Abstract
Among classical Christian doctrines, the idea of original sin is one that has fared particularly poorly in the modern era. Quite simply, many modern minds find the idea of congenital sinfulness that precedes any human action to be morally and spiritually repugnant. Such a concept appears to strike at the heart of personal agency and responsibility and leads to moral despair and political quietism. Ian McFarland (Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at Candler School of Theology) has produced a focused and lucid treatment of the concept of original sin that is both historically sensitive and also grapples with contemporary re-assessments of the Christian language of sin.
In Adam’s Fall is divided into three parts. In the first part, McFarland begins his “meditation” on original sin by discussing the alienation of the doctrine in modern theology and culture and attends to some of the nuances of sin language in the Bible. He then moves on to discuss the emergence of the doctrine in the patristic period, its culmination in the writings of St Augustine, and the reception of the doctrine through to the modern era, particularly by Protestants. In order to meet the objections to the doctrine of original sin unearthed in the first part, McFarland engages in a carefully nuanced analysis of personhood, human nature, and the will. He conducts this analysis through an exposition of the doctrine in the writing of Augustine and Maximus the Confessor and a discussion of how their views play out in the question of the sinless Christ’s fallen human nature. Through this attention to Augustine and Maximus, McFarland attempts to construct a theological anthropology in which human freedom is not equated with its power for self-determination, but a view where human freedom is finally located in the act of the God who draws the will, and ultimately human nature itself, to its proper end. The third and final part of the book provides an opportunity for McFarland to reply to the cultured despisers of original sin. In the first instance, he attempts to describe how original sin can be universal without also specifying the mode of its transmission or its point of historical origination. McFarland sees original sin as a corruption of desire, such that human beings come to will that which is against God’s will for them. Original sin is thus a condition of human nature, but not directly related to the human person, per se. Rather, as human persons exercise their agency, actualized through their will in their human nature, they are drawn to sin by the corruption of their desires. Due to original sin being a statement about their nature, rather than their person, it is coherent to say that original sin is not something for which one can be considered “guilty.”
McFarland then moves on to discuss the relation between original sin and actual sin. He argues that due to the effect of original sin on human nature and not on the human person, actual sins are particular to the individual. He thus resists a view of original sin that posits that all sin is ultimately of the same essential sort (e.g., pride). In the final chapter of the book, McFarland addresses the objection that original sin leads to political quietism and moral resignation. Original sin is battled in the particularities of one’s life by heeding God’s will in its specificity; therefore, there is good reason for moral effort. Furthermore, knowledge of one’s sin is by definition unknowable to the sinning person. It requires the cultivation of a political community in which the voices of suffering victims can be heard, to alert the sinner to the nature and effects of their sin.
In Adam’s Fall is an excellent exploration of the doctrine of original sin. McFarland has examined the most essential elements of the doctrine both carefully and concisely. The expositions of Augustine and Maximus are particularly lucid and provide great clarity for understanding the doctrine in its most seminal period of development. The distinction between nature and person in the doctrine of original sin, especially as it is discussed through Christological lenses, is also helpful. McFarland’s work begs comparison with the thought of Karl Barth, who only makes a brief appearance in McFarland’s book, but whose hamartiology is similar on several central points. Barth, like McFarland, affirms the doctrine of original sin, but denies its hereditary transmission and refrains from positing a theory of its historical origination. Barth and McFarland diverge in the degree to which McFarland stands aloof from constructing his doctrine of sin on Christological grounds. While McFarland and Barth affirm that human beings only know they are sinners through the Gospel, McFarland does not specify exactly how that takes place. Instead, he emphasizes the possibility that the victims of sin cast light on the sin committed by others. This, however, does not appear to address the full scope of sin, particularly the biblical description of sins in which human victims are not self-evident (e.g., the sins of “abomination”). Furthermore, it is unclear why the sinned-against should be given a privileged epistemological position if they too are bound up in sin (albeit in a different way than those who sin against them). This is where Barth’s notion of sin as revealed in the cross might shed some light. All sinners, including those sinned against and those who perpetrate sin, can only discover the truth about themselves as sinners in the event of the crucifixion of Jesus. This nuance, rather than overturning McFarland’s work, safeguards his emphasis on the universality of original sin and its comprehensive effects. Overall, In Adam’s Fall is an engaging and historically-informed reflection on a difficult aspect of Christian teaching that stimulates constructive dialogue and further examination.