Eurocentrism and the construction of the ‘self’ in colonialism: The Okinawa–Japan relationality

Introduction

When studying colonialism, we often focus on the former colonies. There, the fundamental structure of conflict between the colonising and colonised powers is examined, revealing how this relationship of domination persists to this day. Conversely, it is also true that the colonisers were themselves shaped by a form of self-colonised subjectivity. ¹ In the case of colonisers from regions outside the West, such as Asia, this often manifested as extreme Eurocentrism. This is because non-Europeans must demonstrate that they possess subjectivity equal to that of Europeans, which requires them to excessively internalise the norms and values embedded in the prevailing orders, and this dynamic may be understood as self-colonisation.

In non-Western countries like Japan, which began its modernisation process in the late 19th century, the colonisation of Taiwan and Korea was a process of simultaneously colonising the Japanese self in a Eurocentric direction. The world at that time was structured by two orders: a horizontal international order on the basis of reason and a vertical imperial or colonial order grounded in violence and domination (Keene, 2002; Sakai, 2007). In order to participate in the Eurocentric structure of international society, vertical domination, namely, colonisation of other nations, was deemed to be essential. Joining the international society by colonising others simultaneously meant escaping from the danger of colonisation by European powers. Therefore, to constitute itself as a modern ‘self’ through Eurocentric subjectivity by colonising others was an urgent necessity to secure Japan’s very existence. Colonisation was not merely domination of other nations but a performative act through which Japan sought recognition as a sovereign subject within the Eurocentric order. ²

The significance of Okinawa as a case study becomes clear when we consider the asymmetric structure of the post-war East Asian order. The Cold War period is commonly characterised in Japan as a time of peace, yet this narrative conceals a profound positionality. As scholars have noted, post-war ‘peace’ was accessible only to specific strata in specific regions (Bilgin and Smith, 2024; Kavalski, 2015; Nakano, 2024). For the peoples of Okinawa, Korea, and Taiwan, the same period was one of occupation, military dictatorship, and unceasing violence. Kwon Hyeoktae captures this asymmetry precisely: though Korea and Japan exist within the same triangular security framework, they lived through distinct ‘post-war’ experiences, Japan enjoying ‘peace’, the Korean Peninsula enduring division and military rule (Kwon, 2016: vi–vii). The Korean Peninsula was a battlefield, Okinawa an occupied territory hosting US launch bases, and mainland Japan a site of reconstruction and economic growth, each interconnected through the presence of US military force (Yakahi, 2006: 23). This pluriversal structure of the post-war order (Shih, 2021; Trownsell et al., 2023) reveals that Eurocentrism in the region did not disappear with the end of Japanese imperialism but was reconstituted as the US-centred liberal security architecture at the core of East Asian diplomacy. It is precisely within this continuity of Eurocentric structuring that Japan’s ongoing colonial relationship with Okinawa must be situated. Okinawa’s position at the margins of both the Westphalian order and Japanese sovereignty makes it a particularly illuminating case for examining how Eurocentric meta-narratives are contested and reproduced (Chen and Shimizu, 2019).

How Japan colonised Okinawa is particularly important when studying Eurocentrism. This is because it reveals how non-European regions propagate Eurocentrism and what specific mechanisms are at work in its concentric spread. In this article, I contend that Japan’s process of colonising Okinawa had as one of its primary objectives the securing of its existence within a world swept by European imperialism, and this process was a complex interweaving of Eurocentrism, Japan’s inferior identity, Okinawa’s ambivalent position, and the transition of East Asian diplomatic systems towards the Westphalian order. In order to clarify this point, this paper focuses on relationality in Japan’s colonisation of Okinawa from the perspective of Japan’s Eurocentric subjectivity formation, that is, its self-colonisation. By re-reading these policies through the relational lens, it tries to unentangle the complexity of the non-Western colonisation process. First, it provides a theoretical discussion for the analysis of Eurocentrism and relationality by introducing the arborescent and rhizomatic organisation developed by Deleuze and Guattari. Second, it focuses specifically on the mechanism of Japan’s colonial rule over Okinawa, clarifying the concrete policies implemented. Third, it elucidates how such Japanese colonial policies contributed to the reinforcement of the Eurocentric structure through the construction of the non-Western Eurocentric self. Subsequently, it develops a tentative discussion on how to transcend Eurocentrism from relational perspectives.

The arborescent and the rhizomatic organisations: A theoretical framework

Deleuze and Guattari present two contrasting concepts as pathways for social organisation: the arborescent and the rhizomatic. The arborescent organisation represents a worldview based on fixed rules, presupposing that all things possess a structural form akin to roots, trunk, and leaves. This presupposes a structure that branches out vertically from a single root (origin or centre). This formation maintains itself by reproducing the arborescent structure. Underlying this is a series of assimilation processes that organise the world through binary oppositions (civilisation/barbarism, modernity/pre-modernity, and subject/object) and trace existing maps. Tracing involves reproducing a pre-given, existing structure in which any possibility of new connections or deviations is strictly excluded. Eurocentrism is a prime example of this, drawing nourishment from the roots of the colony; it utilises the branches and leaves – the parts and individuals – to channel sustenance towards the trunk: the core of the political and economic system. In contrast, the rhizome represents underground stems. It is depicted as heterogeneous, contingent, plural, and uncontrollable (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). The rhizome is conceived as a manifold that connects disparate elements, with its mode of recognition being a mapping that constantly generates new connections. In rhizomatic thinking, any point can be connected to any other point, and fixed hierarchies and binary oppositions are dismantled in principle. For example, for Viveiros de Castro, one of the prominent scholars of pluriverse, development in the traditional sense signifies the takeover of communities originally resembling the rhizomic organisation by the arborescent Eurocentric organisation. It has thus far been defined as development or growth to form communities in a manner dictated by fixed forms and development as supreme imperatives (Viveiros de Castro, 2017).

The Eurocentric structure of governance has developed as an arborescent trait, with everything structured around the centre. That single root is the European concept of reason and sovereignty, and the hierarchical structures derived from it have positioned non-Western regions as mere offshoots. In other words, Europe, not only in terms of political systems, economic structures and social formations but also ideologies and lifestyles, became the sole point of reference. Actors thrown into this environment shape their own subjectivity accordingly while conscious of this reference point. In other words, all who embarked on the path of modernisation after the West were destined to find themselves in the concentric circles, conscious of this vector pointing towards the centre. In short, within this structure, the only mode of recognition permitted to non-Western regions was that of ‘tracing’; entry into the international community was made possible only by tracing the existing map of European norms. Entry into the system of sovereign states, the demonstration of the capacity to conclude treaties, and conformity to civilisational standards were all acts of tracing the map of the European arborescent structure (Hamashita, 2004). In this sense, self-colonisation can be understood as the internalisation of tracing. Non-Westerners constructed themselves as Eurocentric subjects not only through external coercion but also by incorporating the logic of the arborescent structure into their own modes of cognition.

In contrast, the tribute system in East Asia prior to the 19th century and the Tokugawa regime in Japan possessed a rhizomatic character. While it is true that China and the Edo Shogunate occupied hegemonic positions, that order was maintained by a logic distinct from the arborescent model of vertical derivation from a single centre. The tribute system, for example, was a relatively loose system of governance based on virtue, possessing a polycentric structure in which Korea, pre-Edo Japan and Vietnam each functioned as ‘little Chinas’ (Hamashita, 2004). Boundaries within this system were not clearly demarcated but were maintained fluidly within a network of relations between multiple centres (Ringmar, 2012). In this sense, the tribute system can be understood as a rhizomatic manifold that, while possessing a fixed hierarchy, permits diverse connections and multiple centres. It was precisely this rhizomatic character of the system that enabled the ambiguous connection of the Ryukyu Kingdom, as will be discussed later, to both the tributary system of the Qing Dynasty and the bakuhan (shogunate-domains) system of Edo Shogunate.

Japan’s modernisation signified a transition from this rhizomatic tribute system to an arborescent Westphalian system. However, this transition was not merely a political or institutional change; it implied a more fundamental epistemological transformation, a shift from mapping the world rhizomatically to tracing it arborescently. The pluralistic, rhizomatic mode of existence of the Ryukyu Kingdom, belonging to both the Qing Dynasty and the Edo Shogunate, was not tolerated within the Westphalian system, which demands clear boundaries and singular allegiance (Chen and Shimizu, 2019). Japan’s entry into this system logically required that Ryukyu be torn away from its ambiguous, pluralistic allegiances and redefined as a single arborescent branch known as ‘Okinawa Prefecture’. In this sense, the Ryukyu Disposition can be understood as the first manifestation of the violence of arborescentisation. Japan transformed Ryukyu, with its rhizomatic mode of existence, into Okinawa through the logic of tracing Eurocentric arborescent structures.

However, the reception of Western geopolitical knowledge in Japan, while involving a transfer of geographical knowledge, did not bring about a complete transformation of spatiality, that is, the very mode of apprehending and organising space. In Deleuzian terms, this means that while Japan adopted an arborescent mode of tracing at the surface level, it continued to maintain its own rhizomatic logic of mapping at a deeper level. This paper applies this insight to an analysis of the Okinawa issue. Drawing on Watanabe’s insight that Japan’s reception of Western geopolitical knowledge was superficial and did not transform its underlying spatiality, that is, the mode of apprehending and organising space rooted in a concentric power structure with the Emperor as its vertical centre (Watanabe, 2026), this paper argues that Japan’s colonisation of Okinawa must be understood accordingly. At the surface level, it was carried out as a tracing of Eurocentric arborescence; yet at a deeper level, it was driven by this indigenous spatial logic that Westphalian adoption left fundamentally intact. What is important here is that the rhizomatic structure persisting at a deeper level was not simply non-hierarchical or liberatory. While the tribute and bakuhan systems were rhizomatic, they were simultaneously based on a hierarchical order with virtue. In other words, the vertical, concentric power structure centred on the emperor constitutes an innovation within this hierarchical rhizome. It is precisely this duality that holds the key to revealing the unique mechanisms of non-Western colonialism, which are often overlooked in critical analyses of Eurocentrism. What made Japan’s colonisation of Okinawa possible was not merely the logic of Westphalian arborescence but rather the tributary and bakuhan hierarchical logic that persisted at this deeper level. In other words, a dual operation was carried out: while justifying the colonisation of Okinawa on the surface using the Westphalian language of sovereignty and borders, at a deeper level, Okinawa was marginalised through the logic of the hierarchical centre-periphery order derived from the tribute and bakuhan systems. In this sense, the problem of Japan’s Eurocentric self-colonisation must be understood not merely as a matter of imitating arborescence but as a unique structure of violence produced by the combination of a hierarchy and arborescence.

Building upon the theoretical framework outlined above, this paper seeks to connect Deleuzian concepts with Buddhist relational theory. There is a significant affinity between the rhizome and the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (engi: pratītyasamutpāda). Both deny the existence of the subject as a fixed entity and situate existence within a web of relationships. Just as in rhizomatic thinking, any point can be connected to any other point; from the perspective of engi, no being can exist autonomously outside of interdependent relations with other beings. However, there are also significant differences between the two. Whereas the Deleuzian rhizome discusses generation, transformation, and lines of flight as positive forces, Buddhist dependent origination connects the ontological insights of impermanence, suffering, and non-self with ethical practice. In other words, the ontological recognition of the primacy of relations unfolds into an awareness of the illusion of a fixed subject, that is, the ignorance (mumyo: avidya) and into the practical and ethical responsibility grounded in that awareness. The reason this paper relies on Buddhist relational theory is simply that the critique of Eurocentrism does not stop at a mere epistemological re-examination but rather inquires into the conditions for liberation as an ontological reconfiguration. In this sense, the Deleuzian concept of the arborescent/rhizome functions as an analytical tool in this paper, while Buddhist relational theory serves as its ontological and ethical foundation.

The colonisation of Okinawa

The theoretical framework outlined above, the combination of surface-level arborescent tracing and the persistence of hierarchical logic at a deeper level, can now be applied to the concrete historical process of Japan’s colonisation of Okinawa. As will be shown, the Ryukyu Disposition of 1879 was not simply an act of Westphalian arborescentisation. Rather, it was simultaneously driven by the hierarchical spatial logic inherited from the tributary and bakuhan systems, in which the Ryukyus had long occupied an ambiguous nodal position. It is precisely this dual operation, Westphalian justification at the surface and tributary-derived centre-periphery logic at the depth, that constitutes the distinctive mechanism of Japan’s non-Western colonialism. The subsequent post-war relegation of Okinawa to the role of military base, while mainland Japan enjoyed peace and prosperity, represents not a rupture but a continuation of this same structural logic under the reconstituted form of US-centred liberal hegemony.

Generally, Japanese colonialism is considered to have commenced with the rule of Taiwan following the first Sino-Japanese War. Taiwan, acquired as a result of the Sino-Japanese War that concluded in 1895, allegedly represented the first major step towards securing its existence in the form of the Japanese Empire. However, when viewed within the context of Japan’s colonialist practices, the description of Taiwan as the first colony is not entirely accurate. This is because Japan had already been advancing colonial policies at an earlier stage. Here, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and Ezochi (Hokkaido) come into the picture. Within the context of the subsequent colonisation of Taiwan and Korea, the colonisation of the Ryukyus – which, unlike Ezochi, was, before the full-scale annexation by Japan, already established as an independent nation within the rhizomatic tributary system with China – held a significant meaning. This is because many of the colonial policies implemented in Okinawa were later applied to Taiwan and Korea as well, and in that sense, the colonisation of Okinawa can be regarded as the prototype of Japanese colonialism (Teruya, 2009).

The Ryukyu Kingdom was initially invaded by the Satsuma domain of Japan in 1609, and subsequently, for more than 250 years, it remained part of a dual tributary system centred on China (the Qing) and Japan (the Edo shogunate) (Mogi, 1997). The tributary system, unlike Eurocentrism, possessed a loose and ambiguous rhizomatic structure. While China undoubtedly formed its core, with successive dynasties occupying its centre in a hierarchical manner (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003; Kang, 2010), the hierarchy was not hegemonic. Rather, it can be understood as a comparatively loose system of governance on the basis of virtue. The Japanese bakuhan system of this era was supposedly a system of governance modelled on the China-centred tributary system (Maruyama, 1952). The historical fact that the Ryukyu Kingdom belonged to both the Qing-centred tributary system and the Edo shogunate-centred bakuhan system clearly demonstrates that, unlike the arborescent structure of Eurocentrism, the tributary system was founded upon highly ambiguous boundaries with multiple centres. In this context, the Ryukyus can be seen as a node connecting both the Qing dynasty and the Edo shogunate. This node was not unique to the Ryukyus. For example, the distinguished China Studies historian Hamashita Takeshi explains the tributary system as follows:

This China-centred order nevertheless permitted Korea, Japan, and Vietnam to assert themselves as ‘centres’ vis-à-vis smaller neighbouring states under their sway. The region was sustained by a hierarchical order defined by the Confucian conception of a ‘rule of virtue’. Like any other order, it was backed by military force, but when the system functioned well, principles of reciprocity involving politics and economics permitted long periods of peaceful interaction. (Hamashita, 2004: 20)

Korea, Japan, and Vietnam were each permitted to become the provincial ‘centre’ of their respective regions, that is, to become a ‘lesser China’. The tributary system was, in this way, constituted by the networking of multiple centres on the basis of the rule of virtue.

However, the transition of the Ryukyu Kingdom to Okinawa Prefecture in the late 19th century, following the Meiji Restoration, namely, the legal annexation of the Ryukyus by the Japanese Empire, can be regarded as a shift from the tributary system to the Eurocentric Westphalian system in terms of legal institutions. It represented a transformation from a loose system of relations to a more clearly defined hegemonic structure in which the boundaries of each entity became distinct, shifting towards a tree-like system possessing an absolute centre: Europe. Indeed, the Japanese Empire abolished feudal domains and established prefectures nationwide in 1871, set up the Ryukyu domain in 1872, and transferred it to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1874. In response, the Qing Dynasty and the Ryukyu Kingdom protested, escalating the matter into an international issue. Nevertheless, in 1879, the Japanese Empire forcibly annexed the Ryukyus as a de jure colony under international law and established Okinawa Prefecture (Yasuda, 2006). This violent colonisation, termed the ‘Ryukyu Disposition’, profoundly impacted the locals in the Ryukyus through various aspects such as the creation of family names and the forced adoption of the Japanese language. At its core, however, lay a transformation towards a Eurocentric arborescent structure. In other words, as Japan joined the Westphalian system as a nation-state, it repositioned the Ryukyus as Okinawa, that is, by controlling its name, altering its identity, and regulating its language, redefining it not as a vassal state within the rhizomatic quasi-tributary system but as a colony within the arborescent Westphalian system (Hook and Siddle, 2001; Hoshino, 2018; Nakano, 2024; Ota, 1996; Sakurazawa, 2017).

This did not, of course, mean that Okinawa attained an equal standing with other regions of Japan because of the remaining hierarchical structure of bakuhan system. For instance, Okinawa was entirely absent from the philosophy of world history developed by the Kyoto School during the Second World War, indicating it was not incorporated within the framework of ‘Japan’ engaged in warfare with the West (Kosaka et al., 1943). Nevertheless, Okinawa’s unequal position violently thrust it onto the main stage of East Asian history just before the war’s end. Okinawa was the only place in Japan where ground battles took place during the Second World War, resulting in over 100,000 civilian casualties from the fierce fighting. Some were victims of mass suicides enforced by the military, while records also document many civilians falling victim to US military machine-gun fire (Hook and Siddle, 2001; Hoshino, 2018; Nakano et al., 2006; Nomura, 2019; Takahashi, 2012). Post-war correspondence from Emperor Shōwa to General MacArthur of the GHQ stated that Okinawa should be permitted for US military use under a long-term lease of 25–50 years, while the mainland of Japan retains its sovereignty. This was deemed the most appropriate method to satisfy the public opinion of the mainland Japanese (Ota, 2000; Takahashi, 2012). As a result, Okinawa remained under US military control for 25 years until its reversion to Japan in 1972. In other words, while Okinawa was outside Japan’s territory, it became a crucial cornerstone in the subjectivity construction of Japan and the US through the Japan–US Security Treaty.

From an international legal perspective, Okinawa was an entity separated from Japanese sovereignty during the US occupation. For instance, when fishing vessels from Okinawa and Kōchi were seized in Indonesia during the 1960s, the Kōchi vessel was released relatively quickly through the efforts of the Japanese Embassy in Indonesia. In contrast, the Japanese Embassy made no such representations to the Indonesian government regarding the release of the Okinawan vessel. It was the US government that actively intervened with the Indonesian government in the case of the Okinawa vessel (Ota, 2000). For the Japanese government, the Okinawan and Kōchi fishing vessels represented distinct entities. While the crew aboard the Kōchi vessel were Japanese nationals, the crew of the Okinawan vessel were Okinawans, not Japanese. This distinction is further supported by the following facts. During the 1960s, Okinawan fishing vessels were effectively stateless. Consequently, they faced discriminatory treatment from various nations and, in some instances, were even fired upon. Efforts were therefore made to persuade the Japanese government to allow Okinawan vessels to fly the Japanese flag. Following persistent negotiations, Okinawan vessels were finally permitted to fly the Japanese flag in July 1967. However, this was conditional upon displaying a triangular flag bearing the word ‘Ryukyu’ above the Japanese flag. Okinawan fishing boats thus occupied a delicate position: they were Japanese fishing boats, yet not entirely so (Ota, 2000).

The series of discriminatory treatments by Japan towards Okinawa has persisted throughout the post-war period and continues to this day. The plan to relocate the Futenma Air Station, described as a globally unparalleled dangerous base, clearly demonstrates that discriminatory attitudes towards Okinawa still exist within Japan. The people of Okinawa have long fervently desired the relocation of the base outside the prefecture. Okinawa Prefecture, a mere 0.6% of Japan’s land area, hosts 74% of US military bases (Takahashi, 2012). Criminal offences committed by US military personnel near bases between 1972 and 2023 totalled 6235 cases, including 586 violent crimes such as murder, rape, and arson (Yoshida, 2024). Furthermore, perpetrators of such crimes were, when they were US military personnel, protected under the Japan–US Status of Forces Agreement and, until recent years, were rarely punished under Japanese law (Takahashi, 2012). It is also worth noting here that when a US military helicopter crashed into the Okinawa International University campus adjacent to Futenma Air Station, the US military unilaterally sealed off the campus, barring university personnel from entering, and refused to allow Okinawa’s fire department or Okinawa Prefectural Police to conduct an on-site investigation (Hoshino, 2018). This clearly demonstrates the extraterritoriality enjoyed by the US military in Okinawa. Above all, what complicates this issue is that the Japanese government did not protest to the US military regarding this matter. Regarding this point, Tetsuya Takahashi, a preeminent philosopher, explains that it is a situation legitimised by both the Japanese and US governments and that ‘it is not only the US side that benefits from this situation, but the Japanese government does so as well’ (Takahashi, 2012, p. loc. 1691/2146).

What are the benefits for the Japanese government, then? A distinguished cultural studies scholar, Shunya Yoshimi, sees the answer in the externalisation of base-related violence. In the 1950s, US military bases were deployed throughout Japan. There, various forms of violence had a profound impact on local populations (Yoshimi, 2007). The situation regarding sexual violence was particularly shocking. It is well documented that the Japanese government established military ‘comfort stations’ in various locations during Second World War in order to allegedly reduce the sexual assaults (Hayashi, 2015). Similarly, the Japanese government established ‘comfort stations’ for US soldiers all over Japan shortly after the war (Maeda, 2001), and this illustrates how the expansion of military bases and the systemic production of sexual violence became structurally intertwined. Numerous resident movements emerged in response to this pervasive violence, compelling the government to take action. The result was the reduction of bases on the mainland and the expansion of bases in Okinawa. The concentration of US military bases in Okinawa meant that mainland Japan retained bases only in very limited areas such as Hirosaki, Yokosuka, Iwakuni, and Sasebo. Consequently, the base violence that had previously been present on the mainland rapidly lost its presence. Instead, the United States appeared to Japan with a new identity representing consumer culture and economic prosperity (Yoshimi, 2007). In essence, the violence inherent in US bases became dissociated from consumer culture. The rupture between the America represented by base violence and the America represented by economic prosperity and consumer culture unfolded in a manner mirroring the disconnection between Okinawa and mainland Japan. It is precisely this domestic Japanese atmosphere of ‘peace and stability’, born of this rupture, that constitutes the aforementioned interest of the Japanese government.

This domestic order, maintained through the separation of violence and economic prosperity, was sustained for many years under successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations. The first to challenge this status quo was the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which seized power in 2009. Eager to emphasise its difference from the LDP, the DPJ government formulated the goal of ‘at least relocating the base outside the prefecture’ regarding US military bases, particularly Futenma, and indeed attempted to formulate policies towards achieving this goal. The Democratic administration had finally tried to address the elephant in the room. However, this policy objective met stubborn opposition from multiple quarters domestically and was swiftly abandoned. At the National Governors’ Association meeting held in May 2010, for example, many governors avoided explicitly stating their acceptance of base relocation, arguing that ‘national defence is a matter for the central government’ (Shimabukuro, 2019: 316).

This sequence of events illustrates how Okinawa has long been regarded as indispensable to Japan while simultaneously being perceived as other. In this way, Eurocentric Japanese subjectivity constituted itself through the othering of Okinawa, positing it as that which stands in opposition to the Japanese ‘self’. The subjectivity of the ‘self’ is constituted by being reflected in the non-self as a mirror. The ‘self’ reflected therein gains the identity of a nation, the sense of ‘us’ (Garcia, 2021), that enjoys sovereignty in the international community as a bearer of Eurocentrism, that is, a growth-oriented economic order and support for the prevailing security regime of US hegemony.

Japan’s Eurocentric self-formation and Okinawa

In a sense, the distortions of the arboreal structure of Eurocentrism manifested themselves in Okinawa as a periphery. During the war, Okinawa was the ground for a brutal battle; post-war, it became the cornerstone of the Japan–US security framework, serving as a base for the US military’s deployment across Asia. What is clear here is that Japan, in its attempt to internalise the European arborescent system of values, proved unable to manage the violence inherent in that arboreal structure. Consequently, Okinawa was positioned as the entity that would bear this violence, pushed outward and marginalised at the periphery of the tree itself (Yoshimi, 2007). In other words, post-war Japan’s peace and democracy have been established through the externalisation of violence at Okinawa’s expense (Takahashi, 2012), and this externalisation of violence has been rendered invisible through the recent rediscovery of Okinawa as a popular tourist destination (Matsumura, 2015; Nomura, 2019).

The promotion of Okinawa as a tourist destination is naturally underpinned by several binary oppositions inherent to Eurocentrism: namely, civilised/exotic, reason/emotion, modern/primitive, and culture/nature. These combinations precisely represent the gaze Eurocentrism has directed towards the Orient, as pointed out by numerous postcolonial thinkers such as Edward Said and Takeuchi Yoshimi in the context of Western incursion into the Orient (Said, 1978, 1993; Takeuchi, 2005), and this gaze has been transplanted directly onto Japan’s view of Okinawa. Here, a discriminatory gaze towards the islands deemed barbaric and uncivilised justifies the imposition of military violence, while an exotic, oriental image materialises in the form of a popular tourist destination. The former is associated with images of underdevelopment, such as dilapidated buildings and poorly maintained roads, while the latter emphasises the vivid blue sea and deep forests that pique the traveller’s curiosity.

The connection between violence and tourism in Okinawa can be clarified by tracing post-war Okinawan history and the record of messages Japan has directed towards Okinawa. This began with the establishment of the Okinawa Development Agency by the Japanese government in 1972, the year of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Prior to this, relations between Okinawa and Japan had been largely formal, conducted through the Japanese Government Southern Liaison Office established in 1952 under GHQ directives. The primary activities conducted through this office were travel procedures to Japan and economic and cultural exchanges. During this period, the Japanese government’s aid to the Ryukyu Government for Okinawa’s reconstruction amounted to 0.2% of the Japanese government general account expenditure budget, totalling ¥123.2 billion. In contrast, the US government’s expenditure during the same period was ¥164.9 billion. However, the majority of the ¥123.2 billion spent by Japan constituted post-1969 reversion-related expenditure, following the confirmation of Okinawa’s return to Japan (Miyata, 2018). Subsequently, the Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Agency was established in 1970, followed by the Okinawa Development Agency upon Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972. Accordingly, the government expenditure on Okinawa increased, targeting the correction of disparities with mainland Japan.

In 1971, prior to Okinawa’s reversion, the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion and Development of Okinawa (old law) was enacted to promote Okinawa’s revitalisation and development. This law was amended in 2002 to become the Act on Special Measures for the Development of Okinawa (new law), which remains in force today. Both laws were fundamentally enacted to stimulate Okinawa’s economic development and, in that sense, share a similar structure. However, what is interesting is the order of priority within the revitalisation and development plans. Under the old law, tourism was stipulated as the 11th item out of 14, indicating it formed part of the promotion plan, while the bulk of the plan focused on economic development through infrastructure and similar means. In other words, apart from this explicit inclusion of tourism within the development plan, tourism was not discussed elsewhere in the old law. In contrast, under the new law, tourism is listed as the very first of the 12 basic policy items (though Article 3-2, which establishes the basic policy, lists 13 items, with the first being the purpose of promotion and the specific content beginning from item 2 onwards). Furthermore, while other items are allocated only around 2–5 articles each for specific content, tourism is allocated 29 articles (The second most prominent item is Article 14 concerning the ‘International Logistics Hub Industrial Cluster Plan, etc.’). It is thus evident that tourism is given significant emphasis in the new law. As mentioned earlier, this signifies that the coercive nature imposed upon Okinawa has been subsumed within the rhetoric of ‘Okinawan development through tourism’, a process that has been reinforced within the flow of history.

Beyond Eurocentrism: From a Mahayana Buddhist theory of relationality

The relationship between Okinawa and Japan has been left in a state of entanglement for many years. The Okinawan people’s long-held wish for the relocation of military bases remains unfulfilled, while its ‘exotic’ image has been exceedingly emphasised for tourism, presumably becoming the main source of economic growth. Underlying this is the unspoken discriminatory consciousness Japan holds towards Okinawa, where Eurocentric colonialism, hierarchical order of bakuhan system and US hegemonic security strategy are closely intertwined (Nakano, 2024; Nakano et al., 2006; Nomura, 2019; Ota, 1996, 2000; Tomiyama, 1990). However, the colonisation of Okinawa cannot be understood solely through the lens of Japan’s violence towards Okinawa. Various intertwined relationalities are at play, and only by unravelling these entangled connections can the full picture be depicted.

How, then, should we understand Japan’s ongoing colonialism towards Okinawa on the basis of Eurocentrism? As discussed in this paper, Okinawa has served as a mirror image for the formation of Japanese subjectivity. The concept of ‘Japanese’ can only be established in relation to others, and the existence of the Okinawan people has fulfilled the role of the ‘other’ within this framework:

The identity of the Okinawan people has always been formed in tandem with the mirror image of ‘Japan’ or ‘the Japanese’. The mirror in which ‘the Ryukyus’ or ‘Ryukyuan people’ reflected themselves, and the mirror in which ‘Japan’ or ‘Japanese people’ reflected themselves, sometimes reflected an image where the two were unified, and sometimes reflected a difference that could never be unified. Yet, the self-image each drew, amplified by these mirror images, was formed. (Hasegawa and Kuramoto, 2000)

Here, whereas Hasegawa & Kuramoto use ‘identity’ in referring to the self-formation of Japanese, what they call identity here corresponds more closely to what I define as subjectivity. This point is well captured in the argument developed by Ichiro Tomiyama, a pre-eminent scholar of Okinawan studies:

The formation of the ‘Okinawan’ was also the formation of the ‘Japanese’. That is to say, just as the ‘Okinawan’ is unrelated to the cultural attributes of Okinawans, the ‘Japanese’ is unrelated to the cultural attributes of the Japanese. Furthermore, becoming ‘Japanese’ is not a matter of the cultural differences between Okinawans and the Japanese. Moreover, how ‘Okinawan’ is defined simultaneously determines the circuitry through which becoming ‘Japanese’ is prepared. (Tomiyama, 1990: 4)

Japanese and Okinawans have long been entangled with each other in the structure of Eurocentrism since the Meiji Restoration. From the beginning of its modernisation process, Japan needed a non-Japanese in order to constitute Eurocentric subjectivity. Constituting an other became the primary means through which Japan secured recognition and stabilised its existence. But this non-Japanese had to be inferior to the Japanese in order for Japan to occupy a certain position in the Eurocentric structure. Because Eurocentrism ranks subjects hierarchically, recognition is possible only through positioning others as more peripheral. The remaining hierarchical perspective of the tributary system and the bakuhan system that persisted in the region strongly reinforced the constitution of Japan’s Eurocentric subjectivity. Colonisation thus became a structural necessity rather than a mere political choice. Hierarchy is not accidental within Eurocentrism; it is constitutive of subject formation.

The Takeuchi Yoshimi employs more corrosive language to refer to the production of the ‘Japanese’ as ‘masters’ in world history:

At the turning point towards modernity, Japan harboured a decisive sense of inferiority towards Europe (this was due to the excellence of Japanese culture). It then began to pursue Europe with fierce determination. It was conceived that becoming Europe, or rather, becoming a better Europe, was the path to liberation. In other words, it sought liberation from being a slave by becoming the master of slaves. (Takeuchi, 2002, p. loc.494/4320)

This relationship itself is not necessarily new. It is, in fact, a problem recognised from the outset of postcolonialism. The formation of ‘Japanese’ and ‘Okinawan’ occurs through the activation of the binary oppositions emanating from Eurocentrism, such as civilisation/barbarism, stability/chaos, certainty/uncertainty, culture/nature, development/underdevelopment, predictability/unpredictability, and peace/violence. These provide the basis for identities that emerge alongside the binary opposition of the Occident/Orient. Through this circuit, Eurocentric values become embedded within Japan/Okinawa relations. However, as Takeuchi notes, unlike Western nations, Japan entered world history as a ‘slave’. ³ In other words, for Japan to survive in the Eurocentric structure, it must become an active actor in international relations rather than a mere passive recipient. In this sense, colonies were absolutely necessary because non-Europeans had to be more Eurocentric than Europeans in order to prove that they were equal members of the club. Simply proving that they are similar to Europeans was not sufficient. They must be even better Europeans to retain their membership. In this way, the Eurocentric structure continues to reproduce itself through the transformation of the ‘other’ into the ‘self’.

Eurocentrism persists to this day because it is grounded in an ontological commitment to substantial and hierarchical subjects. How, then, might this structure be resisted? Such resistance cannot be achieved solely at the epistemological level. Rather, it must be addressed as an ontological issue. Within a Mahayana Buddhist ontological framework, the emphasis shifts from subjects producing relations to relations constituting subjects (Shimizu, 2021, 2024). To borrow the words of Edward Keene and Sakai Tetsuya, the collusive relationship between the Eurocentric International Order and the violent Colonial Order constitutes the Japan/Okinawa subjectivities (Keene, 2002; Sakai, 2007). For those residing on the Japanese mainland, an order centred on America and Europe – structured through diplomacy, cooperation, non-intervention, and sovereignty – serves as the mediation through which the subjectivity of the Japanese is produced. Within this configuration, a relatively non-violent international order becomes the default horizon of perception, shaping political common sense.

On the other hand, Okinawa was created as a site for the apparatus of violence – conceived as a necessary evil – required by the metropole as it conducted diplomatic negotiations and discussions with its peer states. Simultaneously, its construction as a tourist destination for those inhabiting the international order, the very existence of this apparatus of violence is rendered invisible. For the people living in Okinawa, the world means to be daily reproduced by colonial relations, which are characterised by conflicts such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Palestinian conflict, the Iraq War, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the Afghanistan War (Nomura, 2019). Indeed, many US soldiers who participated in these military operations departed from the bases in Okinawa to travel to the battlefields. Okinawa has become a strategic stronghold not only for the Far East but also for Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Yoneyama, 2010), where it is produced and reproduced as an entrance to battlefields swirling with uncertainty and unpredictability.

The Japan/Okinawa dichotomy is reproduced daily, with the colonial relationship generated by Eurocentrism at its core. Buddhist understanding of relationality emphasises that this situation is produced by the illusion of a fixed subject. That is, whether in Japan or Okinawa, existence mediated through relationships is ephemeral and does not necessarily possess permanence. That it appears to exist as if inherently so is due to our ignorance (avidya), and in this sense, we bear the responsibility to transcend this state of ignorance (Shimizu and Noro, 2024; Sueki, 2018, 2024). In other words, we must recognise that there is no such thing as an essential ‘Japanese person’ or ‘Okinawan person’; these are existences produced within Eurocentric relations.

Considering this, accepting the ontological argument that the subject itself, as taught by Buddhism, does not exist prior to relationality can be seen as one way to overcome Eurocentrism. This tendency is particularly pronounced in Japan, where we find the existence of diverse types of words representing the ‘I’ – such as ‘私’ (watashi/watakushi), ‘俺’ (ore), ‘僕’ (boku), ‘自分’ (jibun), and ‘うち’ (uchi). These pronouns for the ‘self’ each presuppose subtly different relational contexts and do not carry identical meanings. This is because ‘the words used are determined only within the context of the relationship with the other’ (Sueki, 2019: 28). The notion that relation precedes existence and subjectivity expresses the subject’s state of dislocation and suspension. If relations construct the subject, then the subject cannot possess a fixed and continuous being as well as subjectivity. Thus, all subjects depend on relationality, and such subjects can be said to be destined to exist in a constant state of existential anxiety. It is only when we accept this existential anxiety of the subject that we gain the possibility of liberation. Simultaneously, this represents an ethical imperative towards the people of Okinawa. In this sense, overcoming the concept of the subject presupposed by Eurocentrism is the responsibility incumbent upon us. ⁴

Conclusion

The relationship between Japan and Okinawa is constructed through a web of diverse relations, such as the International and colonial orders, economic development and prosperity. Simultaneously, the development of the tourism industry, operating within a binary opposition of centre/periphery, can also be seen as one such relationality. What is common to these relations is a Eurocentric perspective, with the binary opposition itself forming its foundation. Poststructuralism and postcolonialism have long subjected this point to rigorous critique. Yet the reason this binary opposition persists seems to lie in the manner in which subjects are posited. Even poststructuralism and postcolonialism may not have sufficiently critically engaged with the very existence of the ‘subject’. Might not the profoundly entrenched image of the subject, dating back to Descartes, have constrained our thinking?

As discussed in this paper, ‘Japan’ and ‘Okinawa’ are constructs within Eurocentrism; these categories do not exist as essential entities. Consequently, to speak of liberation as a ‘Japanese’ or an ‘Okinawan’ contains the paradox of reconstructing these categories in the name of liberation. In contrast, from the Buddhist relational perspective introduced in this paper, neither ‘Japanese’ nor ‘Okinawan’ essentially exists. These are merely provisional phenomena that temporarily manifest within the framework of dependent origination. In this sense, liberation from Eurocentrism is not achieved by essentialising the categories of ‘Japanese’ or ‘Okinawan’ but becomes possible only through a deeper recognition that these categories are products of relationality.

This also raises another question of who is to carry out whose liberation, and in what capacity. From a Buddhist perspective, the act of an essentialised subject ‘acting on behalf of’ others’ liberation carries the risk of creating a different form of subject-centrism. Liberation is not something bestowed from the outside by a specific subject but rather something that emerges from the reconfiguration of relationships. In this sense, the ontological reconfiguration proposed in this paper is positioned not as the goal of liberation but as an attempt to re-examine its conditions.

Today, non-Western nations, primarily China and India, are using the term ‘Global South’ to challenge the Western-centric international order. The history of wartime Japan, which plunged headlong into a devastating war from a similar perspective, must now be re-examined in detail. The most crucial aspect here is how the subject ‘Japan’ was constructed relationally through the dynamics of self-colonisation analysed in this paper. The relationship between Japan and Okinawa discussed in this paper can be understood as one such scene within this broader narrative. To gain a deeper understanding of contemporary international relations, the issues of subject construction and relationality require further examination.