Psychological Science

Individuals sometimes use social media instead of sleeping or while driving. This fact raises the crucial need for—and challenge of—successfully self-regulating potent social-media temptations. To date, however, empirical evidence showing whether social-media temptations can be self-regulated and how self-regulation can be achieved remains scarce. Accordingly, the present within-participants study (N = 30 adults) provided causal evidence for self-regulation of social-media content and identified a potential underlying neural mechanism. We tested the premise that successful self-regulation requires limiting the mental representation of temptations in working memory. Specifically, we showed that loading working memory with neutral contents via attentional distraction, relative to passively watching tempting social-media stimuli, resulted in reduced self-reported desire to use social media, reduced initial attention allocation toward social-media stimuli (reduced late-positive-potential amplitudes), and reduced online representation of social-media stimuli in working memory (reduced contralateral-delay-activity amplitudes). These results have important implications for successfully navigating a social-media-saturated environment.

Replication of existing research is often referred to as one of the cornerstones of modern science. In this study, I tested whether the publication of independent replication attempts affects the citation patterns of the original studies. Investigating 95 replications conducted in the context of the Reproducibility Project: Psychology, I found little evidence for an adjustment of citation patterns in response to the publication of these independent replication attempts. This finding was robust to the choice of replication criterion, various model specifications, and the composition of the contrast group. I further present some suggestive evidence that shifts in the underlying composition of supporting and disputing citations have likely been small. I conclude with a review of the evidence in favor of the remaining explanations and discuss the potential consequences of these findings for the workings of the scientific process.

Some people hold beliefs that are opposed to overwhelming scientific evidence. Such misperceptions can be harmful to both personal and societal well-being. Communicating scientific consensus has been found to be effective in eliciting scientifically accurate beliefs, but it is unclear whether it is also effective in correcting false beliefs. Here, we show that a strategy that boosts people’s understanding of and ability to identify scientific consensus can help to correct misperceptions. In three experiments with more than 1,500 U.S. adults who held false beliefs, participants first learned the value of scientific consensus and how to identify it. Subsequently, they read a news article with information about a scientific consensus opposing their beliefs. We found strong evidence that in the domain of genetically engineered food, this two-step communication strategy was more successful in correcting misperceptions than merely communicating scientific consensus. The data suggest that the current approach may not work for misperceptions about climate change.

Over the past decade, evolutionary psychologists have proposed that many moral stances function to promote self-interests. At the same time, behavioral geneticists have demonstrated that many moral stances have genetic bases. We integrated these perspectives by examining how moral condemnation of recreational drug use relates to sexual strategy (i.e., being more vs. less open to sex outside of a committed relationship) in a sample of Finnish twins and siblings (N = 8,118). Twin modeling suggested that genetic factors accounted for 53%, 46%, and 41% of the variance in drug condemnation, sociosexuality, and sexual-disgust sensitivity, respectively. Further, approximately 75% of the phenotypic covariance between drug condemnation and sexual strategy was accounted for by genes, and there was substantial overlap in the genetic effects underlying both drug condemnation and sexual strategy (r_g = .41). Results are consistent with the proposal that some moral sentiments are calibrated to promote strategic sexual interests, which arise partially via genetic factors.

What drives people’s perceptions of novel risks, and how malleable are such risk perceptions? Psychological research has identified multiple potential drivers of risk perception, but no studies have yet tested within a unified analytic framework how well each of these drivers accounts for individual differences in large population samples. To provide such a framework, I harnessed the deployment of 5G—the latest generation of cellular network technology. Specifically, I conducted a multiverse analysis using a representative population sample in Switzerland (Study 1; N = 2,919 individuals between 15 and 94 years old), finding that interindividual differences in risk perceptions were strongly associated with hazard-related drivers (e.g., trust in the institutions regulating 5G, dread) and person-specific drivers (e.g., electromagnetic hypersensitivity)—and strongly predictive of people’s policy-related attitudes (e.g., voting intentions). Further, a field experiment based on a national expert report on 5G (N = 839 individuals in a longitudinal sample between 17 and 79 years old) identified links between intraindividual changes in psychological drivers and perceived risk, thus highlighting potential targets for future policy interventions.

Past work has suggested that people prescribe optimism—believing it is better to be optimistic, instead of accurate or pessimistic, about uncertain future events. Here, we identified and addressed an important ambiguity about whether those findings reflect an endorsement of biased beliefs—that is, whether people prescribe likelihood estimates that reflect overoptimism. In three studies, participants (N = 663 U.S. university students) read scenarios about protagonists facing uncertain events with a desired outcome. Results replicated prescriptions of optimism when we used the same solicitations as in past work. However, we found quite different prescriptions when using alternative solicitations that asked about potential bias in likelihood estimations and that did not involve vague terms such as “optimistic.” Participants generally prescribed being optimistic, feeling optimistic, and even thinking optimistically about the events, but they did not prescribe overestimating the likelihood of those events.

Humans primarily rely on language to communicate, on the basis of a shared understanding of the basic building blocks of communication: words. Do we mean the same things when we use the same words? Although cognitive neural research on semantics has revealed the common principles of word-meaning representation, the factors underlying the potential individual variations in word meanings are unknown. Here, we empirically characterized the intersubject consistency of 90 words across 20 adult subjects (10 female) using both behavioral measures (rating-based semantic-relationship patterns) and neuroimaging measures (word-evoked brain activity patterns). Across both the behavioral and neuroimaging experiments, we showed that the magnitude of individual disagreements on word meanings could be modeled on the basis of how much language or sensory experience is associated with a word and that this variation increases with word abstractness. Uncovering the cognitive and neural origins of word-meaning disagreements across individuals has implications for potential mechanisms to modulate such disagreements.

Most of our interactions with our environment involve manipulating real 3D objects. Accordingly, 3D objects seem to enjoy preferential processing compared with 2D images, for example, in capturing attention or being better remembered. But are they also more readily perceived? Thus far, the possibility of preferred detection for real 3D objects could not be empirically tested because suppression from awareness has been applied only to on-screen stimuli. Here, using a variant of continuous flash suppression (CFS) with augmented-reality goggles (“real-life” CFS), we managed to suppress both real 3D objects and their 2D representations. In 20 healthy young adults, real objects broke suppression faster than their photographs. Using 3D printing, we also showed in 50 healthy young adults that this finding held only for meaningful objects, whereas no difference was found for meaningless, novel ones (a similar trend was observed in another experiment with 20 subjects, yet it did not reach significance). This suggests that the effect might be mediated by affordances facilitating detection of 3D objects under interocular suppression.

Overconfidence is one of the most ubiquitous biases in the social sciences, but the evidence regarding its overall costs and benefits is mixed. To test the possibility that overconfidence might yield important relative benefits that offset its absolute costs, we conducted an experiment (N = 298 university students) in which pairs of participants bargained over the unequal allocation of a prize that was earned through a joint effort. We manipulated confidence using a binary noisy signal to investigate the causal effect of negotiators’ beliefs about their relative contribution to the outcome of the negotiation. Our results provide evidence that high levels of confidence lead to relative benefits (how much one earns compared with one’s partner) but absolute costs (how much money one receives overall). These results suggest that overconfidence creates an inefficient equilibrium whereby overconfident negotiators benefit over their partners even as they bring about joint losses.

The vigilance decrement is a decline in signal detection rate that occurs over time on a sustained-attention task. The effect has typically been ascribed to conservative shifts of response bias and losses of perceptual sensitivity. Recent work, though, has suggested that sensitivity losses in vigilance tasks are spurious, and other findings have implied that attentional lapses contribute to vigilance failures. To test these possibilities, we used Bayesian hierarchical modeling to compare psychometric curves for the first and last blocks of a visual vigilance task. Participants were a convenience sample of 99 young adults. Data showed evidence for all three postulated mechanisms of vigilance loss: a conservative shift of response bias, a decrease in perceptual sensitivity, and a tendency toward more frequent attentional lapses. Results confirm that sensitivity losses are possible in a sustained-attention task but indicate that mental lapses can also contribute to the vigilance decrement.

Psychological theories of identity concealment locate the ultimate source of concealment decisions within the social environment, yet most studies have not explicitly assessed stigmatizing environments beyond the immediate situation. We advanced the identity-concealment literature by objectively measuring structural forms of stigma related to sexual orientation (e.g., social policies) at proximal and distal geographic levels. We linked these measures to a new, population-based data set of 502 gay and bisexual men (residing in 44 states and Washington, DC; 269 counties; and 354 cities) who completed survey items about stigma, including identity-concealment motivation. Among gay men, the association between structural stigma and concealment motivation was (a) observed across three levels (city, county, and state), (b) conditional on one’s exposure at another geographic level (participants reported the least motivations to conceal their identity if they resided in both cities and states that were lowest in structural stigma), and (c) mediated by subjective perceptions of greater structural stigma.