Power cycle theory, which associates future foreign policy role expectations with the level and trend of relative power, will be used to derive propositions about the likely us role in future trade negotiations involving the Free Trade Area for the Americas (ftaa). In power cycle theory, foreign policy role is the “bargaining substance” of statecraft, requiring actor initiative and systemic (other actors') acceptance. Leadership is not hegemony. The concept of “systemism” provides a persuasive justification for the research on micro-micro and micro-macro linkages in power cycle theory. Forecasting negotiation outcomes, the Decision Insights expected utility bargaining model finds support for the hypotheses derived from the known us position on its power cycle, and for the theory's claim that the inertia of role change is greater than that of power.
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