Perception

Modern developments in machine vision and object recognition have generated renewed interest in the proposal for drawing inferences put forward by the Rev. Thomas Bayes (1701–1759). In this connection the epistemological studies by Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894) are often cited as laying the foundation of the currently popular move to regard perception as Bayesian inference. Helmholtz in his mature writings tried to reconcile the German idealist notions of reality-as-hypothesis with scientists' quests for the laws of nature, and espoused the view that we “attain knowledge of the lawful order in the realm of the real, but only in so far as it is represented in the tokens within the system of sensory impressions”. His propositions of inferring objects from internal sensory signals by what he called ‘unconscious inferences’ have made Helmholtz be regarded as a proto-Bayesian. But juxtaposing Bayes's original writings, the modern formulation of Bayesian inference, and Helmholtz's views of perception reveals only a tenuous relationship.

The generally accepted explanation of the Hermann grid illusion is Baumgartner's hypothesis that the illusory effect is generated by the response of retinal ganglion cells with concentric ON–OFF or OFF–ON receptive fields. To challenge this explanation, we have introduced some simple distortions to the grid lines which make the illusion disappear totally, while all preconditions of Baumgartner's hypothesis remain unchanged. To analyse the behaviour of the new versions of the grid, we carried out psychophysical experiments, in which we measured the distortion tolerance: the level of distortion at which the illusion disappears at a given type of distortion for a given subject. Statistical analysis has shown that the distortion tolerance is independent of grid-line width within a wide range, and of the type of distortion, except when one side of each line remains straight. We conclude that the main cause of the Hermann grid illusion is the straightness of the edges of the grid lines, and we propose a theory which explains why the illusory spots occur in the original Hermann grid and why they disappear in curved grids.

We analyse here people's perception of their reflections in mirrors placed in different positions. In two experiments, participants looked at their mirror image, in a third experiment they looked at another person's image. In both cases they were asked to answer a series of questions about how the virtual body appeared relative to the real body, focusing on different aspects. In experiment 1, they were asked to decide whether the reflections were identical, similar, different, or opposite in terms of the global relationship, orientation, and lateralisation (left-right arm). In experiment 2 they were instructed to make simple gestures and to evaluate if the gestures in the reflection were identical, opposite, similar, or different from theirs. Results show that ‘identity’ was preferred when the mirror was in front, and ‘opposition’ was preferred when the mirror was below. When opposition was experienced, it was attributed mainly to the exocentric frame of reference. Egocentric left – right reversal was not a common experience, although it was reported more frequently when the mirror was in front. The different roles of the exocentric and egocentric frames of reference were further tested in experiment 3, in which the condition of an observer looking at another person's reflection was studied. Contrary to the emphasis on the egocentric frame of reference in the literature on the ‘mirror question’, results presented in this paper demonstrate the importance of the exocentric frame of reference in influencing how observers react to their reflections.

Apparent motion is perceived when two objects are presented alternately at different positions. The internal representations of apparently moving objects are formed in an apparent-motion path which lacks physical inputs. We investigated the depth information contained in the representation of 3-D moving objects in an apparent-motion path. We examined how probe objects—briefly placed in the motion path—affected the perceived smoothness of apparent motion. The probe objects comprised 3-D objects which were defined by being shaded or by disparity (convex/concave) or 2-D (flat) objects, while the moving objects were convex/concave objects. We found that flat probe objects induced a significantly smoother motion perception than concave probe objects only in the case of the convex moving objects. However, convex probe objects did not lead to smoother motion as the flat objects did, although the convex probe objects contained the same depth information for the moving objects. Moreover, the difference between probe objects was reduced when the moving objects were concave. These counterintuitive results were consistent in conditions when both depth cues were used. The results suggest that internal representations contain incomplete depth information that is intermediate between that of 2-D and 3-D objects.

When stationary observers view an optic-flow pattern, visually induced self-motion perception (vection) and a form of motion sickness known as simulator sickness (SS), can result. Previous results suggest that an expanding flow pattern leads to more SS than a contracting pattern. Sensory conflict, a possible cause of SS, may be more salient when an expanding optic-flow pattern is viewed. An experiment was conducted to test if a more salient sensory conflict accompanying expanding flow patterns might inhibit vection. Participants (n = 15) viewed a pattern of blue squares, either steadily expanded or contracted, on a large rear-projection screen. Vection onset and magnitude were measured for 30 s with a computer-interfaced slide device. Vection onset was significantly faster, and vection magnitude stronger, when a contracting pattern was viewed. We propose that our extensive experience with forward self-motion may form a neural expectancy (exposure-history) about the sensory inputs which typically accompany expanding flow. However, since backward self-motion is less common, there may be a weaker exposure-history for contracting flow, and as a result these patterns generate less salient sensory conflict and subsequently less vection.

A basic finding in the time-perception literature is an interference effect in dual-task conditions involving concurrent timing and distractor tasks. Dual-task conditions typically cause time judgments to become less accurate than single-task conditions in which subjects judge time alone. Previous research (Brown, 1998 Psychological Research 61 71–81; Brown and Bennett, 2002 Psychological Research 66 80–89) has shown that practice on the distractor task reduces interference, a phenomenon called the attenuation effect. The present research was designed to determine whether practice on the time-judgment task would produce a similar result. In experiment 1, subjects reproduced 6–14 s intervals in a series of practice trials. Some subjects received feedback regarding the accuracy of each response and others received no feedback. Subsequent testing under dual-task (timing + digit memory) conditions showed that feedback training reduced interference. In experiment 2, the practice trials included both single-task and dual-task conditions. Later tests showed that feedback training eliminated the interference effect. The results highlight the role of attentional resources, the transfer of skills, and compensatory decision processes in time-judgment skill training.

We cite two different perceptual-correspondence principles whose emphasis can help to disambiguate the otherwise ambiguous Ternus display in apparent movement (a display that can alternately be seen in one of two possible configurations). One of these principles is spatial correspondence, which emphasizes the maintenance of similar stimulus elements in given locations over time. The other principle is relation correspondence, which emphasizes the maintenance of the inter-organization of stimulus elements across frames. Each of four experiments reported here made use of a different stimulus feature (eg element color or element texture) to emphasize these different correspondence principles in Ternus displays. As predicted, an emphasis upon spatial correspondence resulted in an increase in reports of element movement compared to a featureless control condition. Emphasis on relation correspondence resulted in an increase in reports of group movement. Extensions and limitations of the use of these principles to explain apparent movement are discussed.

Spatial and figural characteristics of backward masking were studied, with two collinear arcs presented end-to-end and serving as target and mask, respectively. Stimulus onset asynchrony was 50 ms while interstimulus interval was 0 ms. Mask exposure duration required for masking was determined as a function of target length with mask length as a parameter. The exposure duration of the mask required for complete masking varied directly with target length, but inversely with mask length. The fact that masking strength increased with mask duration while all other parameters were kept constant suggests that masking depended on stimulus termination asynchrony. Maximal masking occurred for target arcs as long as 5.0 deg of visual angle, exceeding previously reported distances. Misaligned or differently shaped stimuli produced less masking, suggesting that figural factors play a role in long-range backward masking.

There are well-known differences in resolution and performance across the visual field with performance generally better for the lower than the upper visual hemifield. Here we attempted to assess how transient attention summoned by a peripheral precue affects performance across the visual field. Four different attentional precueing tasks were used, varying in difficulty and attentional load. When a single discrimination target was presented (experiments 1 and 2), precues that summon transient attention had very little, if any, effect upon performance. However, when the target was presented among distractors (experiments 3 and 4), the precue had a substantial effect upon discrimination performance. The results showed that asymmetries in visual resolution between the upper and lower hemifields become more pronounced with increasing eccentricity. Furthermore, when the observers performed a precued acuity task with distractors, involving the judgment of the relative position of a small disk within a larger one, there was an asymmetry in the transient attentional effect on discrimination performance; the benefits of transient attention were larger in the upper than in the lower hemifield. Areas in the visual field where visual performance is generally worse thus appear to receive the largest attentional boost when needed. Possible ecological explanations for this are discussed.

Alex, a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) who identifies the bigger or smaller of two objects by reporting its color or matter using a vocal English label and who states “none” if they do not differ in size, was presented with two-dimensional Müller-Lyer figures (Brentano form) in which the central lines were of contrasting colors. His responses to “What color bigger/smaller?” demonstrated that he saw the standard length illusion in the Müller-Lyer figures in 32 of 50 tests where human observers would also see the illusion and reported the reverse direction only twice. He did not report the illusion when (a) arrows on the shafts were perpendicular to the shafts or closely approached perpendicularity, (b) shafts were 6 times thicker than the arrows, or (c) after being tested with multiple exposures—conditions that also lessen or eliminate the illusion for human observers. These data suggest that parrot and human visual systems process the Müller-Lyer figure in analogous ways despite a 175-fold difference in the respective sizes of their brain volumes. The similarity in results also indicates that parrots with vocal abilities like Alex's can be reliably tested on visual illusions with paradigms similar to those used on human subjects.

There is a growing interest in the question whether the phenomenon of subitising (fast and accurate detection of fewer than 4–5 stimuli presented simultaneously), widely thought to affect numerosity judgments in vision, can also affect the processing of tactile stimuli. In a recent study, in which multiple tactile stimuli were simultaneously presented across the body surface, Gallace et al (2006 Perception 35 247–266) concluded that tactile stimuli cannot be subitised. By contrast, Riggs et al (2006 Psychological Science 17 271–275), who presented tactile stimuli to participants' fingertips, came to precisely the opposite conclusion, arguing instead that subitising does occur in touch. Here, we re-analyse the data from both studies using more powerful statistical procedures. We show that Riggs et al's error data do not offer strong support for the subitising account and, what is more, Gallace et al's data are not entirely compatible with a linear model account of numerosity judgments in humans either. We then report an experiment in which we compare numerosity judgments for stimuli presented on the fingertips with those for stimuli presented on the rest of the body surface. The results show no major differences between the fingers and the rest of the body, and an absence of subitising in either condition. On the basis of these observations, we discuss whether the purported existence of subitisation in touch reflects a genuine cognitive phenomenon, or whether, instead, it may reflect a bias in the interpretation of the particular psychometric functions that happen to have been chosen by researchers to fit their data.

It is a common belief that we are experts in the processing of famous faces. Although our ability to quickly and accurately recognise pictures of famous faces is quite impressive, we might not really process famous faces as faces per se, but as ‘icons’ or famous still pictures of famous faces. This assumption was tested in two parallel experiments employing a recognition task on famous, but personally unfamiliar, and on personally familiar faces. Both tests included (a) original, ‘iconic’ pictures, (b) slightly modified versions of familiar pictures, and (c) rather unfamiliar pictures of familiar persons. Participants (n = 70 + 70) indeed recognised original pictures of famous and personally familiar people very accurately, while performing poorly in recognising slightly modified, as well as unfamiliar versions of famous, but not personally familiar persons. These results indicate that the successful processing of famous faces may depend on icons imbued in society but not on the face as such.