Journal of Theoretical Politics

We model the cultural outcomes of ‘sons of the soil’ conflicts. These are conflicts between the local inhabitants of a particular region and migrants to the region, typically belonging to a dominant national culture. Our goal is to understand the conditions under which migrants assimilate into the local culture, or in which locals assimilate into the national culture. The model has two main actors: a national elite of a dominant ethnic group, and a regional elite seeking to promote the traditional culture of the sons of the soil. Both actors have parallel strategies, viz. assimilating the other group into their culture, controlling the size of the migrant population, doing both, or allowing market forces to determine outcomes. The model has three possible cultural outcomes: the culture tips to that of the sons of the soil; the culture tips to that of the migrant group; or the region remains bicultural, with each group retaining its own culture. We illustrate these outcomes through four cases: (i) Bengalis and Assamese in the Indian state of Assam; (ii) Russians and Estonians in the Ida-Virumaa county of Estonia; (iii) Tamils and Sinhalese in Jaffna and the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka; and (iv) Castilians and Catalans in the autonomous community of Catalonia in Spain.

Regions of limited state presence persist in weak states, but does unevenness persist even in so-called ‘strong’ states? An underlying assumption behind weak states is that they lack capacity to broadcast power evenly over the entirety of their territory. Yet all states have finite resources, thus it is not clear that uneven state presence should be restricted to weak states. I develop a formal model that explores when strong states might strategically retain regions of limited state presence or subcontract state functions to non-state actors. The model demonstrates subnational characteristics that render the broadcasting of power by the state to be suboptimal, creating incentives for even strong states to retain regions of limited state presence.

Why do mainstream opposition parties sometimes fail to adopt policy positions that are attractive to the wider electorate? In this paper, I construct a game-theoretic model between the party leader, the party’s MPs, and the party organization to illustrate how opposition parties’ platform adjustments depend on the party leader’s risk assessment of being deposed and MPs’ re-election incentives. The model predicts that a party leader is most likely to adhere to the activists’ position when MPs’ re-election probabilities depend greatly on activists’ campaign effort, and when MPs’ benefits of re-election are high. Platform adjustments are only possible when the reverse is true. These results have important implications on electoral competitiveness and strategies of parties in majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems. Namely, I expect that opposition parties in majoritarian systems are less able to adjust their platforms than those in proportional systems.