Abstract
This study investigates the risks and causes of fatal officer involved shootings (OIS) following ineffective applications of TASER conducted energy weapons (CEWs). Content analysis of open-source records resulted in quantitative and qualitative characteristics and conditions associated with the ineffective application of CEWs resulting in fatal OIS. Research and field-use data indicate that CEWs were ineffective in as many as 47% of applications. From 1985 through 2020, 1349 fatal OIS followed ineffective applications of CEWs in the United States. Officers were more likely first to use CEWs to subdue minority suspects before fatally shooting them than they were with White suspects. In 14 instances since 2004, suspects shot and killed 16 law enforcement officers following ineffective applications of CEWs. The policy implications of the findings are articulated. This is the first study to examine the use of deadly force following the ineffective use of TASER technology.
Introduction
For two decades, researchers have explored the physiological effects of the use of TASER® 1 technology and its relationship to adverse reactions and sudden arrest-related deaths (Kroll, 2009; Vilke et al., 2007; Williams, 2008; Webster et al., 2006; Werner et al., 2012). Physiological research has examined cardiac, respiratory, and metabolic effects (Baliatsas et al., 2021; Bozeman et al., 2009; Jauchem et al., 2009). More recently, research has centered on the effects of associated trauma, such as injuries from uncontrolled falls, from the ignition of volatile fumes, and from impacts to the eyes (Gapsis et al., 2017; Kroll et al., 2016; Kroll et al., 2017). One topic lacking from the literature is fatalities from the use of deadly force following the failure of conducted energy weapons (CEWs) to subdue violent subjects. This study examines fatal police officer involved shootings (OIS) following the ineffective application of TASER CEWs in the United States.
On the website of Axon® Enterprise, Inc. 2 (the company manufacturing the TASER CEW), the Chief Executive Officer, Rick Smith, states, “We are going to make the bullet obsolete” (Axon, 2021). His intent is clear—to make CEWs a suitable substitute for the use of firearms in deadly force encounters. As of November 2020, the company claims that in approximately 4.5 million field applications TASER CEWs have saved more than 245,000 lives (Axon, 2020). Independent data bases do not exist to verify or to contradict Axon’s claim. Nonetheless, despite the claims of lives saved, law enforcement officers in the United States shoot and kill more than 1000 people annually (Williams et al., 2019), often after the ineffective use of a TASER CEW. This study focuses on incidents of OIS in the United States because of the large number of incidents there.
Little research exists on the efficacy of less-lethal force in avoiding or mitigating the need for deadly force in law enforcement. Nevertheless, officers’ knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of CEWs in subduing suspects during deadly force encounters is critical for officer and public safety. Ineffective applications of CEWs during violent confrontations have culminated in officers’ and citizens’ deaths. Understanding how frequently and under what conditions CEWs are ineffective can inform officer judgment of whether to use a CEW or resort to an alternative force option. Those decisions can have dire consequences, as the nationwide protests and riots in the United States during the summer of 2020 dramatically demonstrated.
This study examines the risks and causes of fatal OIS following ineffective applications of TASER CEWs. It contributes to the literature on use of CEWs and deployment of deadly force following the ineffective use of TASER CEW technology. The findings of this study are relevant for informing use of force policy and officer training. The study is divided into six sections. The first section explores available evidence on deadly use of force after ineffective TASER CEW deployment. The second section focuses on the data and methods of this study. The findings of the study are articulated in the third section. The section four deals with discussion of findings. The limitations of the study are highlighted in section five. The final section offers conclusions and implications of the findings.
Interrogating use of deadly force after ineffective TASER CEW deployment
Reliable sources of data related to use of deadly force after ineffective deployment of TASER CEWs are non-existent. Below, we engage with the available sources of data and their limitations. We also engage briefly with the literature on TASER CEWs. This section does not attempt to cover the entire vast material on TASER CEWs. Rather, it focuses on aspects of the literature that are pertinent to the current study.
Government data sets
Having accurate and reliable data is necessary for public policy debates and for the development of training regimens. The power and legitimacy of decision making suffers with the lack of reliable information on use of deadly force following the failure of less-lethal force. Incomplete and unreliable data lead to misunderstandings about use of force. Such misunderstandings lead to counterproductive policies on training and tactics. Although government data sources on police use of deadly force are publicly available, studies have demonstrated that those data are incomplete and unreliable due to underreporting and classification errors (Alpert, 2016; Fyfe, 2002; Klinger, 2008; Loftin et al., 2003; Sherman and Langworthy, 1979; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Depending on the year in question, public records research reveals about 30%–45% more fatal police shootings than are reflected in the commonly used federal databases: the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Vital Statistics System, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Arrest-Related Deaths Program (Williams et al., 2019). Regardless, those datasets do not include data on the use of deadly force following failed application of less-lethal force.
Connecticut is the only state that currently collects data on the use of CEWs (Connecticut General Assembly, 2014). However, Connecticut data do not include measures of whether the application of the CEW was effective, or, if it was not, what alternate uses of force were necessary to subdue a suspect. No other government databases are readily available on the use of less-lethal force or on how often officers use deadly force following an ineffective application of less-lethal force.
In January 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began collecting information on non-lethal use of police force under the National Use of Force Data Collection initiative (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019). That program collects data on incidents involving death and serious bodily injury. Because this initiative involves the voluntary collection of data from police agencies across the country, it will likely be subject to the same underreporting and inaccurate reporting as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Although the Bureau intends to publish reports twice a year, it will publish only trend reports. Raw data will not be available to researchers.
Agency reports
A few law enforcement agencies have published public reports on use of force that reflect the effectiveness of TASER CEWs. The Houston Police Department reported that CEWs were effective in controlling subjects about 77% of the time, an ineffective rate of 23% (Parker and Shoonover, 2009). The Los Angeles Police Department has reported the effectiveness of applications from 2012 through 2019. The reports indicated that the applications were effective a maximum of 65% of the time in 2012 (an ineffective rate of 35%) and a minimum of 53% in 2015 and in 2019 (an ineffective rate of 47%) (Los Angeles Police Department, 2016, 2019). The New York Police Department reported that the use of CEWs was 82% effective in 2016 (18% ineffective) and 75% effective in 2017 and 2018 (25% ineffective) (New York Police Department, 2016, 2017, 2018).
The Fort Collins (Colorado) Police Department reported that TASER CEWs were ineffective in 29% of all applications, and the Larimer County (Colorado) Sheriff’s Office reported that CEWs were ineffective 32% of the time (Pohl, 2017). The Indianapolis (Indiana) Metropolitan Police Department reported that CEWs were ineffective or had limited effectiveness in almost 38% of all applications (Morgan, 2019).
Two methodological considerations exist with studying agency reports on the use of CEWs. First, law enforcement may gain suspect compliance by pointing the CEW at a suspect without deployment (Pohl, 2017). The act of aiming a less-lethal device at a suspect may not be included in police reports or official statistics of techniques used to gain compliance because the weapon was never deployed or physically applied to a suspect. Second, research has found CEWs to be of decreasing effectiveness the further away a suspect is from the CEW when an officer uses it (Mesloh and Thompson, 2006; Mesloh et al., 2008). However, effectiveness rates are often calculated dichotomously as success or failure, and due to data collection limitations, officer–suspect application distance can rarely be accurately calculated.
TASER CEW effect on use of deadly force
Reports of ineffective TASER CEW applications.
Note: CEW: conducted energy weapon.
aBased on TASER proximate sudden arrest-related deaths only.
Conversely, Lee et al. (2009) reviewed CEW application outcomes in 126 law enforcement agencies in California. They reported that the use of CEWs did not decrease firearm-related deaths. Khanna (2007) and Kleinig (2007) reported comparable results. Amnesty International (2004) reported that some law enforcement agencies experienced increases in use of lethal force after the adoption of CEWs.
Ferdik et al. (2014), in a study on the effects of use of force policies, found that less restrictive policies on the use of CEWs corresponded with fewer fatal shootings by police. An early pilot study examining a random selection of 400 deployments reported that CEWs were successful in subduing a suspect without the need for further force in 68% of incidents (an ineffective rate of 32%) (Mesloh et al., 2005). In a later study at a large metropolitan police agency, researchers found that deployment of CEWs incapacitated 86% of suspects without the need for more force (an ineffective rate of 14%) (White and Ready, 2007).
In studies of arrest-related deaths following the application of CEWs, Williams (2008) found that CEWs were ineffective in subduing 61.6% of 213 people who died unexpectedly after the application of the CEW. White et al., (2013) examined 392 CEW proximate deaths and found that in 58.4% of those deaths, the use of the CEW failed to subdue the subjects, who continued to struggle. None of the studies, however, examined use of deadly force after an ineffective application of a CEW.
Media reports
APM Reports (APM), the investigative and documentary unit of American Public Media, released a story questioning the effectiveness of CEWs (Caputo et al., 2019). Investigative journalists compiled a database of almost 3000 fatal law enforcement officer-involved fatal shootings between 2015 and 2017. In 258 of those incidents, APM reported that officers had tried to use a CEW to subdue someone, but when the application was ineffective, the officers then shot and killed that person. Caputo et al. (2019) determined that in 106 of those fatal shootings, the person became more aggressive following the application of the CEW. They reported that some large city police departments rated the CEW as unreliable in up to 40% of all applications and that newer models of the CEW were less effective than older models. They concluded that the failed application of a CEW can be life threatening to police and to the public (Caputo et al., 2019). Several news agencies picked up the story and either republished it emphasizing local incidents or referenced it in reports of incidents involving the use of CEWs (Caputo, 2019; Davies and Martin, 2019; Gilbert, 2019; Joseph, 2019; Reveal News, 2019; Williams, 2019).
Despite the seemingly high ineffective rates of applications, the CEW still appears to be the most effective less-lethal force option available to law enforcement (Mesloh et al., 2005) and one of the most used less-lethal techniques (Mesloh et al., 2008). These demonstrated CEW ineffective rates raise serious concerns over the efficacy of the use of TASER CEWs during deadly force confrontations.
Method
To examine the extent of fatal OIS following the ineffective application of a CEW, a four-step approach was necessary to construct a sampling frame of OIS. The first step consisted of searching commercial news media databases for articles reporting all fatal OIS in the United States following an ineffective application of a CEW for all years since the invention of the TASER CEW in 1974. The second step involved searching commercial news media databases for articles reporting all fatal OIS for the most recent 7 years, from January 1, 2014, through 31 December 2020. The third step involved searching legal databases for court decisions involving wrongful death suits arising from use of force and wrongful death claims involving CEWs. The fourth step involved searching the internet for sites of commercial news sources, such as newspapers, television, or radio stations, or government sites with information on OIS. Information from individually hosted, non-commercial, and crowd-sourced websites was included if listed incidents could be verified through government or commercial news sources. From content analysis of those records, data on TASER CEW proximate shooting fatalities were extracted.
Unfortunately, no governmental or academic database is available against which to compare the results of this search process (Williams et al., 2019). The only basis for comparison is the APM report (Caputo et al., 2019), which published 258 incidents dating from 3 January 2015, through 6 January 2018. The search process for this research revealed 324 incidents during that same period, or an additional 66 cases (25.6%).
Quantitative data attributes include the age of the deceased (in years), sex (male or female), race/ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, or other), and what type of weapon the deceased possessed (firearm, edged weapon, impact weapon, vehicle, replica firearm, or unarmed).
Qualitatively, each incident was analyzed for reported conditions or characteristics potentially associated with the ineffective application of the CEW. Sources often could not, or did not, identify specific reasons the application was ineffective. Therefore, quantitative analysis of the causes of ineffective applications was not possible.
Results
From 28 May 1985 (the date of the first recorded fatal shooting), through 31 December 2020, open-source research revealed 1349 fatal OIS following an ineffective application of a TASER CEW. Figure 1 depicts these results. CEW proximate fatal OIS by year.
Before 2001, CEW proximate fatal OIS never exceeded three incidents per year. Starting in 2001, corresponding with increased market penetration following release of new generation neuromuscular disruption devices, the number of incidents began to climb steadily to a high of 121 in 2018.
Fatal OIS comparison by year.
Note: OIS: officer involved shootings; CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Sex, race/ethnicity
CEW proximate fatal OIS by sex and race/ethnicity.
Note: OIS: officer-involved shootings; CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Fatal OIS comparison by sex and race/ethnicity.
Note: OIS: officer-involved shootings; CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Chi-square calculation for men.
Chi-square calculation for women.
Age
Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the ages of the 1349 fatal OSI victims following ineffective applications of CEWs from 1985 through 2020. Ages range from 15 to 84 years, but the ages of three suspects are not discernible from the available data. The sample is positively skewed. The mean age is 36.1 years (SD ± 11.8), and the median age is 34.5. The interquartile range is 27–44. Females are older than males, 39.9 years (SD ± 11.3; 95% CI 36.8–43.0) compared to 35.9 years (SD ± 11.8; 95% CI 35.3–36.5), respectively. Females range in age from 17 to 63 years (IQR 32.5–47.5). Males range in age from 15 to 84 years (IQR 27–44). CEW proximate fatal OIS by age.
Fatal OIS comparison by age.
Note: OIS: officer-involved shootings; CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Weapon type
Armed by type of weapon.
Note: OIS: officer-involved shootings: CEW: conducted energy weapon.
In 79.4% of CEW proximate fatal OIS, the suspect was armed with some type of weapon at the outset of the encounter. In 20.6%, the suspect was not armed at the outset; however, officers often resorted to deadly force after the suspect tried to seize the officers’ CEW or firearm, or after the suspect gained physical advantage over the officer. In about 22.1% of CEW proximate fatal OIS, the suspect was armed with a firearm. More frequently (46.1%), the suspect was armed with an edged weapon, such as a knife, machete, and axe.
Law enforcement fatalities
Officer fatalities following ineffective TASER CEW applications.
CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Variables affecting efficacy of applications
Open-source records seldom give the reasons the application of a CEW is ineffective. Consequently, no effort is made here quantitatively to describe the variables that lead to ineffective applications. However, a few studies have attempted to quantify those variables (Brandl and Stroshine, 2017; Somers et al., 2020; Sung, 2019; White and Ready, 2007; 2010), and other variables prevalent in news reports appear related to those effects. These fall under three categories: situational, suspect, and officer variables.
Situational variables
The distance from the suspect that the officer fires the CEW is relevant to effective application (Sung, 2019; White and Ready, 2010). By design, the prongs spread after firing, and they need a minimum distance to ensure maximum effectiveness. A minimum 12-inch spread is recommended for maximum effect (AXON Enterprise, 2019; Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2020). The best effect results when the area between the probes encompasses a large muscle group or more than one muscle group. CEWs use electrical stimuli to interfere with the body’s peripheral nervous system signals temporarily to impair a subject’s ability to control voluntary muscle movement through a phenomenon called clonus—a series of rapid repetitive contractions and relaxations in muscles. The clonus effect is what causes a suspect to lose control of muscle movement. The larger the muscle group, or the more muscle groups involved, the better the neuromuscular incapacitation (NMI) effect.
The best distance to use the TASER CEW depends on the model of the device. The models currently in use by law enforcement include the X2, X26P, and X7 (e.g., see Kroll et al., 2016). The cartridges for each model fire the probes at different angles of departure. The X7 has two types of cartridges, a close quarters version with a wide angle of departure and a standoff version with a much narrower spread. Consequently, the most effective distance depends on the device model and cartridge version used.
The farther from the suspect the officer fires the CEW, the more likely the probes are to miss the target. Both probes must either strike the target or be close enough to the target to complete the electric circuit. Even when considering the variations of device model and cartridge version, there is disagreement about the effective distance. Sung (2019) reports that the best distance for positive effect is 7–9 feet. White and Ready (2010) hold that the CEW is less effective when fired from farther away, but they find the best distance is about 3 feet. Additionally, CEWs used in drive stun mode (when the weapon is pressed against the suspect, but the probes are not deployed) lack the NMI effect. Drive stun mode works primarily as a pain compliance technique and, therefore, is less likely to incapacitate a suspect (Axon Enterprise, 2019).
When used outdoors, environmental factors affect the outcome. Because the CEW prongs are not precision guided and lack gyroscopic stability, factors such as high wind, rain, and poor visibility add to the odds that an officer will miss the target. Wintry weather also means that the suspect is more likely to be wearing bulky or thick clothing that prevents the current from reaching the suspect’s body. Additionally, obstructions, such as tree limbs or bushes, can deflect a probe and result in a failed application.
Technical problems with the CEW can cause an application to fail. Such problems include the wires leading to the probes breaking, the cartridge dislodging from the device, and the batteries having insufficient charge (Sung, 2019). The wires falling on a conductive surface can short circuit the current and cause an intermittent or ineffective application.
Researchers disagree on the effectiveness of CEWs when used in combination with other less-lethal techniques and weapons. Sung (2019) maintains that a CEW is more effective when used in combination with other types of less-lethal force, but White and Ready (2010) find that the CEW is less effective when other types of less-lethal weapons are used in conjunction with the CEW. Sung (2019) and White and Ready (2007) agree that the more times an officer uses a CEW on a suspect, the greater the success rate. Conversely, news stories often report officers repeatedly using a CEW without success before resorting to lethal force (Gilbert, 2019). Moreover, officers often tried using different less-lethal means such as physical force, pepper spray, baton strikes, foam batons, and beanbag rounds in conjunction with the CEW before resorting to deadly force (Williams, 2008).
Suspect variables
Researchers also disagree on whether the suspects’ physical stature and sex affect the results of a CEW application. Brandl and Stroshine (2017) report that effectiveness does not vary according to suspects’ height, weight, or sex. However, White and Ready (2010) hold that the CEW is less effective on suspects weighing more than 200 pounds, and Somers et al. (2020) report that height, weight, and sex could impact effectiveness due to the relative strength of the suspect and the size of the target area. Analysis of open-source records offers little guidance on the debate over the suspects’ stature, but as noted above, officers are more likely to shoot and kill men after a failed application of a CEW than they are to shoot and kill women. In the past 7 years, men were 95.7% of all OIS fatalities, but they were 97.2% of fatalities after a failed CEW application. Women were 4.3% of all fatal shootings, but they were only 2.8% of CEW proximate shooting fatalities (see Table 4).
The type of clothing the suspect is wearing can affect TASER CEW applications. The 50,000 V that a TASER CEW builds up in the capacitor allows the electric current to arc a gap of only about 4 cm (AXON Enterprise, 2019). Heavy winter clothing or loose baggy clothing can prevent the completion of the circuit or result in an intermittent circuit, which reduces the effectiveness of the weapon. Additionally, certain clothing, such as a leather jacket, offers more resistance to the current, thereby blocking the effectiveness of the charge.
A common characteristic related to ineffective application of CEWs repeatedly found in media reports is the intoxicated state of the suspect. White and Ready (2010) and Somers et al. (2020) find that applications are less effective on suspects who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Suspects impaired from drugs or alcohol are less likely to feel the NMI effects of a CEW in probe mode and might have higher pain tolerance when subjected to a drive stun.
Brandl and Stroshine (2017) argue that the effectiveness of a CEW does not vary according to the level of subject resistance. However, White and Ready (2007) believe that the application is less effective on aggressively resisting subjects because that resistance could lead to broken wires during probe deployment and avoidance of direct contact in drive stun mode. Somers et al. (2020) claim that a suspect’s carrying a weapon can also diminish an officer’s aim, thus preventing contact with the target in both probe and drive stun modes. Additionally, if a suspect is fleeing, it becomes more difficult for an officer to hit the target, thus making the application less likely to be effective.
Officer variables
Officer characteristics, such as years on the job, are related to effectiveness due to an officer’s experience in using a CEW and the techniques that the officers are trained to use (Somers et al., 2020). Officers with more experience are more likely to find ways to increase the effectiveness of the CEW in tense situations. Moreover, the physical stature of the officer might be a factor. The officer’s size (Schuck and Rabe-Hemp, 2005) certainly does not decide whether the application will be effective, but larger, stronger officers may be more likely to try other less-lethal means of subduing a suspect before resorting to lethal force.
Variables reducing the effects of TASER CEW applications.
CEW: conducted energy weapon.
Discussion
It is axiomatic that no weapon is fail proof, and TASER CEWs are no exception. Studies and field-use statistics show that applications of CEWs are ineffective in subduing suspects in 15%–47% of applications. In the United States, law enforcement officers employ CEWs approximately 900 times each day (Thompson and Berman, 2015), or approximately 328,500 times per year. Consequently, between 135 and 423 times each day, or between 49,275 and 154,395 times each year, the application of a TASER CEW is ineffective in subduing a suspect, and law enforcement officers must resort to other forms of force. The findings of this research challenge studies demonstrating that officers armed with TASER CEWs were less likely to discharge their firearms while confronting a potentially lethal suspect resistance (Souza et al., 2010). The effectiveness of CEW deployment in real life situations is crucial. Inevitably, failures occur during deadly force encounters, so the use of deadly force by law enforcement becomes necessary. Certainly not all CEW failures result in shootings, and not all shootings result in fatalities, but ineffective applications led to 121 fatal OIS in 2018, which translates to approximately 36.8 fatal OIS per 100,000 applications of a TASER CEW that year.
For the past 7 years (2014 through 2020), ineffective applications of a TASER CEW resulted in 723 fatal OIS, which translates to approximately 31.4 fatal OIS per 100,000 CEW applications over that period. Calculations of the probability of a CEW triggering ventricular fibrillation (and potentially death) range only as high as 17.2 per 100,000 applications (Webster et al., 2006). This means that the likelihood of deadly force following an ineffective application of a CEW is much higher than the likelihood of an adverse cardiac event, which has been the topic of much debate regarding the potential lethality of CEWs (Mesloh et al., 2008; Webster et al., 2006).
For various reasons, in deadly force situations, law enforcement officers are likely to resort to the use of firearms instead of first trying to use a CEW to subdue a suspect. First, officers might not have a CEW available during the encounter. Not all officers train to use them, and some jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, do not permit their use (Lee et al., 2009). Second, officers might feel that the threat is immediate, and the use of deadly force is necessary to counter it. The chances of the CEW being ineffective can be high, and an ineffective application affords an assailant more time to continue an assault before an officer can employ another form of force. Third, officers might not be within the distance, approximately 3–9 feet, in which the CEW is most effective (Sung, 2019). Fourth, the environment might not be conducive to the use of a CEW, such as when a suspect is in a motor vehicle, and it is clear to the officer that the chances of a CEW subduing the individual are small. Fifth, officers might reasonably believe that the application will be ineffective on a violently resisting subject who appears intoxicated on alcohol or drugs or who appears to be in an altered mental state.
Because the threat posed by an individual with a firearm is so serious and so immediate, officers are less likely to try a CEW before resorting to deadly force. Still, in more than one in five CEW proximate OIS fatalities from 2014 through 2020, the suspect was armed with a firearm, and in about four of every five CEW proximate OIS fatalities, the suspect was armed with some type of weapon at the outset of the encounter.
Perhaps the most significant finding was that law enforcement officers in the United States were statistically more likely first to try using a TASER CEW to subdue minority male suspects with TASER CEWs before shooting and killing him than they were a White male. This finding is counter to the popular impression that officers are more likely to use deadly force on minorities.
Limitations
A method for collecting primary source data on the use of TASER CEWs and the subsequent use of deadly force would be preferable to the use of secondary sources, such as news media reports. However, there is no practical way to collect nationwide data from primary sources. Government data collection captures only 46.0%–75.3% of OIS fatalities, depending on the year and the program (Williams et al., 2019), and those programs collect no data on less-lethal efforts that precede the use of deadly force, revealing an important shortcoming in the publicly available government data on OIS fatalities. Additionally, many states exempt police reports from disclosure under public information laws, thus limiting the ability to obtain primary data. Studies are either products of existing government databases (which are underreported and beset with reporting errors), or they are based on data only from agencies willing to share the data (Kane, 2007). Agencies may also have an incentive not to be cooperative out of concern that data are presented in a manner that reduces perceived agency legitimacy or might be used in litigation against the agency. In any case, nationwide data on the use of deadly force following the failed application of a CEW are widely available only through media reports. Even so, there is little doubt that cases remained undiscovered using this research method, and there is the possibility of bias in the media reports.
Additionally, there was no effort to determine specifically why CEWs were ineffective in the identified cases. More research is necessary to determine specific causes for effective and for ineffective applications of CEWs. Despite these limitations, this study marks the first attempt to collect data on CEW proximate fatal OIS.
Conclusions
Adams and Jennison (2007) concluded nearly 14 years ago that “Tasers are en route to becoming the weapon of choice for police officers, bumping out other use-of-force technologies” (p. 463). While the notion of TASER CEWs “bumping out” other use-of-force technologies has arguably turned out to be an exaggeration, the call for more training, accountability, and policy consistency remains relevant (Adams and Jennison, 2007). For example, failure rates of CEW applications, which range from 15% to 47% or between 50,000 to more than 150,000 ineffective uses per year, mean that ineffective applications will inevitably occur during deadly force encounters. Officers are likely to continue to try less-lethal means to subdue suspects, but less-lethal means are not always successful. Ineffective applications of TASER CEWs in deadly force encounters will continue to pose serious threats to the safety of officers and suspects alike, regardless of placement on use of force continua. This is a serious concern. Officers are unlikely to know the statistics on the ineffective application of TASER CEWs, but they know from experience that the devices often do not produce the desired result of subduing a resisting subject.
Existing policy impacts deployment of CEWs (Bishopp et al., 2015; Terrill and Paoline, 2017). Therefore, CEW policies, training, and tactics adopted by police departments need to reflect the realities confronted by officers vis-à-vis ineffective CEW deployment. Rather than directing attention to officer injuries proximal to CEW use (Alpert et al., 2011), this study directs attention to officer deaths. The hope is that this and other research continues to increase awareness of the harms associated with ineffective CEW applications and to provide guidance on when officers should forgo the use of CEWs and consider other use of force options.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Dr. Williams is a retired chief of police whose officers used TASER CEWs during his tenure. Dr. Williams has testified as an expert witness in criminal cases and in a coroner’s inquest about the use of TASER technology. He has also received an honorarium from TASER International, Inc. (now Axon Enterprises, Inc.) for presenting his research findings to its Scientific and Medical Advisory Board.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
