Political Studies Review

Negative campaigning has long concerned scholars because of the potential effects on the electorate and on democracy. Most scholarship has focused on single-election studies in the United States, whereas less is known about how campaigns go on the attack in the UK, and few compare two elections. Drawing from a dataset of Facebook posts by parties and leaders in Great Britain during the five weeks of campaigning in the 2017 and 2019 General Elections (N = 3560), we use supervised machine learning to categorise posts as negative campaigning and distinguish between attacks focused on issues and attacks on candidates’ images. Our findings show that the 2019 election was more negative than in 2017, and that larger parties were more inclined to adopt attacks as a campaign strategy. Moreover, we found that party accounts posted more attack messages than leader accounts and were more focused on attacking based on issues, rather than personal character or image. Finally, we found that attack messages elicit stronger engagement from audiences, with attack messages receiving more attention, particularly attacks on image.

Diplomacy is often presented as subordinated to politics as if it merely received politically willed ‘inputs’ to produce politically structured ‘outputs’. However, diplomacy often deviates from political instructions. It can even operate almost without any political considerations whatsoever. This observation gives rise to a sense that politics and diplomacy operate as two separate systems that are mutually dependent and yet simultaneously independent from each other. To illuminate this relationship, the present paper draws from Modern Systems Theory (especially Parsons and Luhmann) to argue that politics and diplomacy engage in double interchanges: (1) they stimulate each other through premises for actions like ‘foreign policy goals’, and (2) they implement each other such that diplomatic happenings can be booked as political successes and vice versa. The discussion section outlines how the autonomy of the two systems varies empirically – such as in the case of politically appointed diplomats – and how extreme cases of autonomous operations (apolitical diplomacy or adiplomatic politics) face negative sanctions.

Although research has highlighted how parties use parliamentary tools to monitor coalition partners and ensure that they loyally execute compromises, the role of electoral competition in intra-coalition oversight is less well documented. Do coalition parties actually ‘police the bargain’ or do they rather use their tools to publicly target and potentially discredit parties with whom they will eventually compete for votes? Although generally difficult to disentangle, this study focuses on the unique Belgian polity, where Flemish and francophone parties govern together in a federal cabinet but compete electorally in two separate party systems. Multivariate analyses of MPs’ use of parliamentary questions between 1995 and 2018 (N = 30,661) confirm that coalition partners are particularly scrutinized when they are ideologically distant or control salient portfolios. Contrary to expectations, however, electoral competitors are not targeted more intensively, nor does direct electoral competition decrease the relative importance of ideological divisiveness or issue salience. These findings provide new insights into how and to what extent parliaments serve as arenas for intra-coalition governance.

While numerous explanations for vote-switching have been proposed (e.g. declining rates of partisanship, ideological shifts, partisan ambivalence, change in policy preferences), far less work has examined the personality profile of people more likely to engage in this behaviour. In Study 1, we examined the relationship between both general (i.e. openness, conscientiousness) and antagonistic (i.e. psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism) personality traits and the intent to switch one’s vote in a large sample of Canadian citizens, while controlling for several established correlates such as age, income and political interest. Of all personality traits, only individuals higher in openness reported a greater intent to engage in vote switching. Despite our expectations, Machiavellianism, a trait characterized by its strategic nature, was unrelated to vote switching intentions. In Study 2, we addressed several methodological reasons for why antagonistic traits may have been unrelated to vote switching intentions in Study 1 by examining the traits at the facet level and utilizing a new measure of Machiavellianism among a separate sample of Canadian citizens. Here again, we found little evidence for a relationship between antagonistic traits, including Machiavellianism, and vote switching intentions.

When exploring assessments of factionalism, there is the tendency to rely on quantitative assessments based upon an institutionalised and consciously organised group. However, to rely solely on the assessment of factionalism as such undermines and dismisses much of the intra-party dialogue which facilitates, encourages or could undermine party cohesion and unity. Quantitative analysis can rely on quite static understandings of the faction; however, this research understands factionalism as dynamic and changeable dependent on a range of internal and external variables. The fluidity of the faction is demonstrated in the ways in which the faction can adopt or drop ideological positions dependent on the appetite of intra-party groups and the electorate. Its dynamism is also reflected through the different typologies of factions that exist. The dynamic forms that the faction take are exemplified through the case study analysis of the Labour Party within the UK. The Labour Party also provides an interesting analysis in understanding the wide range of external factors that factions must negotiate. This includes, but is not limited to, the changing ways in which we understand party allegiance, identity and voting patterns. Factionalism is ultimately an interpersonal event, and to accurately capture this detail, qualitative assessments are necessary.

Defining ‘radical left’ political actors by their challenge to contemporary economic norms, this article draws the example of Die Linke in Germany and analyses explanations for this party’s support. Two theories are tested. First, the policy-proximity account, building off the Downsian spatial model and tested with three policy dimensions relating to economics, cultural policy, and migration policy. Second, the populism-based account, which defines this as a conflict between ‘the people’ versus ‘elites’. Using German Longitudinal Election Survey data, this article carries out a large-N analysis of support for Die Linke. It uses multiple linear regression to test how far support for this party is explained by proximity between voters and the party, or by levels of populism among voters. Results showed greater support for Die Linke from proximal voters on each dimension; however, highly populist voters were not found to be more supportive of Die Linke. The article concludes in favour of a policy-proximity explanation but suggests the party’s well-established nature may have altered voters’ policy preferences, potentially leaving a reverse causal relationship and leaving in doubt the role of policy-proximity on radical left support.

Institutional scholarship highlights policy as a frozen landscape, explaining its reluctance to depart from the predetermined trajectories. However, this argument needs to be reassessed to better capture the reality of the Indonesian social policy reform, most notably in healthcare. The reform involved sudden and radical changes from a segmented and decentralized model to a more integrated and inclusive one—outside the critical juncture of the 1998 economic crisis—creating a patchwork of old and new ideas and features within policy institutions. Empirical interview data show that path-creation changes in healthcare reform are characterized by a deviation from the path followed as an institutionally embedded principle. This deviation was made possible due to the considerable influence of academics-turned-senior bureaucrats (policy entrepreneurs), who capitalized on the widespread distrust of the ruling government to drive the desired reform. In addition, the success of Obamacare as a populist healthcare program amid the capitalist US system also undermined the legitimacy of policy actors’ previous attempts to reject reform. This article helps clarify the development and application of the path-creation theory, comparing it to established theories to reduce ambiguity.

Emotions are inseparable from political decision-making. This idea has been especially strongly supported for negative emotions. The current study examines the role of anxiety in forming political attitudes using data from a nationally representative American National Election Studies survey (N = 5900). Our path analysis highlights a significant indirect relationship between anxiety and political participation through two mediators: information-seeking tendencies and internal political efficacy. By examining the unique role of anxiety in political decision-making, our study provides a more nuanced understanding of how negative emotions can impact democracy.

Recent research has examined the effectiveness of inclusion tools aimed at encouraging greater involvement of disadvantaged social groups in local deliberative institutions. Most research, quantitative and qualitative, tends to examine positive outcomes, although results are frequently ambivalent. This research begins by arguing that analytical frameworks should consider the limitations of inclusion tools and that greater attention should be given to alternative approaches to inclusion (material/symbolic, formal/informal, focused/general). Based on these theoretical points, the study focuses on the views and experiences of working-class people and smallholder farmers in relation to their participation in open rural assemblies (concejos abiertos) in the Basque Country (Spain). The research employed an ethnographic methodology involving 20 observations of assemblies/events and 55 in-depth interviews conducted between 2012 and 2015. Three inclusion tools were identified as key to the functioning of the assemblies: “administrative and technical support” for engaging with the bureaucratic processes, a legal “right to paid work leave” for board members, and the use of “multi-disciplinary boards.” The study examines the effectiveness of these tools in motivating and facilitating the involvement of participants from disadvantaged social class positions, presenting novel findings in the case of paid work leave and multi-disciplinary boards. The importance of informal practices and procedures for reducing material constraints are emphasized as well as the identification of some limitations of inclusion tools in a context of predominant elitist paradigms.

Party discipline is an area that has received considerable attention in the party cohesion literature. While existing comparative research has predominantly focused on the institutional environment that impacts party discipline, we know less about its relationship with party-related variables. In this article, we explore the effect of party ideology on legislators’ perceptions of party discipline in Latin America. The difficulties for parliamentary groups to act cohesively in Latin America make party discipline and its study a major task. We argue that party ideology shapes the perceptions of legislators vis-à-vis their relative autonomy and the resulting ability of the party to be cohesive. To perform the analysis, we have constructed a database containing the responses of 1272 parliamentarians from 71 political parties in 17 countries across the 2011–2022 legislatures. In addition to party-related variables, we have included individual- and system-level variables. The results suggest that Latin American parliamentarians belonging to left-wing parties tend to conform to party discipline more frequently than those of the right wing.

Little is known about young non-voters’ appraisals of ethnic tribune politics in Northern Ireland. This article draws attention to how some young non-voters in Northern Ireland actively challenge such representational strategies, while others are reluctant to express critical views regarding party politics, despite their interest in a range of broadly political issues and dissatisfaction with aspects of social life. The article accounts for these findings by reworking existing conceptualisations of youth political engagement to include consideration of those who are not apathetic, engaged sceptics or conservatives. This permits a more nuanced understanding of the position of youth within the Northern Ireland electorate.

In their volume The American Political Economy, Jacob S. Hacker et al. seek to renew the study of American political economy (APE) through a direct engagement with other areas of political science, including and especially comparative political economy (CPE). In the introduction of their volume, they lay out the foundations of APE as both a field of research and an approach to American politics that seeks to contribute to the study of the United States as well as to the broader discipline of political science. In this review essay, I will discuss the APE as an intellectual project to stress its key assumptions and its potential contribution to the study of politics and public policy, in the United States and beyond. Then, I will discuss two key issues that, while not explicitly central to APE as developed in The American Political Economy, could help enrich this novel approach. These two issues are policy feedback, a concept already prominent in the institutionalist tradition APE draws on, and the role of ideas in politics, which in recent decades has gained more currency in the study of politics, public policy and CPE.

A variety of research has found strong evidence that men are more likely to donate to political parties and candidates relative to women. Yet studies of other kinds of political participation have observed a shrinking gender gap. What explains this variation? One possible explanation comes from several studies that report women are more likely to donate to nonpolitical groups when told they have been entered into a monetary draw. Does simulating resource equality also reduce the political donations gender gap? To answer this question, we analyse original Canadian data from two surveys that asked participants how much they would give to a federal (survey 1)/provincial (survey 2) political party if they were given CDN$100. Contrary to our expectations, we find no gender gap at the federal level and a positive gap favouring women at the provincial level.

Activist groups debate the complex connection between climate change and migration but generally agree on the normative value of describing those migrants as “environmental refugees.” They argue that using such a term, even though unrecognized under international law, might increase the urgency of this issue in the eyes of the public. Does the term do the normative work that has been assumed? To our knowledge, the idea has not been subject to empirical confirmation. In this research note, we present data from two experimental surveys conducted in the UK and the Netherlands (N = 2261) directly addressing that question. The findings significantly undermine the assumption that “environmental refugee” is normatively persuasive outside activists and academic circles. We demonstrate that using “environmental refugees” frames compared to “environmental migrants” does not increase the urgency of the climate migration problem in the eyes of the public, and as our results show, such frames may slightly lower perceptions of urgency. Yet, this result is rather negligible.