Abstract
The terminology used to describe sexually violent offenses vary, and how these labels are interpreted by the public remains unclear. This study explores the terms for the primary—legally most severe—offense of sexual violence in legal statutes across the United States and investigates how different terms evoke different perceptions about crime severity. Results indicate that nine different terms are used to identify the primary offense of sexual violence in state statutes, with significant differences in perceived severity for these terms. The findings have implications for the public's (mis)understanding of sexual violence and the treatment of survivors and perpetrators.
“Language is an important resource. Once a term is accepted, it constrains our communication of ideas to others; in fact, it constrains the very generation of ideas.” (Muehlenhard et al., 1992, p. 23)
Discussions about sexual violence are rife with examples of uncertainty about what the definition of sexual violence is, who a victim of sexual violence is, and which behaviors constitute sexual violence. The crime of rape is a prime example. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, rape is defined as “the penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.” However, there is ample evidence to suggest people differ in their beliefs about what constitutes rape, impacting perceptions and the understanding of survivors’ experiences, perpetrators’ accountability, and the circumstances of incidents of rape (e.g., Harris & Socia, 2016; Sacks et al., 2018; Wilson et al., 2021).
Although some research has explored the various terminology that is used to describe acts of sexual violence, most research centers on how survivors label their own experiences and the factors that influence these labels (e.g., “rape” vs. “sexual assault” vs. unacknowledged victimization; e.g., Cleere & Lynn, 2013; Donde et al., 2018; Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2011). To our knowledge, research has yet to examine public perceptions surrounding the severity of these labels. This gap is significant because the terminology used to describe the most statutorily severe form of sexual violence, which is federally designated as rape, varies across state statutes. To be clear, we are not minimizing any acts of sexual violence. Rather, by using the phrase “most severe form of sexual violence,” we are referring to the acts and terms identified in the state's primary sexual offense statute that is legally the most severe and carries the most severe penalties. It is common for state statutes to directly or indirectly grade sexual offenses by legal severity, either by adding elements to the sexual offense or using terms to describe its severity. We believe this inquiry is important in order to unpack the effect of different terminology on the public's understanding of sexual violence, including a survivor's sense of experience, a perpetrator's sense of blameworthiness, the criminal justice system's response, and the public's perception of the severity of the crime (Wilkinson, 2008).
This study aims to better understand perceptions associated with the terminology used to describe acts of sexual violence in state statutes. We first identify the various terms used to describe the primary offense of sexual violence in each state statute in the United States. Then, we use survey data from a sample of U.S. residents to examine perceptions of severity associated with each of the various terms identified in state statutes. In doing so, we consider whether perceptions of severity are further impacted by a prior experience of sexual violence. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and recommendations for future research and policymakers alike.
Labels: Why Do They Matter?
Legal statutes provide labels or terms to represent specific behaviors that violate criminal codes in the specific jurisdiction. In 1981, Ashworth presented the principle of “representative labeling”/“fair labeling” (Chalmers & Leverick, 2008; Williams, 1983), which argues that offenses are labeled in a way to distinguish between acts and are meant to fairly and transparently describe the extent of law-breaking behavior (Ashworth, 1981). Ashworth (1981) and other legal scholars have argued that labels should reflect common patterns of thought in society or, in some cases, are intended to shape public opinions about acceptable and unacceptable behavior in order to protect vulnerable populations (e.g., female survivors of domestic violence; Chalmers & Leverick, 2008; Tadros, 2005). As such, criminal offense labels speak to the severity of the offense and culpability of the offender, with some labels implicating greater seriousness and moral culpability (or wrongdoing). Willis (2018) argued that criminal offense labels are particularly important for sexual offenses because they convey the severity of the offense and level of culpability. This severity and culpability, in turn, provide a justification to the offender and the general public for punishment. With this logic, a label that is perceived as less severe and/or one that incurs less moral culpability would be viewed by society and punished less harshly than a label that is perceived as more severe and invoking greater moral culpability. Misalignment of a label and punishment may undermine perceptions of fair treatment and legitimacy and promote offending (Tyler, 2012).
Victims and the Blurred Lines Between Self-Labels and Criminal Offense Labels
Labels for criminal offenses are particularly important for survivors of crime. As articulated by Waples (2020): The words we choose can either validate or diminish the experiences of people who are touched by rape. (p. xviii)
Differential labeling for the same experience is important to consider for many reasons. First, if a victim does not label or define one's experience as rape, then he or she is also less likely to report the incident to the police (Kahn et al., 2003; Weiss, 2011). Research suggests, however, that reporting of sex crimes is extremely low (e.g., Fisher et al., 2003; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006). Still, it is possible survivors that who label their victimization as sexual assault may perceive their victimization as less serious in nature or perceive that others will view their victimization as less serious in nature compared to those who label their victimization as rape. As a result, these survivors may be less likely to report the incident to the police due to perceptions that the criminal act will be taken less seriously or given less attention by the police. It is also weighed strongly against the high likelihood of revictimization by the police as a result of detailing the incident (i.e., reliving the victimization) and subsequent scrutiny (Kidd & Chayet, 1984).
State Statutes and Labels for Sexual Violence
How survivors, offenders, and the general public more broadly consider perceptions of severity associated with criminal labels is important in light of the changing terminology and definitions of rape throughout American history. English Common Law, the precursor to many state laws in the United States, characterized rape similar to the pre-2013 Uniform Crime Report definition of rape: “the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will” (Scutt, 1978; U.S. Department of Justice, 2014; Waples, 2020). Such definitions of rape only recognized female victims, vaginal–penile penetration, and physical force (Scutt, 1978; Tracy et al., 2012; Waples, 2020). Excluded from the definition were male victims, incidents involving other forms of penetration (e.g., anal or oral penetration or penetration with objects), incidents not involving physical force (e.g., coercion, incapacitation), and incidents where a victim did not vocally or forcefully resist.
In the 1970s, a time of increased attention to women's and victims’ rights, states began to reexamine rape laws—a period known as rape law reform. The goals of rape law reform were multifaceted, including efforts for the law to better reflect the realities of sexual violence, increase victim reporting, improve victims’ experiences with the legal system, and facilitate the processing of cases of sexual violence (Bienen, 1980). One notable effort was to redefine and replace the term rape with others such as sexual assault, sexual battery, criminal sexual conduct (Bienen, 1980). According to Searles and Berger (1987, pp. 25–26), the movement away from the word rape and toward a term such as sexual assault was meant to highlight the violence inherent to such incidents and underscore that it is “not a crime of uncontrollable sexual passion.” Similar to other assault crimes (e.g., aggravated assault), the victim does not consent, either actively or passively (Bienen, 1980).
Subsequently, Bienen (1980) and Searles and Berger (1987) examined the terminology used to describe the crime of rape in state statutes. Both studies found variation in labels, as well as the particular forms of penetration included in the primary offense of sexual violence in each state. In the 1980s, 28 states (including the District of Columbia) used the term rape, and 17 of those states limited rape to vaginal penetration (Searles & Berger, 1987). In contrast, 23 states used one of the following terms to label the primary offense of sexual violence in their state: sexual assault, sexual battery, sexual abuse, sexual intercourse without consent, criminal sexual penetration, gross sexual imposition, and criminal sexual conduct (Searles & Berger, 1987, p. 31, Table 1, note A). Notably, both of the aforementioned studies are dated, and state and federal statutes have continued to change in the past 30 years. As such, a modern review of state statutes and the terms used to label the primary offense of sexual violence is needed. Furthermore, the impact of these labels is unclear, complicating how offenders, survivors, and the general public may perceive criminal acts of sexual violence that meet the current federal definition of rape.
Terminology for Primary Sex Offense Statutes Within 50 U.S. States.
Current Study
The aims of the current study are two-fold. First, this research updates the work of Bienen (1980) and Searles and Berger (1987) by examining current legal statutes in the 50 states and the District of Columbia and identifying the term used to label the primary offense of sexual violence. Second, this work explores how the various terms identified in state statutes are perceived by the general public and survivors, in particular, in terms of perceived severity. Given the dual goals of this study, we present the data, methods, and results separately.
Study 1: State Statutes
Data and Methods
We used the U.S. Rape and Sexual Assault Laws document compiled by Aequitas, updated in July 2019, 1 supplemented with the Nexis Uni database, to explore the terms used in state statutes. All 50 state statutes and the District of Columbia were reviewed to identify the specific terminology used to describe sex crimes. We focused on the primary offense of sexual violence. To be clear, the primary offense refers to the sexual offense statute that is legally the most severe and carries the most severe penalties. We note that within state statutes, variations existed regarding the elements of the crime, including the type of penetration (e.g., vaginal, anal, oral) and how penetration occurs (e.g., with genitalia, an object, digitally). Such elements of the crime are important but are not the main focus of this article. We solely focus on the terminology used in state statutes. For a descriptive legal analysis of state statutes, see Tracy et al. (2012) or Aequitas’ resource page.
Results
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the primary offense and terminology used in every state and the District of Columbia. Throughout the United States, the labels for the primary offense of sexual violence vary, with the most common term being rape. Notably, less than half of jurisdictions (n = 24) use the term rape to label the primary offense of sexual violence. The second most common term used was sexual assault, or a variation thereof, such as gross sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated sexual assault (n = 17). Other terms for the primary offense of sexual violence were criminal sexual conduct (n = 3), sexual abuse (n = 2), sexual battery (n = 1), forcible sexual intercourse (n = 1), sexual intercourse without consent (n = 1), criminal sexual penetration (n = 1), and gross sexual imposition (n = 1). Put simply, not all states call rape, rape.
Study 2: Perceptions of Severity Associated With Terms
Data
In order to assess differences in perceived severity for the various terms used to label the primary offense of sexual violence among statute statutes in the United States, data were collected through an online survey from a sample of adults in the United States who were aged 18 and over and proportionally represented the U.S. population in terms of gender, race/ethnicity, and age based on 2019 U.S. Census population estimates. These data are part of a larger survey intended to examine perceptions and experiences of sexual violence. Participants were recruited through email in May and June of 2021 by Qualtrics. Incentives (e.g., airline miles, gift card cards, redeemable points) were commiserated with the length of the survey. Once quotas to represent the various gender, race/ethnicity, and age strata for the age 18 and over U.S. population were met (based on the target sample size of 1,250 respondents determined through a power analysis), no more individuals were able to complete the survey within the specified strata (e.g., female, age 25–34, Hispanic). The University of Nevada, Las Vegas Institutional Review Board approved this study.
A total of 1,318 individuals completed the survey. 2 Our study includes 1,215 participants who responded to all of the questions regarding perceptions of severity for each identified term used in state statutes and also answered whether or not they had previously experienced sexual violence. Table 2 provides demographic information for the final analytic sample (n = 1,215). 3 The final analytic sample was roughly evenly split between male and female participants. The majority of the analytic sample self-identified as White (approximately 67%), whereas 13% self-identified as Black, 5% self-identified as Asian, 2% self-identified as American Indian/Native American, 1% self-identified as another race/ethnicity, and less than 1% self-identified as Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. The remaining participants preferred not to disclose their race. In addition, 17% of the final sample self-identified as Hispanic. The age stratification of the final analytic sample was as follows: 17% were between the ages of 18 and 24, 11% were between the ages of 25 and 34, 17% were between the ages of 35 and 44, 18% were between the ages of 45 and 54, 17% were between the ages of 55 and 64, and 20% were 65 years of age or older.
Demographics for the Final Analytic Sample (n = 1,215).
Measures
Perceptions of Severity
Using the terms identified in Part 1 of this study, participants were asked to indicate the perceived level of severity associated with the nine primary sex offense terms used in state statutes: criminal sexual conduct, criminal sexual penetration, forcible sexual intercourse, gross sexual imposition, rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual intercourse without consent. 4 For each of the terms, participants were asked to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10 the severity of the behavior associated with each term (with 0 indicating “it is not serious at all” and 10 indicating “it is very serious”). The terms were presented to participants in alphabetical order in order to eliminate preconceived perceptions regarding their severity.
Survivor of Sexual Violence
Given the importance of terminology for survivors, we included a measure indicating whether or not the participant self-reported any previous experience of sexual violence. Participants were asked eight behaviorally specific questions to gauge whether they had ever experienced sexual violence in the form of attempted or completed sexual penetration (defined as someone putting a sex organ, other body part, or object inside someone's vagina or anus) as a result of force or threat of force, attempted or completed oral sex (defined as someone's mouth or tongue making contact with someone else's genitals) as a result of force or threat of force, sexual penetration when one was incapacitated or unable to provide consent (e.g., intoxicated, sleeping), oral sex when one was incapacitated or unable to provide consent, sexual penetration as a result of pressure or threatening nonphysical harm, and oral sex as a result of pressure or threatening nonphysical harm. The full text for each of the questions is included in the Appendix. If the participant answered “yes” to at least one of the eight questions, they were coded as having experienced sexual violence. The questions asked in this study were adapted from the multicollege bystander efficacy evaluation campus climate studies (Clear et al., 2020).
Analytic Plan
To explore differences in the perceived severity of each term for a primary offense of sexual violence in state statutes, we first considered the mean severity scores of each term. After determining which term had the highest severity score, on average, we compared this mean score to the mean severity score for each of the other terms using paired sample t tests.
In order to further investigate differences in perceived severity of the terms for the primary offense of sexual violence in state statutes among victims of sexual violence and among persons who had not experienced sexual violence, we split the sample between those who self-reported a history of sexual violence and those who did not self-report a history of sexual violence. We replicated the previously described analyses among each subsample. Finally, we computed independent sample t tests to assess for differences in the means of perceived severity scores for each term between victims of sexual violence and those who had not experienced sexual violence. Due to the number of statistical comparisons, we applied a Bonferroni Correction to adjust our p value to reduce the likelihood of a Type I error. Our adjusted p values for the traditional alpha level of .05 (95% confident that we did not make a Type I error) and .01 (99% confident that we did not make a Type I error) were .006 and .001, respectively.
Results
Table 3 presents findings of the mean perceived severity score for each of the nine terms identified in state statutes. All terms were viewed as severe in nature, with an average perceived severity score of 8.97 (of 10) or higher among the full sample. However, of the nine terms, the sample perceived the term rape as the most serious, on average (x̄ = 9.53, SD = 1.56). This was followed by criminal sexual intercourse (x̄ = 9.40, SD = 1.61), sexual abuse (x̄ = 9.39, SD = 1.56), sexual assault (x̄ = 9.37, SD = 1.60) and sexual intercourse without consent (x̄ = 9.37, SD = 1.60), criminal sexual penetration (x̄ = 9.36, SD = 1.64), sexual battery (x̄ = 9.31, SD = 1.64), criminal sexual conduct (x̄ = 9.11, SD = 1.83), and criminal sexual imposition (x̄ = 8.97, SD = 1.83), which was perceived as least severe, on average.
Mean Severity Scores for Each Term (n = 1,215).
Note. Mean severity score for term was significantly different from the mean severity score for the term rape within group: * p ≤ .006 and ** p ≤ .001; mean scores between survivors and non-survivors were significantly different: a p ≤ .006
Because the term rape evoked the greatest perceived severity, on average, we examined whether there were statistically significant differences in the mean severity score for the term rape compared to the other terms. Results indicated that the mean severity score for the term rape was significantly higher than the mean severity score for all terms (p < .006). That is, the participants in this study viewed the term rape as more serious than each of the eight other terms.
We next split our sample into participants who were survivors of sexual violence and participants who did not report any previous experiences of sexual violence and repeated the above analyses. Rape was perceived to be the most serious term, on average, for both those who had experienced sexual violence (x̄ = 9.23, SD = 1.95) and those who did not self-report any prior experiences of sexual violence (x̄ = 9.69, SD = 1.27). However, statistically significant differences among terms varied depending on the group. Among persons who did not report a history of sexual violence, the term rape, on average, was significantly higher than all other terms. However, among survivors of sexual violence, rape was only perceived as more severe, on average, than criminal sexual conduct (x̄ = 8.85, SD = 2.15, t = 4.42), gross sexual imposition (x̄ = 8.77, SD = 1.99, t = 5.50), and sexual battery (x̄ = 9.01, SD = 1.99, t = 3.19).
Table 3 also presents the findings comparing whether survivors of sexual violence and those who had not experienced sexual violence differed in how they perceived the severity of each term. Notable statistically significant differences emerged between the two groups, such that the mean score for the perceived severity of each term was significantly higher among those who had never experienced sexual violence in contrast to survivors of sexual violence.
Discussion
This research endeavor sought to explore the primary offense of sexual violence in U.S. state statutes and the District of Columbia as well as the potential implications of the terms. As Tracy et al. (2012) noted, though, it is impossible to assess meaningful statutory differences by simply reading the terms used. 5 Therefore, after first identifying the various terms used to label the primary offense of sexual violence in each statute, we notably investigated how the public perceives the severity associated with each in order to speak to the potential effects of the terminology.
Analyses indicated that the most common term used to describe the primary offense of sexual violence is rape. However, 27 jurisdictions in the United States refer to the primary offense of sexual violence as something other than rape. The term sexual assault was the most commonly used alternative. The frequent use of the term sexual assault is unsurprising given efforts during the Rape Law Reform Era to redefine and relabel the term rape with one such as sexual assault, which was considered to be more indicative of nonconsensual behavior (Bienen, 1980; Searles & Berger, 1987). Although the term of sexual assault was originally intended to benefit and empower survivors of sexual violence as they navigate the justice system and encounter public perceptions associated with victimization, it does not appear that these goals, the latter in particular, have been fully achieved. After all, there is a significant relationship between formal reporting of victimization and the self-identified labels of rape versus sexual assault (Kahn et al., 2003; Weiss, 2011), as victims who label their experience as rape are more likely to report their victimization to the police or other agencies in comparison to those who label the experience as sexual assault.
The findings from the second part of this research endeavor also suggest there are negative implications associated with the differential application of terms. We found that the public, in general, views each sex offense term as severe in nature. However, the term rape evoked higher perceptions of severity compared to all other terms, including sexual assault, for the full sample. Moreover, the average perception of severity score was significantly higher for rape compared to all other terms among the full sample and the subsample of individuals who had never experienced sexual violence. Interestingly, among persons who had previously experienced sexual violence, the term rape was only perceived to be more severe in nature compared to sexual battery, criminal sexual imposition, and criminal sexual conduct.
Overall, while each term for the primary offense of sexual violence among U.S. jurisdictions is perceived as severe in nature (based on average scores of severity), in general, it does not appear that efforts to redefine and label rape another term may have achieved the intended goals since significant differences in perceptions of severity exist. These differences are likely to affect responses to victims and perpetrators by actors in the criminal justice system and public perceptions regarding the nature and experience of victimization.
There are a number of possible explanations for these findings. First, it may be that the public is most familiar with the term rape. Indeed, with the exception of sexual assault, other identified terms were used in less than a handful of states. Therefore, rape simply may be the term most people associate with the most severe form of sexual violence, and there is a lack of knowledge about other terms and what they entail. Alternatively, it is also possible that these findings reflect long-standing misperceptions about sexual violence, tied to stereotypes and myths (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980, 1998; Payne et al., 1999). As described by Addington and Rennison (2008, p. 206), the stereotypical “real” rape consists of a “weapon-wielding stranger jumping out of the bushes to attack a sober, virginal woman who is physically resisting.” When statutes do not use the word rape, this may provide false support for incorrect notions about crimes of sexual violence. Research by Sasson and Paul (2014) supports this argument. Assessing online participants’ responses to a vignette about rape, the authors found that 28% of individuals who labeled the scenario sexual assault or sexual aggression rather than rape did so because the circumstances in the vignette did not conform to stereotypical beliefs about what constitutes rape, including physical force or survivors’ resistance. Unfortunately, the lack of use of the term rape may dampen perceptions of the level of wrongdoing and moral culpability of offenders who commit acts that align with the federal definition of rape or commit criminal acts in line with the primary offense of sexual violence in statutes across the United States.
The observed finding that all of the identified terms for the primary offense of sexual violence are perceived, on average, as less severe in nature compared to the term rape presents a dilemma for the current legal system. Muehlenhard and Kimes (1999, p. 237) argued that terms and definitions for sexual violence “convey an air of objectivity; they seem like the real definitions of these terms.” However, because the terms used to identify the primary offense of sexual violence in U.S. states and the District of Columbia differ (as well as the specific conduct they cover, Tracy et al., 2012, p. 12) as does their perceived severity, there is likely to be confusion. This confusion is not only limited to the perceived the severity of the offense, as observed in this work, but also the moral culpability of a perpetrator and necessary compassion for victims. Arguably, terms other than rape are likely beneficial for offenders whose behavior will be viewed as less severe and detrimental to the treatment of survivors. If society as a whole views certain terms as implicating less serious offenses, then levels of compassion, understanding, and the ability and/or willingness to treat victims with the needed trauma-informed care may be lacking. As Tracy et al. (2012, p. 34) noted: The disconnect between the law and reality can play a crucial role in individual victims’ perceptions of whether or not they were victims of a crime and whether they believe they will receive some measure of justice.
Interestingly, survivors largely did not distinguish between the various terms used for the primary offense of sexual violence among state statutes. It is possible that survivors are more attuned to the different terms used in the discourse surrounding sexual violence, perhaps as a result of their own help-seeking, and are more knowledgeable about the true nature of the offense associated with the term in usage. It is also possible that survivors reflected upon their own experiences, which informs their labeling of any experiences of sexual violence. After all, research suggests that victims of sexual violence often do not label their victimization as rape (e.g., Bondurant, 2001; Cleere & Lynn, 2013; Fisher et al., 2003; LeMaire et al., 2016; Littleton & Henderson, 2009; Orchowski et al., 2013), yet they are acutely aware of the severity of the experience and culpability of the offender (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2011). Both possible explanations are speculation and cannot be tested with the current data.
Finally, analyses indicated that survivors evaluated the severity of each term, on average, as lower than those who had never experienced sexual violence. This finding should not be interpreted as though experiences of sexual violence are trivial to survivors; rather, it is more likely that these differences are related to coping strategies and subsequent treatment after victimization. For instance, it is well-documented that survivors of sexual violence minimize victimization and/or cope with the experience by stating that the experience and consequences “could have been worse” (e.g., Taylor et al., 1983). Alternatively, treatment by the police and others after victimization may affect the perceived severity of sexual violence (Lorenz & Jacobsen, 2021), as victims often complain that the criminal justice system does not take sexual violence seriously or minimizes victim experiences (Murphy-Oikonen et al., 2022; Spencer et al., 2018). From a victim's perspective, this minimization likely promotes behaviors and emotional states that may lead to further mental distress (Carson et al., 2020; Hirsch, 2022) and/or an increased likelihood of subsequent sexual victimization (Macy, 2007). From a public perspective, this minimization is indicative that offenders are often not being held accountable in line with perceptions of the severity of the offense (see Spohn & Tellis, 2012). These explanations for the findings are pure speculation, however.
Limitations
Despite the benefits of this study to advance knowledge about the current labels associated with the primary offense of sexual violence in all U.S. jurisdictions, there are some important limitations. First, survey participants were not asked why they perceived labels the way they did, nor were they asked about the definitions of the terms/required elements of the offense associated with the terms. Therefore, our attempts to understand the reasons for differences in perceptions of severity associated with various terms are only speculation. Relatedly, this study did not take into consideration the various factors that may influence perceptions of severity, including rape myths, nor did it investigate other important subgroup differences in perceptions for the various terms. For instance, the survey did not include questions about a history of sexual violence perpetration. It is certainly possible that persons who have engaged in some form of sexual violence may view labels differently in an attempt to downplay their own behaviors or account for their own perceived moral culpability. This study also did not compare the perceptions of offense severity by respondent demographics. It is possible that respondents’ gender identity, sexual orientation, or race/ethnicity could impact perceptions of offense severity, just as they impact the experiences of sexual violence and help-seeking behaviors (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2018; Basile et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2020). Future research should not only examine the various incident-related factors associated with the perceived level of severity associated with each term but also subgroup differences in perceptions of severity. Lastly, this research did not collect data on public perceptions about any other crimes; therefore, a comparison between the term for the primary offense of sexual violence and other crimes (ranging in type of crime and severity of crime) cannot be assessed.
Implications
Because people—especially those who have not experienced sexual violence—view terms representing the primary offense of sexual violence in state statutes as implicating different levels of severity, the terminology used to label acts of sexual violence impacts perceptions about these offenses. This includes how survivors view their own experiences, perpetrators view their wrongfulness of their own behaviors, criminal justice system personnel prioritize cases and interact with victims, and members of the public understand the nuances and harms associated with sexual violence. Therefore, it is worthwhile to speculate whether there would be a benefit to the standardization of terms (and definitions) used to describe the primary offense of sexual violence among all U.S. jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, this study alone cannot answer that question. Despite #MeToo and other recent social movements targeting sexual harassment and violence, public discourse about sexual violence is still viewed as somewhat taboo. Therefore, efforts to determine the need to standardize terminology are lacking. However, this work seeks to move the field forward in this right as standardized terminology may be one way to move forward the conversation about sexual violence. Consistent language would simplify statutes and provide for a consistent understanding regarding sexual violence victimization. After all, behaviorally specific measures of sexual violence prevail in research in lieu of terms and labels that may not be defined similarly among different groups. Furthermore, standardized language might also assist with the development and presentation of prevention and training programs and weaken the pervasiveness of rape myths in society, which are highly correlated with perpetration of sexual violence (Yapp & Quayle, 2018).
Beyond previously stated calls for additional research, we lay out additional ideas that focus on the consequences of variable terminology assigned to acts of sexual violence. First, research should continue the practice of hearing the voices of those directly impacted by sexual violence: victims themselves. Some research has considered the labels that victims of sexual violence apply to their victimization (Cleere & Lynn, 2013; Donde et al., 2018; Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2011), but, to our knowledge, most research, has not directly explored why particular labels are chosen (but see Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2011) and the impact of the label itself on the survivor (see Kilimnik et al., 2018; Kilimnik & Meston, 2019). While recognizing that individuals’ acknowledgement of their experiences as victimization is more important than a label they assign to those experiences (Orchowski et al., 2013), we also believe that labels used to describe sexual violence impact how people perceive their experiences and decisions after the incident, such as whether and how to seek help (Tracy et al., 2012). Although research indicates that survivors are negatively affected by sexual violence regardless of how they label their experience (Harned, 2004; Khan et al., 2018; Layman et al., 1996; Littleton et al., 2007; Littleton & Henderson, 2009), research has not yet considered if and how state-imposed labels—such as labeling a person a victim of rape as opposed to other terminology—actually affect survivors both in terms of mental and physical health but also help-seeking behavior. Therefore, a better understanding of labeling decisions and why they may not align with legal terms may be helpful for efforts to support the needs of survivors of sexual violence. After all, this research suggests that labels used to describe acts of sexual violence impact how people perceive victim experiences in terms of severity; it is not unimaginable that these public responses and perceptions impact subsequent functioning of victims who live in a world were labels and terms matter.
Future research should also consider how terminology impacts perpetrators’ level of accountability for their actions. Willis (2018) argued that an offense label may promote subsequent offending because it undermines rehabilitative or correctional efforts. Often utilized in the treatment for sexual offenders is cognitive behavioral therapy (Harrison et al., 2020). Importantly, for this form of treatment to be effective, cognitive behavioral therapy necessitates change in cognitions, affect, and attitudes, which in turn affect behavior (MacKenzie, 2000). However, if an offender uses a label to undermine moral culpability and diminish empathy and affect for a victim, this will undermine the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy in reducing the likelihood of recidivism (Jennings & Deming, 2013). Alternatively, perceptually severe labels can inhibit correctional efforts to reform an offender because the offender may internalize the label as being a true measure of identity or feel isolated from prosocial others as a result of the label (see Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989 for a theoretical argument). Therefore, the impact of labels on a perpetrator's perception of their behavior should be considered, given implications for prevention and rehabilitation efforts related to sexual violence.
Finally, further research is needed to better understand the public's understanding of other terminology associated with sexual violence included in state statutes and public discourse. With these suggestions in mind, there is a worthwhile line of research to be pursued, not only for survivors of sexual violence but also persons who commit acts of sexual violence and the general public more broadly. In sum, gauging how people understand terms used in state laws will be a strong contributor to the discourse surrounding sexual violence and efforts to reduce its incidence and consequences.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.