Outfoxing the Eagle: Soviet,East European and Cuban Involvement in Nicaragua in the 1980s

Twenty years after the Cuban Revolution, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) ousted the Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. This move represented one of the most important revolutionary developments in recent Latin American history, alongside Castro's victory in Cuba and Allende's in Chile. Somoza's overthrow quickly drew the attention of the Soviet Union to Central America, while turning the region into a fulcrum of regional tensions and hotbed of East-West rivalry. This paper offers an examination of the relations of the Soviet Union, Cuba and the East European socialist states with Nicaragua from Somoza's removal in July 1979 until Violeta Chamorro's election victory in February 1990, using a wide array of original documents, collected from Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, German and Czech diplomatic, party and security services archives. Additionally, it consults already published Russian and American primary materials, a number of existing secondary accounts, and, last but not least, the memoirs of former members of the Sandinista government. Although the secondary literature abounds with accounts examining Washington's relations with Nicaragua during the Sandinista government, considerably less has been provided with regard to the regional involvement of the Soviet Union, Cuba and the East European states. While this account, in line with others ¹ agrees that the Kremlin did not want to risk antagonizing the United States over Nicaragua, it delves more deeply into the motivations behind the Kremlin's circumscribed approach. It breaks new ground by looking in detail at Moscow's communication and coordination with its allies, aimed at supporting Managua without risking major confrontation with Washington. The documents show us the difficulties the Soviet Union, the East European socialist states and Cuba had to endure in trying to help the troubled Sandinista government.

The new archival evidence demonstrates clearly that while the Sandinista experience represented a considerable window of opportunity for the Eastern Bloc, it provided them with a number of challenges which required careful planning and coordination to avoid aggressive American reaction. This paper therefore aims to add to the existing historiography by looking not only at the motivations behind Soviet and Eastern Bloc involvement, but also by taking into account the circumstances preventing the Soviet Union and its allies from developing more comprehensive political and economic relations with Nicaragua. Ultimately, Managua, by dint of proximity to American shores, and its great distance from Moscow and Eastern Europe, serves as an important example of the ways in which Moscow and its partners tried to pursue their internationalist agenda under intense pressure from Washington, determined to protect its sphere of influence in the western hemisphere. Another important theme of this study is the complex relationship between Havana and Moscow in Managua, whereby the Soviet Union had to keep a precarious balance between Havana's regional ambitions and its own foreign policy objectives, which were not always in complete agreement. Finally, this account seeks to shed more light on the closing years of East-West rivalry by investigating the influences vestiges of the old thinking had across the Eastern Bloc as Gorbachev's new foreign policy course attempted to allow for closer cooperation with Washington in helping to lessen the tensions of decade-long regional conflicts across the globe.

On 19 July 1979, the Sandinista army ousted the forces of Anastasio Somoza. Created in 1961 under the leadership of Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga and Tomás Borge, the Sandinista Frente drew its nationalist fervour from the anti-imperialist guerrilla war against US troops, waged by Augusto Cesar Sandino in the 1930s in Nicaragua, while the Cuban Revolution provided its military inspiration. By the late 1970s, the Sandinista movement had developed a coherent political programme built on national self-determination, political non-alignment and social justice for Nicaragua's impoverished masses, founding its ideological backing in a mix of nationalist ideas, Christian liberation theology and a localized version of Marxism. ² As a result, the dramatic events surrounding the Sandinista government's rule between July 1979 and February 1990 attracted the interest of East and West, prompting extensive analyses and planning on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

To the East, the Nicaraguan question provoked broad discussions of the place and the role of the Sandinista revolution. For instance, during a meeting in Moscow in May 1982, the chiefs of the foreign intelligence organs of the socialist states embedded the Nicaraguan question into the larger Third World narrative. According to the head of the Soviet KGB's First Chief Directorate (PGU), Vladimir Kryuchkov, the struggle for independence and social progress of the peoples of the Third World was part of the common struggle against imperialism. Faithful to the principles of socialist internationalism, the countries of the socialist community were tasked with providing support and assistance to the peoples of these countries. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry considered the Central American region to be one of the hottest arenas of anti-imperialist struggle in the world: it highlighted the growing influence of ‘real socialism’ and the deepening of revolutionary processes, which in turn were encountering strong American reaction. Similarly, the East Germany leader, Erich Honecker, expressed on behalf of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc the need to expose the US’ responsibility for escalating the conflict in Nicaragua. More defiant, yet worried, Cuban leader Fidel Castro believed that Washington could undermine the Sandinista regime only through direct military intervention, which would transform Nicaragua, El Salvador and the entire Central American region into a ‘second Vietnam’, ultimately threatening détente and potentially escalating Cold War tensions into a general international conflict. ³

Seen from Washington, Central America has become, as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick solemnly avowed in 1981, ‘the most important place in the world’, ⁴ representing the pinnacle of Latin America's Cold War. The intense pressure the Reagan Administration exerted on Nicaragua was not uniformly supported within the American political establishment and led to negative reactions from less conservative voices inside the State Department. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzulo, for example, believed that Washington had proceeded from a careful, calculated attempt to remove the revolutionary Sandinista leadership ‘to some sort of a circus’, which was ‘the end of diplomacy’, replacing professionalism with ‘a theatrical Hollywood spectacular’. ⁵ Gradually, from a highly charged testing ground of the superpowers’ ability to shape the politics of the Third World, which attracted interventions of a wide array of international actors, including the East European states and Cuba, Nicaragua turned into one of the major examples of collaboration between Washington and Moscow in their efforts to end regional conflicts in the closing years of the Cold War. ⁶

The Sandinista victory coincided with a conservative shift in the political mood in Washington. The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the end of detente and provided ammunition for those who sought to see all Third World conflicts through the prism of East-West confrontation. For those in Washington who took a hard and pessimistic line, the FSLN's historic relations with Cuba meant that what happened in Nicaragua could be seen only through the prism of US-Soviet geopolitical competition. As a result, from 1981 to 1990, the US engaged in a concerted and multifaceted campaign to overthrow the Nicaraguan government – a policy that was highly controversial domestically and culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal. The upsurge of Cuban-backed left-wing forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador became the Reagan administration's main concern for almost a decade. Consequently, Reagan came to perceive Central American revolutions as part of a sinister Soviet design. ⁷ In the Nicaraguan case, Washington seemed incapable of understanding that the origin of the Sandinista Revolution was ‘very much a Nicaraguan phenomenon’, ⁸ once again applying the Cold War interpretative template to portray the anti-Somoza insurgency as a direct extension of the Soviet drive for world domination. ⁹

Consequently, throughout the 1980s the US persistently put pressure on Nicaragua in pursuit of its objective to defeat subversion, advance economic and political development, and restore tranquillity in Central America. The arrival in Cuba of 17 advanced MiG fighters, attracted American attention and led to speculation that Cuba might be about to transfer some of its older MiG 21s to Nicaragua. ¹⁰ By imposing a commercial embargo on 1 May 1984, Washington signalled its resolve not to allow the emergence of a ‘second Cuba’. ¹¹ According to the CIA, Washington's concern became clear to the Kremlin since the fallout from a confrontation over Nicaragua had the potential to affect the whole range of US-Soviet bilateral issues, including other regional hotspots, a possible summit and arms limitation talks. ¹² And there was concern in Moscow. In a directive distributed to its East European allies in March 1984, Moscow found the American secret services to be directly violating the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation by their ‘terrorist actions against international civil ship traffic’ near the shores of Nicaragua. The Americans were seen as engaging in very dangerous actions leading to the creation of an emergency hotspot in Central America. ¹³

The Eastern Bloc also saw Washington's aggressive regional posture as a reaction to an increase in Soviet and East European activities near its borders. As noted during a meeting between Czechoslovak and GDR's foreign ministers in March 1985, Washington justified its ‘aggression against Nicaragua and the Salvadoran resistance movement’ with the notion that the anti-imperialist and emancipatory tendencies in Central America were resulting from Cuba-mediated expansionary policies of the Soviet Union, which must be put to an end in order to preserve Western values. ¹⁴ This assessment agreed with the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates’ statement which said in order to prevent disaster in Central America, the US would do everything in its power short of invasion to bring that regime down. ¹⁵ The seriousness of American intentions was felt across the Eastern Bloc. For example, Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, felt increasingly pressured by the Americans as Bulgaria was one of the East European states which most actively supported the Sandinista government. At a meeting with Daniel Ortega in May 1985, Zhivkov complained that the ‘delicate question’ of weapons transport pitted the Bulgarians against the Americans in the most unfavourable way as far as Sofia was concerned. American pressure involved a wide spectrum of attacks including accusations of a Bulgarian connection with the attempt on John Paul II's life, arms dealing and drugs trafficking. As a result, the Bulgarian leadership thought it was not Moscow but Sofia that had become Washington's number one enemy. In Zhivkov's opinion, Bulgarian relations with the US were on the brink of crisis. ¹⁶ Accordingly, the pressure exerted on the Bulgarian leadership for its material support of the Sandinistas was a clear manifestation of Reagan's intention to use Central America to draw a line for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World.

Moscow did not rely only on its East European partners in Nicaragua, as Cuba came to play an instrumental role as an intermediary between Nicaragua and the East as well as being a power in its own right. Initially, Havana's involvement with the Sandinista regime had been more substantial than Moscow's. Prior to the spring of 1979, the CPSU had contacts only with the Socialist Party of Nicaragua, which was lauded for its ‘maturity’. The Sandinistas, on the other hand, were seen as ‘petty bourgeois’ revolutionaries and ‘voluntarist-minded adventurers’. The Soviet Union therefore had nothing to do with the Sandinista victory. ¹⁷ Confirming this, the Nicaraguan Interior Minister, Tomás Borge, admitted that the Soviet Union's influence over the Sandinista Revolution was ‘rather more remote’, compared to Cuba's involvement. According to Jorge Domínguez, as in Grenada, Cuba's leaders drew the Soviets into a deeper commitment to Nicaragua than the Soviets might have undertaken on their own. ¹⁸ This observation was supported by the CIA, which posited that Castro's vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries beginning in 1978 was essentially a Cuban initiative, which had a marked impact on Soviet attitudes and policy toward the region. Moscow became increasingly impressed by Havana's success in exploiting the revolutionary situation in Managua. ¹⁹ Cuban officials, however, offered a somewhat more nuanced interpretation of the relationships between Havana and Moscow in which the Soviets appeared to have relied on their Cuban allies to provide them with local knowledge. This allowed the Soviets to keep a low profile while gradually increasing their influence. Discussing Cuba's international behaviour with his East German counterpart, Havana's Interior Minister, Sergio del Valle, claimed that Cuba was closely cooperating with the Soviet Union with regard to activities concerning the entire socialist community; Moscow stood behind most of Havana's initiatives, acting as a ‘grey eminence’. ²⁰

In the case of Nicaragua, while Fidel Castro agreed with Moscow's cautiousness for tactical reasons, he felt that the Soviets had to do more to support the Sandinistas. ²¹ Havana sought to use its proximity to Managua and the influence it had over the Sandinistas to provide crucial material support from the early days of the revolution. As noted by Henry Ruiz, known as Comandante Modesto, Cuba provided the Frente with weapons, training and advisors. Havana created a permanent air supply link for the delivery of military and other materials, guided the leadership in difficult moments and helped it establish relations with the other socialist states. ²² Within 10 days of Somoza's ouster, on 26 July 1979, Fidel Castro delivered a speech for the 26th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada Barracks in Holguin. The speech was full of references to Cuba's solidarity action with national liberation movements, and in particular to an assessment of the recent events in Nicaragua. He praised the Nicaraguan Revolution for its ‘heroism’ and ‘perseverance’, for it being not a victory of a single day, but rather ‘a victory after 20 years of struggle’. ²³ The leitmotif of Castro's speech was the need to mobilize Cuban society to provide the Nicaraguans with their full support in the reconstruction of their economy. He stressed that Cuba would do everything possible to help Nicaragua, signalling his readiness to send physicians and teachers to Nicaragua, which the students present at the rally enthusiastically welcomed. ²⁴

Without delay, Cuba started sending various forms of assistance, including a medical brigade. When the Sandinista government launched its first literacy campaign in 1980, 2,000 Cuban teachers arrived to join the tens of thousands of Nicaraguan urban youth volunteers. ²⁵ There were reportedly more than 2,000 Cuban military and internal security advisors in Nicaragua in 1983. ²⁶ At the beginning of 1980, the Cuban government acknowledged the presence of 4,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, including 200 military advisers, while GDR's Stasi reported that more than 5,000 Cuban citizens were present in Nicaragua, providing assistance in various fields, including the military arena. ²⁷

On a daily basis, the Cubans’ role with the regular Nicaraguan army involved the training of low ranking soldiers, as well as the development of all aspects of security and defence. There were 400 Cuban advisors to the army alone. ²⁸ According to the Chief Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior, Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, the Cuban influence on decision-making within the interior ministry was extensive and Cuban advice was treated as though it was an order. ²⁹ However, in late 1987, the Cuban Interior Minister, Jose Abrantes, offered a somewhat different account. In a meeting with the Stasi's chief, Erich Mielke, Abrantes noted that while the Cubans indeed maintained close contacts with the Sandinista government, the guiding principle in the relationship was that Havana respected all of Managua's decisions. The Cubans supported their Nicaraguan colleagues, although they were not in agreement on all matters with them. Whenever they could offer their advice, they did so, but it was the Nicaraguans who decided what was right for them. ³⁰ This assessment coincided with the East German security personnel's observations, according to which the Cubans were anchored in all areas of the Nicaraguan interior ministry and were mainly involved in consultative roles while providing minimal material support. ³¹ However, as the United States was, in Gromyko's words ‘hurling gangs of mercenaries and terrorists against Nicaragua’, ³² Moscow and Havana had to step up their involvement in the local conflict. According to the memories of Roger Miranda, who was a senior Sandinista official, a chief of the Defence Ministry Secretariat, and a close aide to Humberto Ortega, the Soviets helped to further strengthen the Cuban role, as they preferred all matters relating to military and security agreements to be addressed by a tripartite commission consisting of Managua, Moscow and Havana, with latter's approval being required in all decisions. ³³

While Moscow continued to provide the weapons it had previously agreed to supply, by 1983 it realized that any upgrade of arms supplies could prompt Washington into attempting a Grenada-type operation in Nicaragua. ³⁴ Everything seems to have gone smoothly until early 1984, when Fidel Castro suggested to Sandinista leaders that they should forget the MiG-21s and have the Soviets deliver Mi-24 attack helicopters instead. As Castro emphasized to his Nicaraguan colleagues, the Mi-24 would prove much more capable in the fight against the Contra insurgency, which posed an increasing threat to the regime in Managua. He thought that the Sandinistas should follow the examples of Vietnam and Cuba by adapting its defensive military strategy and focusing on an all-out conventional and unconventional ground conflict. However, Nicaragua's Minister of Defence, Humberto Ortega, was openly against Fidel's proposal. He agreed the helicopters would be more useful in fighting the Contras but it was far more important for Managua to receive the MiGs as a signal of Moscow's commitment. While Humberto Ortega obtained Soviet's commitment to deliver the MiGs in 1985, ³⁵ Alejandro Bendaña, the Foreign Affairs Secretary General in the Sandinista government observed that the Soviets backed out soon after the Punta Huete ³⁶ site was finished. The news that the Sandinista regime was not getting a weapon system they had always regarded as a security blanket, together with Soviet advice that it was ‘time to achieve a regional settlement of security problems’, made the Nicaraguan leadership realize that it could no longer depend on the Soviet Union. ³⁷

The MiGs episode is a clear indication not only of the complex interaction between Moscow, Havana and Managua; it also showed the limits of Soviet involvement. It also hints at Soviet's lack of resolve in fully embracing the Sandinistas, a position that was not based on geo-political considerations but also on one that reflected ideological constraints. Immediately after the Revolution, the FSLN began sending delegations abroad to seek support for their cause. The Sandinistas’ external relations also concentrated on the Eastern Bloc. Emissaries of the Frente’s National Directorate and Comandantes of the Revolution sought to present themselves as communists. ³⁸ As Henry Ruiz told the Bulgarian Communist Party officials in October 1979, the FSLN's mission was to show the socialist countries the strategic importance of the Nicaraguan Revolution, which was taking place in the very backyard of imperialism. ³⁹ In the words of Managua's Foreign Minister, Miguel d’Escoto, the Nicaraguan people and its leadership expected that with the fraternal support of the countries of the socialist community Managua would be able to overcome its difficulties. It would create the conditions for a gradual transition and the construction of socialism, as it maintained an ‘anti-imperialist’ course in its non-aligned policy. ⁴⁰ The Bulgarian Communist Party's Foreign Policy and International Relations Department, however, recognized the dualist character of FSLN policies. Behind closed doors, the Sandinista leaders pointed out that the Nicaraguan revolution relied primarily on the socialist community and aimed at the construction of socialism. Still, in public, for tactical reasons, FSLN refrained from openly proclaiming its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and its intention to build a socialist society in Nicaragua. ⁴¹ In his March 1981 meeting with East Berlin's ambassador to Sofia, the head of the Latin American Department of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry maintained that the Sandinistas wanted to build socialism but did not want to say it aloud. ⁴²

While leaders across the Eastern Bloc seemed to offer a more lenient treatment of the Sandinistas’ ideological affinity with Marxism, the Soviets remained somewhat sceptical about their Nicaraguan colleagues’ revolutionary zeal. In March 1980, Moscow warmly welcomed a delegation of Sandinista leaders with whom they signed a number of agreements on economic and technical cooperation. In private conversations, however, Soviet diplomats did not consider the Sandinistas to be genuine Marxists and suggested that Nicaragua may not be ready for a socialist revolution on Soviet terms. Consequently, in February 1981, the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress welcomed Nicaragua as a revolutionary country, but it did not include it in the list of socialist-oriented new states. ⁴³ The adherence of Nicaraguan leaders to the teachings of Marxism and Leninism remained a question of continuous debate across the Bloc well until the end of the Sandinista regime. As late as December 1989, during his meeting with Bush in Malta, Gorbachev openly voiced the Soviet leadership disbelief in Sandinista's adherence to Marxism. ‘It is ridiculous to speak of the Sandinistas as Marxists,’ he told Bush. ⁴⁴

At the same time, despite its lack of faith in the FSLN's ideological clarity, throughout the 1980s Moscow did not want to be seen to be abandoning a country that was struggling against the US. By supporting Managua against ‘Yankee imperialism’ Moscow sought to portray itself as the natural ally of the Latin American left. Nevertheless, the Kremlin kept its support limited and in the event of a Washington invasion of Managua, Moscow was not to be expected to defend it any more than it had supported Salvador Allende's Chilean regime when Pinochet's forces toppled it in 1973. Following this line, in private, a Soviet official admitted that, if the Americans invaded Nicaragua, the Soviets would not be able to do anything to defend it. ⁴⁵ This was also echoed in conversations between the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Moscow stressed frankly that it would not be able to give Nicaragua effective help in the case of direct American intervention. ⁴⁶ Similarly, Vadim Zagladin, who was a CPSU CC member at the time, told a visiting American delegation in Moscow in 1985 that the Russians were ‘not prepared to make a crisis in bilateral relations with the United States over Nicaragua’. ⁴⁷ Despite its comprehensive support, Cuba struck a similar note. Following the 1983 US-led invasion of Grenada, and again during the February 1986 meeting of the Cuban Communist Party Congress, Castro made it clear that while Havana was prepared to increase its aid to Managua to offset Washington's escalations, it was not prepared to send troops to Nicaragua to defend it against a potential US invasion. ⁴⁸

As soon as it emerged victorious, the new regime in Managua demonstrated marked caution in approaching the Soviets and the East Europeans. Their restraint coincided with advice coming from Fidel Castro, Moscow and its East European allies, all of whom believed that the Sandinistas would only provoke a strong US reaction by establishing too open and extensive relations with the socialist countries. Cuba, for its part, was averse to encouraging Nicaragua to repeat its own immediate transition to socialism, being aware of the economic pitfalls and security risks associated with it. From the outset, therefore, Fidel Castro's advice to the Sandinista leadership had been to exercise moderation and caution. ⁴⁹ Caution was a vital tool in Nicaragua's foreign policy, which, in the words of Miguel d’Escoto, became a matter of ‘outfoxing’ the US. ⁵⁰ According to various Eastern Bloc reports, the FSLN avoided placing Nicaragua's Revolution in the framework of East-West confrontation, seeking its root cause in the characteristic of Latin America social injustice as well as in the American capital's dominance in the Central American region. In its foreign policy, the Sandinista government aimed to counterbalance Washington's anti-Nicaraguan position by maintaining the sympathy of international public opinion and the support of almost all West European countries and by seeking allies among the socialist countries and the Non-Aligned Movement. During his June 1980 visit to the US, d’Escoto told the Americans that it was very important for Nicaragua to open its doors to all countries in an attempt to diversify its contacts and to avoid attachment to just one country or bloc. ⁵¹

As a result, Nicaragua made a number of overtures for military assistance to the United States and Western Europe. In late July 1979, Borge met with the US Ambassador, Pezzulo, and requested military aid. A Sandinista delegation, which visited President Carter in September, made similar demands, but Washington quickly made it clear it was not seriously interested in providing substantial military aid to the FSLN. While Carter tried to move away from traditional ‘interventionism’ in Latin America, he was concerned by the perception of growing Soviet and Cuban strength, the spread of Marxism-Leninism, and systematic violations of human rights in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan efforts to acquire military assistance in Western Europe also proved disappointing for Managua. At the same time, a US$15.8 million deal with France, agreed in December 1981, failed to materialize fully due to pressure from Washington. ⁵² In the following year, d’Escoto paid a visit to Western Europe and Libya, in which he expressed Nicaragua's desire to maintain normal political and economic ties. This was justified by the growing need Nicaragua felt to obtain political solidarity and international support against American economic and political pressures. ⁵³

As the West did not appear to respond favourably to Nicaragua's military needs, Managua stepped up its overtures towards the East. However, as Odd Arne Westad's research in Soviet archives revealed, Moscow's initial view was that the Nicaraguan revolution was an ‘uncertain proposition’, and questioned the positive results of any Soviet direct assistance. Coming at a time when the Soviet appetite for Third World involvements was decreasing, both the CPSU International Department and the KGB recommended in 1979–80 a wait-and-see stance; most Soviet aid would come through Cuba. ⁵⁴ This assessment was widely shared across the Soviet Bloc. Several key meetings between leaders of the security services of the Soviet Union and its East European allies and Cuba in early 1980s laid the groundwork for their future cooperation with Managua. Havana was to play a key role and act as an intermediary to keep the Soviets’ physical presence in the local scene minimal while providing the necessary local influence and knowledge. In April 1980, talking with the Warsaw Pact's commander-in-chief, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, noted that the introduction of troops from the socialist countries would weaken the struggle against the US, as it would prompt some of the local peoples to react negatively against their presence. While the Socialist states had to provide economic, political and military support, they had to consider the complexities of the local revolutionary struggle. ⁵⁵ Next month, in May, Borge visited the Soviet Union and met with KGB Chairman, Yuri Andropov, and the Minister of the Internal Affairs, Nikolai Shchelokov. Borge submitted various requests on behalf of the Sandinista Frente for material and technical assistance. However, despite the fact that the both sides did not sign any protocol or agreement, significant help was already being provided by the Soviets in which they heavily relied on the credibility of the Cubans’ assessment. There was complete agreement between the Soviet KGB and their Cuban colleagues, who aimed to prevent the Latin Americans from entering into open hostility against one another. ⁵⁶

In May 1980, representatives of the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria held a meeting in Berlin to discuss the question of assisting the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry. According to Colonel Hamel Ruiz, deputy chief of Cuban counterintelligence, the FSLN aimed to build socialism in Nicaragua and needed the moral and material support of the socialist community. For Havana, this meant primarily helping Managua's security authorities. In the Cuban assessment, the construction of socialism in Nicaragua was of fundamental importance for the socialist community and for the further development of the national liberation movement in Latin America and the rest of the world. Agreeing with Ruiz's statement, the deputy director of Stasi's Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA), Major General Horst Jänicke, suggested that the socialist states had to develop a common strategy on how best to help Nicaragua. He also acknowledged that the obvious presence of the socialist community in Nicaragua could harm the Revolution. ⁵⁷ In response, security officials from the East European socialist states expressed their readiness to train their Nicaraguan counterparts, though they accepted that basic education should be provided by the Cubans. While Nicaraguan specialists could be trained in Eastern Europe, the Cubans should take a decisive role in selecting the trainees, verifying their reliability, suitability and prior education. ⁵⁸

On the Soviet side, General Major Yakov Medyanik, the first deputy director of KGB's PGU, noted that as the Socialist states, with the exception of Cuba, had no previous experience in Nicaragua, they had to work closely together to strengthen their positions in the country in order to be able to strike heavy blows against the main enemy – the United States – which had been deploying agents among those to be trained across the Bloc, some of whom ended up at training facilities in the Soviet Union. For his part, the head of the Latin American Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, Colonel Boris Kolomyakov, noted that Nicaragua's neighbours were watching with great concern whether the Sandinista Revolution would lead to an increase of Soviet presence in the region. These countries were, however, already used to growing Cuban influence in Latin America. Thus, in Kolomyakov's view, the Nicaraguans and the Cubans had to proceed cautiously in order not to deepen the mistrust of the other countries in the region. As a result, the KGB sought to develop such forms of cooperation that would both be efficient and capable of preventing the CIA from encountering a very obvious Soviet presence in Nicaragua. Considering Nicaragua's size, hiding Soviet officers was deemed near impossible and Moscow considered it appropriate to be represented in Managua by only a few officers, concentrating instead on providing material and technical and operational-technical assistance. The work of the advisors in the security agencies was to be done first and foremost by the Cubans. ⁵⁹

By January 1981, the difficult political situation in Nicaragua had dramatically deteriorated. The initial cautiousness of 1980 gradually gave way to a more aggressive approach in 1981. By mid-1981, as the new Reagan administration increased pressure on Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were no longer willing to accept the Eastern Bloc's caution. Managua had been receiving Soviet-made weapons since the early days of the revolution – mostly from Cuba. Borge pushed hard for increased military assistance during his visit to the Soviet Union in August 1981. In November, Humberto Ortega visited the Kremlin and concluded the first major military support agreement, including tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and helicopters. Ortega helped initiate a complex system of arms deliveries, which included supplies by Algeria, Bulgaria and Vietnam, in addition to direct supplies from the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Cuba. ⁶⁰ The Soviets acknowledged that Managua was engaging in a military build-up, which they described as a ‘legitimate’ measure of self-defence against alleged American plans to destabilize Nicaragua, avoiding, at the same time, an armed confrontation with its enemies, as the Czech security services reported. ⁶¹

According to the CIA, the escalation of foreign military support after 1981 allowed the Sandinistas to develop and equip the largest armed force in Central America, with an active-duty strength of some 65,000 and a potential strength of some 120,000 if fully mobilized. The armour inventory more than doubled in 1982, with the addition of MI-24 helicopter gunships strengthening Nicaragua's counterinsurgency capabilities, while the air defence system continued to improve with the addition of new radars. By March 1985, there were 3,750 military and security personnel in Nicaragua from socialist or radical regimes. Cuba provided between 2,500 and 3,500 advisors, the Soviet Union from 50 to 75 advisors plus general staff and helicopter technicians, among others, while Eastern Europe, mainly the GDR, delivered 60 to 80 security and intelligence technicians. ⁶² The Soviets appeared to be responsible for overall command and control; the Cubans provided manpower and served as military and counterintelligence advisors, while the Bulgarians assisted with the processing of information in security matters, in addition to providing weapons, explosives and ammunition. The whole structure of the security system, the methods and means of working, were organized according to handbooks and studies provided by in Cuba and Bulgaria. At the same time, the Bulgarians also sought to implement some reconnaissance tasks. This is evident from a meeting in June 1982 between the head of the First Chief Directorate of the Bulgarian State Security (KDS), General Vasil Kotsev and Nicaragua's intelligence chief, Renan Montero. In Kotsev's assessment, the 20-strong group of Bulgarian technical specialists in Nicaragua attracted the interest of Western intelligence services. At the same time, the Bulgarians were willing to prepare additional specialists, who, under the guidance of Sofia's permanent representative in Managua, planned to target certain foreigners, who would be less restrained from entering in contact with the Bulgarians than with the Nicaraguans. ⁶³

Continuing the original line established in 1980, the Soviets decided to stay under the radar and refrained from sending more than a handful of their own military personnel to Nicaragua. ⁶⁴ Moscow's East European allies also sought to extend less than comprehensive from Nicaraguan point of view economic support, aiming, alongside their solidarity efforts, to provide trade relations on a mutually beneficial basis. East Berlin was interested in developing trade relations with Nicaragua that would meet GDR's needs for raw materials. ⁶⁵ It proved difficult to maintain trade relations on an equal footing given Managua's ever growing demand for external resources to keep its economy afloat and the East European states' limited capabilities. Talking to Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Pál Losonczi, in Budapest in December 1980, Jaime Wheelock Román, a member of the Political Committee of the FSLN National Directorate, expressed his disappointment that East European political solidarity was not matched by flexible economic aid. Nicaragua's leadership understood the economic difficulties of the socialist countries and stressed the Nicaraguan Revolution needed to be supported on a much larger scale in order to maintain its economic development and protect the revolution. ⁶⁶

Despite their limited resources, between 1980 and 1985 the East European states provided US$320 million of the estimated US$580 million in military assistance rendered to Nicaragua by the entire Eastern Bloc. ⁶⁷ At the same time, Nicaraguan party and state delegations to the East European states in 1984–5 alone obtained over US$300 million in credits and free assistance. Bulgaria, for example, granted US$30 million, Czechoslovakia, US$55 million, Hungary, US$30 million, and Soviet Union, 25 million roubles. In terms of non-refundable assistance, Moscow provided 84 million roubles, East Germany, US$25 million, Cuba, 15 million peso, Czechoslovakia, 39 million crones, and Poland, 37 million zlotys. ⁶⁸ The volume of Czechoslovak free assistance by 1985, reached 166m crowns, while the total volume of credits by 1984 amounted to US$77 million. In 1985, the GDR granted Nicaragua loans totalling US$62 million, of which US$20 million, five million more than in 1984, were for special security-related items. Hungary, for its part, provided approximately 217 million forints in non-refundable aid by 1985, while extending bank loans amounting to US$10 million. During Daniel Ortega's visit to Hungary in 1985 another 30 million forints worth of aid was offered to Nicaragua. ⁶⁹

Additionally, Bloc states and Nicaragua attempted to develop economic relations on a bilateral and multilateral basis, in an attempt to integrate Managua more closely into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). A cooperation agreement between Nicaragua and the Eastern Bloc's economic council was signed on 16 September 1983. The move was an important step aimed at keeping the Central American state's economy afloat while allowing it closer access to Eastern Bloc markets at a time when it was increasingly difficult for the Sandinista regime to keep its financial books in order. The move was an urgent necessity for the Nicaraguans. In March 1984, the Soviet Foreign Ministry concluded that it was not the external thread but rather the deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of fuel and raw materials that was the main danger for the Sandinistas survival. ⁷⁰ The First Session of the Joint Commission of Nicaragua with the CMEA was held in September 1984 during which 44 bilateral co-operation and 31 multilateral cooperation projects were agreed between the Council's individual member states and Managua. ⁷¹ However, Nicaragua expected to trade its exports at preferential prices, something not always automatically accepted by the East European states, much to Managua's disappointment. For example, for the 1985 fiscal year, Nicaragua's authorities sought by their Polish colleagues to sell Managua's exports at preferential rates twice exceeding world prices. In October 1985, the Presidium of the Polish Government, however, decided not to accept the preferential terms for the trade exchange with Nicaragua and to provide assistance in other forms. ⁷² Following on Nicaragua's dissatisfaction, Raúl Castro praised the universal and comprehensive assistance the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba and Bulgaria provided for Nicaragua. He sharply criticized the other socialist countries, which did not seem to share the same level of engagement. In Raúl Castro's assessment, all socialist countries, including Mongolia, had to participate in supporting the FSLN. They had to realize that Nicaragua could not significantly improve the economic situation on its own, which would dangerously threaten the advancement of the Revolution. ⁷³

Under Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’, ideological solidarity played a smaller role in the determination of Soviet foreign policy by comparison with economic considerations. Mindful of the grim prospects of potential US military intervention or a long ‘low intensity’ civil war in Nicaragua, as well as of the worsening Soviet economy, the new Soviet leader's approach to Central America further intensified the pragmatic outlook of his predecessors. The new Soviet leader, thus, opted to offer an even more sober effort at finding a diplomatic solution, which sought to allow the Marxist regime to survive. Both the Cubans and Nicaraguans were increasingly pressed by the Soviets to open their economies and to integrate into the world system. At the same time, Moscow's message for Managua was that the FSLN government had to find a political solution to its domestic predicament and not rely on military victory. By 1987, Moscow's support for revolutionaries in Latin America was in decline and it began to advise its clients to support peaceful political change rather than attempt to forcefully overthrow repressive or liberal governments. ⁷⁴

During a meeting in Moscow with Daniel Ortega in April 1985, Gorbachev stressed the importance of reorganizing FSLN into a political party based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, while adopting a flexible line in relation to the right-wing opposition and the ‘bourgeois parties’. As far as Sandinistas foreign policy was concerned, the Soviets continued pressing Managua for a political and diplomatic solution to Washington's aggressiveness. Responding to Ortega's urgent plea for additional financial and economic assistance, Gorbachev informed his Nicaraguan guest of Soviet Union's willingness to grant Nicaragua 50 million convertible roubles and deliver 200,000 tons of oil and petroleum products on top of the previously agreed aid. The new Soviet leader also announced that the scope of Soviet aid for the next two years would not be lower than that of 1985. At the same time, Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union could not provide the amount of economic and financial assistance that would fully ensure the stability of the Nicaraguan economy and Managua should fully mobilize its own internal resources. However, the Soviets were content with the fact that Ortega appeared more appreciative of the need to preserve the concept of ‘mixed economy’ and ‘political pluralism’. In the Soviet view, radical measures would be extremely unfavourable for the Sandinista Revolution, and they advised their Nicaraguan guests to preserve the private sector of the economy as well as the multi-party political structure. ⁷⁵ Similar voices of moderation were heard across Eastern Europe. Talking to Comandante Bayardo Arce, member of the National Directorate of the FSLN, the GDR leader Honecker expressed the SED's conviction that by being flexible, the Sandinista Frente could help the process of liberation in Central America and defend its revolutionary achievements. The economic problem, however, demanded the greatest attention as ‘forces of imperialism and internal opposition’ sought to exploit certain economic difficulties in Nicaragua in order to attack the FSLN. ⁷⁶

While pressuring Nicaragua to support domestic political pluralism, the Soviet Union and its East European allies increased their efforts to portray themselves as regional peacemakers sympathetic to Latin American nationalism and supportive of the ‘besieged regime’ in Nicaragua, most notably as a safeguard against ‘United States imperialism’. This new strategy was most notable in Moscow's vocal support for the Contadora peace process. ⁷⁷ Established in January 1983 by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Colombia, to draw up a treaty that would reduce tensions between Nicaragua and its neighbours, the Contadora process failed initially to secure Soviet support. However, with the drastic change in Soviet foreign policy, Moscow became an active supporter of the plan and sought to persuade local powerbrokers that it was not looking for strategic gains or a military presence in Central America, and that it was ready to use its seat on the UN's Security Council to act as ‘guarantor’ of the peace plan. ⁷⁸ Moscow also sought to assure the Nicaraguan leadership that the Soviet Union was to continue to provide the Sandinista government with all-round political-diplomatic support and reasonable economic and financial assistance. It also counted on the support of its East European allies in the pursuit of a peaceful resolution for the Central American predicament. For example, the Kremlin sent a message to Budapest through the Hungarian chargé d’affaires to Moscow, expressing the Soviet leader's hope that their Hungarian counterparts would take the appropriate steps to support Nicaragua. ⁷⁹ The Eastern Bloc was thus fully committed to the Contadora process, as was evidenced by Honecker's vocal support expressed to Daniel Ortega in May 1985. The GDR was fully sympathetic with Nicaragua's efforts to find a friendly solution to the Central American conflict, a position it reiterated on numerous occasions in meetings with other Contadora states. ⁸⁰ The SED's leader also stressed that the GDR followed developments in Central America with great attention, and had extended from the outset political and diplomatic support to the peace process. ⁸¹

While Moscow and the other socialist countries considered that the most sensible option for Nicaragua was to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis in Central America, they were pessimistic that such an agreement could be concluded as part of the Contadora process. ⁸² Soviet leaders, therefore, sought additional diplomatic channels and called for the leadership of several Western European and Latin American states, a number of developing countries, the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the Socialist International and several Social Democratic party leaders to use their authority and influence to impede the further development of the conflict in Central America. ⁸³ At the same time, talking to Nicaragua's head of intelligence, Comandante Jacinto Suárez Espinoza, the GDR's Minister for State Security, Erich Mielke, expressed his conviction that Nicaragua and the Socialist states had to remain vigilant and accept that Washington was doing everything possible to sabotage the peace process and introduce new weapons. Therefore, it was important for the socialist states to continue supporting the peace process, while being vigilant and showing healthy mistrust. ⁸⁴ According to this line of thinking, there was no contradiction between the ‘peace-loving’ rhetoric on part of Gorbachev and his East European counterparts, and the continuation of Soviet and Bloc military deliveries until 1989.

At their 1986 meeting in Moscow, the General Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the CMEA member states and the Permanent Advisory Committee of the Ministers of the Defence of the Warsaw Pact agreed to provide additional substantial and expedient assistance to Nicaragua. ⁸⁵ In 1986, for example, Socialist states delivered US$600 million in military assistance, including six MI-24 helicopter gunships, 24 MI-8 helicopters, transport aircraft and patrol boats. During the first half of 1987, the CIA estimated that Soviet arms shipments to the Sandinistas amounted to more than US$300 million. Under the military protocols between the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua, signed in 1987, Soviet military aid had continued to flow to Nicaragua, and the levels of aid in 1988 were only slightly lower than in the record-breaking year of 1987. At US$515 million and 19,000 tons, Soviet deliveries in 1988 far outstripped the most extreme years under the ‘old thinking’. ⁸⁶ Still, the Soviets tried to play down the military aspect of their assistance to Managua in order not to provoke Congressional reaction during this crucial period. Moscow refrained from delivering big-ticket items, such as helicopters, despite Sandinista concerns about increased helicopter losses. Reportedly, Moscow was irritated with Humberto Ortega's poorly timed public assertions that Managua was planning a massive military build-up, regardless of the peace plan's outcome. Nevertheless, the CIA Directorate of Intelligence agreed that the Soviet Union would continue to supply the Sandinistas with military aid sufficient to their needs, as long as they believed it would not provoke US intervention. ⁸⁷

At the end of 1980s, the Nicaraguan issue became central for the Soviet-US relations. In early 1988, Soviet Foreign Ministry seemed appreciative of the US Secretary of State James Baker's stance towards Central America which showed a marked departure from the approaches of the previous US administrations. Accordingly, Baker made it clear to his Soviet counterparts that the US was ready to engage in dialogue with the Soviet Union over Central America, ⁸⁸ over what remained ‘the single most disruptive element’ in US-Soviet bilateral relations and what turned into a key test of the Soviet Union's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy. ⁸⁹ Gorbachev's visit to Cuba in April 1989 became a significant breakthrough on Central America and probably started Cuba's turn away from the support of revolutionary movements around the globe. The most important part of the meeting dealt with Nicaragua. Gorbachev suggested that Cuba should announce that it would stop supplying weapons to Nicaragua and El Salvador and support the Contadora Group, to which Castro agreed and even suggested he would stop sending advisers. Similarly, the Soviets halted their military aid and refused a Sandinista request for emergency economic aid on the eve of the 25 February 1990 elections. ⁹⁰

Under the Sandinista government, between July 1979 and February 1990, Nicaragua became one of the major areas of East-West competition. Using a broad array of new archival material, this paper sought to examine the limits of Soviet Bloc's involvement in Nicaragua during the 1980s. In the Central American political vortex, the risk averse Kremlin had to contend with the aggressive overtures of the White House, the lukewarm interest of its resource-limited East European allies, the pushy regional activism of the Cubans and the constant pleas for support of the Nicaraguans. Facing a dilemma, on the one hand, to lead and coordinate the socialist states' political, moral, economic and financial support for the Sandinista leadership, and, on the other, to honour the tenets of peaceful coexistence with Washington, Moscow had to thread with utmost care while meddling in its arch-rival's immediate zone of interest. The prudence required to navigate between the red lines set up by the superpower competition and socialist states' own limitations resulted in a complex set of manoeuvers demonstrated in this narrative, ranging from Soviet Bloc's combined efforts at concealing their involvement in the early stages of the Sandinista rule, through Moscow's bid to moderate Havana's regional ambitions, to East European states' compromises between Nicaragua's persistent requests for free assistance and their limited resources.

The need to ‘outfox the eagle’ in its own backyard, therefore, became a tactical prerequisite for the Soviet Bloc to achieve optimal results in Nicaragua involving minimal stakes, in a very high-risk environment. It was also a meaningful prerequisite for the Sandinista leadership's own survival. For Managua, the outfoxing of their powerful adversary meant to manoeuvre cautiously in searching for help from as many corners as possible and to avoid the reliance on a single source of support. As the 1980s progressed, Managua's hopes for alternative western sources of support diminished and the Soviet Bloc became Managua's main hope. However, as the decade drew to a close, Soviet Union increased its pressure for the finding of diplomatic and peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. The ruling Frente suffered an astounding electoral defeat on 25 February 1990, which led to a governing coalition headed by President Violeta Chamorro. At its meeting on 13 April 1990, the CPSU CC Politburo approved a memo according to which ‘the emergence of a new leadership in Nicaragua calls for substantial corrections in Soviet-Nicaraguan relations with the aim of making them more pragmatic and de-ideologized’, ⁹¹ reducing Soviet involvement with Nicaragua dramatically.