Abstract
Public reaction to spies during the First World War has often been characterised as mania or hysteria. However, Harry Richards argues that the distinction between emotional responses and factual occurrences has been obscured by historians who have dismissed reported reactions as merely ‘irrational’. Instead, he portrays the reaction to spy fever as a far more complex cultural mechanism, that formed a part of a society coping with the unprecedented anxieties that the war brought. Furthermore, he contends that the spy fever experienced at the outbreak of war was distinct from the later ‘hidden hand’ conspiracy theories that emerged as the conflict progressed.
Richards acknowledges the complexities historians encounter when addressing emotions, particularly when multiple emotions are intertwined. To present his argument, he adopts a contextual approach, drawing on methodologies from the field of emotional history, particularly those of Peter and Carol Stearns. To further enrich the analysis, he employs both quantitative and qualitative methods, rather than merely relying on the word of contemporary accounts.
The book is divided into three sections. The first, titled ‘Origins of Spy Fever’, examines the situation in Britain before the onset of war, linking the political discourse of the period with popular fears, such as the Invasion Scare. It then explores the reaction at the initial outbreak of war, highlighting the hyperbolic nature of the press and arguing that, rather than being overwhelmed by a fear of spies, the British public was encouraged to adopt feelings of distrust and anxiety through officially sanctioned spy hunts. Richards identifies a geographical distinction, noting that most spy scares occurred along the coast, particularly in areas with Royal Naval docks. More striking, however, is his comparison of the instigators behind the reports, which reveals that it was the police and Territorials, rather than the general public, who were the primary sources of most scare stories. These official alarms legitimised suspicion and acted as a behavioural model for the public to follow.
The second section, ‘Individual Fears’, begins with an examination of mental illness styled as hysteria within the period, arguing that because of its prominence and frequency as a topic, historians have adopted medical terminology when discussing emotions in the past, with labels such as ‘hysteria’ and ‘mania’ being overused as catch-all descriptors. From an examination of official and unofficial sources, Richards argues that rather than terror, spy fever provided agency, a coping mechanism, and entertainment as a distraction from wartime boredom and anxiety. Particularly compelling is the comparison between spy fever and the ‘Terror of the Zeppelins’ – if a tangible threat did not produce widespread panic, the case for spy fever as mass mania becomes difficult to sustain.
The third section, ‘Collective Anxieties’, examines how widespread spy fever actually was and the forms it took. Through quantitative analysis, Richards shows that spy fever peaked in the first five months of the war and declined as a topic by the end of 1915. Drawing on personal diaries and records, he demonstrates that, overall, people were largely oblivious and indifferent to the spy threat and were more concerned with pressing material concerns such as food shortages. Yet at the same time, spy fever increased in frequency as a subject in popular culture – in the theatre, cinema, and in fiction – reinforcing the idea of spy fever as a form of entertainment rather than genuine social panic.
The extreme elements associated with spy fever – such as Germanophobia and anti-alien hatred – were, Richards argues, never dominant views, but rather manufactured paranoia propagated by radical conservatives and extremist organisations such as the British Empire Legion, and disseminated through the right-wing press to undermine the Liberal government and stoke xenophobia. Far from representing a universal reaction, it remained a marginalised ideology, met by a far more tolerant public, through humour and satire, evidenced by the cartoons that featured in publications such as Punch.
Overall, Richards puts forward a convincing argument that spy fever during the First World War was not a mass mania, but rather a confluence of wide-ranging emotional responses. Far from being irrational, it was legitimised and constructed by both the authorities and the press, and exploited for political ends. One might argue that official propaganda efforts perhaps warrant greater consideration than the book allows, though this is unlikely to have altered his broader conclusions, and the argument remains well-structured and persuasive throughout.
Our understanding of reactions to the First World War has long moved on from the view encapsulated in Taylor's seminal work, The Deluge, and before, during, and after the centennial, several works have challenged the dominant popular memory. Richard's book is a welcome addition to this corpus. Beyond its appeal to scholars of the First World War, those with an interest in how emotion can be approached by the historian may also find it a useful point of reference.
