Rethinking GCC Security: Lessons From the Saudi-Led Coalition’s Intervention in Yemen

The Consequences of Military Intervention

The Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen had far-reaching consequences for both the country and the wider region. First, it heightened vulnerabilities for the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Until December 2021, Saudi Arabia alone endured approximately 430 missile and 851 drone attacks by the Houthis (Reuters, 2021). Second, the intervention caused a massive humanitarian crisis. According to the Yemen Data Project, the coalition waged around 24,800 air raids during the coalition operations, which resulted in significant collateral damage to civilians and infrastructure, including the deaths of over 9,200 civilians (Yemen Data Project, n.d). Third, the intervention paradoxically strengthened the Houthis’ position. By framing themselves as defenders against foreign aggression, the Houthis consolidated domestic alliances—such as their temporary alignment with former President Saleh—and deepened their ties with Iran, which viewed the war as a means of countering Saudi regional influence (Juneau, 2021). Fourth, the intervention, coupled with the Qatar blockade by the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt)—which followed the 2017 GCC crisis, during which these fellow states severed diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar over allegations of support for terrorism and rapprochement with Iran—has pushed other GCC states to seek alternative security arrangements. Qatar, for example, turned to Turkey (Bakir, 2023). Oman also viewed the Saudi and Emirati military presence in Yemen’s al-Mahra province with suspicion and apprehension, considering it part of its traditional sphere of influence. Fifth, by falling short of its initial objectives, the intervention has contributed to the emergence of de facto statehood in Yemen. Semi-autonomous regions emerged along conflict lines, with the Houthis controlling significant parts of the north, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the UAE, controlling much of the south, and Saudi Arabia maintaining influence in Hadramout (Al-Dahab, personal communication, February 15, 2024). This fragmented post-intervention situation resembles the earlier failed initiatives, such as the 2011 Gulf Initiative and subsequent National Dialogue Conference, which proposed a federal constitution and governing system.

Becoming a ‘Saudinised’ and ‘Emiratised’ Coalition

The term ‘Arab Coalition’ arguably became a misnomer, reflecting a primarily bilateral effort by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Even these two remaining core members harboured divergent strategic visions for Yemen (Parker, 2021), making distinct ‘Saudinised’ and ‘Emiratised’ strands of the intervention. These clashing objectives of the two Gulf Arab states—along with their aligned Yemeni forces—directly impacted the combat operations, including the logistical distribution, the effectiveness of intelligence sharing, the degree of political polarisation, and overall operational performance. These dynamics are further discussed in the forthcoming section.

The coalition strategies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen diverged, indicating that the latter adopted a more autonomous posture and pursued a distinct agenda, in contrast to its initial bandwagoning alignment with Saudi Arabia. In terms of security, Saudi Arabia adopted a northern Yemen-oriented approach aimed at restoring political legitimacy, deterring the Iran-backed Houthis, and securing its borders. For Saudi Arabia, Northern Yemen remains a strategic concern due to its geographical proximity, political weight, demographic intensity, and entrenched tribal networks. In contrast, the UAE adopted a southern Yemen-oriented approach, focused on countering the Houthis in the south, containing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and securing vital maritime lines (Salisbury, 2020). Politically, Saudi Arabia primarily engaged with traditional northern actors, IRGY, and the Islah party to preserve the de jure Yemen authority and offset the Houthis. While the UAE navigated two main allies: STC with its Security Belt Forces, and exclusively the northern-based Saleh family network, particularly Brig-General Tareq Saleh—the nephew of former President Saleh—who leads UAE-backed forces in parts of the Red Sea coast.

The UAE’s southern Yemen policy stemmed from: (1) historical sympathy for southern grievances since the 1994 Secession War; (2) a strategic aspiration to project influence in vital maritime routes, including the Gulf of Aden, Socotra Island, and key seaports such as Aden; and (3) an ideological perception that an independent South would be free from the influence of northern actors, particularly the MB and Zaydi elites. Leveraging the political, ideological, and geographic cohesion among southern actors, the UAE helped consolidate a relatively unified southern entity capable of resisting the Houthis, containing the MB, and ultimately asserting a stronger position in the pursuit of secession.

Although southern Salafists, particularly the Giant Brigades, initially rejected the idea of southern secession, they increasingly came to view the South as an ideal space for advancing their ideological vision, free from the perceived dominance of Zaydism and the MB in the north (Juneau, 2020). Consequently, Yemen witnessed widespread debate over the shifting objectives of the intervention and the evolving trajectory of the coalition, with criticism of Saudi Arabia for appearing to overlook these developments.

By 2019, the UAE adjusted its Yemen policy by withdrawing its military forces from the country. Emirati scholar Al-Ketbi (2020) suggests that this decision was driven by a reevaluation of the UAE’s foreign policy direction (p.396), shaped by the growing complexities of Yemen’s internal conflict and mounting international pressure (Said & Kalin, 2023). Although the UAE achieved notable military success, particularly in southern Yemen, it ultimately recognised the stagnation of the broader conflict, with its influence sustained through local allies it had trained and armed, such as the STC-led militias and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces in the Red Sea region. Simultaneously, the UAE faced Houthi attacks, diverging priorities with Saudi Arabia, and increasing criticism from both the Yemeni public and government regarding its southern-oriented strategy. This shift marked a transition in Abu Dhabi’s role within the coalition—from initial bandwagoning with Riyadh, to a more autonomous policy, and ultimately to a pronounced buck-passing strategy (Dogan-Akkas, 2021): a posture whereby a state seeks to shift the burden of confronting a shared threat onto another actor (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Three Overlapping Phases of Operation

The coalition’s operation in Yemen unfolded across three overlapping phases: a decisive military advance (2015), a protracted civil-military campaign (2016-2022), and a gradual withdrawal (since 2017). Over this period, the operation produced mixed outcomes. While the initial year achieved significant territorial gains, these came at the cost of substantial civilian casualties.

The first phase, characterised by airstrikes, ground offensives, and a naval blockade, achieved notable successes in the south and east. In support of Yemeni government forces and local resistance groups, the coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm, launched on March 25, 2015, neutralised Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities. This was followed by Operation Restoring Hope (April 21, 2015), also known as the ‘Golden Arrow,’ a kinetic operation which successfully dislodged Houthi-Saleh forces from Aden by July 2015. By August, five southern provinces and the resource-rich Marib region were also retaken. However, extensive aerial bombardment resulted in infrastructure destruction and civilian casualties. Targeting the residences and bases of Houthi-Saleh leaders proved counterproductive as it failed to eliminate their leadership or alter their course towards a political resolution (Shield, 2018).

The second phase drew on a civil-military campaign outlined in the early Operation Restoring Hope in April 2015, combining military pressure with political negotiation and economic reconstruction. Yet, progress in non-Houthi-controlled areas was hindered by limited economic recovery, and the political track stalled. The coalition’s adherence to the ‘Three Terms of Reference’—the Gulf Initiative, the Outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and UNSC Resolution 2216—to resolve the conflict failed to adapt to evolving realities. This rigidity paralysed peace efforts from the 2016 Kuwait Talks to the 2019 Riyadh Agreement. Two factors, however, help explain the coalition’s initial territorial gains: first, the Houthis were at that time relatively disorganised and lacked a strong support base in the south; second, the flat, open terrain of the southern and eastern regions afforded strategic advantages to coalition forces, especially in terms of air and naval superiority.

The third phase, beginning around 2017, saw a gradual drawdown of coalition members, officially and operationally coinciding with the GCC crisis. This shift stemmed from the growing realisation that military victory was unlikely, mounting international scrutiny over the humanitarian crisis in the country, and the risk of escalation in the region. Coalition operations, particularly in the north, gradually became reactive and defensive in nature. A notable example was the failed attempt to save Nihm district, just 20 km from Sana’a, in February 2016. Meanwhile, Houthi tactics had evolved into a strategy of regaining lost territory through counteroffensives, coupled with missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Williams & Shaan, 2020). This shift forced Saudi Arabia to prioritise border security and the defence of recently liberated areas. In Yemen, it prompted debate over the coalition’s failure to advance on all fronts—an approach that, if adopted, might have weakened or overwhelmed the Houthis.

However, the Houthi offensives gained momentum due to four key factors. First, they capitalised on political compromises such as the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, which established a ceasefire in Hodeidah. This enabled the Houthis to solidify control over the strategic Red Sea port and its extensive coastlines, preserving smuggling routes and posing threats to shipping lanes. Second, the reduction in coalition air defences—including the drawdown of joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), the scaling back of Patriot and Pantsir systems, and subsequent U.S. withdrawal of Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia in mid-2021—lessened pressure on Houthi positions, particularly following the withdrawal of key Emirati support. Third, intra-conflicts between the Yemeni government and the STC diverted resources and attention from critical fronts such as Marib (Almeida & Knights, 2020). The UAE’s airstrikes on the Yemeni government forces near Aden in August 2019 deepened tensions between the Yemeni government and the UAE. The Riyadh Agreement of November 2019 sought to address this through a power-sharing arrangement (Jalal, 2021). Fourth, the Houthis’ growing combat experience, improved weaponry, and entrenchment in mountainous terrain—where they enjoyed local support and logistical advantages—bolstered their resilience as the conflict moved northwards, approaching Sana’a and its surrounding governorates such as Marib, al-Jawf, and al-Bayda.

Fighting a Semi-State Houthis

The Yemen war exhibits characteristics of both asymmetric warfare and operational challenges faced by military operations in Afghanistan. Evidences suggest the coalition faced three major operational challenges in Yemen: limited experience in counterinsurgency warfare, deficiencies in intelligence and coordination, and structural organisational constraints.

First, the coalition lacked adequate experience and training in counterinsurgency warfare in a rugged and mountainous environment like Yemen. Indeed, the Saudi army had minimal prior engagement in such warfare except for limited indirect support to the Yemeni army in its operation against the Houthis in 2009-2010. In contrast, Emirati forces were more efficient in ground combat and organisational structure, particularly in southern Yemen, largely stemming from prior military engagements alongside Western militaries in operations such as Afghanistan (Knights, 2023). Despite access to a vast stockpile of precision-guided munitions replenished by the U.S., the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) inflicted significant collateral damage, suggesting shortcomings in training and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Coalition airstrikes struck civilian targets on several occasions, resulting in considerable civilian casualties, including the bombing of a funeral hall in 2016, a school bus in a public market in 2018, and a wedding party in the same year. Under mounting international scrutiny, the coalition eventually conceded to such combat errors and reportedly launched investigations into the conduct of certain Saudi commanders.

The coalition became entangled in a protracted guerrilla warfare with the Houthis (Mutschler & Bales, 2024), a capable semi-state actor that, for roughly two decades, has received Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militia support in missile development, drone technology, and guerrilla-warfare training (United Nations Security Council, 2024). Using SCUD missiles looted from Yemen’s army and further external assistance, primarily from Iran, the group acquired a varied arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, armed and reconnaissance drones, and man-portable air-defence systems. As Knights (2018) observes, the Houthis “moved from small-arms ambushes to medium-range ballistic missiles in half a decade” (p.15). Their Iranian-derived ballistic missiles include the Qaher-1/M2 (250–400 km), Burkan-2H (1,000 km), Burkan-3 (1,200 km), Toofan (1,950 km), and the Palestine-2 hypersonic missile (2,150 km). Attack drones include: Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K (150 km), Sammad-1 (500 km), Sammad-2 (900 km), Sammad-3 (1,500 km), and Waid-2 (2,500 km) (Anderson, 2025; Hoffmann & Wright, 2022). Training by Iranian and allied operatives includes training in missile assembly, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) programming, and guerrilla tactics.

The coalition struggled to understand the nature of the Houthi tactics and strategy. Tactically, the Houthis adeptly employed ambushes and deployed small, agile units of three to five fighters to maximise mobility and minimise vulnerability to airstrikes (Knights, 2018, p.19). In contrast, coalition forces often operated in large, static formations vulnerable to missile attacks. For instance, in September 2015, a gathering of Emirati, Saudi and Bahraini soldiers near an ammunition depot in Marib was struck by a Houthi missile that killed more than 50 personnel. Similarly, in September 2019, three Saudi-backed Yemeni brigades were encircled by Houthi forces in Kitaf District, approximately 25 km from the Saudi border. The frequency of such incidents and the growing toll of collateral damage prompted self-reflection within the coalition. Brigadier Ahmed al-Asseri, the former coalition spokesperson, acknowledged these challenges, stating, “This is their first fight…you learn the hard way” (McDowall et al., 2016). Informed by time and earlier operational mistakes, the coalition seemed to adjust its conduct, with the final phase of operations reportedly proving effective in avoiding the bombing of civilians. Strategically, the Houthis adopted four approaches. (1) They mobilised through legitimacy and resistance narratives, presenting themselves as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty against foreign intervention and framing the war as both a national and religious struggle. These narratives countered the coalition’s collective punishment strategy aimed at turning public anger against the group. (2) They demonstrated resilience by withstanding sustained pressure and leveraging civilian suffering to bolster their position. (3) They employed an in-out offensive manipulation, fighting on local and border fronts while launching missile and drone attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (4) They tactically engaged in peace talks to buy time, reorganise, and consolidate their position.

Second, intelligence and coordination shortcomings were evident in both the identification of Houthi positions and capabilities and in the coordination with Yemeni ground forces. These deficiencies manifested across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level, the coalition struggled to anticipate the Houthi coup and detect Iran and Hezbollah’s supply routes to the Houthis. Moreover, the absence of pre-war military intelligence—despite the protracted Houthi insurgency in Sa’ada between 2004 and 2010—undermined the coalition’s preparedness for such a campaign. Consequently, the coalition became heavily reliant on externally sourced intelligence—particularly from the U.S., the UAE, and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government—to inform target selection. Intra-GCC tensions during the campaign raised concerns that sensitive information had been deliberately leaked or manipulated as a tool of political leverage within the broader regional dispute. At the operational level, the military operations in Yemen revealed intelligence dissonance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which was rooted in political and doctrinal differences. Some sources alleged that the UAE’s military intelligence apparatus had deliberately misled coalition forces, particularly the air forces, with the aim of targeting formations affiliated with the Islah party within the IRGY army (Hammoud, 2020). This context could explain the repeated airstrikes on these units, which were routinely attributed to ‘mistakes’ by the coalition. A particularly illustrative incident occurred in July 2015, when a coalition airstrike hit the ‘al-Abr’ military camp of IRGY in Hadramout, in the far east of the country, resulting in the deaths and injuries of approximately 100 soldiers, including senior officers. At the tactical level, coalition forces faced repeated failures in early warning and real-time intelligence, limiting their ability to anticipate and pre-empt Houthi offensives within Yemen and across the borders into Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Several airstrikes resulted in fratricide due to flawed target identification and inadequate coordination. In contrast, the Houthis—supported by Iranian and Hezbollah-linked counterintelligence units—employed information warfare and deception tactics to disrupt coalition operations. This included signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection via control of Yemen’s telecommunications infrastructure in Sana’a, enabling the interception of adversarial communications. They also reportedly manipulated targets and deployed disinformation to redirect coalition strikes towards rival factions and civilians, exploiting the aftermath for propaganda purposes (Gentry, 2019).

Third, the coalition—primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE—faced organisational challenges in forming, integrating, and coordinating with a newly constituted Yemeni army composed of remnants of the pre-war military, tribal militias, and religious factions, each with distinct ideological outlooks and regional concentrations (Hokayem & Roberts, 2016). In addition to managing tribal dynamics, the Saudis and Emiratis were compelled to align with either Salafist forces or those affiliated with the MB. Despite Riyadh’s longstanding discomfort with the latter, it engaged them opportunistically for operational objectives. Due to a shortage of deployable infantry and the risks associated with ground operations, coalition members relied heavily on local forces. Although a Joint Operations Room was established by Saudi and Yemeni military elements, longstanding distrust—rooted in the post-Arab Spring political realignments and the intra-Gulf crisis (i.e., Saudi Arabia and the UAE versus Qatar)—contributed to fragmented agendas and geographically disconnected operations. This lack of cohesion, particularly with Islah-aligned forces in Taiz and Marib, led to communication breakdowns, incidents of friendly fire, and growing scepticism over the depth of Saudi–Emirati commitment to these allied formations (Al-Dahab, personal communication, February 15, 2024).

Reliability and Limitations of GCC’s Extra- Regional Security Partnerships

The Gulf Arab monarchies have long relied on extra-regional security partners, particularly the U.S., to manage external threats (Al-Shayji, 2014; Arafat, 2020; Saleh, 2020). Saudi Arabia, in particular, has maintained a strategic partnership with the U.S. since the onset of the Cold War, driven by shared concerns over international and regional communist movements. This alignment was formalised through the Nixon Doctrine, which positioned Saudi Arabia as a regional security pillar, and the Carter Doctrine, which committed the U.S. to protecting Gulf energy resources and allied regimes from communist expansion and Iranian revisionism. The alliance deepened during the rise of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, especially following its invasion of Kuwait. In the wake of Iran’s regional expansion and the post-Arab Spring upheavals, Saudi Arabia and its GCC counterparts have intensified their demand for security guarantees from international allies, particularly the U.S. (Ulrichsen, 2025).

Alongside other Western powers, the U.S. provided logistical and intelligence support to the coalition. According to former U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis, this support constituted “limited U.S. military assistance to coalition forces engaging in operations in the legitimate exercise of self-defence” (Robbins et al., 2018). This included intelligence sharing, aerial refuelling, munitions supply, and the deployment of approximately 50 to 60 U.S. military personnel to coordinate and support coalition operations, with around 10 directly involved in the Saudi Air Force Operations Centre in Riyadh (McDowall et al., 2016). Although the Biden administration announced an end to offensive weapons sales to coalition members, defensive support, particularly missile defence systems, continued, exemplified by a $650 million sale to Saudi Arabia and a $65 million sale to the UAE (Lee et al., 2022). The UK and France also contributed substantial military assistance to the coalition, including the supply of heavy weaponry, training, technical expertise, and arms maintenance. Both countries deployed liaison officers to the operations centre in Riyadh to advise and monitor air operations. Additionally, the UK, through BAE Systems—its largest defence contractor—deployed Royal Air Force personnel to train and advise Saudi pilots (Merat, 2019).

However, Saudi expectations and U.S. responsiveness towards the coalition in Yemen diverged. Four key factors shaped Washington’s approach to the coalition. First, the U.S. ‘Asia Pivot’ and strategic retrenchment from the Middle East marked a shift towards offshore balancing, favouring indirect influence through partners over direct military involvement (Shield, 2018). Second, the doctrinal shifts in U.S. foreign policy from President Obama to President Trump (second term) further substantiate this argument. Third, U.S. policy on Yemen places emphasis on countering AQAP and safeguarding national interests in the region (Hartig & Hathaway, 2022). Since November 2023, the U.S. has led an international coalition, ‘Prosperity Guard’, in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea to explicitly protect the shipping routes and implicitly to prevent Houthi attacks against Israel and its regional interests. Fourth, the deterioration of the U.S.-Saudi relationship impacted the coalition in Yemen in several ways, including President Trump’s subdued response to the 2019 attack on the Abqaiq processing plant and Khurais oilfield and Biden’s initial stance, in which he sought to treat the kingdom as a pariah state (Munassar, 2023). Also, the Biden administration’s suspension of arms sales, revocation of the Houthis’ Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) designation, previously enacted under Trump, and the 2021 withdrawal of Patriot missile defence systems from Saudi Arabia contributed to Saudi concerns over the credibility of U.S. security commitments. This sentiment was underscored by Prince Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi intelligence chief. In a CNBC interview, he commented ironically, “I think we need to be reassured about American commitment…That looks like, for example, not withdrawing Patriot missiles from Saudi Arabia at a time when Saudi Arabia is the victim of missile attacks and drone attacks — not just from Yemen, but from Iran” (CNBC, 2021).

After years of relative truce in the Yemen conflict, Trump’s 2025 redesignation of the Houthis as a terrorist group during his second term notably marks a reversal of the Biden-era delisting, reinforcing a hardline stance aligned with Saudi narratives. However, this approach has also been characterised by contradictions and strategic unpredictability. While Gulf leaders had high expectations for Trump’s return, especially following the strained Biden–MbS relationship, his administration has thus far delivered brutal continuities rather than strategic clarity (Lynch, 2025). Trump’s Riyadh speech in May 2025 lacked concrete policy declarations on Yemen, instead promoting arms sales and offering vague gestures towards diplomacy with Iran. This ambiguity has left Gulf leaders uncertain whether to expect confrontation or rapprochement. The resulting confusion underscores the GCC’s growing perception of Washington as an unreliable partner and has reinforced the ongoing recalibration of Gulf foreign policy, particularly Riyadh’s hedging strategies and economic diplomacy.

The perceived detachment of the U.S. from the regional and Saudi national interests (Wolf, 2020) has contributed to a growing trend towards foreign policy autonomy in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. This autonomy is reflected in their increasing willingness to challenge established norms, including the long-standing ‘security for oil’ paradigm underpinning their alliances with Western powers (Saab, 2023). This shift is evident in a range of autonomous policy choices and strategic realignments.

First, the GCC states appear to be seeking a more diversified and flexible security architecture that better serves their specific needs and objectives. Saudi Arabia’s OPEC + decision to cut oil production, its refusal to join the U.S.-UK-led Red Sea coalition against the Houthis, and its growing links with China and Russia represent clear manifestations of this shift. The growing regional presence of China and Russia has contributed to a reconfiguration of the regional balance of power and has intensified great power competition (Bekkevold, 2019). In response, the GCC states began to adopt a more pragmatic approach to their foreign policy, seeking partnerships beyond traditional Western allies and engaging more actively in Global South blocs. Notably, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were invited to join the BRICS in its 15^th summit in South Africa in 2023.

Such moves indicate that the GCC monarchies are adopting a calibrated foreign policy posture—characterised by strategic hedging—between established Western allies and emerging non-Western partners. For them, China presents an alternative model of governance focused on economic development rather than liberal norms (Fulton, 2019). Meanwhile, Russia—seeking to regain its Soviet-era influence and counter U.S. dominance—proposed security initiatives for the region, such as the ‘2019 Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Area.’ In the Yemen conflict, Russia has maintained strategic neutrality, positioning itself as a potential mediator. Saudi Arabia, in particular, sees China and Russia—given their close ties with Iran—as potential actors to pressure Tehran and its proxies towards de-escalation and a negotiated settlement.

Second, the GCC states appear to be assuming greater responsibility for their own security by pursuing self-reliance through the formation of ad hoc military coalitions in response to threat contingencies (e.g., the coalition in Yemen) and by investing in the development of domestic defence industries. These efforts aim to reduce their reliance on external partners and enhance their capacity to manage security challenges autonomously.