based motivations. As symbolic motivations, conspiracy theories help people develop, maintain, and protect a positive social identity. Conspiracy theories can unite people through a shared belief system, provide a basis for favorable intergroup comparison, and enable perceivers to attribute ingroup status threats to external forces beyond their control. As realistic motivations, conspiracy theories prepare people for conflict with other groups. Conspiracy theories transform an abstract sense of distrust into concrete allegations of misconduct. This provides a signal that an outgroup is threatening, mobilizes the ingroup, and promotes a readiness to fight. I discuss the implications of these processes for theory and practice.

Transgression credit is a form of deviance credit that occurs when people are more permissive towards transgressions by in-group leaders than by in-group nonleaders and out-group members and leaders. Despite rigorous experimental and simulation evidence for transgression credit, the ability to make such group processes research relevant to organizations and wider policy requires evidence with greater ecological validity. We examine transgression credit using spontaneously arising data from Twitter (now X) to test theoretically specified reactions to instances of transgressive leadership by the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Studies 1a and 1b compared Conservative and Labour Members of Parliament’s (MPs’) tweets in response to Boris Johnson’s unlawful prorogation of Parliament (Study 1a) and his publication of an Internal Market Bill that would break international law (Study 1b) with tweets responding to a nonleader, Dominic Cummings, breaking coronavirus lockdown rules. Conservative, but not Labour, MPs were more permissive of Johnson’s, but not Cummings’, transgression. Study 2 examined the semantic themes occurring among supportive and unsupportive tweets posted by the UK general public in response to Boris Johnson’s unlawful prorogation of Parliament. Across studies, the evidence is consistent with propositions from deviance credit and social identity theories.

The social control identity motivated (SCIM) model proposes that perceived failure of group social control mechanisms in punishing deviance increases the threat associated with the emergence of deviance in groups. Based on this assumption, this model explains the psychosocial processes involved in the consequences for social cohesion and social identity management strategies of a match or mismatch between the implemented formal social control and the mechanisms that group members expect to be implemented based on social identity motivation processes. This model explains members’ commitment to the reinforcement of ingroup social order and status quo (in case of a match), or a need to cope with perceived inefficacy of ingroup formal social control (in case of mismatch). In response to perceived inefficacy of ingroup formal social control, individuals may engage in various identity-motivated processes, including disinvestment from the ingroup, informal social control responses, or efforts to strengthen the ingroup’s normative system through social innovation or social control mechanisms reinforcement. By accounting for the interplay between formal social control mechanisms and identity motivated social control expectations, the SCIM model intends to contribute to the understanding of social identity protective strategies in response to deviance, by highlighting that (in)efficacy of group social control mechanisms shapes this dynamic. This model is justified with both direct and indirect empirical support, and we discuss the potential of the model’s applicability, as well as the need for additional research to understand determinants of each type of response, thus leaving this model open to potential refinement.

This article discusses a timely and recent domain of intergroup relations scholarship that focuses on communication between police and the public—a domain we have previously described as intergroup par excellence. We begin with a brief overview of research on this topic, and then introduce four interrelated areas of research that illustrate the diversity and relevance of this approach: policing and stereotyping, communication accommodation (and nonaccommodation) by police officials, intergroup contact and communication interventions that seek to improve relations between the police and the public, and the role of intergroup communication in translating scientific evidence into police policy and practice. Finally, we provide a critical research agenda that includes an integrated model of intergroup communication and policing.

In recent years, there has been growing recognition of the threats to health posed by loneliness. One of the main strategies that has been recommended to address this is social prescribing (SP). This typically involves general practitioners (GPs) and other health practitioners directing clients who are experiencing loneliness and related conditions to take part in social activities—typically in recreational and community contexts. However, evidence for the effectiveness of SP is mixed—leading some to suggest that enthusiasm for it might be misplaced. In this review, we argue that a core problem with most existing approaches to SP is that they lack a strong theoretical base. This has been a barrier to (a) understanding when SP will work and why, (b) designing optimally effective SP programmes, and (c) developing practitioner skills and appropriate infrastructure to support them. As a corrective to this state of affairs, this review outlines a three-tier social identity framework for SP and five associated hypotheses. These hypotheses predict that SP will be more effective when (a) clients join groups and (b) these groups are ones with which they identify, and when SP is supported by (c) social-identity-enhancing social infrastructure, (d) a social-identity-based therapeutic alliance, and (e) identity leadership that builds and shapes this alliance as well as clients’ identification with prescribed groups. This framework is supported by a range of evidence and provides an agenda for much-needed future research and practice.

As the impacts of climate change grow in frequency and intensity, climate justice—the recognition of climate change’s unequal impacts across populations, as well as inequities in the benefits and burdens from societal responses to climate change—has become a central focus of climate policymaking, advocacy, and scholarship. In this review, we take stock of these trends to consider what social psychologists can contribute to this discourse. We draw from integrative perspectives within the environmental social sciences, as well as emerging insights from psychology, communication, and public health, to highlight three areas with growing policy relevance that are ripe for social psychological inquiry: (a) understanding factors that influence climate vulnerability, its causes, and remediation; (b) identifying barriers and pathways to inclusive climate governance and decision-making; and (c) enhancing justice in climate solutions. For each, we consider the relevance of group and intergroup processes and highlight emerging empirical insights and key unanswered questions. We conclude by considering the urgency and challenges of translating psychological research to address climate injustice and highlighting opportunities for advancing the societal relevance of this research.

In this paper, we describe two basic motives for social identification: a drive for collective enhancement and a drive for epistemic fulfillment (uncertainty reduction). We posit that these two motives are critical for understanding one of the fundamental underlying mechanisms of social identity theory (SIT): positive distinctiveness, which is a desire to feel different from and better than relevant outgroups. Whereas “positive” was clearly outlined in the original social identity theory of intergroup relations, “distinctiveness” became a focal point of self-categorization theory. Most existing literature treats positive distinctiveness as a single construct; however, we argue that the “positive” and “distinctive” elements should be treated as separate but critically intertwined concepts. We suggest that “positive” is a direct feature of a desire for collective enhancement, and “distinctiveness” from a relevant outgroup is necessary for self-categorization that provides information to reduce self-uncertainty. Using the subjective group dynamics framework, which has historically emphasized the enhancement motive, we mathematically show that the motives act sequentially and differently to affect responses to deviance and change from it.

The 21st century has seen unprecedented levels of mass protest all over the world. Protest is a dynamic interplay of actions over time, across levels of society (e.g., individual, interpersonal, group, intergroup), and across domains (e.g., social, cultural, political, economic). To illustrate this systems view, we first describe the local and global ecology of protest as it operates in the world now. We rely mainly on macro-level social science research to describe the scale and scope of specific movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter) as well as temporal trends in protest across the world. Second, we offer an expansive conceptualization of the types of protest, and the consequences of protest, based on an integrative review of micro- and meso-level research in psychology, and macro-level research in social science. Third, we present a temporal social network analysis of the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement as an empirical example of a systems approach.