Uncovering the Opium Crisis: The Poison of Turkish–American Relations in the 1960s and 1970s

Relations between Turkey and the United States of America (USA) began to blossom during the Cold War, owing to overlapping interests. The USA needed a reliable ally in the Middle East, and Turkey needed the political, economic, and military support of the USA for development and modernization, in order to bolster its resistance to the Soviet threat. Bilateral relations developed throughout the 1950s, but began to decline after the Cyprus Crisis and the Johnson letter in 1964. Relations deteriorated further with the rise of the left and anti-Americanism in Turkey in the late 1960s.

Opium cultivation in Turkey was another challenge between the two countries. Turkey was one of the world's opium production centres, and according to US decision-makers, the main source of heroin entering the USA. Public pressure created by the rising number of heroin addicts compelled the Nixon administration to pressure Turkey's Justice Party (JP) government to ban opium cultivation. Although the JP government and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel rejected these accusations of being the main supplier of opium entering the USA, they promised to limit and control opium cultivation in Turkey. As they were a populist party, the JP government was afraid of losing the support of farmers. More importantly, it believed that the volume of opium cultivation in Turkey was far lower than the opium supply required for heroin abuse across the USA. When the military intervened in Turkish politics in 1971, the technocratic Nihat Erim government banned opium cultivation in response to US demands. After the 1973 elections, the leader of the Republican People's Party (RPP), Bülent Ecevit, formed a coalition government with Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP) and lifted the ban on opium cultivation in 1974. This policy change elicited a strong reaction and an embargo by the USA, following the Cyprus intervention.

This study analyses the USA's diplomatic offensive against Turkey – Turkey was not alone in this process as the USA also pressurized Latin American and West and Southeast Asian countries, and particularly countries such as Mexico, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India ¹ – through the lens of the opium crisis by examining American and Turkish primary and secondary sources more rigorously than the majority of previous studies. ² I argue that the opium crisis was not simply a crop crisis owing to the lack of clear evidence directly linking the impact of opium cultivation in Turkey to drug addiction in the USA. As Epstein, Evered, and Erhan jointly argue, Turkey's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and economic and military dependence ³ made it more vulnerable to US pressure than other countries, particularly countries in the Golden Triangle, such as Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, where guerillas had placed opium production beyond the government's control. ⁴ Therefore, the opium crisis can be seen as a diplomatic offensive to test the economically and militarily dependent NATO ally's loyalty to the USA and NATO. At the time, Turkey was trying to change its US-centric foreign policy after the Cyprus Crisis in 1964 by developing its economic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and improving its standing with Arab states during Six Days War in 1967; domestically, Turkey was also shaken by the rise of the left and anti-Americanism in the late 1960s.

The 1960s witnessed a deterioration of Turkish–American relations. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Turkish decision-makers began to question Turkey's US-centric foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. The crisis was resolved with the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey; however, the Kennedy administration did not consult with the Turkish government during the crisis, even though the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were on the negotiation table between the two superpowers. ⁵

The Cyprus Crisis and the Johnson letter in 1964 also negatively influenced Turkish–American relations until the 1980s. After the rise of tension between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots at the end of 1963 and the attacks against the Turkish community by militants in the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, Prime Minister İnönü decided to intervene in the summer of 1964 to protect the Turkish community living in Cyprus in accordance with rights granted to Turkey by the London–Zurich Agreements. The İnönü government informed the Johnson government about Turkey's intention to intervene, but President Lyndon Johnson prevented the Turkish intervention by sending a harsh and threatening letter to İnönü. The US president's letter shocked the Turkish government and community and soured Turkish–American relations during the subsequent period.

As a result, successive Turkish governments tried to balance relations with the USA and the USSR, particularly in the economic realm, although Turkey did not seek to leave the NATO alliance. ⁶ Demirel's government signed agreements with the USSR during this period to develop heavy industries. In addition, Turkey sided with and supported Arab states during the Six Days War in 1967 and prevented the USA from helping Israel by using its bases in Turkey. ⁷ These efforts to reorient Turkish foreign policy from US-centrism to a more balanced strategy coincided with the rise of leftist ideologies and anti-Americanism under the influence of freedom movements after 1968. ⁸ American soldiers and bases in Turkey were heavily criticized by the country's leftists and nationalists, which influenced popular opinion.

Banning the cultivation of opium became a major issue between the USA and Turkey in the following period, because the cultivation of opium in Anatolia had a long history and went back to the Hittites (2000–1500 BC). ⁹ The opium poppy had been used as a source of food and oil, a painkiller, and as an ingredient of painkillers by local and international pharmaceutical companies. In the early twentieth century, the number of heroin addicts rose in many parts of the USA, and the USA started to put pressure on other countries to agree on common policies in the fight against heroin addiction worldwide. ¹⁰ After the formation of the Republican regime in Turkey in 1923, opium production was legally restricted in certain areas. As time passed, however, the number of cities in which opium was cultivated increased to 23 in 1940, 35 in 1946, 40 in 1955, and 41 in 1956. ¹¹ In 1961, the United Nations (UN) accepted the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to which Turkey was a signatory. The convention required member states to take measures to separate the legal production of opium from illegal production and marketing. ¹²

Coincidentally, drug addiction rose in the USA, which alarmed the US administration and accelerated the fight against illicit drugs worldwide. ¹³ President Richard Nixon's election campaign was mainly based on fighting the illicit trafficking of drugs; he defined drug addiction in the USA as ‘an epidemic, a national threat, and a public enemy’, and stated that the fight against drugs would be ‘an offensive, a crusade, and even a war’. ¹⁴ His advisors persuaded him that 80 per cent of the opium used in heroin production to supply the USA was coming from Turkey, with drugs entering the USA from various parts of the world such as Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Mexico. ¹⁵ On the contrary, Turkey's annual opium production was estimated to be around 122 tonnes in 1968. ¹⁶ Turkish opium had an estimated maximum efficiency of 13 to 14 per cent in heroin production, and around 20 to 25 per cent was estimated to be sold in illicit markets. In other words, approximately 3–4 tonnes of heroin could be obtained from Turkish opium annually, which could supply only 5 to 15 per cent of the heroin worldwide. ¹⁷ Similarly, the number of heroin addicts in the USA was estimated at around 250,000 at the end of the 1960s, which implies that the heroin obtained from Turkish opium would be equivalent to less than a month's supply for US addicts (1 g per addict per day). ¹⁸ Although the numbers varied, it was impossible for Turkey to supply 80 per cent of the raw material of the heroin entering the USA.

However, the Nixon administration puts pressure on the Demirel government in the late 1960s to enforce a total ban on the cultivation of opium poppies to curb drug addiction in the USA. Ultimately, the cultivation of opium was banned in 1971, but it did not solve the USA's drug addiction problem. As Schneider argues, after a short heroin shortage in the USA following the ban on opium cultivation in Turkey, ‘new heroin supplies from Mexico, Latin America, and Southeast Asia available, new dealing networks established, and Latin American cocaine appearing on the market in larger quantities, the drug marketplace was transformed from a place of scarcity in 1972 to one offering a cornucopia of mind-altering substances five years later’. ¹⁹ This shows how the US administration exaggerated Turkey's role in the illegal trafficking of drugs, and how Turkey could not be regarded as the major source of addiction problem in the USA. However, the USA launched a diplomatic offensive against Turkey in the late 1960s as its major target in the fight against heroin addiction. The Demirel government had to face this challenge.

Nixon's assistant for Domestic Policy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, supported the 80 per cent claims as early as 1969 and suggested that opium production in Turkey had to be stopped and laboratories in France that made heroin from Turkish opium had to be closed down. Furthermore, Turkey had no monetary interest in opium cultivation because the country had approximately 110,000 families producing only 175 tonnes of opium per year. ²⁰ The income from opium production for these people was around US$1.4m. Moynihan also suggested ‘buying Turkey out of business’, and that the USA provides aid to Turkey to persuade the government to stop opium cultivation and include economic inducements, or even sanctions, to push the country to ban opium cultivation. Moreover, he stated that the US government should declare that countries involved in opium production or illegal drug trafficking would be considered hostile to the USA, potentially leading to retaliation. According to Moynihan, the US president should also send diplomatic missions to Turkey and France immediately, be ready to provide economic support, and initiate an exchange of letters between the parties. ²¹

In a meeting between the US president's assistants on 24 October 1969, the main concern was stopping opium cultivation in Turkey. In the meeting, they argued that stopping opium cultivation in Southeast Asia would be difficult because there was no substitute crop to offer to these countries, the crop had a high cash value, transportation was easy, and opium production areas were outside government control. ²² Opium production in Turkey had to be stopped, as stated by Moynihan. The assistant for Domestic Affairs, John Ehrlichman, argued that Nixon was ready to take on all risks to achieve his national goal of curbing drug addiction, even if it annoyed the Turkish and French governments. The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, argued that such policies might be counterproductive, and offered to establish a task force to coordinate these policies under the State Department. More importantly, he suggested measures to stop opium production in Turkey before the summer of 1970. ²³

Following this meeting, the US State Department sent Nixon's message to Demirel via the US ambassador in Ankara, William Handley. The State Department urged the ambassador to deliver an oral message, rather than a written one, to avoid leaks like the Johnson letter in 1964, which harmed relations between the two countries. In his message, the US president stated that he was having trouble fighting rising drug addiction in the USA; therefore, the US administration was compelled to implement global measures to curb drug addiction. Nixon also appreciated Demirel's pledge to American ambassador in Turkey Parker Hart in 1967 that opium cultivation would be stopped within 3–4 years in exchange for US$3m in aid. However, it would be too late, as Turkish opium would still be available for illegal trafficking 3 years after the end of cultivation. As a result, Demirel should persuade Turkish farmers to plow up their fields and not to plant opium poppies again; moreover, the US administration was ready to pay US$5m to farmers who plowed up their crops. Nixon was ready to discuss the opium issue during Demirel's Washington visit. ²⁴

Nixon's message was delivered to Demirel on 15 November 1969. Demirel argued that there were real impediments to eradicating opium cultivation, but he would see what could be done in addition to limiting and controlling production in Turkey. He also added that an immediate ban on opium cultivation and plowing up crops were not possible. He stated that in many areas, farmers planted opium poppies for oil. The Turkish government had already done its best, and the areas where smuggling predominated had been cleaned out, police forces had been reorganized, and border controls had been tightened. He emphasized that opium cultivation was vital for some farmer families, and during his election campaign in Malatya, farmers requested him not to ban opium cultivation. The US ambassador added that the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), John Ingersoll, would visit Turkey to discuss the problem and the possible measures in detail. ²⁵ The BNDD Director visited Turkey and met the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior and the Assistant Under Secretary in the Prime Ministry. After these talks, Handley sent a message to the State Department on 19 November 1969 and proposed continuing to put pressure on the Turkish government. ²⁶

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Alexis Johnson, sent a memorandum to Kissinger on 12 December 1969 and stated that Handley should try to persuade Demirel to plow the present opium crop in return for US$5m. In addition, he should stress that he had discussed the issue with the US president, who would contact the Turkish ambassador in Washington to share his opinion. Unless the Turkish government was persuaded, the US administration should offer pharmaceutical companies the sale of Turkey's whole opium crop, and the Turkish government should declare that all opium poppies planted after 1970 were illegal. In the event that US companies bought the Turkish opium, the volume of opium in the illicit market would dramatically drop. ²⁷ Johnson's suggestion was delivered to Nixon on 27 December 1969. ²⁸

Handley visited Demirel on 20 January 1970, to discuss the opium problem. In this meeting, Handley told Demirel that Turkish–American relations were very important to Nixon; however, the president and his staff were disappointed in the Demirel government's inability to eliminate opium cultivation in Turkey, which had a direct impact on the quality of life in the USA. Both the opium problem and the USA's approach to it had become more serious since Hart's visit to Demirel in 1967. For the present administration, drug addiction was the main foreign policy concern because, in the preceding year, hundreds of Americans had died from an overdose of heroin. Handley also stated that the USA would pay Turkey US$5m to plow in the current year's opium crop. In return, Demirel reminded Handley that Turkey was a US ally and wanted to do everything possible to help the USA; however, plowing in the crop was politically and technically impossible. Demirel also stated that the main issue was not money, but finding an alternative solution to the problem. After the meeting, Handley reported that the US offer, along with the US–French diplomatic offensive, could help Demirel understand the significance of the problem. ²⁹

In the meantime, Ingersoll, the Director of the BNDD, organized a press conference on the opium problem, and according to Handley, Ingersoll puts Demirel and the Turkish government in ‘the hot seat’, a move that was ‘unexpected, untimely, maladroit, and unnecessary’. Handley noted that the Turkish government was experiencing difficulties regarding parliamentary democracy and the future of opium-producing farmers and their families. Therefore, a cautious and patient strategy should have been followed. Moreover, Ingersoll's press conference may have embarrassed the Demirel government, making the problem insoluble through diplomatic and democratic processes. ³⁰ In response to this comment, the State Department asked Handley to offer the Turkish government a way to reduce opium production for the current harvest year. Unless the Turkish government accepted this offer, the US administration would ask US pharmaceutical companies to buy Turkey's opium stock in return for an agreement with the Turkish government to stop opium production after 1970. The BNDD estimated that Turkey would sell 76 tonnes of opium to pharmaceutical companies, with 130 tonnes of additional opium available for the illegal market. The State Department argued that the basic problem was a lack of adequate control over opium production. The Turkish government was collecting enough opium to fill orders from licensed purchasers abroad; as a result, the remaining crop could be sold on the black market. ³¹

Keeping these factors in mind, the US Secretary of State met with the Turkish ambassador in Washington and told the Turkish ambassador that the narcotics problem was a serious concern for the US president and society. Therefore, measures should be taken immediately. The US government was ready to compensate Turkish farmers for their losses. Ambassador Melih Esenbel responded that the Turkish government had taken measures to control its borders and had formed a new security force to combat illegal trafficking. Opium cultivation had been reduced from 42 provinces to nine and would be reduced further. However, Esenbel reiterated that opium had been produced by Turkish farmers for its oil for centuries, and it was not easy to eradicate a tradition in such a short time. However, the Secretary of State insisted that Turkey should stop opium cultivation because the US government believed that the heroin coming into the USA originated in Turkey. They also did not want public opinion of Turkey to decline in the USA. ³²

The US decision-makers also tried to internationalize the opium issue and intensify international pressure on Turkey, while the Turkish government was expected to use international forums to alleviate US pressure on Turkey. According to Under Secretary of State Richardson, during his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil in Washington on 13 May, the two agreed to convene an ad hoc meeting of the Committee on the Challenges of a Modern Society (CCMS). ³³ Under Secretary of State Richardson expected Turkey to use such an international forum to declare its intention to eliminate all future opium production after the 1971 crop. Moreover, the Turkish government could restrict opium cultivation to just one province, Afyon. However, Turkey could also argue that legal opium production was still necessary for the manufacture of useful drugs such as morphine. More importantly, Turkey could also argue that as long as opium production was legal anywhere, illicit production would move to other countries, even if Turkey ceased opium production. Therefore, the USA might have to control and stop the cultivation of opium worldwide. As a result, the Task Force should convene as soon as possible to consider and decide on alternative approaches. ³⁴

The Task Force met at the White House on 9 June 1970 at the request of Secretary of State Richardson. At the meeting, Richardson argued that internationalizing the opium problem would push the Turkish government to move faster than direct US pressure; moreover, countries in an international forum might exert additional pressure on Turkey, making it more productive. The possibility of a global ban on opium was also discussed in the same meeting; however, the possibility of objections from pharmaceutical companies was also considered because opium was used in 20 medical preparations for two to four million people a year and there were no viable alternatives possessing the same attributes. One of the participants, the US Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, argued that Turkey's opium cultivation should be stopped forcefully. The Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Gene Rossides, suggested that unless the Turkish government was able to collect the whole crop, the US Defence Department should consider working closely with Turkey's army. Richardson agreed with this suggestion. It was also argued that Nixon was not happy with the US ambassador's performance in eradicating opium cultivation in Turkey. Kleindienst argued that the USA needed a very active ambassador in Ankara. Richardson replied that he was happy with the ambassador's performance; more importantly, he argued that the Demirel government would fall if it responded directly to US pressure regarding the opium problem. Kleindienst reminded that the next government could be less friendly to the USA compared to the Demirel government. Richardson argued that the military taking over the Demirel government would be a better alternative. He also argued that the CCMS meeting was not productive. Richardson concluded that Turkey was a significant ally for the USA. ³⁵ In other words, Nixon's decision-making staff considered alternative solutions to the opium problem, including the overthrowing of the Demirel government via a military intervention; therefore, the possibility of solving the problem through democratic means began to fade.

Moynihan stated that the USA should bomb the Blue Mosque in response to Turkey's aggressive behaviour towards US decision-makers. The Director of the Office of Turkish Affairs stated that some people in the government, such as Rossides and Kleindienst, who were not responsible for US foreign relations but concerned about the narcotics problem, might damage Turkish–American relations in an irreversible way. ³⁶ It can be argued that there was a lack of consensus in US decision-making circles regarding the ideal policy to persuade Turkey to stop opium cultivation. Nixon and his inner circle were more rigid and hawkish on the issue compared to the diplomats in the State Department. The director of Turkish Affairs was not alone in criticizing the president's inner circle regarding the opium policy towards Turkey. Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, argued that Turkish demand for wheat from the USA should not be linked to the ban on opium cultivation. He opined that US policy should not be punitive towards the Demirel government, which was already under pressure from voters, leftist groups seeking Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, and members of his own party. Therefore, there was no need for added international pressure on the Demirel government. NATO's southern flank was so vital that it required a stable and friendly Turkey to protect it, and according to Johnson, there may not be a more friendly government in Turkey, despite the opium problem, than the Demirel government. The Demirel government was not acting fast, but there was progress in addressing the narcotics problem in the USA. As a result, the US government should act carefully so as not to deteriorate its relations with Turkey. ³⁷

Handley met Turkish officials, including the minister of foreign affairs and the Turkish ambassador, in Washington in July 1970. In the meeting, Turkish officials reiterated that their government was aware of the USA's serious narcotics problem and ready to cooperate; however, it was impossible for the Turkish government to ban all opium cultivation in Turkey. They promised that the government would buy the entire opium crop in 1970 and limit opium production to Afyon, Isparta, and a number of licensed producers. The Turkish government also promised to comply with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. ³⁸ In the meantime, a UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND) meeting was held in Geneva on 28 September 1970, to internationalize the issue of opium production in Turkey following the CCMS meeting. At the meeting, the US administration tried to mobilize international pressure on the Turkish government; in response, Turkish authorities argued that the USA was treating Turkey ‘like a small African country’. US pressure on Turkey created reactions and resentment on the Turkish side. Demirel had declared in June 1970 that the number of opium-producing provinces would decrease to seven in 1971 and four in 1972, which did not satisfy the US administration. The US intelligence community hoped that the UNCND meeting would give Demirel an opportunity to show that the opium problem was not just a concern for the USA, but for the whole world. Although US intelligence did not expect a dramatic result from the meeting, it would have been useful to make the problem an international issue. ³⁹

In his meeting with Nixon in Washington on 17 August, Handley explained the situation in Turkey, not only regarding the opium problem but also the rise of the left and anti-Americanism. He stated that the position of the Turkish government in the opium problem was cooperative, and they were preparing a bill to gradually restrict the number of opium production centres and licensed producers. Nixon argued that it was vital for the USA to reduce the supply of opium entering the country as much as possible. In addition, he asked Handley to tell the Turkish government that the USA would not embarrass them publicly but that, privately, the issue was significant for the USA. Handley, in turn, argued that Turkish–American relations were proceeding well and that Turkey was loyal to NATO policies, allocating a large share of its budget for NATO purposes. The Incirlik base in Turkey was also critical for the USA, so the main issues in Turkish–American relations were the rising left and anti-Americanism; however, optimistically, he did not expect these developments to deteriorate relations between the two countries. ⁴⁰

In the meantime, Turkish military staff handed a memorandum to the government, and Demirel had to resign on 12 March 1971. Demirel's JP ruled Turkey as a single-party government after the 1965 general elections and came to power again in the 1969 elections. However, Turkey was in political and social turmoil after 1968 because of the rise of leftist ideologies, which caused anarchy and social polarization. Several insurgencies occurred during this period, and the Islamist and nationalist right emerged as a counter-attack to the left. The Demirel government was not able to quell the political and social unrest. In addition, the Turkish military staff was not happy with the Demirel government's performance in carrying out the Kemalist reforms as stated in the 1961 Constitution; there was also ideological conflict within the army. Following the memorandum, Demirel resigned and Nihat Erim formed the first technocratic government of the transition period, which remained in power until the elections in 1973. ⁴¹

Although the military memorandum and the fall of the Demirel government in 1971 stemmed from domestic problems in addition to the power struggle and conflicts in the army, the JP government's Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil believed that the USA was behind the military memorandum because of the Demirel government's refusal to completely ban opium cultivation in Turkey, despite the lack of any evidence showing the US involvement in this development. ⁴² After the fall of the Demirel government, one of the issues on the agenda of the technocratic government was to resolve the opium problem; however, its approach and solution to the problem would differ from that of the Demirel government.

After the fall of the Demirel government on 12 March 1971, Nihat Erim, a former member of the RPP, was appointed to form the new government by President Cevdet Sunay. Erim formed a technocratic government with non-political figures with the support of the military on 26 March 1971. The end of social struggle, the suppression of leftist groups, and the implementation of the political, economic, and social reforms demanded by the army were the objectives of Erim's government.

The State Department instructed Handley to visit Prime Minister Erim and tell him that the best solution to the problem was the total eradication of opium cultivation in Turkey. The ambassador should also ask Erim about his plans for addressing the opium problem. If the Turkish government argued that it was not possible to stop opium cultivation in a short period of time, they should restrict it to a maximum of two cities in 1972, and cease all production in 1973. Concurrently, Turkish opium producers should be protected from subsequent economic losses, so the US administration would assist Turkey, either directly or through funds provided by the UN or other international organizations, in combating drug abuse or developing alternatives to opium cultivation. ⁴³

In the meantime, another intelligence report was prepared on the Erim government's position on the opium problem. In the report, Erim stated in his first speech in parliament that drug addiction was a ‘terrible disaster for the youth of the world’; thus, he publicly accepted the seriousness of the problem. However, the Erim government was not more willing to eradicate the opium cultivation than the Demirel government; they sought to control it as well. The government's position reflected the interests of Turkey: Turkish control of Turkish territory. ⁴⁴ Therefore, the Erim government began to take measures, such as collecting the current year's crop, and refused the USA's assistance to avoid an increased resistance to the Turkish government's collection programme and stimulate illegal production rather than controlling it. The US administration and Handley urged Erim to pass the licensing and control bill in parliament and complete the total abolition of opium production by the next year. In return, Erim stated that an alternative crop or agriculture-based industry should be offered to opium producers and asked the US administration to work with them. Upon this invitation, the US bureaucracy began preparing proposals. ⁴⁵

On 17 May, Handley visited Erim, and reported that throughout the meeting Erim was ‘cordial, forthcoming, and positive’. Erim asked Handley, ‘What is the alternative being proposed to the opium producers?’ Handley replied that the US administration was working on feasible alternative proposals and re-affirmed that total eradication was the best possible solution. Handley concluded that if Erim was interested in the elimination of opium cultivation, it could be done. Erim replied that legal procedures were going well and that a single institution, the Soil Products Office, would control the entire production process from seed to harvest. Erim's assistant reminded him that the Ministry of Health stated that they needed opium for medical products, but Erim replied that the current stock could be used or it could be imported. Erim also underlined that controls were not strict enough to stop illegal trafficking. Despite demands from some other provinces to cultivate opium poppies, such as Malatya, Erim declined. After the meeting, Handley commented that he was encouraged by Erim's attitude and believed that Erim was convinced that the best solution was eradication of opium cultivation. More importantly, Erim was willing to ban opium production immediately if the laws allowed him to do so. ⁴⁶

In return for the ambassador's report to the State Department, the Department instructed the ambassador to deliver Nixon's personal message to the Turkish prime minister. ⁴⁷ After Nixon's message was delivered to Erim, opium cultivation was discussed again in a White House meeting in mid-June 1971, in which Handley participated. During this meeting, Nixon asked his advisors how much heroin came from Southeast Asia, specifically the Golden Triangle (Thailand–Laos–Myanmar), and they told him 10 per cent, with the rest coming from Turkey. ⁴⁸ This argument was definitely an exaggerated estimate because the calculations, including those in this study, showed that the amount of heroin originating from Turkey had a much lower percentage. ⁴⁹

Following a meeting between Nixon and his advisors, Handley met Erim and his staff members. After the meeting, he stated that although the Turkish government was still considering banning opium cultivation, its position had changed, which was a disappointment. Nevertheless, the Turkish government was trying to find a solution to the problem and asked whether the US government would compensate opium producers for their losses. If the US government provided financial assistance to Turkey, the Turkish government was prepared to ban opium production from 1972. ⁵⁰

In response to Handley's report on his meeting with officials in Turkey, the State Department asked the ambassador to tell Erim that the opium problem should not endanger bilateral relations between the two countries and that he might not be able to control the punitive measures taken by Congress under public pressure from the American people. The opium problem was widespread; however, Turkey was at its epicentre. The US government was prepared to provide US$10–15m to Turkey to compensate opium producers’ losses for up to 3 years. However, the Turkish parliament would have to pass a bill to ban the planting, cultivation, and production of opium in Turkey after 30 June 1972. The Turkish government would also have to buy the whole crop of 1971 and pay the equivalent of US$10–15m in Turkish Liras to farmers who voluntarily gave up opium production in the autumn 1971 and spring 1972 in the regions where opium cultivation was still permitted. Therefore, to obtain assistance from the USA, the Turkish government had to agree on the eradication of opium cultivation after 30 June 1972. Unless the collection of 1971 opium poppies was effective, the US administration would take all possible actions to protect the health of its people. ⁵¹

After receiving the aforementioned instructions from the US administration, Handley met Erim and his decision-making staff in an unofficial environment on 21 June 1971. Erim was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Osman Olcay, Minister of Commerce and Industry Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, and Foreign Economic Relations Minister İsmail Hamit Özer Derbil. At the beginning of the meeting, Handley summarized the US president's remarks and the instructions given by his government. Turkish officials questioned why Turkey was regarded as the primary source of heroin entering the USA and what the US administration was doing to combat other sources. Olcay also argued that many people in Turkey believed that US pharmaceutical companies were putting pressure on Turkey's ban on opium production in order to enable them to sell more. Handley replied that his government was taking necessary measures globally, but that the former Turkish government had not done its best to control opium production. He added that US$10–15m in aid was a generous offer to the Turkish government. According to Çilingiroğlu, the USA did not want to eradicate opium production globally but rather put pressure on Turkey to pass the bill. He added that Turkey was ready to control opium production, but why were bilateral relation issues on the table? Olcay told Handley that if the USA pushed more and Turkey could not adopt desirable measures, the entire countryside would commence opium cultivation. Çilingiroğlu went on to say that the Erim government accomplished more in two and a half months than Demirel did in the previous 5 years and that the US administration should appreciate the Erim government's response. Erim added that Demirel had told him that the US anti-opium diplomatic offensive against Turkey was a propaganda effort by American Jews opposed to Turkey's Middle East policy. Moreover, Bizim Radyo, which was making communist broadcasts from East Germany, argued that his government was being sold to the USA. Erim conceded that the US administration had made some acceptable suggestions, but with the financial support offered, his government could only ban the following year's crops. The primary issue was what the US administration would do in the long term. Handley replied that he did not have instructions or specifics about future US policies, but wanted to act as a bridge between his government and Turkey. He waited for the Turkish government to respond to the proposal, but Erim was hesitant to inform Turkish society of the situation. Handley replied that he was ready to write his speech by stressing the humanitarian aspect, the possibility of increased development, compensation plans, and assurances of outside help. Erim replied that public opinion was significant and that the losses of affected Turks should be compensated. Handley repeated the US conditions. ⁵²

The US administration praised the Turkish government's cooperative stance and the passage of the licensing bill by parliament, while the financial demands were deemed outrageous. The Turkish government's attempts would have a positive impact on its own people and the global community. The price of the economic losses should be decided by negotiations between the two countries, and the US administration was ready to pay no more than US$10m in the 1972 fiscal year. Unless the Turkish government took the necessary measures, it would endanger future US assistance to Turkey. More importantly, the US administration should continue its diplomatic offensive against the Turkish government until the problem was solved, rather than leaving Turkey to resolve it in its own way. ⁵³

Handley met with Erim again on 25 June, and he emphasized that the Turkish government should eradicate opium production to maintain friendly relations with the USA. Erim replied that money was not important but friendship was. In return, Handley promised that the USA would pay US$10m for the fiscal year of 1972 and US$10m more for 1973 to compensate for the losses of the Turkish government and opium producers. In addition, the USA would advise on new agricultural programmes and do whatever was required to provide help from international organizations and private funds. Erim replied that he agreed on two points: helping Turkish farmers and eventual eradication of opium production. He added that compensation would be based on the 1971 crop and international prices. They agreed to exclude illegal sales from the calculation. Erim stated that a new decree would be passed to restrict opium cultivation to four provinces in 1972 and that there would be no more production after that. The draft decree was shared with the US administration. In return, Erim expected Nixon to publicly declare his appreciation of Turkey's efforts to eradicate opium cultivation, promise to help farmers, and reiterate military cooperation between the two countries. He also asked Handley to tell Nixon that he had a reliable ally in Turkey and that his government would realize the promised reforms to move towards the ‘normal state of affairs’, by controlling the extremists. ⁵⁴

After a 3-month diplomatic offensive against the Erim government, the USA declared that opium cultivation in Turkey would be prohibited after 1972. Both sides thought that the crisis was over, but the prohibition caused a reaction and resentment in Turkish society. People did not accept or support it and the opium ban became part of the 1973 election campaign. In 1972, Handley's personal assistant, Mann, argued that any government that would decide to lift the ban on opium cultivation should take responsibility for the irreversible political ramifications of such a decision. ⁵⁵

Robins argues that during the 1973 election campaign, the prohibition of opium cultivation mobilized opposition. Ecevit, the leader of the RPP, promised to lift the ban after the RPP came to power because the problem concerned Turkey's independence. Moreover, the opposition parties gained the support of voters in the former opium-producing regions. Robins argues that Ecevit's populist stance regarding the opium ban contributed to his success in the election. ⁵⁶ Ecevit's RPP won the elections but lacked the parliamentary majority required to form a single-party government. As a result, Ecevit's RPP agreed to form a coalition with Erbakan's NSP on 26 January 1974, after lengthy negotiations. This unlikely coalition comprised an alliance of a leftist, secular party with a conservative, Islamist party.

The new US ambassador in Turkey, William Macomber, paid a visit to Prime Minister Ecevit on 21 February 1974. In the meeting, Macomber stated that although the ban on opium cultivation was a domestic issue, there was a negative public reaction to drug addiction in the USA. On the one hand, the ban on opium cultivation had positive results: a decrease in the volume of stocks in heroin refineries in Marseilles and heroin entering the USA, a number of heroin addicts on the streets coming in for treatment, and an increase in prices. The US administration, on the other, did not expect that the agreement with the Turkish government on the prohibition of opium cultivation would end in 3 years. The US administration also believed that the poverty of former opium producers could not be overcome by allowing them to cultivate it again. The ambassador concluded that his government hoped that Ecevit's government would not lift the ban on opium production. Ecevit replied that any democratically elected Turkish government could not take a decision in the same manner as the military-sponsored Erim government. He also added that although the revenues from the legal production of opium were low, they were still important for poor farmers. Furthermore, these people had difficulty sourcing cooking oil, which they made from opium seed. The prime minister also noted that there was no agreement between Turkey and the USA because any self-respecting government could not reach such an agreement. He also stated that he believed his government could provide a strong surveillance system for opium production and that his government would take all humanitarian aspects into consideration while making a decision on opium production. ⁵⁷

As the conversation between Macomber and Ecevit shows, Ecevit had decided to act against the ban on opium cultivation and wanted the Turkish government to make this decision independently. Thus, the coalition government lifted the ban on opium cultivation and resume production in six provinces and part of Konya on 1 July 1974. In addition, Ecevit guaranteed the secure production of opium poppy by preventing its leakage into the illegal market. In this vein, he formed a security force in collaboration with international agencies in addition to Turkish gendarmerie forces to control the cultivation and production by ‘universally mandating the imminently policeable straw method of opiate extraction which involves whole capsules rather than lancing capsules for their milk’. As a result, US and international monitors recognized Turkey's success in producing poppy while considerably preventing its leakage to the illegal market after 1974. ⁵⁸ In other words, following 1974, Turkey concentrated on producing poppy straw rather than opium and became a licit producer in the world market. ⁵⁹

In the meantime, Nixon was forced to resign on 8 August 1974 as a result of the Watergate scandal, and Gerald Ford became the new US president the next day. Ford decided to enter into discussions with the Turkish government and related UN agencies regarding measures to prevent opium smuggling. The objective of the US administration during the bilateral discussions was to persuade the Turkish government to severely restrict acreage in the first year and expand only when controls were proven to be effective; immediately experiment with, and ultimately shift to, more controllable agricultural and technological processes for the production of opium; and design, install, and implement a stringent control system. More importantly, the Turkish government was informed that all US economic and military assistance to Turkey would be suspended. ⁶⁰

Similarly, the US Secretary of State Kissinger sent a letter to Ecevit via Macomber. In his letter, Kissinger underlined that the Ecevit government's decision had prompted reactions not only in the US administration but also in US society because the fight against drugs had been a serious concern in the USA for years. His government's decision, besides the recent events in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in Cyprus, would result in the suspension of US economic and military aid to Turkey, unless the decision was reconsidered or effective controls were implemented. Kissinger also added that Turkish–American relations were of vital importance to US decision-makers, but these relations could not be preserved without the Ecevit government's help. ⁶¹

Gingeras argues that the Cyprus Crisis in 1974 enabled Ford to pacify the US Congress. In February 1975, Congress passed an arms embargo against Turkey due to the illegal use of American weaponry during the Cyprus conflict. Ankara responded with the seizure of American military instillations and threats to consider its broader military alliance with the USA. Despite these conflicts, Ford administration did not want Turkish–American relations to collapse, and Ford met with Demirel, who had succeeded Ecevit, in Helsinki in July 1975. The meeting was cordial and Ford informed Demirel about efforts to lift the embargo. For the president, the potential resistance might come from Congressman Charlie Rangel who was insisting on the reforms on the opium issues with Turkey. However, Demirel summarized the measures taken such as limiting the acreage of land used for cultivation and the establishment of a new counter-narcotics unit, Ford promised to meet with Rangel in order to persuade him on lifting the embargo. Ultimately, the USA's opium problem with Turkey receded after 1975, and Ford and the Carter administrations focused more on Southeast Asia for the suppression of illicit trafficking. ⁶² However, despite the end of the opium crisis, Turkey has been a transit route for illegal trafficking of narcotics since then, and Turkish police forces have been an integral part of fight against illegal trafficking of narcotics.

Nixon focused on the war against drugs, and specifically opium cultivation, as a result of the promises he made during his election campaign. Turkey was his main target because he believed that it was the primary source of opium. The US arguments were based on estimates and beliefs rather than clear and irrefutable evidence. As calculations in this study show, Turkey's opium supply was far from these estimates.

On the basis of these claims, the US administration began to put pressure on Demirel government to ban opium production in Turkey. The Demirel government resisted and argued that the heroin produced from Turkish opium could not meet US demand; however, it promised to control and limit opium production in Turkey. The US administration continued its diplomatic offensive against the Demirel government via Handley in Ankara. On 12 March 1971, the Demirel government was forced to resign after receiving a military memorandum.

After the fall of the JP government, Nihat Erim formed a technocratic government that banned opium production in the country after long negotiations. Archival documents show that Erim was open to collaboration with the USA and opposed to opium cultivation in Turkey. The Erim government declared opium cultivation illegal on 30 June 1971. In the 1973 election campaign, opposition to the prohibition of opium production reached a crescendo, and the RPP–NSP coalition government formed by Ecevit and Erbakan lifted the ban on opium cultivation in Turkey on 1 July 1974. This decision disturbed the US administration, and the US Congress suspended economic and military aid to Turkey for 3 years, after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus.

In summary, the opium crisis was not merely a crop crisis, but rather it can be considered as a diplomatic offensive testing economically and militarily dependent NATO ally's loyalty to the USA and NATO, which was trying to change its US-centric foreign policy after the Cyprus Crisis in 1964 by developing its economic relations with the USSR, and standing with the Arab states in Six Days War in 1967, and shaken by the rise of the left and anti-Americanism in the late 1960s. Ultimately, democratically elected Demirel and Ecevit governments failed the test of loyalty to the USA and NATO, while appointed and military-backed Erim government passed it due to different political, economic, and social concerns.