Leading a Successful Transition to Democracy: A Qualitative Analysis of Political Leadership in Spain and Lithuania

The Spanish transition

The Spanish transition to democracy initiated in 1975 with the end of the Franconian dictatorship (which began in 1939 after the Spanish Civil War). A process of change thus initiated that fully reached the political arena (including socio-economic, cultural and religious spheres; Soto Carmona, 2005). It was a change dynamic that, after the death of the dictator General Franco, would be catalysed through consensus between the political leaders and forces advocating political change and democratization. The transition was certainly far from being a process as coherent and logical as its outcome might suggest. The immobility of Carlos Arias Navarro (Prime Minister during the Franconian dictatorship) aggravated political tensions, and the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister caused great disappointment in certain circles. It was a change that would ultimately be indissoluble from its context, due to the processes of political change towards democracy in the Mediterranean (e.g. Greece and Portugal) and the influence of the international environment after the Cold War.

Upon Franco’s death, Juan Carlos was proclaimed King of Spain as the legal successor of Franco. King Juan Carlos I made it clear that he aimed to establish democracy in Spain, and although initial support from the government was not great, the wider Spanish public was hopeful; journalists and historians described King Juan Carlos I as the ‘protective shield of the transition’ (Tusell, 2000) and the ‘pilot of change’ (Powell, 1991). The King led the transition by changing Franconian laws and implementing a schedule for reforms. His role during Spain’s democratization was widely praised for countering pro-Franconian movements and supporting the approval of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which established Spain as a constitutional monarchy.

One of the King’s first crucial decisions involved selecting the team which would aid him in enacting the necessary changes. The King made a pivotal choice when he appointed Adolfo Suárez as the Prime Minister of Spain in 1976. Suárez was committed to making the necessary democratic reforms, and, although he was not a very well-known political figure at the time, he had enough ties with the previous regime so that those against the change did not openly oppose him. He also led the Union of the Democratic Centre to victory in Spain’s first free elections in 1977, and he became the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the post-Franco regime. Suárez has hence been described as the ‘leader who changed the history of Spain’ (Prieto, 2014).

The Lithuanian transition

Lithuania was annexed to the USSR in 1940 and remained a soviet state for decades, until the USSR began undertaking political and economic changes with the Perestroika reform movement and the glasnost policy reform during the 1980s (which aimed to bring the USSR out of its economic crisis; Kučinskas, 1991). In the context of the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and wider developments in Europe, the USSR’s reforms facilitated many republics’ nationalist movements and calls for independence (Laurinavicius & Sirutavicius, 2008). In August 1991, members of the Soviet Union government led a coup in an attempt to take control of the country from the Soviet President and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup collapsed two days later following a short but effective campaign of civil resistance, led by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This failed coup destabilised the Soviet Union and led to the definitive independence of Lithuania, which Moscow accepted in September 1991. Only after this event did countries around the world dare to recognize Lithuania’s independence.

Algirdas Brazauskas served as the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party in 1988, and he led this party through the Lithuanian independence movement in which they broke away from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1993, he was elected the first President of the newly independent Lithuania with a majority vote (Čepaitienė, 2013).

Vytautas Landsbergis entered politics in 1988 as the leader of the democratic reform movement Sajūdis, which emerged at the beginning of the transition. In the 1990 elections, Sajūdis emerged victorious, and Landsbergis became the de jure Head of State of Lithuania as the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. In 1990, he headed the Seimas parliamentary session during which the restoration of Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union was declared, making it the first Soviet Republic to do so.

This transition period was intimately linked to establishing independence from the USSR, which generated even more uncertainty around not only political factors, but also economic and social considerations (Keller, 1990). Nonetheless, pro-independence movements in the Baltic countries were growing and hopeful, and in 1989, approximately two million people from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formed the Baltic Chain, holding hands across three nations to demonstrate their united desired for independence (Laurinavičius & Sirutavičius, 2008; Landsbergis, 2007).

In sum, both countries’ contexts reflect a climate of great uncertainty, and there was no guarantee that the democratization would be successful. As Huntington (1991) states, the two factors that determine the future expansion of democracy are economic development and political leadership: economic development makes democracy possible, while political leadership makes it real.

Communicating vision in Spain

Prime Minister Suárez saw democracy as their one and only hope, and the King was adamant on establishing a democracy because he did not want to be ‘an authoritarian king’ (as repeatedly mentioned by several participants, including Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, one of the founders of the Spanish Constitution, and Alfonso Osorio, Minister of the Presidency). The leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, stated that the King ‘made a very clear democratic commitment’. Although Carrillo was initially sceptical of Suárez’s aims (along with Alfonso Guerra, leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party), both admitted that, after Suárez met privately with these parties, they realized that they shared common points with Suárez’s democratic vision. These opposition leaders provide powerful testimonies to the value of Suárez’s well-communicated vision, given that it is arguably more challenging, yet crucial, to align the opposition with the democratic vision – otherwise, the chances of successful democratization through reforms are slim.

Fernández Campo (Chief of the Spanish Royal House) confirmed that the King likewise met with the leaders of different political parties to establish the most adequate rhythm of change, and despite his clear objectives, the King also displayed certain prudence in public speeches by introducing his vision through implicit messages. For example, he made no mentions of ‘democracy’ in his coronation speech, but he did announce that ‘Today begins a new stage of the history of Spain. This stage, which we must travel together, begins in peace’ (Moraga, 2014). One year later, the King made his democratic goals explicit for the first time when speaking to the American Congress to request their support for Spain’s transition (Gijon, 1976), and the headline of the Spanish newspaper El País announced, ‘The King of Spain promises a democratic Monarchy’. In his speech to the Congress, the King concluded:

The Monarchy will ensure that, under the principles of democracy, social peace and political stability are maintained in Spain, while ensuring the orderly access to power of the different government alternatives, according to the freely expressed wishes of the people. The Monarchy symbolizes and maintains the unity of our nation… (Casqueiro, 2018)

Besides carefully timing their messages, both leaders likewise used their vision to orient action. For example, Landelino Lavilla (Minister of Justice and one of Suárez’s trusted team members) reflected on his work with Suárez:

It was an operation with a clear and linear objective… linear in terms of the steps that had to be taken to achieve the goal. As a whole, all the complexity yielded to the clarity of what we did and what we really wanted to do… We had clear ideas, and a schedule as well.

Communicating vision in Lithuania

Head of State Landsbergis was guided by his vision for ‘a free independent Lithuania, as is it should be and as is normal… to set up a normal European democratic state’, and President Brazauskas likewise sought ‘real Lithuanian independence’, but he was also aware that this necessitated a stable economy and ‘energy autonomy’ from their previous dependence on Russia. Interviewees perceived Landsbergis as more vehement about achieving his vision as soon as possible, while Brazauskas proceeded in a careful, step-by-step manner. Indeed, the goal of Sajūdis was to re-establish independence in Lithuania, and even though some perceived this as too ambitious or unrealistic, Landsbergis wanted nothing less than full independence (Taškūnas, 2008). Nonetheless, the wider Lithuanian public desired independence, and they were hopeful and prepared for the consequences this could incite from Moscow (Keller, 1990). Brazauskas seemed adept in timing and implementing the necessary changes, as he successfully led his political party through negotiations with Moscow, and he consistently won popularity polls (Keller, 1990). Vytenis Andriukaitis, a co-signatory of the Lithuanian Independence Reform Act, reflected on Brazauskas’ pragmatic thinking: he judged Brazauskas’ vision to be geared not so much towards democratization per se as it was towards dealing with basic issues, such as what the people would eat and where they would sleep.

This difference between the two leaders may be explained by their distinct positions: Landsbergis was the head of the opposition while Brazauskas held the highest formal political position in Lithuania. This meant that Brazauskas’ actions were held particularly accountable by the powerful political forces in Moscow – who were constantly monitoring Lithuania’s progress to establishing independence – while Landsbergis’ position was not as susceptible to the USSR. Vytautas Astrauskas, President of the Supreme Council of Lithuania (1987–1990), further confirmed that Brazauskas had the clear conviction – and vision – of restoring independence in Lithuania, but, at the same time, the leader recognized the benefit of respecting the time that was needed in order to avoid arousing any uneasiness in Moscow. Brazauskas was aware of Lithuania’s dependence on Russia, and, although the question of independence had already been planted in his parliament, Brazauskas stated that for Moscow ‘it was like poison’. Thus, Brazauskas’ step-by-step vision reflected his recognition that successfully establishing a democracy was a multifaceted issue that first necessitated a stable, independent economy in Lithuania.

Nonetheless, Landsbergis likewise refrained from revealing a clear democratic objective when initially presenting Sajūdis’ goals to the Vilnius community (on 8 July 1988): Landsbergis instead focused his message on economic and cultural autonomy, environmental awareness, educational reform, protection of their language and, ultimately, ‘restoring Lithuania’s history’ (in the words of Romualdas Ozolas, deputy of the Presidium of the Soviet Supreme Council of Lithuania). Ozolas pointed out that this message put forth a gradual vision that was implicitly geared towards democratization – as Lithuania had historically experienced independence and democracy – without openly declaring this primary objective. It seems that Landsbergis chose to transmit his vision moderately in that public event for it was likely to reach Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. This example once again underscores the importance of considering the context and timing of how a political leader communicates their vision during such a transition period.

Comparing Spain and Lithuania

Thus, in Spain, the principal objective was to move from the Franconian regime towards a democracy, while in Lithuania, they faced the double task of regaining their independence and establishing a democracy. Nonetheless, these findings confirm that the political leaders had to develop a clear, democratic vision, and this vision was thoughtfully communicated to the government and opposition. Naturally, the leader’s vision influenced their actions, especially regarding how the leader made important decisions that led to the realization of their democratic vision.

Decision-making styles in Spain

Lavilla had an ‘unconditional confidence in the good sense, in the “smell”, in the intuition of Adolfo Suárez’ throughout their consultations together. The same was found for King Juan Carlos I, as illuminated by Fernández Campo, who described their close collaboration throughout the transition period:

[I met with the King] daily in the office, but first thing in the morning I would already be in the King’s office, we would attend to matters, and later he would frequently call me to discuss things. Many times, we had to have lunch there, stay during the night until whatever time. The work was very intense but very interesting.

In light of the leaders’ consistent collaboration with others, the adequate selection of the loyal team was an important emergent factor throughout the interview data. The leaders counted on a relatively neutral group of the new generation, as they were more likely to be open-minded, tolerant and have democratic ideas. Several participants, including Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Minister of External Affairs), described one of the ways in which Prime Minister Suárez chose his team: in the beginning, he selected many people from the Grupo Tácito, a group of Spanish professionals, politicians and journalists who were dedicated to advancing information about the economic and political future of Spain. While other participants, such as Osorio, did not explicitly mention Suárez’s reliance on the Grupo Tácito, they did agree that Suárez counted mostly on people who were trustworthy, had professional merits and shared the democratic vision for Spain. From the testimonies obtained, we can conclude that the nucleus of loyal ministers that Suárez counted on were Alfonso Osorio (Minister of Presidency and Vice-Prime Minister to Suárez), Landelino Lavilla (Minister of Justice), Martín Villa (Minister of the Interior) and Gutiérrez Mellado (Minister of Defence) – that is to say, only four of the twenty ministers of the government. George (1980) points out that crucial decisions in the real world tend to be formed by a small group of two to seven people. Whether the leader is consulting, delegating or simply informing others of their decisions, the leader’s adequate selection of their team is a pertinent consideration for decision-making.

Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez (one of the founders of the constitution) affirms that both Suárez and the King counted on a small loyal team for frequent consultations, but it was always the leader who ultimately made the decision. The King, for example, demonstrated this when he selected Suárez to be the Prime Minister: throughout several interviews, participants explained how they initially had differing opinions, but with time the majority came to agree with the King’s choice. Osorio explained that the King’s close, small group consisted of Osorio himself and Suárez; Fernández Campo also played a very relevant role in consulting with the King. Oreja Aguirre positively valued the King’s appointment of Suárez as the Prime Minister and Fernández-Miranda as the speaker of the legislature and president of the Council of the Kingdom – Oreja Aguirre felt that these three leaders formed a very good team, as Suárez represented sympathy, courage and skill, while Fernández-Miranda was responsible for the ideas. Participants affirmed that the King chose team members of the new generation that held the King’s maximum trust and shared the democratic vision.

In the case of Suárez, the complex issue of legalizing the Spanish Communist Party provides an interesting example of one of the most crucial decisions he had to make: Suárez met with Mellado, and then decided to act without speaking with other members of the military, despite, according to some testimonies, having initially promised that the party would not be legalized. Fernández Campo, who was very close to the military authorities, explains that the military viewed this as treason. Moreover, Fernández Campo believes that if Suárez had met with the military before making his decision, he could have not only easily convinced them of this course of action, but he could have likewise avoided the attempted coup of February 1981. If this is true, then the government certainly benefited from the King’s leadership as well, for he was the one who immediately stopped the coup. Moreover, Suárez announced his decision during the holidays of Spain’s Holy Easter Week, and most participants (including Carrillo) believed that Suárez and his team took advantage of the Easter holidays to legalize this party. These personal accounts indicate that a political leader’s decision-making processes are not only defined by what decisions they make, but also by the planning of decisions, another emergent factor from our analysis: whether the leader has private meetings, informs others of the evolving decision and how they choose to finally announce their decision publicly.

Decision-making in Lithuania

When speaking of Head of State Landsbergis, there was agreement across the testimonies in line with what Ozolas remarked: Landsbergis often made decisions as he saw fit and rarely explained his reasons afterwards, which illustrates both how Landsbergis personally carried out his political work and also the fact that, even when consulting with others, the political leader still held the final decision-making power. President Brazauskas likewise frequently consulted with his team (as mentioned by several participants, including Egidijus Bičkauskas and Česlovas Juršėnas, both co-signatories of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania). Bičkauskas emphasized that counting on a good team is essential for any political leader’s success. Nonetheless, as remarked by Gediminas Ilgūnas (advisor to Brazauskas during his presidency), Brazauskas ultimately made decisions according to his own judgement rather than always following the consensus of his team, which Ilgūnas described as Brazauskas’ very nature: contemplating the reality from a more ample and long-term point of view, and at times telling his team ‘Thank you, but I am going to do the opposite.’

Various testimonies from those who worked with Brazauskas and Suárez highlighted their leader’s ability to listen – another emergent factor. The members of each team felt their views were genuinely considered, and their ideas were generally accepted. Conversely, when the leader decided not to follow a suggested solution, the team member expressed frustration, displeasure or disappointment; interestingly, though, such negative feelings were only expressed by team members who were regularly consulted with, suggesting that such reactions are actually indicative of the leaders’ genuinely consultative nature, given that a non-consultative leader would not have fostered expectations for collaborators’ ideas to be accepted in the first place.

When discussing Brazauskas’ decision-making processes, participants almost unanimously spoke of his decision to reinstate the use of the Cathedral in Vilnius, to the Catholic Church – this was considered an especially transcendent moment in the beginning of the Lithuanian transition due to the hegemonic repression of the Church under Soviet Union communism. Brazauskas announced this on 22 October 1988, during the Constitutional Congress of the Reformist Movement Sajūdis. Vytenis Andriukaitis, who energetically participated in the political activities of the transition, further explained that this decision was made seemingly spontaneously during this very meeting, when Lionginas Šepetys (Secretary of Ideology) passed Brazauskas a written note suggesting that it was time to bring the Cathedral back to its traditional religious use. From Andriukaitis’ perspective, Brazauskas was adept at feeling the pulse of the context, knowing to what extent Šepetys’ idea was valuable and judging the opportunity of the moment. After consulting with his close team member, Brazauskas announced his decision to reinstate the Church during the very meeting in which it emerged. This decision considerably contributed to the Lithuanian people gaining trust in Brazauskas, along with signalling to Gorbachev that Brazauskas – and Lithuania as a whole – chose a path different to the Soviet Union.

One of the most pivotal decisions for the political transition in Lithuania was the restoration of independence: Landsbergis ultimately chose to declare independence on 11 March 1990. Stasys Lozoraitis (a friend of the leader who worked as chief diplomat in the United States during the transition period) explains that he called Landsbergis and told him ‘now or never’ after having met with President Bush, who assured him that Lithuania could count on the unofficial support of the United States if Lithuania were to declare independence. Lozoraitis argued that this was now expected of Lithuania, and the longer they waited, the more this decision would lose value; Landsbergis affirmed that this argument was what ultimately convinced him to declare independence. Brazauskas likewise approved of Landsbergis making this decision without further negotiation, because the duration of such negotiations was unpredictable, but executing this decision was undeniably necessary. Participants’ responses highlighted that Landsbergis made more unidirectional decisions than Brazauskas, affirming that a leader cannot use the same decision-making style in every situation – what is more important is that the leader knows when and how to apply each decision-making style.

Comparing Spain and Lithuania

Thus, while the political leaders made decisions crucial to the political change in a consultative manner, they also demonstrated that they had the ultimate word when choosing the best course of action. However, our analysis likewise made it clear that each country faced distinct challenges to their decision-making processes: in Lithuania, the political leaders had to confront many external problems that were related to pressures from their imposing neighbour, the Soviet Union, while in Spain, their resistances stemmed mostly from internal forces.

Participants’ testimonies showed that the political leaders made decisions that were crucial to the democratization through consultations with a small group of trusted collaborators before choosing the most appropriate course of action. When peacefully reforming a political regime, it makes sense that the leader should consider others’ perspectives to make effective decisions, but when it came to collaboratively deciding on a controversial matter, the political leaders’ negotiation strategies also played a key role.

Negotiation strategies in Spain

Interviewees perceived that both leaders always searched for the solution that was most satisfactory for all the groups of power involved. For example, Alfonso Osorio said that Prime Minister Suárez followed a ‘give and take’ strategy of negotiating, which harks to Pruitt’s (1981) concept of firm flexibility. This was also illustrated in the example of Suárez meeting with Carrillo to negotiate the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party following Suárez’s few but important demands: the party would adopt the Spanish flag and accept the Spanish constitutional monarchy. Carrillo admitted that Suárez’s arguments persuaded him to follow the democratic vision, and thanks to this ‘give and take’ strategy, Suárez was able to mitigate the risk of the extreme-right reacting with violence.

The Spanish King likewise searched for mutual solutions with Carrillo regarding the legalization of the party and recognition of the monarchy. However, participants did not specifically mention very many negotiations with the King, suggesting that, due to the high level of legitimate and formal power the King inherited from Franco, negotiations per se did not occur as frequently. It is also worth considering that Juan Carlos was still King at the time of the interviews, and participants’ responses may have been filtered or withheld given the social delicacy of sharing information regarding the leader. Suárez was clearly more implicated in direct negotiations, and the King’s support of Suárez’s actions contributed to successfully carrying out the political changes.

Negotiation strategies in Lithuania

Both leaders presented clearly different negotiation profiles: President Brazauskas sought solutions to problems, while Head of State Landsbergis made demands according to his plans. As emphasized by many interviewees, however, both styles were necessary for the transition: for example, Vytenis Andriukaitis (a co-signatory of the Reestablishment Act of the State of Lithuania) spoke positively of Brazauskas’ genuine concern for finding mutual solutions, but he said Landsbergis was never a good negotiator, as he tended to convert negotiations into a farce or humiliate the other side. Andriukaitis nonetheless recognized that Landsbergis’ categorical approach was what ultimately brought the re-independence of Lithuania.

Perhaps, once again, these different profiles can be better understood by considering each leader’s context: Brazauskas was the principal leader of Lithuania and delegate of Moscow (with Gorbachev as the only person above him), while Landsbergis was the leader of the reformist group Sajūdis, with arguably fewer external pressures. Brazauskas’ testimony highlights his awareness of the threat that the USSR posed should Lithuania take any wrong steps: he saw the KGB’s list of Lithuanian people they could incarcerate, he knew they had installed microphones in his office to keep an eye on his actions and he was aware that the USSR military forces could have crushed Lithuania in one day should they have decided that violent action was necessary. Brazauskas viewed Landsbergis as incapable of understanding his situation, as he said, ‘I could not strut on the streets with the Lithuanian flag, because the consequences of this would be tragic.’ In efforts to control the situation, Brazauskas would privately meet with Landsbergis in Vingis Park in Vilnius to search for solutions to the problem created by Landsbergis’ radical position: Brazauskas urged him to be more prudent and exercise patience with the economy, energy and petroleum projects. Yet, Landsbergis remained distrustful of Brazauskas’ recommendations, and his actions continued to confront the USSR, which, in Brazauskas’ perspective, directly led to the economic blockade from the USSR that Lithuania suffered.

Landsbergis himself recognized his tendency to use dominant negotiation strategies, as illustrated by one of his most important negotiations with Boris Yeltsin (chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet and first President of the Russian Federation), during which they established the agreement between Lithuania and Russia. In particular, the two leaders disagreed over the inclusion of two points in the document’s introduction: the peace agreement of 1920 between Russia and Lithuania, and the subsequent occupation and annexation of Lithuania by the USSR. Yeltsin did not want these two points included, but Landsbergis argued for them, as he reasoned that these points implicated the USSR, not Russia, which now supported Lithuania and its independence; therefore, Landsbergis felt that the document that would define the future relationship between Russia and Lithuania should recognize this unfortunate occupation by the USSR. While they negotiated to remove the first point, Landsbergis remained firm in insisting the second point be included, and they finally agreed to this. When Landsbergis later heard that Moscow sought to pressure him again to remove the second point, Landsbergis spoke to Yeltsin immediately to inquire whether their agreement continued, or Yeltsin preferred they go back to including the original two points – Yeltsin conformed to their agreement and the question was permanently closed.

During his interview, Algimantas Čekuolis (one of the most famous journalists of Lithuania) compared both leaders to the strong, unbending oak and the flexible, resilient cane – he insists that both were essential for the success of the political transition. This metaphor reaffirms the importance of firm flexibility (Pruitt, 1981) during negotiation, and shows that these opposite, yet complementary, negotiation profiles were necessary for instigating the Lithuanian democracy of today.

Comparing Spain and Lithuania

Overall, there was a clear tendency for leaders to negotiate with firm flexibility: using dominant, direct and private negotiation strategies for topics that were crucial to the change (especially during the beginning phase), meanwhile solution-seeking strategies were used in negotiations of less importance to the change, thus fostering a peaceful transition to democracy. To understand how the political leaders ultimately manoeuvred these crucial negotiations, it was essential to consider their use of power.

Controlling through power in Spain

When influencing the military’s opinion, for example, Prime Minister Suárez counted on informational power: Osorio explained how ‘Adolfo, who had an enormous power of conviction, explained very well to the Spanish people what he wanted to do and how he would do it.’ Osorio’s statement underscores the persuasive intersection of Suárez’s vision and informational power: Suárez argued the need for democracy but at the same time expressed that they needed the military’s support in order to succeed. Suárez’s convincing arguments about the change and the situation in Western Europe likewise led to the approval of the Political Reform Law in Spain, which ultimately had 425 (out of 497) votes in favour. Finally, many participants also foregrounded Suárez’s referent power as they almost unanimously described him as a charismatic person, which contributed to his persuading and ‘seducing’ the communist leader Carrillo (in the words of Fernando Suárez, Minister of Labour).

The King was most prominently referred to in terms of his legitimate power, which is understandable given that he held the highest position of formal power and, moreover, he was the legal successor to Franco. Several interviewees, including the King’s close friend Jaime Carvajal, believed Spain’s transition was successful partly because the military viewed the King as the heir to Franco. This was most notable during the attempted coup of 23 February 1981, which the King effectively ended when he ‘put on his General Capitan uniform and ordered the military to go back to their quarters’, in the words of Luis María Ansón (Director of the Spanish daily newspaper ABC and close friend of the royal family). From Ansón’s perspective, this act saved democracy and liberty in Spain. Moreover, Oreja Aguirre defined the King as the motor of change, without whom this ‘would not have happened, because the reform had to occur from the Head of State’.

Controlling through power in Lithuania

Participants described a similar trend of legitimate, informational and referent power. Ilgūnas explained that President Brazauskas’ legitimate power was invaluable for leading Lithuania through the USSR’s economic blockade, while other interviewees reflected Brazauskas’ referent power through their feelings of respect, admiration, confidence and loyalty towards the leader (likewise showing that referent power is closely related to charisma). Brazauskas’ most prominent type of power, however, was informational power. The leader himself explained that he always tried to use a variety of arguments – economic, ideological and emotional – especially when negotiating with Head of State Landsbergis. Brazauskas tried to persuade him to be patient before adopting any irrevocable decisions and to be prudent with the Russians, as Brazauskas told him, ‘Don’t play with the lion’s ears.’ His informational power also worked to reassure the Soviet Union when the Lithuanian flag and national anthem were legalized: Brazauskas explained to Gorbachev that the flag and anthem were only symbols of Lithuania – even translating the entire Lithuanian anthem to assure Gorbachev that it contained nothing unfavourable against the Soviet Union. Brazauskas further used ideological arguments to convince Gorbachev that the Lithuanian Communist Party was not seeking to break their relations with the Soviet Communist Party, but rather that they were acting in accordance with the democratic votes of the Lithuanian people. Vladimiras Beriozovas (member of the Lithuanian Supreme Council and present at the re-establishment act of Lithuania), explained one of Brazauskas’ arguments: when the USSR ‘liberated’ Lithuania from Nazi occupation, they first hoisted the Lithuanian flag – if the flag being raised then produced no problems, there was no reason to fear that it would now. This argument was particularly well-placed, because the Soviets relied on deliverance from Nazi occupation to justify their own occupation of Lithuania. Thus, Brazauskas proved to be adept in convincing others based on the information he presented and argued, and this was crucial for showing Moscow that Lithuania meant them no harm in their pursuit of democracy.

While participants’ responses clearly attributed the exercise of informational power more to Brazauskas, Landsbergis himself also stated that he utilized this type of power, especially when arguing for the approval of the Temporary Principal Law of Lithuania with Yeltsin. One of Landsbergis’ most salient uses of power was when he became President of the Lithuanian Council (in 1990) and began pushing out his political opponent, Brazauskas, by using coercive power and ignoring Brazauskas. The participants’ responses, however, illustrated that Landsbergis’ vehemence and unbending dominance were highly valuable in bringing Lithuania through the transition.

Comparing Spain and Lithuania

The cases of Lithuania and Spain confirm the close interrelationship of power, control of the situation and another important emergent factor: establishing a national and international network of support. For example, control over the situation is not characteristic in revolutions, as these changes are rarely gradual or planned from within (Huntington, 1991). Conversely, when democratization is being realized through reforms, the political leader’s formal power and network of support provide the necessary control for convincing the majority to follow them and ultimately establish a democracy. Brazauskas and Suárez focused more on the support they could gain within their respective countries, while King Juan Carlos I and Landsbergis oriented their efforts towards establishing international networks of support, focusing on countries that could have geopolitical interests in Lithuania and Spain (e.g. the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany and France). In his interview, Landsbergis pointed out that society’s support provides more power than being able to count on tanks or indiscriminate violence.

Throughout the analysis, another unanticipated factor emerged across participants’ testimonies: personality. Although no questions were explicitly asked about the political leaders’ personalities, the majority of participants described each leader’s personality as directly connected with how the leader carried out negotiations, made decisions, communicated their vision and used their resources of power. For example, most participants described how Brazauskas controlled the situation with a personality that was charismatic, brave and moderate, while Landsbergis exhibited control with a personality that was vehement, inflexible and dominant. Interviewees likewise centred on the personality traits they considered essential for establishing the new rules of the political game, from bravery and stubbornness to proactivity and flexibility. These emergent findings demonstrate that each leader’s personality shaped their distinct negotiation strategies and uses of power in realizing decisions towards their vision of democracy, which suggests there may be important factors from previous ‘Great Man’ analyses that could be integrated into a framework for successful political leadership during democratization through reforms (Morán, 2002; Service, 2000; Tucker, 1987).

Finally, the interrelationship of the two political leaders of each country also merits further consideration. The cases of Spain and Lithuania foreground the balance between dominant and flexible behaviour, or vehement, drastic behaviour with gradual, measured behaviour (see Appendix B for an overview of all four political leaders). In Spain, this balance was met within each leader, while, in Lithuania, this balance was struck between the two leaders. This dynamic reflects the influence of each leader’s role: both Spanish leaders worked on the same team, while the Lithuanian leaders had different starting points which shaped how they worked towards reaching their overall common goal. In other words, the two Spanish leaders displayed different leadership styles depending on the situation (e.g. the King ordering the military to dismiss the coup, or Suárez’s convincing arguments that led to the approval of the Spanish Reform Law), while in Lithuania, the two leaders were constantly contrasted for their distinct leadership styles (e.g. Landsbergis always pushing for independence, and Brazauskas taking careful, measured steps to restore Lithuania’s economy and quality of living). This reflects the contingency approach to leadership, elucidating the importance of the situation in determining which leadership style would be most effective (Fiedler, 1981; Hersey et al., 2013; House & Aditya, 1997). This reaffirms that no single strategy is better or worse than another, but rather that an effective leader is one who knows how and when to utilize their different sources of power, decision-making styles, vision statements or negotiation strategies, and effectively balance these to establish a democracy.