Foreign Involvement and Loss of Democracy,Estonia 1934

The Republic of Estonia, which had achieved independence in the Eastern European power vacuum following the first world war, lost its democracy on 12 March 1934 after the coup d'etat by Konstantin Päts and Johan Laidoner. This was one instance in the wave of collapsed democracies that hit the whole of Europe between the two worldwars. ¹ Certainly there was more than one reason for this occurrence, both in Estonia and elsewhere, being more the result of an accumulation of unfavourable variables.

Many theoretical studies have concluded that the processes of both democratization and the collapse of democracies are influenced considerably by involvement fromother countries. ² The small nation of Estonia, where the interests of influential major powers crossed, provides a good opportunity to describe such involvement using a concrete example. Both the Soviet Union, an undemocratic neighbour with150 times the population of Estonia, and Germany, with 60 times Estonia's population which had become undemocratic in 1933, were seen in Estonia as security risks. The democratic United Kingdom (UK), however, was seen as its best friend and most influential supporter. The two last countries were also Estonia's main trading partners: in 1933, 37 per cent of Estonia's exports went to the UK, and 21 per cent to Germany, but only 2 per cent to the Soviet Union. ³

The main justification for the coup plotters was the claim that the competingpolitical force – the 'Vabadussõjalased' (the veterans from the War of Independence, an ex-servicemen's organization) were plotting the illegal seizure of power. There is no doubt that such a justification has no basis. The additional argument by the coup plotters, however, was foreign interference, or the danger of this, from the Soviet Union or Germany. ⁴

How extensive was this foreign involvement, in what form did it manifest itself, and how did it affect the change of regime in Estonia? Could Estonia's democracy have survived if there had been no destabilizing interference by the Soviet Union and Germany? Could the UK have influenced Estonian internal policy by stabilizing democracy? Examining these issues also opens up the aims, methods and effectiveness of the actions of the major powers. Initially, this article looks at the background and historiography, followed by the actions of the three large countries as regards their influence on Estonia's domestic politics, and finally there is a concluding analysis of the results of their policies.

As a result of the Great Depression, both international and domestic relationships soured. The economic crisis reached Estonia in 1930 and hit it particularly hard in the autumn of 1931, after Estonia's main export destination countries devalued their currencies, and the situation became grave in 1932. The economic paralysis in Estonia was particularly serious, because Estonia delayed cutting its exchange rate. ⁵

The issue of amending the constitution became the lightning-rod in Estonia forthe internal political tensions resulting from the grave economic crisis. The 1920 constitution set up a parliamentary system, but without the institution of a president. The executive was weak and unstable, whereas the parliament, or to be more precise the party leaders, enjoyed an abundance of power. Nevertheless, this unusual constitutional system did work before the crisis.

Everything began to change, however, during the economic crisis. In the period 1921–32 the lifespan of governments was relatively brief – an average of 11 months. ⁶ At the end of 1931 and the beginning of the following year, there were party mergers – the National Central Party and the large Farmers’ Party were formed. In the parliamentary elections that took place in May 1932, these two parties and a third – the Estonian Socialist Workers’ Party – took a total of 87 per cent of the parliamentary seats. ⁷ But the parties were split over the exchange rate for the kroon. The lifespan of the governments was reduced to five months, and the new large parties again collapsed in 1933. ⁸ Under such conditions it was nowonder that the Estonian Ex-Servicemen's Central Association, which wasestablished in 1929 became political in 1931 and became extraordinarily popular in the following years. The ex-servicemen's message concentrated on the need for better politics through changes to the constitution. ⁹

The parliament also began changing the constitution. The referendum in August 1932 on the Riigikogu (the Estonian parliament) draft failed by just a small margin: there were 334,000 votes supporting the constitutional amendment, and 335,000 votes against. The socialists and ex-servicemen campaigned for a No vote: the former, since they did not consider there was a need to change the constitution, and the latter because they considered the parliamentary draft to be incomplete.

The relationships of the ex-servicemen with the parliamentary parties, particularly the socialists, began to sour at the end of 1931. This opposition did not becomeviolent, as it did in Germany. No one was killed in Estonia and there was no shooting, although many men had pistols in their pockets or rifles at home, in thebarn, attic or larder.

In June 1933 a new draft by the parliament was put to a referendum, resulting in162,000 Yes votes, and 333,000 against. This time, the National Central Party submitted a proposal to apply Article 32 of the Constitution, according to which a Riigikogu that had lost the confidence of the people had to disband. ¹⁰ The proposal was not supported by the majority of the parliament. There is no reason to believe that this decision would have improved the image of the Riigikogu and the parliamentary parties.

In addition, a number of corruption scandals lowered the image of the political elite. Tension increased to an extraordinary level. On 11 August 1933 Jaan Tõnisson's government declared a nationwide state of emergency and banned the activities and political meetings of the ex-servicemen, set up preliminary censorship and disbanded the paramilitary groups. There were five of the latter, of which three belonged to the socialists. ¹¹ No citizens were arrested, but this action, which had not been well argued, clearly created among the people an even greater opposition to the current political elite and more favourable attitudes towards the ex-servicemen.

Although the activities of the ex-servicemen were now banned, parliament was obliged to continue with the plan to change the constitution, which it had proposed in 1932. Its draft strengthened the executive, but also left possibilities for the continuation of a parliamentary system. ¹²

In the referendum that took place in October, the ex-servicemen's draft received strong support: 417,000 citizens voted for, with 157,000 against. Jaan Tõnisson's government terminated the state of emergency and submitted their joint resignation. The main aim of the government of Konstantin Päts, who had become head of state, was to bring the Republic of Estonia to new elections. ¹³

The popularity of the ex-servicemen, however, kept increasing. It was the Estonian socialists who were most worried about this turn of events. Their leaders had agreed with Konstantin Päts that they trusted his firm wish to put the ex-servicemen ‘in theirplace’, which Päts also had clearly promised them. Karl Ast claims to have understood that Päts would use illegal means if needed in order to stay in power, but claims to have considered that ‘a thousand times better’ than giving up power to the ex-servicemen. ¹⁴

On 5 December the Riigikogu decided, led by the socialists, to shut down the Baltic-German National Socialist movement, which was headed in Estonia by Victor von zur Mühlen. ¹⁵ The Estonian socialists claimed that the ex-servicemen and the Baltic-German National Socialists were co-operating. As a counter-measure, the ex-servicemen used the citizen's initiative mechanism to submit a draft law to parliament on fighting Marxism.

The new constitution came into force on 24 January 1934. Elections for the Riigikogu and the head of state (president) were to take place within 100 days of the constitution entering into force. In the elections for head of state, should no candidate receive a majority of the votes cast in the first round, a second round of voting was to take place within three months.

The ex-servicemen's negotiations for presenting candidates for head of state began in October. First, discussions were held with Päts, but these stalled in the first half of November. Thereafter, negotiations were held with Laidoner for almost a month. ¹⁶ But on 16 December, the leadership of the ex-servicemen decided in favour of one of their own leaders, Andres Larka. In addition to Päts, Laidoner and Larka, the socialist August Rei was also a candidate.

In order to be a candidate for the position of head of state, 10,000 supporting signatures were needed. The collection of signatures which started on 5 March became an important part of the election campaign, a ‘preliminary election’. By 12 March, the ex-servicemen's candidate Larka had exceeded the threshold (52,436 signatures), as had Johan Laidoner (18,220 signatures). Konstantin Päts was just under the threshold (8969 signatures), but the socialist candidate August Rei had collected only 2786 signatures. ¹⁷ Päts and Laidoner could therefore envisage that Larka might get an absolute majority in the first round of the elections.

On 12 March, at two o'clock in the afternoon, companies of cadets from the Defence Forces Joint Academy received the order for an extraordinary operation in full battle dress. The cadets marched out of the barracks, took the city centre under their control and surrounded the homes of ex-servicemen. Extra forces, mounted troops, a machine gun company and an armoured car unit were ordered to proceed to Tallinn. During the government meeting that began at 5.30 pm, a nationwide state of emergency was declared for six months, and Johan Laidoner, who had the respect of the military, was appointed commander-in-chief of the defence forces. ¹⁸ Demonstrations were banned, the ex-servicemen's organizations and newspapers were shut down and many hundreds of the ex-servicemen's leadersand other activists were arrested. ¹⁹ On 15 March Päts informed the parliament about the steps taken, stating that although the highest power in the state was in the hands of the people, the people must be sensible and make considered decisions in the execution of that highest power, and ‘one cannot expect that a fevered person makes a considered decision.’ ²⁰ The decree of 19 March issued by Päts stated that the elections for head of state and the Riigikogu had been postponed until the end of the state of emergency. This meant that a coup had taken place, since appointing a commander-in-chief during peace-time – that is, appointing Laidoner as commander-in-chief – was not possible, according to Article 80 of the Constitution, and the decree issued by Päts on 19 March to postpone the elections was also illegitimate, since Article 60 of the Constitution specifically did not permit an amendment of the electoral law by decree. ²¹ Elections based on the 1933 Constitution were never again carried out in Estonia.

Although the 1934 coup is one of the most important events in the history ofEstonian domestic politics, there has not yet been a study that has concentrated on the reasons, events, results and meaning of the loss of democracy. Of course, neither has there been a study concentrating on the role of foreign influence. ²² It is only since the 1990s that Estonian archives are open to all scholars and the Russian archives are partly open, which has made consideration of such a topic possible. Inrecent years a number of studies have been written, based on archival material from Russia, but these have only touched upon this topic. Some of them are rather superficial, as one would expect from an initial analysis.

The claim that there had been some kind of danger to Estonia posed by the SovietUnion if the coup had not taken place was used by the coup plotters in their statements only immediately after the coup. Later on, this was ‘forgotten’. This claim can still be encountered here and there in non-academic works. ²³ The so-called foreign policy argument has never been taken too seriously in academic research.

Using primary sources, the influence of the Soviet Union has been analysed by Alexander Rupasov and Oleg Ken, Zenonas Butkus and Magnus Ilmjärv. They have all based their research primarily on materials from the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Archives.

Oleg Ken and Alexander Rupasov claim that there was almost sympathy in theSoviet Union regarding the coup (the more so because Päts had earlier tested thewaters regarding Moscow's attitude), but they found no support from the SovietUnion for the coup, or that Moscow had even known about the coup happening. ²⁴

But Butkus and Ilmjärv present another viewpoint. According to Butkus, the USSR wanted to see Päts win the election. Soviet actions in Estonia, according to Butkus, provided considerable assistance regarding Päts coming to the fore, the defeat of his opponents and his longevity in power. ²⁵

Ilmjärv claims that Moscow supported Päts in his fight for power by means of financial deals and that Moscow also approved of Päts's intention to carry out a coup.

Thereafter the Soviet ruling camp approved of Päts' intention to carry out a coup d'état to seize power in Estonia. The Soviets' positive attitude toward a planned putsch, however, was made conditional on the requirement that Laidoner should be excluded from the putsch, and later from the ruling clique. At this point Päts had to concede that he could not carry out the planned coup d'état alone, without the help of either Larka or Laidoner. Consequently he informed the Soviet legation that he had to make a choice between the two undesirables. ²⁶

Ilmjärv also provides a reference to a document where this latter information was to be found.

The second question in this topic that has attracted historians' attention is possible contacts between the ex-servicemen and the German nazis. At the peak of the political struggle, in 1933–4, accusations regarding contacts by the ex-servicemen with the German nazis were very widespread, but they faded in Estonia soon after the coup.

Soviet history writers, however, confirm the claims of the erstwhile Soviet mediathat the ex-servicemen were not only financed from Germany but were also led from there, as well as being nazi-minded.²⁶ But the results of research, focused especially on the topic of the ex-servicemen by Rein Marandi and Andres Kasekamp, do not confirm this. Rein Marandi considers the ex-servicemen to be adistinctive right-wing radical movement, which had only one common characteristic with fascists – anti-Marxism. He notes that, so far as is known, the ex-servicemen had foreign contacts only with Finland. Claims that the ex-servicemen were financed by nazi Germany are considered by Marandi to be unproven or false, but he does eventually concede that there is no conclusive certainty or clarity. ²⁷ Andres Kasekamp decides, according to Stanley Payne's criteria (A History of Fascism 1914–1945, published in 1996) that although the ex-servicemen possessed features characteristic of fascists, they cannot be considered to be a genuine fascistic movement. ²⁸ As regards contact by the ex-servicemen with the German nazis, Kasekamp claims that although there is no evidence, the ex-servicemen also did not shake off accusations of contact with the German nazis. ²⁹ Magnus Ilmjärv, however, claims that the ex-servicemen were financed by the nazis. ³⁰

The following article contains a critical analysis of the entire range of the problem, based on original sources. In the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Archives it has been possible to use correspondence between the Soviet Union's Tallinn legation and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, as well as the diaries of Soviet diplomats. These documents (together with the Soviet foreign intelligence documents held in the Estonian State Archives) ³¹ are sufficient to ascertain Moscow's policies. The relevant materials from the UK are contained in the reports of the consul and envoy, and in the commentaries of Laurence Collier, department head inthe Foreign Office's Scandinavian and Baltic Department, which also provide a sufficient overview in order to be able to answer the questions asked. The available archival material reflecting Germany's policies has unfortunately been mostly destroyed and the surviving material is widely scattered, so all questions cannot be definitively answered.

For London at the beginning of the 1930s, Estonia and the other Baltic states were definitely not seen to be in a region of vital importance. The 1934 annual report by the envoy notes: ‘… idle to pretend, that the Baltic States are a factor of first importance in Europe’. ³² Britain did not tie itself with unconditional aid, should the Baltic States be in danger, which is what the Baltic leaders seem to have hoped for. Already in 1926 London had decided not to object to the possible takeover of the Baltic States by the USSR. ³³

At the beginning of the 1930s British envoy Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, who covered all three Baltic States, resided in Riga. It took 11 hours to travel to Tallinn, and Knatchbull-Hugessen did not often bother. British Consul Hill resided in Tallinn and he informed the envoy of Estonian domestic political events. Both in Hill's reports to the envoy, as well as in the envoy's reports to the Foreign Office, the situation of Estonia's democracy, was reflected as a second- or third-rate question. And the tone of the reports was even indifferent, rather than neutral. ³⁴

Estonia, because of its exports, was strongly economically dependent on Britain. But the economy was not the first consideration as regards the feelings of Estonia towards the UK: ‘The fundamental reason is the least likely reason – gratitude – gratitude for England's assistance in Estonia's war of independence. Itis perhaps not unduly cynical to say that it is surprising to find any nation retaining sentiments of gratitude for such a lengthy period.’ ³⁵ Knatchbull-Hugessen, too, considered Estonians to be particular anglophiles. One of the coup plotters – General Laidoner – was seen as especially British-minded. ³⁶

The primary interest for London, as regards the Estonian domestic situation, however, was the extent of the influence of nazi Germany. Although accusations about the connections of the ex-servicemen with German nazis started appearing in Estonian socialist newspapers by the early spring of 1933, it seems that until December 1933 the German influence was not considered by London to be particularly strong. The head of the Foreign Office's Scandinavia and Baltic States department, Laurence Collier, commented in a Foreign Office internal memorandum on an article from the Moscow newspaper Izvestiya, which wrote that the ex-servicemen are being led from nazi Germany was a ‘grotesque misunderstanding ofEstonian conditions (if the misunderstanding is genuine).’

The ‘Veterans’ are anti-Soviet but they are also and above all things anti-German, because they are the sons of peasants, brought up in semi-serfdom on the estates of German barons, and I am assuming from all sides, that, at present at least Estonian nationalism is much more concerned with the German than with the Russian danger. ³⁷

On 11November 1933 Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote about his discussions in Estonia and noted that neither Päts nor the officials from the Foreign Ministry expressed any kind of concern about German activities. ³⁸

In December 1933, however, different signals began to come from Estonia. On 9December 1933, Hill spoke to Estonian foreign minister Julius Seljamaa, who claimed that the Baltic-German nazis have ‘certain connections’ with nazis in Berlin. ³⁹ On 1 March, Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote of supposed interference by German nazis but did not express doubt about it:

on 28th February the Chief of State mentioned to me the ‘strong suspicion’, that the Ex-Service Men were being financed from abroad. … M. Päts, speaking to me confidentially, was most emphatic in his determination to put a stop to these proceedings, as soon as definite proof was forthcoming, and as soon as he felt himself endowed with the necessary authority … he intimated to me his intention of taking further steps with the final object of putting a stop to this foreign penetration. ⁴⁰

This information from Päts should probably be seen as preparing the ground for the coup, making it acceptable to the British. It cannot be excluded that Knatchbull-Hugessen believed Päts.

The Estonian envoy in London, Oskar Kallas, phoned Collier on 16 March 1934 and spoke about the coup, trying to show the Estonian government as mild and democratic and promising elections soon: ‘The Government had now obtained Parliamentary approval for their action and Parliament was about to be dissolved, new elections being held at the end of the month.’ Collier then gently teased Kallas: ‘I asked Dr Kallas whether the Presidential election would also be held as planned, in view of recent events, and whether General Larka, who had not been arrested with the other ex-Service men's leaders, would be allowed to proceed with his candidature for Presidency.’ Kallas did not give a direct answer, saying that he had asked Tallinn the same question, but it seemed they did not know what to do about the presidential election. ⁴¹

On 16 March Hill reported on Päts' speech, which he gave on 15 March in the Riigikogu, and noted at the end: ‘The speech of the Acting Chief of State was broadcast throughout Estonia, and appears to have created a slight feeling of disappointment, due to the lack of more sensational disclosures’. ⁴²

German influence on the ex-servicemen was not mentioned again. On 13 September Knatchbull-Hugessen provided a long report on developments in theBaltic States. As regards the Estonian coup, he noted, apparently not without irony, that the government is trying to decide whether to prolong the current abnormal workings of government into the following year, and that the government hopes that a notably good grain harvest will help spread contentment. ⁴³ In the 1934 report it was noted: ‘On the plea, that the Ex-Service Men's Association had planned a coup d'état to overthrow the Government, but probably mainly because that M. Päts foresaw the probability of General Larka being elected, the Government took drastic measures.’ ⁴⁴

There are further reports where the ex-servicemen are called a fascist or nazi political movement, but these are in the minority. In some reports, ‘Nazi’ is in quotes; in some the ex-servicemen are described as a movement which is to a degree similar to the German National Socialist, as regards its aims, principles and organization.

After the coup London followed events closely, making professional analyses and ironically commenting on Päts' steps in ensuring authoritarian power; but no recommendations were made regarding organizing elections according to the 1933 Constitution. There are not even any signs that their attitude was ever expressed to the Päts administration. Päts, for his part, did indeed let the British know of all hismore important domestic political plans – for example, speaking about his plan to switch to a completely new constitution even earlier than he let it be known inEstonia. ⁴⁵

Whereas the UK was seen in Estonia as an ally, the Soviet Union was seen as a security threat. This feeling had been intensified by the attempted communist coup led by Moscow on 1 December 1924. Constant attacks and threats voiced by the central Soviet newspapers meant that the danger from the East could not be forgotten.

The documents prepared by Soviet diplomats, however, leave a much less aggressive impression of Moscow's intentions. Of the documents available, it could be concluded that the main aim of the Soviet Union regarding Estonia, at the end of the 1920s and during the first half of the 1930s, was keeping Estonia away from any possible anti-Soviet military-political blocks, or alliance with some major power, and perhaps also keeping Estonia itself as a weak power. ⁴⁶ Secondly, there was also a desire to use Estonia in implementing its international plans. But relatively little financial and political capital was invested in these aims. Although quite a lot was written about Estonian domestic politics in Soviet newspapers, it is possible to derive two facts related to the topic from the documents: firstly, Estonia held a low priority in the Soviet Union's foreign policy plans, and secondly, the Soviet Union was afraid of compromising itself by interfering in Estonian domestic politics.

Although the internal situation of Estonia or its neighbours was not a priority issue in Moscow's Baltic policies, the Soviet Union did follow the increasing popularity of the ex-servicemen in Estonia with concern. The coming to power of the ex-servicemen was considered to be undesirable for mainly foreign policy considerations, or as expressed by Boris Stomonyakov, the member responsible for the Baltic states in the council of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: ‘The success of the fascists in Estonia would also provide a strong stimulus to Latvia and Finland to become fascist.’ ⁴⁷ In other words, forces more hostile towards the Soviet Union might come to power there.

By the start of 1934 it was clear to Moscow that, of the possible candidates for head of state, Päts was the most acceptable. Rei would probably have been even more acceptable, but his chances were not rated particularly highly in Moscow. ⁴⁸ Päts was not a good candidate for the Soviets, but merely the least bad. ⁴⁹ The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did indeed instruct the legation to support Päts, but ‘within the limits of our possibilities’. ⁵⁰ Moscow's indifference is also demonstrated by the fact that envoy Fyodor Raskolnikov had left Estonia in September 1933, but the new envoy, Aleksei Ustinov, arrived in Estonia only in February 1934.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did indeed try to help Päts by commissioning trade deals for Estonia. Stomonyakov wrote to Antipov that the decision made by the centre to place quite substantial orders for agricultural products in the first quarter could be of great assistance to Päts, and this must be used for the purpose of ensuring influence in Estonia. ⁵¹ This Politburo decision was not specifically related to supporting Päts – it was the 17 January decision by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had the objective of increasing in general the involvement of Soviet policy in the Baltic states. Within the framework of the ‘Baltic’ decision, the Soviet leadership planned a series of actions to get closer to the Baltic States. In the case of Estonia, this meant organizing a trip by political and societal figures to the Soviet Union, placing orders worth 200,000 roubles; an excursion by Estonian journalists to the Soviet Union; and organizing an exhibition of Soviet graphic art and books in Estonia. ⁵² This programme continued after the coup. ⁵³ On 5 February, the Politburo adopted a further decision on ‘Import from Estonia’, based on the previous decision, where the 200,000 roubles was divided specifically amongst various products – potatoes to be purchased for 35,000, herd animals for 95,000, and so on. ⁵⁴

Soviet bureaucracy, however, was unable to react to these Politburo decisions. By 20 February, there had not been much progress in the potato or herd purchase deals. Ustinov stated that this was creating a very bad impression in Estonian government and business circles. ⁵⁵ The first potato train was handed over to the Russians only on 15 March: that is, after the coup. ⁵⁶

Thus the claim that the Soviet Russians supported Päts financially is invalid for at least two reasons. First, the product orders were insufficient, since the framework set by the Politburo decision – 200,000 roubles per quarter – did not permit it. In the first quarter of 1934, Estonia's exports to the Soviet Union comprised only about 1 per cent of the total value of Estonia's exports for the same period, and was, for example, eight times smaller than Estonia's export to Latvia. ⁵⁷ Second, the timing for the orders was wrong. Most of the already limited orders were filled only after the coup. But it is also important to remember that the steps described were meant to support Päts in legal elections and not in carrying out a coup.

And we now come to the main question: did the Soviet Union support the coup, and if so, with what result? Let us then look at whether Moscow found out about the coup plan, and if so, when.

In his 20 February report to Stomonyakov, Ustinov claimed that there was reason to believe that the president would only be elected in the second round of voting in July. ⁵⁸ In his 7 March report, Ustinov discussed his thoughts on inviting Estonian journalists to the Soviet Union, and noted that if the ‘veterans’ came to power the trip could just be cancelled. ⁵⁹ Ustinov did not even hint in these reports about a possible coup, let alone predict one or hint about any information about it that had reached him.

Snippets of information about a possible coup began to reach the Soviet legation on 8 March. On that day Antipov met the editor of the socialists' journal Rahva Sõna, Erich Joonas. ‘To my question as to whether the “freedom fighters” will win, Joonas responded vaguely, saying that the opposition, i.e. Päts, plans to strike a decisive blow against the “veterans”.’ ⁶⁰ Vague rumours that Ustinov probably was not able to interpret more precisely also reached the legation through German envoy Reinebeck. ⁶¹

On 28 March, Ustinov wrote Stomonyakov his first long post-coup report, where he wrote as much as he knew about the background to the coup. He noted at the start that

you know about the events associated with 12–13 March and the following days (disbanding the veterans) from the newspapers. It is interesting to note and emphasize only some aspects that deserve particular attention. Päts emphasized in his discussions with us that the decision to disband the veterans was made by him alone (‘I had no one with whom to consult’), and the situation was reflected in the same way in his speech to the parliament on 15/III. ⁶²

Soviet intelligence was also unaware of any coup plans. In the 13 March report by the Tallinn resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence, there is still talk of four candidates for the presidential elections, with no mention of a coup. ⁶³ In the special report on Estonia by foreign intelligence on the same day, however, it is noted that, according to information received during the night, Päts had declared a nationwide state of martial law, Laidoner had been appointed as commander-in-chief and 80ex-servicemen had been arrested. ⁶⁴

There is also no trace in any other available documents that Moscow had been aware of plans for the coup or that it had let Päts convince it of the need to involve Laidoner. This means that there is no need to ask whether Moscow supported the coup or to what extent. ⁶⁵

One can agree, however, with Ken and Rupasov that Päts had put out a feeler as to how Moscow might react to the coup. This could be considered to be Erich Joonas' discussion with Antipov on 8 March, which could have taken place at Päts' request. In any case, there is also no doubt that Moscow viewed Päts' coup as a positive development.

Although Moscow did not support the coup plotters, Moscow's actions nevertheless still exacerbated Estonia's domestic political situation. The Soviet central newspapers wrote that the process of turning Estonia fascist was being organized from the outside, to prepare it as a platform for war against the Soviet Union, that the ex-servicemen were in league with the Baltic barons and were plotting a coup, and the ‘Estonian fascists’ were being controlled and financed from Berlin. ⁶⁶ These articles were indeed mentioned in the Estonian press, but more as curiosities. Much more serious, however, was the influence of Moscow via the Estonian socialists, who had close contacts with the Soviet legation. But the documents leave the impression that this co-operation tended to be more on the initiative of the Estonian socialists, who attempted to use Moscow to further their domestic political aims.

The article that appeared on the first page of the socialists' newspaper Rahva Sõna on 15 November 1933, which was markedly detailed compared with previous articles and therefore seemed to demand more serious attention and which has been later cited on numerous occasions, claimed that the ex-servicemen were being financed by the Hitlerites via the Baltic barons. ⁶⁷ The ex-servicemen rejected these accusations. ⁶⁸ As Rein Marandihas explained later, key persons mentioned in the Rahva Sõna article are fabrications. ⁶⁹ Neither the commentators of the time nor historians have previously known that the article was written based on papers that had been given to the editor of Rahva Sõna, Erich Joonas, by the First Secretary of the Soviet legation, Janis Klyavin. ⁷⁰ Joonas later thanked Klyavin for the papers, noting that this ‘had done them a service in destroying the local German Hitlerites’. ⁷¹

Let us reflect on the so-called foreign policy argument of the coup plotters. Would there have been any danger to Estonia posed by Moscow if Päts and Laidoner had not seized power and the ex-servicemen had achieved a good result in the elections? For an answer, let us again refer to Ustinov's report of 28 March. Ustinov says of Laidoner's address to the army: ‘the entire movement – he said veterans in his appeal – generated serious concern also amongst states friendly to us, whence came warning voices.’ And Ustinov continued without irony:

to my question – ‘Which countries did General Laidoner mean?’, Estonian foreign minister Seljamaa was unable to respond. This could in Laidoner's mind be England, but also Latvia or Finland, who were threatened by the strengthening of Germanophile fascism in Estonia; could also be Sweden, the press from all these countries reacted with great satisfaction to the veterans being demolished in Estonia. ⁷²

So, as far as Ustinov was concerned, it was so inconceivable that the Soviet Union would react with aggression against Estonia, if the ex-servicemen had come to power, that the thought did not even occur to him that the Soviet Union could be included amongst those ‘states friendly to us’.

Just as the Soviet Union was perceived in Estonia as a security threat, so also was Germany. This perception of threat had even deeper roots than the Russia fear. Naturally, the Mein Kampf views of Hitler were also well known in Estonia, because of the mention of new German territories in the border states of the Soviet Union; Hitler's coming to power in Germany also generated alarm. ⁷³

The Baltic-German minority living in Estonia was neither influential nor numerous, forming only 1.5 per cent of the population. Because of the limited influence ofthe Baltic-German groups that had adopted the nazi ideology, and their exclusion, it was not possible for Germany to have much effect on Estonian politics. ⁷⁴ It would have been another matter, however, to influence Estonian politics via the ex-servicemen, as a movement enjoying wide popular support.

But in addition to Estonia's inherent fear of Germany, this was also made moredifficult by the anti-German feeling held by the overwhelming majority of the ex-servicemen's membership, and their different ideology, compared with thenazis. In contrast to the claims by the political opponents of the ex-servicemen, the ideology and organization of the ex-servicemen was formed independently of the nazis. The ex-servicemen repeatedly and consistently stated that they were notfascists. Every country, emphasized Võitlus, must find its own solution in accordance with its traditions, conditions and national identity. Võitlus also praised ‘the ingenious political instinct of the English’ and the system of government ‘that made it possible, through the latest parliamentary elections, to quickly and painlessly remove irresponsible class-bound groupings from the responsible work of leading the country’. It was concluded that the victory marks ‘the Old English example to others’. ⁷⁵ The rhetoric of the ex-servicemen did include some features of antisemitism, but this was probably no stronger than the average in Europe at the time, and of course incomparable in its acrimony with the antisemitism of the German nazis. Such an anti-Jewish wave of violence as occurred in Germany in March 1933, which in addition was not orchestrated from the top or officially sanctioned, ⁷⁶ would have been unheard of in Estonia. Among those who supported Andres Larka, as listed in the 6 March 1934 edition of Võitlus, there were also names such as Abramson and Co, J. Rubin and Samuel Besprosvanie: ⁷⁷ that is, companies owned by Jewish businessmen. There was also none of the racism characteristic of the nazis amongst the ex-servicemen. Estonians were indeed seen as special, but not as superior. The ideology of the ex-servicemen – and, what is more important, the practice – rejected the concept of a charismatic leader à la Hitler in a quite obvious manner.

Without doubt the ex-servicemen had political contacts with German politicians and also with National Socialists. ⁷⁸ Especially since the latter were in power in Germany. The ex-servicemen were also preparing to come to power in Estonia. In addition, Germany was Estonia's second most important country for exports.

A completely different matter, however, is the nature of these contacts. From thestandpoint of this topic, the most important question is whether the ex-servicemen were supported from Germany in such a manner as to strengthen them or increase their aggressiveness. What could be considered is primarily secret funding, since public political support from the nazis would have been compromising for theex-servicemen.

The accusation that the ex-servicemen were being funded by the German naziscame originally from the Estonian communists and socialists. The communists could not have had any proof for these accusations. Neither did the socialists. The socialists had indeed spoken of the nazi origin of the ex-servicemen's funding in the Soviet legation, but when the doubting Soviets, who were also interested inthis issue, wanted more details, Erich Joonas, as well as Nigol Andresen andMaksim Unt, avoided the question, saying only that the German nazis were funding the ex-servicemen via the Scheel bank. August Rei, however, had said that there were ties between the nazis and the ex-servicemen through the Scheel bank and through some companies. ⁷⁹ Klaus Scheel – the Baltic-German top banker, whose relations with the nazis were not problem-free, and who also was part-Jewish and could have easily managed to give the ex-servicemen the quoted amount – 10,000 kroons – without the involvement of the nazis. It is unlikely that the Soviets believed these accusations or the role of Scheel, which of course did not stop them from having the information published as proven facts in theircentral newspapers. ⁸⁰ The opponents of the ex-servicemen also did not manage to prove the accusation that the ex-servicemen had received a printing press from Germany for free or at a reduced price.

But the fact that the accusers of the time had no evidence does not necessarily mean that the ex-servicemen were not actually funded from Germany. We can, though, consider as unproven the claims by those historians that are based solely on the Estonian socialists.

Olaf Kuuli, however, bases his claim on Estonian Political Police documents, saying that the ex-servicemen received, from Germany, a ‘modern printing press, without paying anything for it… via fascists’ from Finland. ⁸¹ But in both the documents cited by him it is only rumours that are being reported; besides, they do not say that the printing press had been received free of charge. The second document mentions that the price for the printing press will be paid once the machine starts bringing in money. ⁸²

Ilmjärv claims that the ex-serviceman Karl Arnold Jalakas testified that Germany subsidized the movement through Estonian-German companies and the representations of German companies in Estonia. ⁸³ To back up this claim, Ilmjärv cites the transcript of the interrogation of Karl Arnold Jalakas held in the branch of the State Archive of Latvia. ⁸⁴

The value of this testimony as a historical reference is only that it demonstrates the interrogation methods of the NKVD. The testimony was given in spring 1942 in Severurallager in Siberia and there Jalakas ‘testifies’ that he is a German spy. The transcript also states that Germany was even the main financier of the ex-servicemen. None of the named companies, except for IG Farbenindustrie, are credible as mediators for nazi money and so on.

Secondly, Ilmjärv claims that ‘in the summer of 1933 at the Aussenpolitisches Amt the possibility of concluding a confidential financial agreement between the Nazi Party and Freedom Fighters on support provided to the latter, and whether the Freedom Fighters' press should be supported with the sum of 5000–10,000 Ekr [Estonian kroons] was considered’. Ilmjärv believes that this amount was requested by the leaders of the ex-servicemen themselves, and this is based on an undated document, which he calls a memorandum by the Aussenpolitisches Amt, held in the Russian Centre for the Preservation of Historical Document Collections (TsHIDK, 519-3-34, l. 16–17). ⁸⁵ But it is not clear from this document that the amount was requested by the ex-servicemen, rather than that the document is debating whether it would be beneficial for Germany to fund the ex-servicemen. The same document can also be found in the Bundesarchiv, and from there it can be seen that this is nota memorandum by the Aussenpolitisches Amt, but an overview of the Estonian domestic political situation on 27 June 1933 by Helmut Schiller, the leader of theNSDAP Tallinn support centre (Stützpunkt). Schiller's next report, however, proves that no funding took place. ⁸⁶

The documents held in the Bundesarchiv also cast light on the printing-press transaction. Although the transaction is still somewhat unclear, it seems that the ex-servicemen were able to afford the machine because they were able to pay in instalments and that it was cheap, since it was 20 years old. ⁸⁷ No proof can be found in the available documents that the transaction was carried out with the help of the nazis.

It is therefore not possible, in the light of the available documents, to establish that Hitler's Germany had financed or directed the ex-servicemen, as a result of which the ex-servicemen would have become more aggressive, or merely stronger, and would have thereby destabilized the Estonian domestic political situation.

But this does not mean that events in Germany would not have affected domestic politics in Estonia. The National Socialists came to power in Germany at the beginning of 1933. Hitler emphasized that he wanted to come to power using constitutional means, and the rhetoric used by the ex-servicemen was similar to his. On 30 January 1933 Hitler became State Chancellor. Within one month the personal freedoms protected by the constitution of the Weimar Republic were sidelined. Within two months the most active political opponents were either in prison or had fled the country. Within four months the influential trade unions were disbanded. In less than six months all the opposition parties had been forced to cease activities. ⁸⁸

There is no doubt that what had occurred in Germany in 1933 was a nightmare for Estonian socialists. It would be strange if they had not predicted for Estonia a similar development logic as for Germany, since they identified the ex-servicemen with the National Socialists in content, or at least in their political rhetoric. There is considerable proof for this. Karl Ast claimed, in March 1933, ‘It is apparently a mistake for democracy to attempt to use its power democratically in all situations.’ ⁸⁹ Nigol Andresen said in the Soviet legation that the German events had been a good lesson, which meant that they had decided to provide ‘more vigorous resistance to the veterans’. ⁹⁰ But their popularity was waning. The leaders of the socialists had made a series of political mistakes and had also initially clearly underestimated the possibilities of the ex-servicemen.

These failures made them nervous. The Estonian Socialist Workers' Party had been merged from various Marxist groups which had deep mutual rifts and the leaders probably hoped to strengthen the common identity of these factions under the common banner of the anti-fascist struggle. ⁹¹ These developments no doubt made the socialists even more antagonistic towards the ex-servicemen and also suddenly increased domestic political tensions in Estonia.

But the events in Germany no doubt also influenced the ex-servicemen, who copied external symbols and propaganda techniques from the German National Socialists. What could have been even more important, however, was the example in political behaviour. Hitler refused the position of Vice-Chancellor after the elections insummer 1932, as well as the offer for the NSDAP to participate in government, being satisfied with nothing less than the office of chancellor. When Hitler did indeed became State Chancellor on 30 January 1933, after again refusing the compromises offered to him, the legend was created about his coming to power through a triumph of will. The ex-servicemen could have taken example not only from the propaganda techniques of the National Socialists but also – either consciously or unconsciously – from their rejection of political compromise.

There was almost no interest or attempt by the UK to influence Estonia's domestic politics. This was because of a general lack of interest towards the Baltic region. London was primarily interested in limiting the influence of Germany in the Baltics and Estonia's internal situation was of interest only in this context. Information about Estonia was limited and London probably believed for a while, before and after the coup, the stories about the ex-servicemen being financed by the nazis. For this reason, London may have seen the coming to power of the ex-servicemen through democratic elections a worse possibility than the unconstitutional postponement of elections by the political duo, of whom at least one (Laidoner) was considered to be very British-minded. Besides, perhaps London did initially actually believe the coup plotters and think that the postponement of the elections was temporary.

The limited steps taken by Moscow to support Päts in elections for head of state turned out to be ineffectual and too late and did not really improve Päts' chances. Co-operation by the Estonian socialists with Moscow undoubtedly aggravated theEstonian domestic political situation, but the initiators of this co-operation were more the Estonian socialists themselves. It is also difficult to imagine other possibilities for the Soviet Union to have greater influence on Estonian domestic political events, if it had so wished, without discrediting itself internationally and in Estonia, through direct interference. Since the Soviet Union was seen in Estonia as a threat, vigorous interference could have had the opposite effect – to consolidate the people around anti-Moscow forces. The Soviet Union, however, could not use economic blackmail, because of the very limited trade relations.

Although there is less clarity about Berlin's policies, it also seems that Germany's attempts to influence Estonian domestic politics in its favour were of a limited nature. Just as with the Soviet Union, Germany's possibilities were also limited, since Germany was seen in Estonia as a security threat, and Germany's threats or forceful attempts at ‘positive engagement’ could have resulted in setting the people against Germany and pro-German politicians.

Of the three countries, the UK would have had the best chance of influencing Estonia's domestic political events. As opposed to steps taken by Germany and the Soviet Union, these would have resulted in a positive reception in Estonia and the restriction of trade relations would have been a very effective threat. It is hard to say without an in-depth analysis whether an efficacious intervention of the UK could have saved Estonian democracy.

Thus, interference by the Soviet Union and Germany did destabilize the Estonian domestic political situation to a certain degree, but was certainly not decisive in the loss of democracy. It is difficult to say whether, in the absence of such interference, Estonian democracy would have survived or not, but interference by the Soviet Union and Germany in itself, in the form that it took, and without other factors important in the loss of democracy, would probably not have endangered Estonia's democracy.

The influence of these countries in a wider sense – that is, as an example – is quite a different question, however. That is to say, there is no doubt that events in Germany had a major influence on Estonia's domestic politics, since the Estonian socialists identified the ex-servicemen with German nazis and therefore strongly supported the coup plotters. The ex-servicemen, on the other hand, took example from the nazis’ propaganda techniques, thereby making themselves subject to political attack and probably – either knowingly or unknowingly – also took example from the nazis’ uncompromising stand. More flexible and tolerant political behaviour could havemade a coup and loss of democracy impossible.