Theory & Psychology

A formal system based on the sentential calculus is constructed to explore the logical properties of autogenetic (self-fulfilling and self-negating) beliefs. The language enables us to distinguish among types of autogenesis which have previously been regarded as identical, and to describe new types which have not yet been discussed in the experimental literature. The analysis proceeds in three stages. The first stage deals with individual autogenetic processes, wherein a single person's belief system has an effect on the truth or falsehood of what is believed (e.g. the placebo effect). The second stage deals with social processes in which the belief systems of two or more individuals have an autogenetic effect that cannot be produced by any single belief system in isolation (e.g. a run on the banks). The third stage deals with higher-order processes in which a belief about one's own involvement in an autogenetic processes has itself a further and more complicated autogenetic effect (e.g. faith-healing). Higher-order autogenesis has paradoxical consequences that raise fundamental questions about the nature and scope of empirical knowledge.

Dealing with infinity, an inherently abstract concept which defies concrete representation, involves distinct cognitive difficulties. I first review the research on the development of children's understanding of the endlessness of numbers and of the infinite gap between a large finite set and an infinite set. Second, I consider the contradictions with which mathematicians and philosophers have to cope when attempting to manipulate infinity concepts in a coherent way. These difficulties are highlighted by analyzing one perplexing paradox. Finally, I discuss the intellect's puzzling ability to transcend the limits of our finitely based intuitions, as manifested in science and higher mathematics, and the need to thoroughly explore the emergence of that kind of human capability.

In this article depth hermeneutical theories are analysed by focusing on the development of foundational structures which specify sets of criteria for reasons and expressions. Depth hermeneutical development theories consist of a reconstructive and a dynamic part. The reconstructive part concerns the foundations of reasoning and experiencing and their development and consists of two elements. In the horizontal reconstruction the domain is analysed. In the vertical reconstruction or logic a pattern of stages is reconstructed which additionally can be the subject-matter of an evaluative claim of progress or decline. The dynamic part concerns itself with the actual development of individuals or collectives. In the conceptual component learning principles and societal factors are reconstructed and justified. The empirical component consists of research on the base of these conceptions. Depth hermeneutical developmental theories deliver `what is possible' explanations, which incorporate reasons of subjects. Special attention is paid to the relationship between philosophy and science. Finally, the special consequence of the `double hermeneutic' for developmental theories is discussed.

This paper addresses some of the common criticisms directed against social constructionism. Criticisms which hold constructionism to be a disguised form of behaviourism, a doctrine of subjectivist relativism and an approach of political naivete and impotence are specifically discussed. The analytic of Textuality is introduced as a way of invigorating the constructionist position and rendering such criticism ill-judged and invalid. Textuality, in affirming both the material substance of language and the textual substance of material, is presented as both a defining feature of Being, and as a way of addressing Being. Textuality thereby represents a challenge to modes of inquiry which are predicated upon a subject/object duality. Finally, these issues are contextualized within what we call a contemporary `climate of problematization'.

It is proposed that the thought of Bernard Lonergan has a great deal to contribute to the long-standing questions of what is the right method of inquiry in psychology; of how far, and in what sense, psychology should aspire to be a science; and of to what degree it should pursue the methods of such sciences as physics and chemistry. Lonergan shows that any attempt to eliminate `mentalism' from the explanation of human behavior is self-destructive, since this implies that the theory which purports to eliminate it can itself never be accepted for good reasons. To illustrate the point, B.F. Skinner's account of psychology as a science is summarized, and subjected to criticism in the light of Lonergan's principles. Finally, the moral is applied to some other conceptions of psychology.

The legacy of B.F. Skinner for social improvement is examined. A significant discrepancy is noticed between the rhetoric of change contained in his writings and the underlying philosophy of adjustment to the social order. Promises to modify the environment to advance human welfare were reverted into practices of changing individuals to promote the effective functioning of the social system. A critique of Skinner's theory of values reveals that it is unable to provide a conceptual framework for the `good' society. It is argued that even though radical behaviorism is frequently used to maintain undesirable social institutions, it could be employed to foster beneficial macrosocial changes. This contrast is analyzed in terms of (a) a discrepancy between theory and practice; (b) a preoccupation with technology over ethical decision-making; and (c) a neglect of power issues in institutional and societal settings.

Research is inherently subjective. It is conducted within a theoretical and methodological framework, the validity of which depends on underlying assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. The interpretation of one's own data, and the evaluation of the data interpretation of others, requires assessment of these underlying philosophical assumptions. We contend that while examination of philosophical assumptions is demonstrably an integral part of research, it is one which has largely been neglected in experimental psychology because researchers have rarely explicitly identified their ontological and epistemological assumptions. A contemporary debate in experimental psychology, that between representational and non-representational approaches to understanding the control of movement, is discussed to illustrate the influence such ontological and epistemological assumptions have upon methodological choices and upon the development and evaluation of theory.

Bradley's (1993) analysis of `theories of mind' contains the beginning of a serious reconstruction of psychology from a developmental point of view. Nevertheless, such reconstruction efforts may become hostages to social rhetorics themselves, and some possible lines of theoretical construction that may avoid such danger are pointed out (e.g. systematically developmental perspective, explication of the research processes).

Current critiques of developmental theory impugn all walks of cognitive and empirical psychology. They show that we must undergo a fundamental `renegotiation of our common language habits' as psychologists (Valsiner, p. 149). My difference with Valsiner is over how fundamental this renegotiation should be. He believes that psychologists simply `lack adequate concepts' to capture the phenomena that interest them. I argue that the deficiencies of contemporary psychology, illustrated in my critique of the `theory of mind' approach to children's thinking, must be righted by generating a new psychological poetic that refuses the aggrandizing consolations of the psychological sublime. Only this new poetic would realize the revolutionary destiny that Miller (1969) foresaw for our discipline.