Immigrant integration and their negative sentiments toward recent immigrants: The case of Hong Kong

Abstract

Keywords

negative sentiments recent immigrants group boundary Hong Kong

Introduction

The topic of negative sentiments toward recent immigrants has attracted considerable research attention because it addresses fundamental social issues, such as integration, inequality and group relations, and the rapid increase in international migration. For example, a Gallup Poll in 2014 showed that 41 percent of Americans felt that immigration should be reduced (Blake, 2014). In Canada, a 2010 survey found that 46 percent of Canadians considered immigrants to have a negative impact on Canada (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, 2012). A 2011 public opinion poll in the UK showed that over 50 percent of British people would prefer a significant reduction in immigration (Blinder, 2011).

Most studies on the topic have focused on the views of the native-born population (Manevska and Achterberg, 2013; Savelkoul et al., 2011; Schlueter et al., 2008; Olzak, 1992; Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Quillian, 1995; Schaeffer, 2012; Mayadas and Elliott, 1992; Zhu, 2002; Zamora-Kapoor et al., 2013; Gang et al., 2002; Constant et al., 2009; Hao et al., 2011). Such studies identify the demographic and socio-economic background of individuals who are more likely to have negative sentiments toward recent immigrants as well the social and economic context that shapes that view. There has been surprisingly little research considering the views of long-term immigrants. It is important to analyze whether earlier immigrants share the negative sentiments against recent immigrants. First, previous studies often focused only on the negative sentiments of native-born populations toward recent immigrants. That focus may oversimplify the dynamics of group relations because earlier immigrants may share the same negative sentiments toward their recently arrived counterparts. The simplification may lead to policies that are ineffective in addressing the issues. Second, Park and Burgess (1969) have long noted in their classic discussion that one indicator of assimilation is when immigrants adopt the “attitudes and sentiments” of the native population. Exploring how earlier immigrants and the native population share negative sentiments toward recent immigrants would bring the role of assimilation back into the discussion. Third, when assimilation occurs, some immigrants may adopt negative attitudes that are similar to those of the native-born population. Our study highlights the “paradox of assimilation” (Rumbaut, 1997), by demonstrating that successful assimilation may sometimes result in negative outcomes of assimilation. According to Rumbaut (1997), assimilation could also include the adoption of undesirable lifestyle practices that can have negative consequences on immigrants, such as adverse health outcomes or deviant behavior. As discussed later, findings from our study suggest that assimilation can also mean immigrants sharing the negative attitudes and sentiments of the native-born population toward recent immigrants.

Our study is based on data from Hong Kong collected in 2014. There are advantages to using Hong Kong data to study the topic. First, most studies in major immigrant receiving countries have to contend with the race factor, as they receive immigrants from different continents. It is well documented that race can complicate inter-group relations and, in turn, the integration process (Massey, 1990; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Silberman et al., 2007; Alba and Denton, 2008). In Hong Kong, the overwhelming majority of immigrants come from China. That context allows us to delineate the actual effect of group boundaries on the integration process without the race factor. Individuals who moved from China to Hong Kong are considered as immigrants because, even after the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China in 1997, Hong Kong remains a separate jurisdiction from the rest of China and has its own immigration policy. Individuals from China, like those from other countries, have to apply for immigration in accordance with the existing immigration policy in Hong Kong.

Second, we empirically investigate the importance of immigrants crossing group boundaries as a factor in adopting the sentiments and attitudes of the native-born population. The political and social context in Hong Kong provides a setting to examine how the politics of identity relate to xenophobia, which gives rise to social boundaries. The “imagined” community emerged through shared historical experience and common destiny. Immigrants transform from “strangers” to “local residents” as they acquire resources and power and become like the local-born population (Wimmer, 2008a, 2008b). Xenophobia arises from creating a clear boundary between local residents and immigrants. Thus, Hong Kong well fits the dynamic of the politics of identity and provides a natural “laboratory” to understand the relationship between crossing boundaries and negative sentiments against recent immigrants.

Third, Hong Kong is a useful city for this analysis because tensions between local residents and recent immigrants from China have been acute. In the last few years, a number of social issues related to recent immigrants have been well publicized and gained central attention in the city. In 2011 and 2012, there was controversy over the granting of residency to babies born in Hong Kong to mainland parents. In 2013, the debate about whether newly arrived immigrants were eligible to apply for social security assistance reached Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. In 2014, there were issues related to stiff competition in primary school and kindergarten enrollment due to children of cross-border families (whose children have Hong Kong citizenship status, while their parents may not). Yet, there has been no detailed analysis of negative attitudes toward recent immigrants in Hong Kong.

Finally, most studies on the topic are based on data from European and North American countries. We know very little about the relationship between local residents and immigrants in Asian cities. Given the increase in human migration among Asian countries, the focus on Hong Kong is timely. It opens a window to explore the issue in Asian cities.

The context

Two characteristics of Hong Kong, as an immigrant society and a post-colonial society, have significant implications in understanding the relationship between the native-born and immigrant populations.

Hong Kong: A city of immigrants

The representation of immigrants in Hong Kong has been substantial. In 2016, the latest Population By-census in Hong Kong showed that 39.4 percent of residents were immigrants. Among them, 78.8 percent came from China (including mainland, Macau and Taiwan). Some 44.5 percent of immigrants who arrived less than seven years ago were from China. This group of immigrants is usually referred to as “recent arrivals” (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2015). Hong Kong requires immigrants to stay in Hong Kong at least seven years before they can obtain permanent residence. Until then, they are not entitled to any social assistance.

When the Communist government took control of China in 1949, individuals from China were not allowed to move to Hong Kong. From 1949 to the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, immigration from China to Hong Kong could be roughly divided into a few major periods (Fischer, 1975). The first period started in 1948 when the Communist army won major battles against the Kuomintang, the ruling government in China at the time, which began to flee to Taiwan. While many people followed the Kuomintang government to Taiwan in 1948 and 1949, many also fled to Hong Kong. The second period was between 1962 and 1963. This wave of migration was largely the consequence of the “Great Leap Forward” campaign during the second period of the Second Five Year Plan in China between 1958 and 1963 (Ou and Pong, 2013). The campaign ended with catastrophic consequences and was abruptly stopped in 1961. The full failure of this social experiment led to the complete bankruptcy of agricultural policies that were directly linked to the Great Famine in 1958 in which millions died. Between 1962 and 1963, many people fled from China to Hong Kong to avoid the human-caused “natural disaster.” The third period was between 1966 and 1978, corresponding to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976. During the Cultural Revolution, physical violence was encouraged to fight against the “enemy” hiding in the country. Millions of people died, and millions were forcibly displaced to rural areas. The country’s economy slowed to nearly a complete stop. Education was halted. The period before and after the fall of the Gang of Four was that of political uncertainty. People moved from place to place in search of security and stability. Under such circumstances, many people chose to flee to Hong Kong. The fourth period was between 1979 and 1980, during the period when the Four Modernizations program was initiated by the Chinese government.

These immigrants escaped political instability, social turmoil and economic hardship by going to Hong Kong illegally through various means, such as swimming across Mirs Bay or Deep Bay between the mainland and Hong Kong, or climbing through the mountains (Fischer, 1975). Many died before they reached Hong Kong. The British colonial government in Hong Kong took a lenient “touch-base policy” toward these arrivals in 1974. All individuals arriving from China were allowed to become permanent residents of Hong Kong once they landed south of Boundary Street in Hong Kong. Boundary Street is the street that marks the southern part of the Kowloon City that was ceded to Great Britain in 1860 by the Qing Dynasty.

The Communist government gradually increased restrictions on individuals leaving China. The border was sealed on both sides in 1980 during negotiations before the Sino–British Joint Declaration (Pong et al., 2014; Pong and Tsang, 2010). Subsequently, deportation of individuals arriving from China was enforced by the British colonial government. Later that year (1980), a new agreement was reached between the Chinese and British governments that allowed a daily quota of 150 immigrants to migrate to Hong Kong.

Migrants from mainland China arrived in Hong Kong not only through the 150 daily quota scheme, but also through the “one-way permit.” Most of the immigrants who arrived in Hong Kong through a one-way permit came for the purpose of family reunion. According to Pong et al. (2014), over 760,000 mainland Chinese immigrants arrived in Hong Kong by one-way permit between 1997 and 2012. The post-colonial Hong Kong government implemented other immigration policies after the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 to ensure economic growth and enhance the overall pool of human capital. The “capital investment entrant” program accepted immigrants who invested at least HKD 10 million (about USD 1.5 million). The program was introduced in 2003 and ended in 2014. By the end of 2011, more than 13,000 immigrants had arrived in Hong Kong under this program. The “quality admission” program recruited more than 320,000 immigrants with higher education and skills to Hong Kong between 2006 and 2012. The majority of applicants came from China or grew up in China and studied abroad (Ou and Pong, 2013). Finally, a program was introduced in 2008 that targeted international students in local universities in Hong Kong. They were allowed to stay for one year after graduation to look for employment. Virtually all applicants were international students originally from mainland China. After these immigrants settled in Hong Kong, they could apply for family members to join them. As a result of these various events and policies, immigration from China to Hong Kong has been substantial.

Hong Kong: A city with identity

It is clear that Hong Kong was a place to which people fled from China, mainly to avoid the rule of the Communist government, until the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Most of these early immigrants maintained very little contact with their home country after settling in the former British colony despite the close proximity. Mainland China virtually closed its door to the outside world before the market reform in the late 1970s. Compounding the unfavorable personal or family experience that triggered them to move to Hong Kong, immigrants in Hong Kong have been consciously dissociated from mainland China. At the same time, Hong Kong’s colonial government successfully minimized political and social influences from China, including various political movements and social turmoil in China, except the 1967 riots.

Given limited contact with China, a local Hong Kong identity began to emerge in the 1970s (Fung, 2001). With the steady growth of the Hong Kong economy, the gradual but firm establishment of a market economy and governance under the rule of law, local residents, including immigrants and their children, slowly and steadily developed their own way of life in Hong Kong accompanied by the emergence of common values and norms that were distinctly different from the planned socialist economy in China (Ma and Fung, 1999). Popular media flourished in the 1970s and 1980s and further reinforced the image of differences between Hong Kong and mainland China, particularly along the lines of civility and modernity (Brewer, 1999). Ma and Fung (1999) succinctly described this adopted narrative of Hong Kong identity as largely defined by “de-sinicization.”

The narrative of Hong Kong identity is commonly shared by most Hong Kong residents. According to Ma and Fung’s (2007) study, about 72.8 percent of residents in Hong Kong in 1996 identified themselves as “Hongkongers,” “Hongkongers but also Chinese,” or “Chinese but also Hongkongers.” The Chinese economy began a gradual shift to a market economy in the late 1970s. As it opened to trade with the wider world, people in Hong Kong had more contact with mainland China. The contact exposed them to drastic differences in ways of life and political systems. The Hong Kong identity was further reinforced. The percentage of residents identifying themselves as Hongkongers rose to 80.9 percent in 2006 (Ma and Fung 2007).

Although Hong Kong returned to China in 1997, the city maintained its own immigration policies under the “one country, two systems” agreement between the British Government and China. Despite the government of Hong Kong developing a variety of schemes to attract potential international immigrants with higher levels of education, skill and financial resources, most of the applicants are from China. Growing up in a socialist system, immigrants from China have to learn the operations of the labor market and the way of life in Hong Kong. Differences in way of life become a natural boundary to differentiate those who are “Hong Kong residents” and those who are “migrants.” Such “cultural” distinctiveness and the group boundary between Hong Kong residents and mainland Chinese promotes the conviction of social identity within the group, which, in turn, encourages within-group interaction (Fung, 2001). As one of the key functions of the local Hong Kong identity is to dissociate Hong Kong residents from mainland Chinese, the defensive mechanism to protect “Hong Kong values and norms” is strong. A clear group boundary has to be maintained, sometimes through discrimination and exclusion (Law and Lee, 2006). Negative sentiment against recent immigrants becomes a means to differentiate “we” from “they,” as well as a means to define the boundary (Wimmer, 2008a).

Major incidents against recent immigrants

In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in the demonstration of negative sentiments toward recent immigrants in Hong Kong. In 2011, local residents in Hong Kong became very concerned about the increased numbers of mainland women traveling to Hong Kong to give birth in Hong Kong hospitals. In 2012, the number of such births increased to 33,000, about 37.5 percent of the total births in Hong Kong. The public concern and response were so strong that the government was forced to declare that hospitals in Hong Kong were not allowed to accept any appointments for birth from any mainland mothers. In 2013, when the Court of Final Appeal ruled that it was unconstitutional to decline applications for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance from new immigrants (mainly from mainland China) who had lived in Hong Kong for less than seven years, it caused a major social debate. The public response was an uproar with heated discussion and protests. Some people argued that new immigrants should not receive welfare benefits from Hong Kong without having made any contribution, and that the ruling could over-burden the social welfare system. In 2013, many parents living in the northern part of Hong Kong, close to the border with China, complained that children with Hong Kong resident status who lived in China were attending schools in their regions, limiting the slots available for children living in Hong Kong.

Having a better understanding of the context, we now turn to the literature and develop hypotheses to understand the factors that contribute to the negative sentiments of early immigrants against recent immigrants.

Literature review

Given the historical context that most immigrants of different racial groups traveled across the oceans and arrived in other continents to search for opportunities, social scientists tend to focus on skin color as a marker to differentiate groups (Olzak, 1992; Savelkoul et al., 2011; Silberman et al., 2007; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Fetzer, 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Besides, most studies concentrate on the response from the native-born population. In this study, we investigate negative sentiments toward recent immigrants among early immigrants of the same ethnic group. In the following discussion, we discuss two prominent explanations in the literature and suggest how they may apply to early immigrants in Hong Kong.

Boundary-making explanation

“Group boundary” has become an important tool for social scientists to understand group relations (Wimmer, 2008b; Lamont and Molnár, 2002). The usefulness of the approach has been demonstrated by the study of intergenerational adaptation among immigrants by Telles and Ortiz (2008), the study of group conflict by Olzak (1992), the study of ethnic group relations by Lamont (2002), and the recent work by Wimmer on ethnicity (Wang et al., 2009). The growing popularity of the approach is partly because studies have given firm support to assimilation as a product of social negotiation. Thus, the relationship between the native-born population and immigrants is not viewed as interaction among members of a static pre-defined group, but rather as members of different groups continuing to negotiate, define and configure the fluid boundaries between them (Wang et al., 2009).

To maintain a clear boundary between groups, a sense of “group-ness” among members is crucial. Cultural differences provide a natural division of groups (Wimmer, 2008a). They provide behavioral guidance and lead to association and commensality among members. At the same time, culture constrains behavior and highlights differences between groups. Wimmer (2008b) succinctly argued that the function of the cultural differences between two groups is to “make a boundary appear quasi-natural and self-evident,” (Wimmer 2008b: 983) and also to “unite individuals who follow quite heterogeneous cultural practices.”

Immigrants cross group boundaries as they begin to develop social ties with native-born residents. As suggested by Massey and Sánchez (2010), the dividing line between immigrants and the native-born population becomes less clear when they share friendship ties. As they cross the group boundary, immigrants will have better opportunities to access socio-economic resources. Similar to Shibutani and Kwan’s (1965) emphasis in ethnic stratification, their classic work about assimilation outcomes, the consequence of crossing the boundary is to reduce group differences in everyday activities.

Though limited studies focus on understanding sharing sentiments and attitude of immigrants as they cross group boundaries, we expect crossing boundaries to be related to immigrants sharing sentiments and attitudes with local residents to the extent that they may even share negative sentiments against recent immigrants. This expectation is in line with most discussion about assimilation outcomes, from the early work of Park and Burgess (1969) and Gordon (1964), to the recent work of Alba and Nee (2003) and Wimmer (2008b). Besides, the development of social ties with the native-born population suggests possible socialization and learning of attitudes and sentiments from the native-born population.

Finally, once across the boundary, immigrants have a strong incentive to identify with the way of life and thinking of the native-born population. This identification helps immigrants to avoid being stigmatized as outsiders (Wimmer 2008a). Massey and Sánchez (2010) argued that immigrants actively associate with aspects of the native-born population that they find beneficial. In their terminology, this process is a “brokered boundary.”

Hypothesis 1: Immigrants who have native-born friends are more likely to adopt negative sentiments toward recent immigrants.

Economic threat explanation¹

Social scientists have long viewed group conflict as a response by the dominant group when feeling threatened by the possibility that their positions will be replaced or their wages will suffer. The classic studies by Blalock (1957) and Blumer (1958) observed that the economic threat, in particular, of a minority group to the dominant group is strongly related to an increase in prejudice, discrimination and even violence against the minority group. However, the economic threat does not have to be “real” threat: it can be a perceived threat. Studies on ethnic conflict, such as Bonacich’s (1972) study regarding the split labor market and Olzak’s (1992) ethnic competitive perspective study, have found that any threat, whether actual or perceived, can increase conflict between immigrants and native-born population (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

Research suggests that the economic threat explanation can also apply to anti-migrant sentiments. For example, Quillian (1996) showed that minority group size and economic context are related to the increase in prejudice against immigrants in Europe. A recent study exploring 12 countries in Europe between 1988 and 2000 also showed that economic conditions and a larger proportion of foreign population are consistently related to anti-foreign sentiment (Semyonov et al., 2006). Heizmann (2015) also showed that perceived labor market competition can increase anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe. Citrin et al. (1997), based on the 1992 and 1994 US National Election Study surveys, showed that there is a correlation between concern about the state of the economy and a favorable attitude to more restrictive immigration policy.

Though most studies show strong support for the economic threat explanation, they tend to address how the native-born population responds to recent immigrants. We expect that the argument may not apply to early immigrants. First, despite their economic situation being threatened, early immigrants may have more sympathy for recent immigrants, as they themselves experienced adaptation difficulties in the past. Second, immigrants usually have more knowledge about and understanding of the immigrant community, as they, themselves, are members. Their perception is better informed and closer to the actual situation. Their evaluation of the situation will not be limited to a perception of threat.

Hypothesis 2: Perceived economic threat of recent immigrants is not related to negative sentiments of earlier immigrants toward recent immigrants.

Data and methods

The analysis is based on a data set collected in 2014. Respondents to the survey included immigrants and local-born individuals aged 18 to 59. Immigrants included only those from mainland China. Our analysis addresses two groups of immigrants: immigrants who arrived in Hong Kong less than seven years ago (hereafter, recent immigrants); and those who arrived seven years ago or more (hereafter, earlier immigrants). We divided them into these two groups because immigrants can be naturalized after staying in Hong Kong for seven years or more. Immigrants who are naturalized enjoy the same political rights, social services and social assistance as other Hong Kong citizens. They are fully entitled to all social services and financial assistance provided by the government.

As immigrants from mainland China are not distributed evenly among districts in Hong Kong, we targeted our data collection in five areas with high concentration of recent immigrants from China. These regions are the Eastern district of Hong Kong Island, Sham Shui Pao and Kwan Tong in the Kowloon peninsula, and Kwai Tsing and Yuen Long in the New Territories. Our analysis focuses on two immigrant groups: those who arrived in Hong Kong seven years ago or earlier; and female immigrants who arrived in Hong Kong less than seven years ago. A total of 23,000 living quarters (almost all residents in Hong Kong are living in these apartment buildings) were randomly selected from the frame of all living quarters in these districts. Households for the study were randomly selected from these living quarters, and one person from each household was interviewed face to face. Together, we have 1,029 interviewed cases.

We focused on female recent immigrants because a large proportion of recent immigrants are female. According to the survey conducted by the Hong Kong government in 2005, about 74 percent of recent immigrants were female. The majority of them immigrated for the purpose of family reunion, as 75 percent were married. A large proportion, about 35 percent, were homemakers, while 48 percent were economically active, compared to 11.6 percent and 60.8 percent, respectively, for the total population (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2006: 43). Given their unique working status, we focus our analysis on recent female immigrants.

The dependent variable of the analysis is negative sentiment toward recent immigrants, for which we developed a composite indicator based on five questions asking all respondents whether recent immigrants reduce job opportunities, cause traffic congestion, lower the likelihood of home ownership, reduce educational opportunities, and compete for social assistance resources. The categories for answers include strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree. Combining responses from all answers, the composite scale ranges from 0 to 15. A higher score suggests more negative sentiment toward recent immigrants. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.92. We are aware that there are anti-mainland Chinese sentiments toward tourists. However, our study focused on negative sentiments toward recent immigrants as the causes of both sentiments are different.

One of the key independent variables, crossing boundaries, is measured by the number of native-born individuals among the respondent’s three closest friends. As close friendships are made with the native-born population, the boundary becomes less distinct. The approach is in line with discussions in the literature on boundary crossing (Massey and Sánchez, 2010).

To measure the economic threat perceived by respondents, we employed two proxies. First, we selected two major industrial sectors that employ the highest proportion of immigrants: “import, export, wholesale and retail;” and “accommodation and food.” They represent 38.3 percent of working immigrants from China, that is, recent immigrants (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2015). We expect that people who work in these industrial sectors will perceive higher economic competition. Second, we focused on the income level of respondents. Previous studies suggest that individuals with lower income usually feel more threatened by an increase in immigrants, as they can be easily replaced because their jobs usually require less education and skill.

In our analysis, we controlled for respondent’s demographic background, gender, age and place of birth of spouse. Hondagneu-Sotelo (2003: 9) suggested that “gender permeates a variety of practices, identities and institutions implicated in immigration” (Zhao and Webster, 2011). Younger individuals usually are more ready to adapt to the new environment. We expect that respondents whose spouses are Hong Kong residents have more opportunity to cross the group boundary. In fact, most spouses of the group were born in China. Calculated from a 5 percent sample of the 2016 Hong Kong Census, around 89.7 percent of the spouses of female immigrants were immigrants themselves (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2016).

We also controlled for socio-economic background, namely educational level and working status of respondents. Quillian (1995) showed that education has an effect on level of tolerance. More education is associated with lower prejudice. For the model of immigrants who arrived seven years ago or earlier, we controlled for working status. Those who are housewives or not working may have a limited social circle. They may have fewer opportunities to develop native-born friendships.

Finally, we controlled for age and year of arrival. Studies suggest that those who arrived at a younger age are more integrated (Leaf, 2002). The year of arrival captures their experiences of different economic and political contexts during their stay in Hong Kong.

Results

Figures 1 –5 show the distribution of the native-born population, earlier immigrants and female recent immigrants on sentiments toward recent immigrants. A considerable proportion of earlier immigrants expressed negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. Over 35 percent responded that they either agreed or strongly agreed with the negative sentiments in all 5 survey questions, and for some questions the agreement was 40 percent. At least 15 percent of female recent immigrants expressed agreement or strong agreement with the negative sentiments toward recent immigrants in each question. From the findings, we can see clearly that ignoring earlier immigrants definitely simplifies the composition of those who hold a negative view against recent immigrants. Who are these earlier immigrants who share the views of the native-born population holding negative opinions against recent immigrants? This is the question to which we now turn.

We have reported the descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis (see Table 1). Though our focus is on immigrants, we report the average negative sentiment of the native-born population toward recent immigrants for reference. Echoing the findings from Figure 1, the mean of the negative sentiments of the native-born population toward recent immigrants is almost twice that of female recent immigrants. The average negative sentiments toward recent immigrants of earlier immigrants are in between the two groups. The t-test shows that the difference is significant.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics.

	Hong Kong-born (n = 306)		Earlier immigrants (n = 222)		Female recent immigrants (n = 452)
	Mean	Standard deviation (SD)	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Negative sentiments to recent immigrants	9.27	3.70	6.40	3.89	5.17	2.97
Having at least one native friend	0.97	0.16	0.49	0.50	0.21	0.41
Male	0.38	0.49	0.17	0.38	N/A	N/A
Age	36.80	12.97	42.31	11.36	36.90	7.45
Education	%		%		%
Junior high or lower	27.12		57.21		63.72
Senior high	45.10		27.03		29.87
College and above	27.78		15.77		6.42
Whether highest degree from Hong Kong	0.97	0.18	0.29	0.46	0.03	0.16
Income	9,108.56	9,578.48	5,751.55	8,063.36	1,801.77	4,140.18
At least one parent in Hong Kong	0.84	0.36	0.34	0.47	0.12	0.33
At least one sibling in Hong Kong	0.85	0.36	0.43	0.50	0.25	0.44
Number of children under 18	0.36	0.69	0.64	0.88	1.18	0.86
Has local spouse	0.36	0.48	0.25	0.44	0.50	0.50
Age at arrival	N/A	N/A	24.78	11.40	32.98	7.36
Year of arrival	N/A	N/A	1993	8.69	2009	1.76
Working status	%		%		%
Others	78.10		52.25		23.45
Unemployed	3.92		3.60		3.10
Homemaker	17.97		44.14		73.45
	100.00		100.00		100.00
Industries
Import, export, wholesale and retail	9.48		4.05		1.77
Accommodation and food service	3.92		9.91		2.88
Other industries	86.60		86.04		95.35
	100.00		100.00		100.00

Note: N/A, not applicable.

Source: 2014 Hong Kong Migration Study.

We are particularly interested in the variables indicating the two suggested factors that may influence negative views against recent immigrants. Having at least one native-born among three close friends is a proxy for boundary crossing. The proportion of earlier immigrants who have at least one close friend who is native-born is double that of recent female immigrants. The findings seem to suggest a possible relationship between crossing boundaries and adopting negative sentiments against recent immigrants.

Our sample shows that more earlier immigrants participate in the “accommodation and food” industrial sector than local-born respondents. Ten percent of earlier immigrants participate in the “accommodation and food” sector, compared to only 3 percent of female recent immigrants. Though the census showed that a high proportion of recent immigrants are involved in the “accommodation and food” sector, few respondents in the study were involved in this sector. We limited our sample respondents of recent arrivals to women, many of whom are homemakers. In addition, only about 4 percent of the earlier immigrant respondents and 2 percent of female recent immigrants are involved in the “import, export, wholesale and retail” industrial sector. To fully understand the relationship between boundary crossing and economic threat, we performed multivariate analyses.

Table 2 reports the results of the generalized linear regression to explore how boundary crossing and economic competition are related to negative sentiments toward recent immigrants among earlier immigrants. Maximum likelihood estimation is used for a generalized linear model. Estimated asymptotic standard errors of the coefficients are estimated and the homogeneity of variance does not need to be satisfied. Clearly, having at least one native-born friend significantly increases negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. The two variables indicating economic threat (the effects of income and of involvement in the two industrial sectors with high concentration of immigrants) do not show significant effect on negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. The results of the control variables suggest that individuals who are females, do not have college education, have at least one sibling in Hong Kong, are employed, do not have a local spouse, or arrived at a younger age are more likely to have higher negative sentiments toward recent immigrants.

Table 2.

Generalized linear model on negative sentiments toward recent immigrants among earlier immigrants in Hong Kong.

	Coefficient	Standard error
At least one Hong Kong-born friend	.258***	0.064
Male	−0.146*	0.080
Age	0.011*	0.006
Education (ref. junior high and below)
Senior high	−0.001	0.072
College and above	−0.274***	0.105
Whether highest degree from Hong Kong	0.118	0.100
Income (in ten thousands)	0.031	0.040
At least a parent in Hong Kong	−0.073	0.077
At least a sibling in Hong Kong	0.167***	0.063
Number of children under 18	−0.036	0.036
Industry (ref. others)
Import, export, wholesale and retail	−0.071	0.136
Accommodation and food Industry	−0.085	0.103
Working status (ref. others)
Unemployed	−0.386*	0.182
Homemaker	−0.046	0.073
Has local spouse	−0.137*	0.071
Age at arrival	−0.021***	0.006
Year of arrival	0.008	0.006
Constant	−13.903	13.054
n	222.000
Log-likelihood	−626.857
Akaike information criterion	5.810
Bayesian information criterion	−584.945

Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Source: 2014 Hong Kong Migration Study.

We now turn to analysis of recent female immigrants, using the generalized linear regression results of the models that include only recent female immigrants. The set of independent variables included in the analysis remains the same as in the model for earlier immigrants. The results are reported in Table 3. Having at least one native-born among three best friends is statistically insignificant in relation to negative sentiment, but the sign is positive as expected. Being recent immigrants themselves, they may feel sympathy toward recent immigrants. Regarding income and the two industrial sectors measuring economic competition, only the “import, export, wholesale and retail” sector is related to negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. Other variables suggest that individuals who are older, without a local spouse, or who arrived in Hong Kong at a younger age are associated with higher negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. Having a spouse who is a Hong Kong resident may be associated with lower negative sentiments because most such spouses are immigrants themselves and may not identify with local negative sentiments. Some of them may just have arrived in Hong Kong a few years earlier.

Table 3.

Generalized linear model on negative sentiments toward recent immigrants among female recent immigrants in Hong Kong.

	Coefficient	Standard error
At least one Hong Kong-born friend	0.002	0.053
Age	0.074**	0.036
Education (ref. junior high and below)
Senior high	−0.061	0.048
College and above	−0.066	0.094
Whether highest degree from Hong Kong	−0.061	0.146
Income (in ten thousands)	−0.002	0.059
At least a parent in Hong Kong	0.058	0.073
At least a sibling in Hong Kong	0.079	0.051
Number of children under 18	0.002	0.027
Industry (ref. others)
Import, export, wholesale and retail	−0.429**	0.201
Accommodation and food Industry	0.072	0.128
Working status (ref. others)
Unemployed	−0.012	0.133
Homemaker	0.016	0.061
Has local spouse	−0.112**	0.044
Age at arrival	−0.083**	0.036
Year of arrival	0.058	0.038
Constant	−114.857	77.100
n	452.000
Log-likelihood	−1194.017
Akaike information criterion	5.358
Bayesian information criterion	−1683.093

Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Source: 2014 Hong Kong Migration Study.

The boundary crossing involved in having at least one native-born friend is clearly shown to be related to negative sentiments against recent immigrants among earlier immigrants. However, the relationship may not be due simply to having at least one native-born friend but may be related to the amiable personality of the respondent, or the amicable residential or working environment associated with the likelihood of having at least one native-born close friend. We employed propensity score matching to mimic the group with at least one native-born close friend to be comparable on all observable backgrounds to those without a native-born close friend. We ran separate matching for earlier immigrants and female recent immigrants. We first ran an optimal multiple probit model regressed on having at least one native-born friend to obtain the propensity score.² We then used difference-in-difference matching with kernel algorithm to match respondents having at least one native-born friend to those without. Finally, we used the average treatment effect of the treated to compare the effect with and without adjustment.

Table 4 shows the comparison of the effect of having or not having at least one native-born friend on negative sentiment toward recent immigrants after the matching among earlier immigrants. Those having at least one native-born friend would be about 2.216 points more likely to have negative sentiments than those without. Though the difference is smaller than the unconditional estimates, the effect is still significant. The results also show the effects of having at least one native-born close friend after matching for female recent immigrants. The effect is still not significant even after matching, though having at least one native-born friend is positively related to the level of negative sentiments in the expected direction. With the propensity matching score findings, we can safely conclude that the boundary crossing of having at least one native-born friend is related to negative sentiments against recent immigrants among earlier immigrants, and the relationship is not affected by other unobserved factors.

Table 4.

Unconditional and matching estimates of negative sentiments toward recent immigrants.

	Difference†	t	Average treatment effect of the treated	t
Earlier immigrants (seven years or more in Hong Kong)	2.614***	5.310***	2.216***	3.280***
Recent female immigrants (less than seven years in Hong Kong)	0.001	0.000	0.042	0.120

Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01;

†

unconditional difference between means for having and not having at least one Hong Kong-born close friend.

Source: 2014 Hong Kong Migration Study.

Conclusion

Negative sentiments toward recent immigrants should not be viewed as a dichotomous antagonistic relationship between the native-born population and immigrants. Our study, based on recent data collected from Hong Kong, shows that a considerable proportion of immigrants, especially those who arrived a longer time ago, have adopted negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. The findings have profound implications for understanding negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. They suggest that previous studies that focused primarily on the dichotomous antagonistic relationship between the native-born population and immigrants may oversimplify the reality of group dynamics. The findings call for exploring how different waves of immigrants develop and maintain negative sentiments against recent immigrants. At the same time, policies should distinguish between the native-born population and immigrants so that policies can address the different concerns of these groups.

The results also show that immigrants who have close native-born friends, as an indicator of crossing group boundaries, are more likely to adopt negative sentiments toward recent immigrants. Even when controlling for the possible selectivity effect of other unobservable factors associated with having at least one native-born close friend, the relationship between boundary crossing and negative sentiments toward recent immigrants remains significant for earlier immigrants. The findings suggest that the understanding of negative sentiments toward recent immigrants should incorporate the forces of both integration and antagonism between the native-born population and immigrants.

However, the findings also indicate that crossing boundaries by having at least one native-born close friend does not relate to negative sentiments toward recent immigrants among female recent immigrants (Hypothesis 1). We suspect that recent female immigrants may have sympathy toward other recent immigrants as they themselves are newly arrived in Hong Kong. As recent immigrants themselves, they experience similar difficulties in adjusting to the new environment and taking care of their children. Therefore, this group is likely to identify with the experiences of the new arrivals. Therefore, even when crossing the boundary, they do not adopt a negative sentiment. This finding strongly reflects the brokered boundary suggested by Massey and Sánchez (2010), that is, immigrants can decide which aspects of integration to adopt even after crossing the boundary.

The findings also indicate the paradox of assimilation on feelings and sentiments (Hypothesis 2). As immigrants integrate and share the sentiments and feelings of the native-born population, they also adopt the xenophobic attitude of having negative sentiments against recent immigrants. These findings add to the discussion that the outcome of assimilation may not be always desirable. The findings extend the notion of the “paradox of assimilation” to assimilated immigrants adopting the native-born population’s negative sentiments and attitudes.

Finally, the results show that economic threat does not relate to negative sentiments against recent immigrants by other immigrants. We suggest that this is partly due to all immigrants being members of the immigrant community. They can easily access information about recent immigrants. Their relatives and friends may be recent immigrants. Thus, despite facing economic threat, they may be better informed and less likely to evaluate situations based solely on perceptions. The findings further reinforce the conclusion that immigrants crossing boundaries and adopting the view of the native-born population is a crucial factor in the formation of negative sentiments against recent immigrants.

The study has its limitations. Conceptually, competition focuses on the economic dimension but other dimensions, such as cultural competition and gender difference, should also be addressed. The study is based on a city located in Asia. Besides, immigration from China to Hong Kong has its unique historical context. How much the findings can generalize to other Asian cities or cities on other continents remains to be tested. Finally, the study is based on cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data would show whether having more native-born friends can change the level of negative sentiment toward immigrants. This is especially important as Hong Kong has been facing rapid social changes in recent years. Despite these limitations, our study provides a clear message that some immigrants have crossed boundaries and have come to share negative views toward recent immigrants. As more countries report immigrants facing negative sentiments as they settle in their new societies, it is important that future analysis does not ignore the existing immigrant groups. At the policy level, the awareness that both native-born residents and some immigrants may adopt negative sentiments toward recent immigrants could be useful in fine-tuning social policies and programs.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this paper.

Funding

The first author received funding for this research from the Department of Sociology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

1

Though competition can arise from various aspects, such as cultural and political competitions, our discussion focuses on economic competition as it is one of the most often cited reasons in the public discourse.

2

The results are not shown in this paper. They may be requested from the authors.

References

Alba

Denton

(2008) Racial and ethnic data in the United States: Between scientific knowledge and the politics of identities. Revue Française de Sociologie 49(1): 141–151.

Alba

Nee

(2003) Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Blake A (2014) Anti-immigrant sentiment is down in the United States – way down. The Fix – The Washington Post, 27 June. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/27/americans-were-for-immigration-before-they-were-against-it/?utm_term=.56d15b52c297.

Blalock

(1957) Per cent non-white and discrimination in the South. American Sociological Review 22(6): 677–682.

Blinder

(2011) UK public opinion toward migration: Determinants of attitudes, Migration Observatory Briefing. Oxford: University of OxfordAvailable at: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-migration-determinants-of-attitudes/.

Blumer

(1958) Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacific Sociological Review 1(1): 3–7.

Bonacich

(1972) A theory of ethnic antagonism: The split labor market. American Sociological Review 37(5): 547–559.

Bonacich

Modell

(1980) The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Brewer

(1999) Multiple identities and identity transition: Implications for Hong Kong. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23(2): 187–197.

10.

Citrin

Green

Muste

Wong

(1997) Public opinion toward immigration reform: The role of economic motivations. The Journal of Politics 59(3): 858–881.

11.

Constant

Kahanec

Zimmermann

(2009) Attitudes towards immigrants, other integration barriers, and their veracity. International Journal of Manpower 30(1–2): 5–14.

12.

Espenshade

Hempstead

(1996) Contemporary American attitudes toward U.S. immigration. International Migration Review 30(2): 535–570.

13.

Fetzer

(2000) Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist political movements in France, Germany and the USA. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26(1): 5–23.

14.

Fischer

(1975) Toward a subcultural theory of urbanism. American Journal of Sociology 80(6): 1319–1341.

15.

Fung

(2001) What makes the local? A brief consideration of the rejuvenation of Hong Kong identity. Cultural Studies 15(3–4): 591–601.

16.

Gang IN, Rivera-Batiz FL and Yun M-S (2002) Economic strain, ethnic concentration and attitudes towards foreigners in the European Union. Discussion paper no. 578. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.1561&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

17.

Gordon

(1964) Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

18.

Hainmueller

Hopkins

(2014) Public attitudes toward immigration. Annual Review of Political Science 17(1): 225–249.

19.

Hao

Sliuzas

Geertman

(2011) The development and redevelopment of urban villages in Shenzhen. Habitat International 35(2): 214–224.

20.

Heizmann

(2015) Social policy and perceived immigrant labor market competition in Europe: Is prevention better than cure? Social Forces 93(4): 1655–1685.

21.

Hondagneu-Sotelo

(2003) Gender and immigration: A retrospective and introduction. In: Hondagneu-Sotelo

(eds) Gender and U.S. Immigration: Contemporary Trends, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 3–19.

22.

Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2006) Thematic Household Survey Report No. 28. Available at: https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B11302282006XXXXB0100.pdf.

23.

Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2015) 5 percent 2011 Population Census Data. Census Interactive Data Dissemination Service. Available at: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp170.jsp.

24.

Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2016) 5 percent Sample Datasets of the 2016 By-Census. Census Interactive Data Dissemination Service. Available at: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp459.jsp?productCode=B1120098.

25.

Lamont

(2002) The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

26.

Lamont

Molnár

(2002) The study of boundaries across the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 28: 167–195.

27.

Law

K-Y

Lee

K-M

(2006) Citizenship, economy and social exclusion of mainland Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong. Journal of Contemporary Asia 36(2): 217–242.

28.

Leaf

(2002) A tale of two villages: Globalization and peri-urban change in China and Vietnam. Cities 19(1): 23–31.

29.

EKW

Fung

AYH

(1999) Re-Sinicization, nationalism and the Hong Kong identity. In: So

Chan

(eds) Press and Politics in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 497–528.

30.

EKW

Fung

AYH

(2007) Negotiating local and national identifications: Hong Kong identity surveys 1996–2006. Asian Journal of Communication 17(2): 172–185.

31.

Manevska

Achterberg

(2013) Immigration and perceived ethnic threat: Cultural capital and economic explanations. European Sociological Review 29(3): 437–449.

32.

Massey

(1990) American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the underclass. American Journal of Sociology 96(2): 329–357.

33.

Massey

Sánchez

(2010) Brokered Boundaries: Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times, New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

34.

Mayadas

Elliott

(1992) Integration and xenophobia. Journal of Multicultural Social Work 2(1): 47–62.

35.

McLaren

Johnson

(2007) Resources, group conflict and symbols: Explaining anti-immigration hostility in Britain. Political Studies 55(4): 709–732.

36.

Olzak

(1992) The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

37.

Pong

S-L

(2013) Human capital and the economic assimilation of recent immigrants in Hong Kong. Journal of International Migration and Integration 14(4): 689–710.

38.

Park RE and Burgess EW (1969) Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Including the Original Index to Basic Sociological Concepts. 3rd edition revised, with an introduction by M Janowitz. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

39.

Pong

S-L

Tsang

(2010) The educational progress of mainland Chinese immigrant students in Hong Kong. In: Hannum

Park

Butler

(eds) Globalization, Changing Demographics, and Educational Challenges in East Asia (Research in the Sociology of Education, Volume 17), Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 201–230.

40.

Pong

S-L

Post

et al. (2014) Blurring boundaries? Immigration and exogamous marriages in Hong Kong. Population and Development Review 40(4): 629–652.

41.

Pottie-Sherman

Wilkes

(2012) Anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada. In: Verea

(eds) Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, Actions and Policies in North America and the European Union, Mexico City, Mexico: CISAN Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (CISAN), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, pp. 275–289.

42.

Quillian

(1995) Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. American Sociological Review 60(4): 586–611.

43.

Quillian

(1996) Group threat and regional change in attitudes toward African-Americans. American Journal of Sociology 102(3): 816–860.

44.

Rumbaut

(1997) Assimilation and its discontents: Between rhetoric and reality. International Migration Review 31(4): 923–960.

45.

Savelkoul

Scheepers

Tolsma

Hagendoorn

(2011) Anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of contradictory hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory. European Sociological Review 27(6): 741–758.

46.

Schaeffer

(2012) Which groups are mostly responsible for problems in your neighbourhood? Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(1): 156–178.

47.

Schlueter

Schmidt

Wagner

(2008) Disentangling the causal relations of perceived group threat and outgroup derogation: Cross-national evidence from German and Russian panel surveys. European Sociological Review 24(5): 567–581.

48.

Semyonov

Raijman

Gorodzeisky

(2006) The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988–2000. American Sociological Review 71(3): 426–449.

49.

Shibutani

Kwan

(1965) Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach, New York, NY: Macmillan.

50.

Silberman

Alba

Fournier

(2007) Segmented assimilation in France? Discrimination in the labour market against the second generation. Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(1): 1–27.

51.

Telles

Ortiz

(2008) Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation and Race, New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

52.

Wang

(2009) Urbanization and informal development in China: Urban villages in Shenzhen. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33(4): 957–973.

53.

Wimmer

(2008a) Elementary strategies of ethnic boundary making. Ethnic and Racial Studies 31(6): 1025–1055.

54.

Wimmer

(2008b) The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory. American Journal of Sociology 113(4): 970–1022.

55.

Zamora-Kapoor

Kovincic

Causey

(2013) Anti-foreigner sentiment: State of the art. Sociology Compass 7(4): 303–314.

56.

Zhao

Webster

(2011) Land dispossession and enrichment in China’s suburban villages. Urban Studies 48(3): 529–551.

57.

Zhu

(2002) Urban development under ambiguous property rights: A case of China’s transition economy. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26(1): 41–57.

Immigrant integration and their negative sentiments toward recent immigrants: The case of Hong Kong

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

The context

Hong Kong: A city of immigrants

Hong Kong: A city with identity

Major incidents against recent immigrants

Literature review

Boundary-making explanation

Economic threat explanation 1

Data and methods

Results

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

1

2

References

Economic threat explanation¹