Social Studies of Science

How much is a dinosaur worth? This essay offers an account of the way vertebrate fossils were priced in late 19th-century America to explore the process by which monetary values are established in science. Examining a long and drawn-out negotiation over the sale of an unusually rich dinosaur quarry in Wyoming, I argue that, on their own, abstract market principles did not suffice to mediate between supply and demand. Rather, people haggling over the price of dinosaur bones looked to social norms from the mineral industry for cues on how to value these rare and unusual objects, adopting a set of negotiation tactics that exploited asymmetries in the distribution of scarce information to secure the better end of the deal. On the mining frontier in America’s Gilded Age, dinosaurs were thus valued in much the same way as any other scarce natural resource one could dig out of the ground, including gold, silver, and coal.

We trace the history of the phallometric test – which measures erections of men exposed to visual erotic stimuli to characterize sexualities – in order to account for its functioning as a ‘truthing technology’. On the basis of a content analysis of 410 key scientific journal article abstracts, we argue that since its invention in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, phallometry has been employed within three distinct assemblages: as a test of predominance of sexual desire, as a test for therapeutic efficacy, and as a threshold test of sexual risk. Drawing on works of theorists of materialization and proponents of script theory, we argue that within each assemblage phallometric testing materializes male desire and renders it measurable via a ‘technosexual script’. We consider the performative effects of phallometry in establishing scientific conceptions of normal and abnormal sexualities. At the same time, through attention to debates among practitioners and broader controversies surrounding the employment of phallometry, we examine the limits of researchers’ abilities to establish the broader credibility of the test and capture the phenomenon of sexual desire. This analysis contributes to the study of truthing technologies (or ‘truth machines’) as a class, while also helping to build bridges between science and technology studies and sexuality studies.

Is it possible to prepare and plan for emergent and changing objects of research? Members of the Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study have been investigating AIDS for over 30 years, and in that time, the disease has been repeatedly transformed. Over the years and across many changes, members have continued to study HIV disease while in the process regenerating an adaptable research organization. The key to sustaining this technoscientific flexibility has been what we call the kernel of a research infrastructure: ongoing efforts to maintain the availability of resources and services that may be brought to bear in the investigation of new objects. In the case of the Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study, these resources are as follows: specimens and data, calibrated instruments, heterogeneous experts, and participating cohorts of gay and bisexual men. We track three ontological transformations, examining how members prepared for and responded to changes: the discovery of a novel retroviral agent (HIV), the ability to test for that agent, and the transition of the disease from fatal to chronic through pharmaceutical intervention. Respectively, we call the work, ‘technologies’, and techniques of adapting to these changes, ‘repurposing’, ‘elaborating’, and ‘extending the kernel’.

Some scholars dismiss the distinction between basic and applied science as passé, yet substantive assumptions about this boundary remain obdurate in research policy, popular rhetoric, the sociology and philosophy of science, and, indeed, at the level of bench practice. In this article, I draw on a multiple ontology framework to provide a more stable affirmation of a constructivist position in science and technology studies that cannot be reduced to a matter of competing perspectives on a single reality. The analysis is grounded in ethnographic research in the border zone of Artificial Intelligence science. I translate in-situ moments in which members of neighboring but differently situated labs engage in three distinct repertoires that render the reality of basic and applied science: partitioning, flipping, and collapsing. While the essences of scientific objects are nowhere to be found, the boundary between basic and applied is neither illusion nor mere propaganda. Instead, distinctions among scientific knowledge are made real as a matter of course.

Research on scientific, social scientific, and technical knowledge is increasingly focused on changes in institutionalized fields, such as the commercialization of university-based knowledge. Much less is known about how organizations produce and promote knowledge in the ‘thick boundaries’ between fields. In this article, I draw on 53 semi-structured interviews with Canadian think-tank executives, researchers, research fellows, and communication officers to understand how think-tank knowledge work is linked to the liminal spaces between institutionalized fields. First, although think-tank knowledge work has a broadly utilitarian epistemic culture, there are important differences between organizations that see intellectual simplicity and political consistency as the most important marker of credibility, versus those that emphasize inconsistency. A second major difference is between think tanks that argue for the separation of research and communication strategies and those that conflate them from beginning to end, arguably subordinating research to demands from more powerful fields. Finally, think tanks display different degrees of instrumentalism toward the public sphere, with some seeking publicity as an end in itself and others using it as a means to influence elite or public opinion. Together, we can see these differences as responses to diverging principles of legitimacy.

As scientific research moves increasingly to the private sector, the social organization of science undergoes important transformations. Focusing on the production of ignorance, agnotology has been a fruitful approach to understanding the social and epistemic consequences of the recent commercialization of scientific research. Despite their important contributions, scholars working on agnotology seem to hold implicit normative commitments that are in tension with their descriptive accounts of ignorance-constructive practices. The main aim of this article is to uncover these commitments and to expose the emerging tensions. Thus, this article begins an exploration into normative aspects of the studies of ignorance. In particular, it shows that agnotology still needs the support of a well-articulated normative approach capable of identifying and evaluating the epistemic and social concerns raised by the private funding and performance of science.