Abstract
By late 1943, the British 8th Army had developed a strong learning and training culture, drawing from its battlefield experience. This essay will examine the evolution of this culture and its implementation across diverse units during its Italian campaign. The primary focus will be on the training and performance of the 8th Indian and 78th British divisions, focusing on the battles of October–December 1943. This analysis will consider the learning and training culture, along with the impact of ongoing reform initiatives within the British and Indian armies, and their relationship with strategic decisions made in London and New Delhi.
In early December 1943, the British V Corps, 1 8th Army—comprising the 2nd New Zealand, 8th Indian, and 78th British infantry divisions—closed in on the Moro River in Italy. These three divisions had pierced the German Winter Line (Bernardt) after much heavy fighting; the arrival of V Corps on the Moro represented troops from across the British Empire and Commonwealth. Of these three divisions, two in particular came to represent fundamentally different approaches to the strategic dilemmas that confronted the United Kingdom and its troops drawn from across the Empire. The men who made up the 8th Indian and 78th British divisions comprised prewar regulars, conscripts, and volunteers. These two divisions established reputations as some of the best performing divisions in the Italian campaign by early 1944—how did formations drawn from such diverse backgrounds and experience come to establish a common learning language and culture, enabling such achievements? This reform process was carried out at the same time as British, Commonwealth, and Empire societies were heavily mobilized for war. 2
Many assume that the units and formations of the 8th Army in the Italian campaign were learning and training institutions as a result of building on their experience and success in North Africa and on the influence of their most famous commander, Lt-General Bernard Montgomery. As David French noted, “He [Montgomery] imposed a rigorous training regime at levels of his army [8th], and he insisted that units and formations devised and practiced drills to ensure that they carried out common tasks rapidly and efficiently.” 3 Jonathan Fennell has highlighted that, while General Claude Auchinleck and his staff had recognized the deficiency in training throughout the 8th Army, it was the arrival of Montgomery in August 1942 which fundamentally shifted the effort. Fennel notes that “Montgomery launched an unprecedented training regime for Eighth Army,” 4 and further asserts that “the extent, intensity and attention to detail of Montgomery's training program dwarfed any that had preceded it during the war.” 5
It is well established that powerful personalities are a factor in the “army identity”; Hew Strachan has recounted how “The two army commanders who most inspired confidence in their men, Montgomery and William Slim of the 14th Army, were both persuaded of the value of training, of the need to continue it during a campaign, and of the link between it and morale.” 6 The impact of this belief was not always straightforward, however, as demonstrated in the experiences of the 14th Army in the Burma campaign. 7
As a result of these initiatives, one could argue that by late 1943 the 8th Army and its formations and units had established a strong “learning and training culture” drawn from previous battlefield experience. Interestingly, neither the 78th British nor the 8th Indian had been part of Montgomery's 8th Army in North Africa; they had, in fact, independently established their own learning and training cultures before joining forces with Montgomery in 1943. While training is extremely important, the learning and experience from battle and fostering a “learning culture” were also significant contributors to the 8th and 78th divisions’ success. Both divisions not only actively learned from their battle experience but also shared what they had learned with one another. It was this combination that became a hallmark of these two divisions and underpinned their achievements. 8
This essay will analyze the complexity of this experience, reform, and the state of the 78th British Infantry and 8th Indian Divisions on the eve of their first joint battles on the Italian mainland, in the campaigns along with the Trigno and Sangro rivers in late 1943. The key questions about this development of learning culture are: how did it come to be, and how did it occur with formations and units that represented, and came from, different parts of the British Empire and vastly different experiences? 9 In exploring these questions, the essay will analyze the theme of a learning and training culture from strategic through to tactical levels. It will consider this theme through the experiences of the 78th Infantry and 8th Indian divisions and four battalions drawn from those formations: 1st East Surreys; 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers [6 SKINS] (78th); 1/12th Frontier Force Regiment; and 6/13th Frontier Force Regiment (8th).
By analyzing the formations and units, it will be feasible to gain a better understanding of the impact of a global war on the fighting capabilities of the British and Indian armies during their first battles of the Italian campaign. The “road to the Winter Line” for each division was similar, but not identical. Their presence highlighted an ongoing reform movement within the British and British Indian armies that was impacted at all times by strategic decision-making in London and New Delhi. A recurring theme of this movement was noted in the doctrinal publication, Notes from theatres of war, No. 16 North Africa, November 1942-May 1943: “Training must be continuous, and must not be regarded as complete once a unit takes the field. Battles afford the best possible training, but full value is obtained from them only if each is followed by intensive study and practices to inculcate the lessons learned.” 10
Learning and Training Culture in the Home Army: Doctrine/Battle Drill/Training/and Battlefield Experience pre-September 1943
Within weeks of the losses in Norway and France in 1940, the British Army in the United Kingdom set out to “learn lessons” from that experience. The first effort began in June and was headed by Lieutenant-General Sir William Bartholomew, GOC Northern Command. The committee included three senior members of the BEF as well as the Director of Military Training, Major General C.C. Malden. The committee's remit was to interview many of the divisional, brigade, and battalion commanders, and assess whether there was a need to refine training and organization of the army. Morale was cited as a significant concern, along with the need for officers and men to be instilled with a more “fighting” or “offensive” spirit. On a more practical level, the committee also recommended the need for better fire-support, and for other organizational restructures. The War Office took up these findings, and implementation began immediately. 11
In 1940, the Directorate of Military Training (DMT) was in charge of producing all military training pamphlets (MTPs), Army training instructions, and army training memoranda (ATM). The interpretation and implementation of these documents, however, was a different thing. For many years, the British Army tended to view doctrine as a “book of ideas,” rather than a blueprint to be followed rigidly. Directorate of Military Training created many new manuals, and “lessons” from other theaters were also collated and disseminated; the issue was whether all these new manuals and lessons were being absorbed by the training centers, units, and formations. Training was divided for the units and formations in the UK; the War Office, as noted earlier, was in charge of recruit training. Subunit, unit, and formation training rested with the various Army Commands, corps, and divisions throughout the UK. While there was some centralization of basic training, field, unit, and formation training was in the hands of the Commands and commanders. 12 While many formation and unit schools were created and movement began in the positive direction, practical battlefield experiences were needed to supplement the training. Through 1941 and into 1942, some of these issues started to be dealt with as unit and formation exercises became more realistic; senior officers were given the opportunity to exercise larger formations on larger training ground; and tactically, new battle drill and “schools” were introduced as was battle inoculation, which had been listed as one of the core lessons identified from France 1940. 13
The battle drill/school 14 shift had begun in 1940, highlighting the decentralized nature of the British Army. As noted previously, there were formal and informal systems and debates within the Army after Dunkirk. The I Corps commander, General Sir Harold Alexander, 15 had assessed that men under his command in France had failed the stress of battle due to the lack of tactical drills that dealt with the battlefield itself, in particular the infantry. In late 1940, he had written a set of tactical notes for his leaders under him his command in Southern Command. In early 1941, General Alexander also sent his thoughts to the Home Army CinC, General Alan Brooke, who distributed the notes, I Corps Tactical Notes, throughout the army. The battle drill/school concept was embraced by other commanders; I Corps created its own “battle school,” and the movement was spreading by summer 1941. 16 The 47th Division created its first “battle school” in mid-1941, initiated by Captain Lionel Wigram. 17 The training covered not only its own officers but also many personnel from other formations, including Canadians. 18 Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery pushed for battle inoculation as well as major new drive at collective training at the divisional level as well when he was in command of the V Corps in 1940 and XII Corps in 1941, and later as GOC South-Eastern Command [later Army]. 19 As early as June 1941, Montgomery was clear to his divisions the “value of drill.” 20 General Montgomery would have a major impact on training for most of the British and Canadian formations from 1942 until the end of the war. 21
In December 1941, General Montgomery was clear to the XII Corps HQ when he listed 14 lessons that he had learned since the start of the war. Included in the list of 14 were topics such as stage management of battle; subunit efficiency; tactical advantage to be seized early; control; cooperation of all arms; and surprise. 22 On December 25, 1941, Montgomery was given command of South-Eastern Command [later Army]. Higher-level formation training and exercises kicked into higher levels in 1942, many under the leadership of General Montgomery. In his mind, battle inoculation training was to take place across all levels, from subunit to higher formation. 23 In July 1942, the GHQ School was absorbed and renamed the School of Infantry. 24
By late 1942, the General Staff and much of the War Office leadership had accepted the concept of battle drill and battle inoculation training 25 and developed a provisional training memo for the Army. 26 The manual, Instructor's Handbook on Fieldcraft and Battle Drill, written and distributed in October 1942, was clear in its intent: “battle drill does not teach any new or revolutionary tactics. . . it does not cramp initiative nor lead to stereotyped action. . . it gives a junior commander a firm base on which to develop his own initiative. . . it ensures everyone in the platoon knows what action he has to take and why he has to do it under any circumstances in battle.” 27 The pamphlet was aimed at training throughout a battalion from the section, to platoon, company, and battalion levels. The pamphlet does state that the need for the officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and men need to understand infiltration tactics not only due to the Germans but also due to the recent experiences against the Japanese in Malaya and Burma. 28
The 1st East Surreys, having had battle experience in France 1940, were in the middle of all these debates regarding training and doctrinal reform. While it appears on paper to be a regular unit, the battles of 1940 and expansion of the Home Army had changed its composition through attrition. After many months of back and forth “normal training,” the Bn war diaries describe more higher level training by mid-1941. The war diaries also mention the coming and going of officers and NCOs with further expansion of brigades and divisions, as well as the need for replacements for overseas units and formations. The first major higher level formation training started to take place in June 1941, when “‘Maple’ Exercise took place between V Corps and Canadian Corps in the area west of Salisbury, with the object being to test control by higher commands of large mobile formations.” 29 More formation-level exercises continued throughout the rest of the summer. 30 The first note about one of the new battle schools appears in August when the diary mentions officers being sent to “Southern Command Weapon Training School.” 31 The remainder of 1941 records a steady stream of higher level exercises, culminating with discussion of the movement of the Bn and 11 Brigade for combined operations training, amphibious warfare. 32
January 1942 records the first comment regarding a “4th Division battle school,” “2/Lt. P.H.C. Smith proceeded to 4 Division Tactical School as an instructor.” 33 The battalion moved to Inverary for combined operations training, 34 then returned to Aldershot. The war diary discusses “4th Division Tactical School” multiple times, and the training focus appears to shift as a result of visits from veterans from the fighting in North and East Africa to brief on their experiences, in addition to multiple meetings at 4th Division HQ. 35 The final months that the 1st East Surreys and 11 Brigade remained with the 4th Division, February–June 1942, they saw a flurry of activity as elements of the Amphibious Force 110. 36 Training continued throughout. There are multiple references of “battle schools,” as well as officers and NCOs, being sent to the GHQ Battle School. By the time that the 1st East Surreys and 11 Brigade had been transferred to the 78th Infantry Division in June, it was immersed in the battle school and battle drill reform movement. 37
The 78th Division was raised in June 1942 and commanded by Major General Vivian Evelegh 38 ; initially, the division brought together other brigades that had been trained in amphibious warfare. The 1 Guards Brigade, 39 36 Infantry Brigade, and 11 Brigade formed into the division in June and July. Both the 1st East Surreys and 11 Brigade carried out more amphibious exercises, including “night landings,” during the second half of July. 40 At the end of the month, all the brigades from the division, as well as units from the rest of Amphibious Force 110, carried out a major exercise named “Dryshod” in the first two weeks of August. By this point, the 78th had already formed its own “battle school,” and the pace of exercises continued to intensify, including amphibious training, into September and October. The battalion, brigade, and the rest of the division were embarked on the invasion fleet for Operation Torch by mid-October. 41 By this point, the British Army in the UK, and particularly the 78th Infantry Division, was a much better trained force; however, battlefield experience was still a missing component for many of the units and formations due to the coming and going of officers, NCOs, men, units, and formations due to expansion.
Upon arrival in England in 1942, the 6 SKINS, a unit made up of prewar regulars and war-time volunteers, noted that the pace of training had picked up dramatically. Between February and early June, the 6 SKINS and 38 Brigade were put through many more layers of unit and formation training; their war dairies describe battle drill and inoculation as key to victory in the future. Brigade and battalions worked hard and were earmarked for overseas duty. In early June, they became the “lorried infantry” brigade for the 6th Armoured Division; as with the 78th and East Surreys, the brigade and 6th Armoured were preparing for Operation Torch as part of Amphibious Force 110. While not part of the 78th just yet, it joined in the large Exercise “Dryshod” in August; in November, the brigade and 6 SKINS embarked and landed in North Africa. 42
Learning and Training Culture in India Command and PAIFORCE: 43 Doctrine/Battle Drill/Training/and Battlefield Experience pre-September 1943
After the Fall of France, the Indian Army expanded massively and rapidly, from a force of 200,000 to more than 1.5 million men in 12 months. As with the British Army, this massive expansion caused major issues for the Indian Army during the first years of war as men, NCOs, VCOs (Viceroy Commissioned Officers), and British officers were spread throughout the new units and formations. The upheaval created serious issues with basic training for all the new units and formations. 44 Along with the British Army, the Indian Army began to revamp its training and doctrine mechanisms as quickly as possible, beginning with expansion of the prewar Indian Army Military Training Directorate. Its mission was to run the various training schools; develop training publications; and establish individual training centers. Brigadier Francis Tuker 45 was placed in charge in September 1940, with Colonel David “Punch” Cowan as his deputy. 46 The Directorate was further expanded in 1941 and 1942 with more officers; the Director became a major-general and his deputy a brigadier. 47
The various British Army publications—Field Service Regulations, ATMs (named AITM in India), and MTPs [MTP (India) listings]—were published in India in duplicate as well as with additional materials. Officers, NCOs, and soldiers were trained along with similar lines and the culture of the interpretation of doctrine was very similar to the British model—a “book of ideas.” As with the British Army, the Indian Army expanded the publication of manuals with many covering “lessons” from the war. 48 The Army in India Training Memoranda (AITM) were publishing lessons from fighting the Germans/Italians by 1941 and by 1942, from fighting the Japanese. 49
As noted above, the training of the expanded Indian Army came under pressure from increasing global demands as with the British Army. The training establishments for the Indian Army expanded manyfold in 1941. GHQ India and MTD decided to create new schools in Southern Command and established a Tactical School for both senior and junior officers in 1941. By 1942, GHQ India had to rationalize the many formations newly responsible for training and possible deployments to the Middle East. GHQ India created the “Army” structure to run the formations, while “Commands” were responsible for the training and admin of all the schools and reinforcements. 50
The losses in both the Malaya and the Burma campaigns in 1942-43 refocused GHQ India. Indian Army units and formations were performing well in North Africa and Syria, but for the bulk of the Army, there were serious issues with training the reinforcement pipeline of officers, VCOS, NCOs, and soldiers for all theaters. While the survivors of the various battles in East Africa, North Africa, and Burma set out immediately to assess “lessons” and pass along with their knowledge to others through the AITM and MTPs, gaps and shortfalls remained. Following another defeat in eastern India in early 1943, CinC India, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, gave instructions that a representative committee, Infantry Committee, should be formed to examine the situation as it stood and provide recommendations for improving the infantry and for strengthening the army's morale in all theaters.
The Infantry Committee, India, convened for two weeks in June 1943 and produced a report destined to impact the whole Army, not just those fighting in the Far East. The Infantry Committee's report was divided into seven sections, and its guiding principle was the Committee “opinion that fundamentally the fighting spirit, physique, and morale of both Indian and British units [was] unsatisfactory.”
The Indian Army followed a similar pattern to the British in creating a vast organization to deal with doctrine and training, but the battle drill/school approach (outside of mountain warfare) to training took a little more time to be incorporated into its structures. By the summer of 1942, many recently returned units and formations had begun their own battle schools to try to raise the standard of training for themselves, while the rest of GHQ India hurried to catch up. The Infantry Committee findings in June 1943 finally brought about a consistent approach to training and battle drill for reinforcements heading to the Middle East, Mediterranean, and the Far East.
The 1/12th FFR was formally mobilized for overseas duty in May 1941, earmarked for service in Iraq as part of the 17 Indian Infantry Brigade, 8th Indian Division. Unlike the other battalions mentioned, the 1/12th would serve with the same formation throughout its overseas deployment, including the occupation of Iraq. While in this capacity, the battalion attempted to carry out training in anticipation of active duty in North Africa, but was also targeted to be “milked” for officers, VCOs, and NCOs to support more battalions being raised back in India. The training standards in the battalion shifted constantly in response to external demands 51 until a shift in the strategic environment in 1943 and need for more troops to fight in the Mediterranean.
The 6/13th FFRifles were shipped overseas to Egypt in August 1940 and, after much back and forth, attached to the 29 Indian Infantry Brigade on the Abyssinia border. The battalion was involved in the East African campaign 52 and fought various engagements, including at Keren, 53 and was recognized for its contributions to a successful campaign. In July 1941, the battalion moved on to Egypt with the rest of the 29 Indian Infantry Brigade; despite its experience with mountain fighting, the battalion was not as seasoned as might be expected; it had sustained significant officer, VCO, NCO, and soldier casualties, and the reinforcements received were not veterans. Surviving officers were reassigned within Egypt, or back to India; a few officers went on to Staff College at Quetta. Upon arriving in Egypt, the battalion carried out training with the newly arrived reinforcements, then was posted forward to Gairabub to carry out defensive operations and raids against the Italian garrisons on the other side of the Libya/Egyptian frontier. For the first three months of 1942, the battalion was stationed with the rest of the 29 Brigade at Tobruk, then moved back to Egypt with the brigade in March. In April, the battalion, as a “seasoned unit with battle experience,” was ordered to help stiffen the British 10th Army in Iraq. Upon reaching Baghdad in mid-May 1942, the battalion joined the 19 Indian Infantry Brigade, 8th Indian Division alongside the 1/12th FFR. It carried out occupation duties and training for the rest of 1942.
Both battalions, 1/12th FFR and 6/13th FFRifles, benefitted from the shift in the strategic environment. With the British victory at El Alamein and the allied advance into Tunisia, the 8th Indian Division's role started to shift. The first indication was a new GOC for the division in January 1943—Major General Dudley Russell, formerly the 6/13th FFRifles CO in September 1939. 54 The second indication was when both battalions and the rest of the division entered into more focused unit and formation training for active duty in Middle East Command from February–May 1943. The first 8th divisional training instruction for year, published in March, hinted at all the shifts in training and doctrine to this point, particularly “Battle Drill” which, it stated, must be highly developed, but also “must be our servant, not our master.” The training instruction also highlighted impending training in river crossings 55 and mountain warfare. 56 These shifts were noted by the battalions as well. The 1/12th FFR covered in detail the uptick in “battle drill” and “battle inoculation” training in February–May 1943. 57
The Division continued to distribute training instructions over April and May; in June, the battalions and division were moved to Kabrit at Combined Training Centre (amphibious). In July 1/12th FFR, 6/13th FFRifles, and the 8th Indian were moved to the mountains in Lebanon for “mountain warfare” training at the Middle East Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC). 58 As the various battalions and brigades were put through the paces at the MWTC, the GOC was clear that there was more work to be done at higher levels of the division, noting that “up to the time Div HQ started planning [it] had only been possible to form a skeleton HQ behind the BDEs whose trg was being concentrated on at the CTC [combined operations training center] and MWTC and to carry out one or two battle drill HQ exercises. Div HQ therefore has a considerable amount of trg to do to ensure that it is of the requisite efficiency to take its part in Div training.” 59 The division was moved to the coast in mid-August for more amphibious training; the final training order before deployment, written on 31 August 1943, was a 25-page document, “Lessons from Combined Ops Planning.” As with everything else General Russell sent to his units and formations, it was a tough critical look at how things needed to improve. This was an important cultural aspect—learning and adaptation—for the battalion and the division as it prepared for battle once again. 60
At the same time as this was happening, the two battalions and the rest of the 8th Indian Division were given orders for imminent deployment for duty in the Mediterranean. The 1/12th FFR, 6/13th FFRifles, and the rest of the 8th Indian Division had reaped the benefits of the reforms in both the UK and India and the streamlining of training, doctrine, and battle drill. In September, the division moved to Egypt for embarkation for Taranto, Italy; the upcoming deployment was to be the “test” of whether all this effort would pay dividends.
Learning and Training Culture in the 78th British Division and 8th Indian Division: Doctrine/Battle Drill/Training/and Battlefield Experience pre-September 1943
By 1942/1943, both Home Forces and India Command had rationalized and streamlined the training regime and doctrinal publications for the units and formations, the next layers of professionalization of the expanded armies were the “in-theater” component. As noted above, the 1st East Surreys (78th) and 6/13th FFRifles (8th Indian) had experienced battle, gone through the various training reforms, and attended the “specialized” training centers, including the Combined operations centers in Scotland and the mountain warfare center in Lebanon. The 8th Army in North Africa was going through a major transformation as well; units and formations were receiving specialized training, but it was more than this. Battlefield experience and the need for constant assessment and evaluation of experience and shifts in training were fundamental as well. The learning culture of the 8th Army would go through various phases, and this approach would reinforce the learning cultures of both the 78th and 8th Indian as they came under the 8th Army's operational control in 1943. 61
In August 1942, General Alexander took over as CinC Middle East and General Montgomery took command of the 8th. As noted previously, Montgomery was known as a tough trainer of troops, who stressed that training was the key to success. He understood the limitations of his force after their recent battlefield experience. The first 8th Army Training Memorandum, issued on 31 August, emphasized that “battle drill [across units and formations] must be highly developed and a good system organized in every formation and unit. Unless our standard of battle drill and operational discipline is on a very high level, we shall fight at a disadvantage.” 62
He prepared the 8th Army for what turned out to be the final Battle of El Alamein. He changed the training of his formations. He pulled out two of his corps, X and XXX, who would lead the offensive and had them carry out intensive training well behind the lines. Other units and formations were left in the line, but still carried out more formation training, usually a brigade at a time. The influence of the “reform movement” in the Home Army was clear in his mission: “(a) further toughening and hardening of the troops; (b) developing battle drills and battle inoculation 63 ; (c) making training exercises so similar to the initial attack that every man and officer would become familiar with the part he was to play.” 64 As it is well known, the 8th Army was successful during the 13 days of the final battle of El Alamein, 65 and victorious in Tunisia by 12 May 1943, alongside the 1st Army.
In early 1943, the 78th Division, as well as other formations and units, assessed their experiences and drew lessons. The divisional history noted that “all that the division had learned in the Tunisian mountains was put to the test [on Sicily]. . . it had to learn new lessons.” 66 These, along with other lessons, were incorporated into the training of reinforcements in the 1st East Surreys. 67 The first actions in which the 6 SKINS and 38 Brigade participated were on the Goubellat Plain, Tunisia, in January 1943 as part of the 6th Armoured Division. In March 1943, both transferred to the 78th Infantry Division, and began mountain warfare training and battle. The fighting through the Tunisian mountain passes cost both units heavily in casualties. As with the East Surreys and 11 Brigade, they set out to assess lessons and incorporate those lessons into the training regime, including a culminating Brigade exercise. 68
The experience and lessons from recent fighting were transmitted to doctrinal teams in the UK. The new MTP No. 55, Fighting in Built-up Areas, was published in April 1943. It covered the difficulties of fighting in and defense of fortified villages and towns, clearance of houses, defense of buildings, and “do's and don’t's”. As with other “styles” of warfare, the manual is quick to note that “preparation for fighting in built-up areas must be considered an integral part of every soldier's training. Such fighting is not a job for a specialist.” 69 Another important manual, NOTES FROM THEATRES OF WAR, No. 16 North Africa, November 1942-May 1943, was published in October 1943. It had more than 90 pages of lessons broken down into key topics, including difficult terrain, training, leadership, battle drill, and battle inoculation. One key theme that was stated and noted at the start of the essay, which was important for all the units and formations discussed here, was that “training must be continuous, and must not be regarded as complete once a unit takes the field. Battles afford the best possible training, but full value is obtained from them only if each is followed by intensive study and practices to inculcate the lessons learned.” 70 The manual was critical in its analysis and emphasized the need to “improve,” stating at one point that “there is still room for considerable improvement in the standard of junior leading. . . through bad tactical handling of their sub-units.” 71 Another critical comment focused on the standard of basic training of reinforcements. As with India Command and the drive to “reform” the training structure of reinforcements through the findings of the Infantry Committee in June 1943, the manual stated, “for various reasons the supply and training of reinforcements in North Africa were unsatisfactory. . . the standard of training of drafts from the United Kingdom was most uneven.” The manual then highlighted the need for “refresher training” and the use of directing staff with battlefield experience. 72 These lessons were not lost on any units and formations, as they set up their own battle schools to prepare their reinforcements, as noted by the experience of the 1st East Surreys and 6 SKINS. Units tended to draw out the key passages and apply them to training, unit, and formation tactical notes. These publications were available to the 8th Indian Division, as it was now under the command of the 8th Army. 73
On 22 June 1943, the 78th Division was placed under the command of the 8th Army and prepared for the invasion of Sicily. On 1 July, General Montgomery spoke with the officers of the division and provided clear direction on what he expected from them as they integrated: “I do not think it is possible not to weld an army into a great fighting machine unless all commanders ‘sing the same tune’.” 74 By late July, the 1st East Surreys and the 78th embarked on transports for the Sicilian campaign, where they would further refine their battlefield capabilities. As the 1st East Surreys and the 78th prepared to move from Sicily to support the 8th Army in Italy, it had garnered more battlefield experience, particularly in the difficult battle for the fortress hill town of Centuripe. The East Surreys were involved with the initial battle for the town; the 38 (Irish) Infantry Brigade broke through the difficult German defenses and seized the town in early August. Hilly terrain continued for the 78th Division as it advanced toward Messina, around Mt Etna. By mid-August, the campaign in Sicily was over.
Along with the rest of the 78th Division 75 , the 38th and SKINS assessed lessons from the fighting in Sicily in preparation for the campaign on the Italian mainland, 76 including creation of a “Brigade Battle School” in late August with various courses created for platoon and company grade officers. 77 SKINS carried out their own training as well; their entry for 1 September stated: “Training programme includes: field firing, house fighting and town fighting in a bombed street in Patti and beach landings on a week to week basis,” which would be important in the upcoming battles. 78
Combined Battlefield Experience: 78th and 8th Indian Divisions
The V Corps, with Lieut.-General C.W. Allfrey in charge, landed in Taranto on 18 September. Elements of the 78th Infantry Division, with Major-General V. Evelegh, were being put onto the mainland, mostly into Reggio, Taranto, and Bari, between 19 and 29 September, while the 8th Indian Division landed in Taranto 19–23 September.
Impact of Operating Environment
General Alexander and the commanders in both the 5th US and 8th British armies, recognizing that the coming advance in Italy would be over mountainous terrain, involving multiple river crossings, fortified towns and villages, determined to assess the state of the 8th Army's readiness for these challenges. It had been apparent since Tunisia that the British 8th Army was likely to face more hill and mountain warfare, and 8th Army units and formations attended MWTC in 1943, taking “time out of the line.” 79 The 8th Army had veteran formations that had fought in this complex environment, including the 78th. Lessons from the Sicilian campaign were sought quickly and there was a major push for them to be incorporated into training for units and formations. A 15th Army Group HQ letter to HQ 8th Army noted that “the doctrine contained in the Mideast MT [military training] Instruction Circular No. 16—Mountain Warfare was borne out in general in the Sicilian campaign, but the following points needed emphasis.” These points included heavy infantry focus, fewer vehicles, flank guards, and battle patrols 80 ; General Montgomery signed off on the document and distributed it throughout the Army. The 8th Army asked for mountain warfare training teams to be formed in early October, and the US 5th Army followed suit in late October. Mountain Warfare Training Center obliged and began to form teams quickly. 81
The 8th Indian Division, while highly trained to deal with the complexity of the terrain and geography of southern Italy, was not a veteran organization. It would earn its “spurs” in the advance and breaking of the Winter Line, October to December 1943. The 8th Indian Division recognized that its sister division, the 78th, was a “veteran” division, and accordingly sought “lessons” from their formations and units. Both formations understood the need to learn from one another: the October War Diary, Appendix 11, shows clear evidence of the sharing of lessons, stating that “arrangements have been made for a number of officers and O.Rs. from 8 Ind Div to be attached for short periods to this [78th] DIV. The object is to give personnel of the 8 Ind Div an opportunity of learning first hand from our [78th] experience in the field.” Seven officers and 15 soldiers from the 8th Indian were sent to 6 SKINS alone. 82
River Crossings and Contested Villages
Administrative and logistical issues impeded the Allied advances toward the Winter Line in October and November. Montgomery noted in his diary for the 27 September that “my problem now was concerned mainly with administration.” 83 CIGS General Alan Brooke also commented, “it is becoming more and more evident that our operations in Italy are coming to a standstill and that owing to a lack of resources we shall not only come to a standstill, but also find ourselves in a very dangerous position.” 84 By 22 October, V Corps had closed up on the Trigno River. General Montgomery planned to pierce the German defenses along the Trigno River with diversionary attacks to the west with the XIII Corps and the main effort being the V Corps with the 78th along with the Adriatic coast and the 8th Indian Division to its left in the hills and mountains. The attack was to go in on the evening of the 30/31 October. The German LXXVI Pz Corps was attempting to hold the various defensive lines opposite the 8th Army. General Alfred Kesserling, German commander in Italy, had shifted various divisions between the two main corps, XIV and LXXVI, in late October. For most of the defensive fighting in November, 65th Infantry Division and 1st Parachute Divisions and elements of both the 16th and 26th Panzer divisions opposed the 8th Army. 85
Between 22 and 29 October, V Corps and elements of the German rearguard traded blows along with the southern side of the Trigno River. Elements of both the 11 and 38 Brigades, 78th Division, had troops across the river by 25 October, due to the shallowness of the river. The weather then intervened and the river became swollen and cutoff the small bridgehead. An attack was planned for 27/28 October to support the small bridgehead. The heavy rains and lack of artillery support stopped the attack. 86 Due to the swollen river and terrain on the southern side of the river, the formal attack across the river was delayed until the evening of 2/3 November by the 78th Division. 87 Ten miles upriver, the 8th Indian Division would cross on the evening of 1/2 November. 88 The attacks would be supported by extra artillery batteries as well as naval gunfire support. 89
Both sides, 8th Indian and the Germans, attacked and counterattacked all day and into the evening of 3 November, when the bridgehead was at full strength. Close hand-to-hand fighting ensued for two days. One German counterattack was destroyed by a massive artillery barrage. The various units, including the 6/13th FFRifles, were able to slowly push back the German defenders after more close hand fighting. Due to the fighting along with the river, the Germans on 5 November began to move back toward the Sangro river defensive positions. 90
The 78th Division crossed the river on 3 November as various diversions were placed along with the coast to disrupt the German response. The 6 SKINS were attached to the 36 Infantry Brigade and ordered to attack toward the town San Salvo, after replacing some of the units in the initial bridgehead which had been established on 23 October. The fighting for San Salvo was bitter. By the end of the day, 3 November, the town was taken; the Germans were beginning to pull back. 91 The East Surreys moved through the same bridgehead as the 6 SKINS and attacked toward the San Salvo railway station, which was taken. It then moved out toward Cupello and onto the River Sangro. 92
Both divisions had been able to cross a major contested river crossing as a formed-up corps. The two divisions were commended for their success, even though the Germans managed to withdraw to the more formidable defensive Winter Line along with the Sangro. General Alexander specifically mentioned the 8th in his dispatch, “8 Indian Division under command; the latter was a new formation, though of experienced units, but distinguished itself in this its first action.” 93
By 8 November, the 78th Division was on high ground with two brigades overlooking the Sangro River, 94 while the 8th Indian Division was moving up on the 78th left flank. The German withdrawal to the Sangro had been completed alongside final defensive preparations for the Winter Line. General Kesserling stated on 1 November, “Because of its mountainous character the Bernhardt position presents a natural defense with weak points in each divisional sector. The two flanks are exposed to the sea.” He also added that the allies had a very good knack for infiltration of strong points, and that the Germans needed to ensure sufficient reserves to deal with these threats. 95
Montgomery “decided to deliver a strong blow on the coastal sector with [V Corps] 8 Indian and 78 Divisions [4 Armored Brigade in support] with the objective of breaking into the enemy defences on the Sangro Ridge on a narrow front. The troops were then to work outwards from the area of penetration.” 96 Montgomery's plan was accepted by Alexander and 15th Army Group. The 8th Indian was shifted more to right of the 78th; the 2nd New Zealand Division 97 was moved from XIII Corps and into the former 8th Indian Division's positions, with 19 Indian Brigade remaining to “shield” the shift of the 17 and 21 Indian Brigades and 8th Indian HQ to the right. The rest of XIII Corps on the left were to apply pressure on the German defenses, to allow the main attack by V Corps to go in on 20 November. This date would be delayed due to worsening weather. General Montgomery noted this obstacle in a letter to General Alanbrooke. He stated, “I have lined up three divisions on my right: 78 DIV, 8 Ind DIV, 2 NZ DIV, with 400 tanks and the whole of my airpower. . . . I have now wait for fine weather. All my chaps are in tremendous form.” 98
The bridges across the Sangro had been destroyed by the withdrawing German forces. A small British bridgehead was placed on the opposite bank before the rains commenced. Both formations acted in unison, supporting one another as needed. The 19 Indian Brigade remained and worked with the 2nd NZ Division to create a small bridgehead to draw off the Germans from the 8th and 78th divisional sectors. The XIII Corps attempted to pull off pressure as well; however, the Germans had decided, correctly, that the main attack would come against the 65th Infantry Division. 99
The weather did not improve, and planning for specific crossing points and laying of bridges was all thrown into disarray. 100 V Corps reevaluated their plans, and the HQ created a second revised plan and phases for the attack. On 23 November, the new operational order, number 4, was published. This proposed four phases: 1st phase, 26 November, a battalion [1/12th FFR] from 17 Indian Brigade to seize the ridge close to Mozzagrogna; 2nd phase, 28 November, the rest of 17 Indian Brigade to seize Mozzagrogna and Santa Maria; 3rd phase, 29 or 30 November, a brigade [38 Brigade] from 78th Division to push out of the [small] bridgehead and seize the Li Colli ridge; 4th and final phase, the same brigade to seize Fossacesia and exploit on to the Moro River. Tanks from the 4 Armoured Brigade were to get across, support all these efforts, and prepare for exploitation to the next river, Moro. This new plan was heavily supported by artillery and air power. 101 To further improve prospects, the rain stopped and the river dropped, so much so that by 26 November some of the bridges were restored and others thrown up.
There were two battles for Mozzagrogna carried out by the 8th Indian Division. The first attacks went in during the evening of 27 November, led by the two other battalions from the brigade with 1/12th FFR held in reserve. Fighting was intense. The two battalions were pulled back and 1/12th FFR was put on notice to attack on 28 November with V Corps level artillery support. The town was taken on 29 November after two days of heavy fighting; the brigade and 1/12th FFR had been successful in capturing, clearing the town and the area. The 17 Indian Brigade was then ordered to push on and seize the road junctions outside the village. The Santa Maria attack was handed over to the 38 Brigade from the 78th with 4 Armored Brigade. Tanks from the 4 Armoured Brigade had been supporting both divisions during the attacks. The Germans launched their final counterattack against the 17 Indian Brigade and it was destroyed. The 4 Armoured Brigade exploited in clearing the important road to Fossacesia and captured the town later in the day on 30 November. The CO of the 1/12th FFR received personal congratulations from General Montgomery. 102
The 78th Division's battle for the Sangro was very similar to the 8th Indian Division's, including the need for combined arms, the dilemmas of contested river crossing, infiltration tactics, and potential exploitation. As noted above, on 20 November subunits from 36 Brigade 103 had crossed to create a bridgehead. 104 While the Germans opposed the small bridgehead, the weather began to have a major impact as the river swelled and the mud along with the bank became more and more impassable. The bridgehead was at risk of being overrun. On 21 November, the 11 Brigade, 1st East Surreys, in reserve initially, were asked to send units across to support the bridgehead. Over the course of the next few days, the Royal Engineers worked feverishly to get the bridges and crossings ready for tanks. By the evening of 22/23 November, the bridgeheads were secure and expanded, 105 and the 1st East Surreys moved into the bridgehead on 24 November. The East Surreys carried out countless patrols to defend the bridgehead. The battalion and rest of the 11 Brigade carried out a diversionary attack to take pressure off the attack by the 38 Brigade and 6 SKINS [see below]. The East Surreys kept up the “mock attack” as the main attack went in. The Germans responded with much artillery. As the 38th and 6 SKINS pushed on to the Moro River, the East Surreys moved into the captured town, Fossacesia. On 4 December it, along with the 78th Division and rest of the units, moved out of the line and were relieved by the 1st Canadian Division. 106
Due to the second revised V Corps plan, the 78th Division and 38 Brigade would focus their main effort on clearing the Li Colli ridge and the Santa Maria/Fossacesia road to the sea. 107 On the evening of 27/28 November, the 38 Brigade and 6 SKINS crossed into the bridgeheads secured earlier. The fighting in the 8th Indian Division sector influenced the next actions of the 38th BDE. On 29 November, the 38th and 6 SKINS were ordered to seize Santa Maria and push to the sea, along with elements of the 4 Armoured Brigade, along with the Santa Maria and Fossacesia road and destroy all the German resistance. By 1200 on 29 November, the Li Colli ridge had been seized by the brigade and 6 SKINS, with Santa Maria also falling to the 6 SKINS by the end of the day. The tanks from 4 Armoured Brigade and infantry from 38 Brigade moved out on 30 November to clear to the sea. By last light on 30 November the ridge, Santa Maria to the sea, had been cleared of Germans. The 38 Brigade and 6 SKINS and 4 Armoured Brigade continued the advance and turned north along with the Fossacesia-Rocca-Santa Vito road. 6 SKINs occupied Rocca on 2 December, while the rest of the 78th, 8th Indian, and 2nd New Zealand pushed toward the Moro River. After fighting for Santa Vito on 3 December, the Moro River was reached on 4 December. The 38 Brigade and 6 SKINS held the line on the Moro for three days as the Germans carried out counterattacks. 108
The final V Corps report provides an interesting assessment in smashing the first defensive systems of the Winter Line along with the Sangro, reporting that, “in considering the factors which attributed to the success of this battle several stand out. . . devastating effect of air bombardment, weight and accuracy of our guns. . . perhaps most outstanding. . . complete mutual understanding between tank crews and infantry as there was between the Irish [38th] Bde and 4 Armd Bde.” 109 Over the course of three days, V Corps fired more than 145,000 rounds, or 1,623 tons of ammo. 110 General Montgomery underlined this with his comment that “the artillery and air support for this operation was on a very heavy scale, and the Boche could not stand up against it.” 111 The level of firepower was also noted by the Germans; AOK 10 reported “a heavy artillery barrage, about 6000–7000 rounds; they say it was colossal! [Montgomery's Colossal Cracks]. . . Commitment of enemy Air Force is enormous. . . [Allied] Superiority in the air and of his artillery directed from the air is so great that nothing can move. It is simply impossible to do anything, he has everything concentrated right there. One cannot make a counterattack, the troops would be wiped out.” 112 On 7 December, Montgomery advised General Alanbrooke that “I am fighting a hell of a battle here. . . . I am opposed by 3 ½ divisions; this combined with the mud, makes it not too easy. . . . I don’t think we can get any spectacular results so long as it goes on raining; whole country becomes a sea of mud.” 113
The fighting continued for another month as the 8th Army continued to push north. The 1st Canadian Division, which relieved the 78th Division 114 on 4–7 December, fought major attritional battles in and around the town of Ortona. The 8th Indian Division continued to advance on the left of the Canadians and slugged it out with the Germans for a series of hilltop towns, particularly Villa Grande. 115 The 2nd New Zealand Division, on the left of the 8th Indian, drove on toward Orsogna. The overall aim was to reach the Orsogna-Ortona road; the Canadians succeeded at Ortona and the Indians at Villa Grande, but the Kiwis were unable to seize Orsogna and shift the German flank.
The major fighting came to an end in late December 1943, hampered by weather, exhaustion, and logistical problems. 116 In early January 1944, General Montgomery handed over command of the 8th Army to General Sir Oliver Leese and became commander of the 21st Army Group in the UK. 117 General Eisenhower had left the theater as well, in order to become Supreme Commander for the invasion of France. 118
Conclusion
Learning and Training Culture in the 8th Army: Post Battlefield Assessment V Corps, 78th Division, and 8th Indian Division, Early 1944
As noted previously, the earlier reform movements had continued in each of the British and Indian army units and formations throughout the river battles on the Winter Line, and the evidence indicates that a “learning culture” was still being fostered. As Montgomery prepared to hand over command, he started a larger debate regarding lessons from the fighting in Italy and Sicily, and their applicability in other theaters. General Montgomery had sent a damning note to the Vice CIGS, General Nye, in response to a new pamphlet on tank/infantry cooperation which had been written by the 21st Army Group in the UK. Montgomery declared that “there is a great deal in the pamphlet which is contrary to the practical realities of battle. It would never be accepted in this Army [8th].” 119 The DMT, Major-General J.A.C. Whitaker, responded to this letter directly to Lieutenant-General Nye, hinting at tensions between the Home Army and the “fighting armies”: “As you well know, 8th Army are very critical of anyone else's literary productions, and allow no tactical pamphlets, whether produced under the authority of CIGS or 15 Army Group to be issued to officers in that Army. They produce their own training pamphlets.” 120 While there is some truth in this statement, the training and experiences of the 78th and 8th Divisions indicate a more nuanced reality. In particular, there are indications of flexibility among formations recently arrived under the command of the 8th Army to develop their own training and tactical styles, based upon battlefield performances, rather than simply receiving directives from veteran 8th Army commanders or other formations.
While the battlefield performances of the V Corps with 78th and 8th Divisions had achieved their aims over the two river battles, both formations and the units within the divisions recognized the need to learn from their recent experience, and apply those lessons to training and tactical manuals developed internally and externally. They shared lessons across the corps, army, and beyond. One of the most interesting examples of this was written on 2 December 1943. As it was consolidating and pushing onto the Moro River, the 8th Indian Division published and sent a document to MWTC in Lebanon, in which they described how, “after having passed through the course at MWTC and having had experience in fighting in mountainous country against an enemy. . . the following suggestions are put forward for inclusion in the MWTC syllabus.” The key takeaways presented in this two-page document include fighting in built-up and fortified villages and towns in the hills and mountains, going into detail about what the division had learned about fighting into and defending a village. 121 As the battles came to an end, the GOC, V Corps, Lieut-General Allfrey, traveled around and visited many of the units and formations; various debates and lessons emerged from these discussions. He also visited the various “battle schools” created by the units and formations throughout January. 122
On 6 December 1943, the various commanders from the three brigades and battalions from the 78th Division met to assess next steps. Some key discussions centered around the worsening weather conditions, as well as the need to start retraining as soon as possible, with reinforcements expected to arrive in January 1944. The first training period was set for 13 December to 1 January, and tactical exercises (TEWTs) without troops were encouraged. 123 Key themes included traffic control in river crossings and the importance of good patrolling “to maintain the initiative in no-mans land.” 124 The 38 Infantry Brigade followed up with the directive to create its own “tactical [battle] school” right away. 125
By the end of December, the 78th was back in the line, to the west and in the mountains above the Sangro River and under the command of the XIII Corps, alongside 2nd New Zealand Division. The region was plastered with snow, and the “line” was not held in full strength, with companies and platoons forward and then relieved by units in the rear. The conditions were harsh, but they did allow the division to carry out further training and incorporation of new reinforcements. The first training directive for 1944, published on 10 January, was clear in its intent: “the large number of changes which units have had recently make it imperative that training is carried out as intensively as possible alongside our battle commitments. . . . training must be started without delay.” The document was clear that commanders would be intimately involved with the training, and that there would be many TEWTs due to the snow conditions. The GOC was direct: “high morale results from every officer and man having complete confidence in his own and his unit's ability to beat the enemy. This in turn results from every officer and man using every available hour to improve his standard of training until both individually and together we reach the highest possible standard of efficiency.” The directive also had many appendices discussing important and critical lessons from recent battles; the GOC outlined “tactical points I wish stressed to every man,” which focused on battle drill. Other appendices included “Points of German training” and “training on river crossings.” 126 The combined demands of “holding the line” and winter weather meant that most of the higher level training did not take place in earnest until the end of February and in early March. 127
By early January 1944, the 8th Indian Division was responsible for holding the line after the recent fighting, with units that could be pulled back for rest and retraining allowed to do so. The first training note for 1944 stated that the “main object of enabling each Bde and units and sub-units of Div time to spend ten days in a rest area so that they may be able to re-organize, re-equip and get their new reinforcements settled in.” It also aimed for “time in the line” to provide another training opportunity, and recommended that “every advantage should be taken by fwd Bns to gain experience in patrolling.” The division also called for a different approach to lessons, focused on the creation of “Instructional Battlefield Tours.” Each battalion in a brigade was to write up a detailed description and analysis of “one tough fight” for all in the division to read; then each bring others along to and describe and discuss the specific battle. Other branches, such as artillery and engineers, would also provide their perspectives. 128
Lessons from the 8th Indian Division spread to other formations within the Indian Army and back at GHQ India. As the 4th Indian Division landed in Italy in early December 1943, Maj-Gen Tuker and his commanders moved quickly to the front to attach themselves to the various units and formations to gain knowledge and understand the battlefield, with several officers attached to the 8th Indian Division. 129 As the 4th Indian Division moved into the line to replace the 2nd New Zealand Division on the left alongside the 78th Division, Tuker distributed “4th IND DIV Training Instruction No. 44: Town and Village Fighting” on 5 January 1944. While the document included an American excerpt “British Street Fighting Tactics” (pulled from MTP 55), one can assume that recent experiences of the 8th Indian Division, including lessons from the 8th Army in Sicily, were part of the lesson formulation. 130 These lessons and debates would support the 4th Indian Division as they prepared to fight in the second and third battles of Cassino. The AITM No. 25, published by GHQ India, with many lessons from the Burma Campaign, also included a large section on the 8th Indian Division's experiences. “Lessons taken from the 8 Indian Division training instruction” as well as a battalion commander's observations were included in the publication. 131 As a fitting ending to the 8th Indian Division's first battlefield experience against the Germans, the AOK 10's assessment paid the Indians a compliment: “Indian troops have turned out to be tough and resourceful opponents.” 132
By early 1944, the 8th Indian, and 78th British infantry divisions had pierced the German Winter Line (Bernardt) after much heavy fighting; the arrival of V Corps on the Moro represented troops from across the British Empire and Commonwealth. The road to the Winter Line had shown that the British and Indian armies had communicated and shared similar learning cultures. By early 1944, one could argue that the 8th Army and its formations and units had established a strong “learning and training culture” due to previous battlefield experience and supported by a strong learning and training culture in both the UK and India. As noted earlier, the recurring theme of learning culture was noted in the doctrinal publication, Notes from theatres of war, No. 16 North Africa, November 1942-May 1943: “training must be continuous, and must not be regarded as complete once a unit takes the field. Battles afford the best possible training, but full value is obtained from them only if each is followed by intensive study and practices to inculcate the lessons learned.” 133 Both of these divisions could claim that they had achieved the aims of the doctrinal publication through the cauldron of the Winter Line battles. The fighting in 1944 would test this culture and the resolve of the two divisions as it entered into the cauldron of the Cassino battles and race to the Gothic Line.
