Police capacity and autonomy issues in sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws in Punjab

Abstract

Contemporary research mainly relates police ineffectiveness in sectarian crimes prevention-investigation and enforcement of anti-terror laws to disorganized police infrastructure, a shortage of manpower, a lack of professionalism and limited access to modern equipment. This article, by applying capacity (i.e. manpower, resources, professional and technical training, etc.) and autonomy (effective and neutral exercise of powers within mandates delegated to them) concepts, aims to examine police effectiveness in the enforcement of anti-sectarian laws in the context of interference in their functions by the political executive and the State’s Army. It addresses the question: How do police capacity and autonomy issues affect police effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws? This article applies a mixed method research approach by using data from books, journal articles, newspapers, TV talk shows, online sources and interviews. It relates the police’s effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws to their capacity and autonomy issues in the Punjab Province of Pakistan. It argues that the police due to capacity and autonomy issues cannot exercise delegated powers impartially, which affects their effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws.

Keywords

autonomy capacity executive police sectarian crimes

Introduction

The police being the agent of social control are directly confronted with crime prevention-investigation.¹ Due to a permanent presence in society and by performing duties of law enforcement, they are usually the first to make contact with accused offenders and are in a position to make some very important decisions about what will happen to those individuals. Perhaps the most frequent decision that a police officer makes is whether to initiate an alleged offender’s journey through the maze of criminal justice (Kappeler, 2012). They are the most vital pillar for the elimination of religious-sectarian crimes. According to one study, “73 percent of religious groups ended through policing and intelligence operations, while only 11 percent ended through a political settlement and 16 percent ended through military force” (Jones and Fair, 2010: 99–100).

South Asian countries, including Pakistan, inherited a colonial police force. In these countries, police autonomy issues are the direct fallout of this colonial legacy. During colonial times, the police’s main functions were maintenance of law and order and suppression of rebellion. Detection and prevention-investigation of crime were almost a secondary function, and information collection was prioritized to keep the rulers informed about any possible uprisings against them (Imam, 2011: 2). Just like the colonizers, Pakistani civilian-military rulers have used the police as an instrument to suppress political opposition and to stifle dissent. The police have been deprived of functioning as an autonomous institution with distinct professional capabilities of extending security and protection to citizens (Petzschmann, 2010: 7–8).

Police in Pakistan, or Punjab, are regarded as a force of oppression, not of providing services to protect the people, and are notorious for serving the interests of the wealthy, politicians, bureaucrats and those who have the clout to obtain special treatment. They are considered anti-people due to thana (police station) culture, a term employed in Pakistan to explain a “Police mind-set that accepts as common practice such abuses as demanding bribes for performing Police services, illegal detention, and extraction of confessions through third-degree methods” (Perito and Parvez, 2014: 3).

The police are a deeply politicized, massively corrupt and incompetent force. This is visible in the citizens’ lack of respect towards the state laws. The tit-far-tat struggle between sectarian groups is a grim indication of how the police have turned into a helpless spectator before the rising proclivity of hate speech crimes or hurting other sects’ religious feelings through insulting their belief systems in sectarian rituals which often incite violence. Instead, to effectively enforce anti-terror laws to eradicate sectarian-terrorism related crimes, the police itself falls prey to targeted attacks and mass shootings by the sectarian and terrorist elements. All over Pakistan, since 2005 to February 2017, a total of 2426 police officials have died and another 3916 have been injured in sectarian-terrorism-linked violence. This is the second highest figure after the 22,716 civilians who died during this period (Rana, 2017).

The terms sectarian violence and sectarianism commonly refer to religious discrimination “involving conflict between members of different religions or denominations of the same religion on the basis of adherence to particular religious dogmas” (Waseem, 2010: 34). However, in Pakistan, as in this article, sectarianism or sectarian conflict is primarily understood as a conflict between Sunni-Deobandi and Shia sects. Sipha-e-Sahaba of Pakistan (SSP) and Tahreek-e-Fiqa Jafferia (TFJ) and their splinter groups respectively represent Sunni and Shia sects in this sectarian conflict. The SSP is generally known as the mother of all kinds of sectarian, Jihadi and terrorist groups, and one of its splinter groups (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, LeJ) has morphed into the said groups. These groups and sectarian violence are the byproduct of the General Zia (1977–1988) Islamization policies and the state use of Jihadi elements as a tool for serving strategic interests through them, which also promoted the culture of fanaticism, sectarianism and violence among Sunni-Shia sects in Pakistan.

Previous studies, for instance a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report (Jamal, 2011), have found the police to be an outdated force of coercion which can neither maintain the state writ nor give minimum assurance of security and protection to sectarian communities. This report relates the police’s ineffectiveness in crime detection-investigation and enforcement of anti-sectarian laws to their infrastructural disorganization (Jamal, 2011: 1). Abbas (2011) records police lack of capacity (i.e. lack of manpower, equipment, forensic laboratories, modernization, professional training, resources, cooperation with other intelligence networks, etc.) as a reason for their weaknesses in preventing sectarian crimes and implementing anti-terror laws. However, no study has related police lack of capacity to exercise state powers and ineffectiveness in sectarian crime reduction to their autonomy issues, i.e. interference in the police functions by the political executive and the state military.

Fukuyama refers to autonomy as the process in which the “political principal” sanctions authority to administrative institutions, i.e. the police in the case of this study. The political principal must fix mandates for the police, but once the mandate is delegated, the force and its officials should be autonomous to fulfil responsibilities within the parameter recorded in legal and procedural frameworks. In cases of non-autonomous police, the political executive interferes in their functions, which causes ineffectiveness in crime prevention-investigation and mismanagement of the citizens’ security (Fukuyama, 2013: 10). Both extreme subordination and excessive autonomy are perilous for effective governance, because unnecessary subordination causes poor governance and excessive autonomy at times hamstrings institutional and officials’ cooperation. Less or more autonomy can be a bad or good aspect depending on how much essential capacity the police or another institution has (Fukuyama, 2013: 11–13).

Police effectiveness in prevention-investigation of crimes and enforcement of laws depends on their capacity for exercising state powers and their autonomy in the domain of delegated responsibilities. Punjab’s police capacity and autotomy issue is the subject of this study. It applies the capacity (i.e. manpower, resources, professional and technical training, etc.) and autonomy (effective and impartial exercise of powers within mandates delegated to them) concepts to examine police effectiveness in relation to sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-sectarian laws. The study investigates whether the police have capacity and autonomy enough for effectiveness in the enforcement of law and prevention of sectarian-terrorist crimes in the Punjab Province of Pakistan. It covers the time period of Shahbaz Sharif’s rule (2008–2018) over Punjab. It applies the mixed method of research by using data from books, journal articles, newspapers, TV talk shows, online sources and interviews.

The article consists of four sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section maps police capacity issues in sectarian crime prevention-investigation and enforcement of anti-terror laws in Punjab. The third section deals with police autonomy issues and comprises two sub-sections: the first sub-section attempts to delineate Punjab’s executive meddling in police functions and responsibilities in regard to sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-sectarian laws; the second explains the police dependency on the military’s resources and equipment and the latter’s interference in the former’s autonomous functions of maintaining law and order and enforcement of anti-sectarian laws. The fourth section concludes in the context of the study objectives.

Police capacity issues in handling sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror laws

Punjab has a total police strength of 160,000–180,000 personnel (both officers and low cadres). This is one officer for every 520–585 citizens, which is a little less than the average internationally. Due to mismanagement, politicians deployment of police officials for personal services, only 40,000 officers are routinely deployed in police stations for handling sectarian crimes and enforcement of laws, with the remaining force being deployed for the protocol and security of very important persons (VIPs), foreign offices and dignitaries, and for traffic policing, etc. (Petzschmann, 2010: 7). Punjab Police have only 82,000 arms and 5000 bulletproof jackets in total. Police officials time and again acknowledge the shortage of arms, including very basic training and modern automatic weapons, following failure to prevent attacks on religious places of sectarian minorities in Punjab (Abbas, 2011: 7).

The police carry many although incompatible mandates. Besides crime control duties, they have to thwart occurrences of religious sins, like sex outside of marriage and drinking alcohol. While considering police capacity, in terms of manpower, undefined mandates and inconsistent tasks are unachievable and affect police effectiveness as well as neutrality in power exercises. Non-police duties, which are not included in their core mandate, deplete police strength deployed at police stations for enforcement of anti-terror laws. One police officer described that he had been repeatedly ordered by the authorities to involve the force in many extraneous duties like “helping the electric company disconnect city residents who illegally tapped into power lines, dispensing the polio vaccine to children at Police roadblocks, preventing overpricing in vegetable markets, and monitoring kite flying to prevent fights over intentionally cut kite strings” (Perito and Parvez, 2014: 7–8).

The police lack alternative resources in times of need. Besides corruption and embezzlement, the majority of the budget earmarked for the police is consumed on extra services, which causes less investment in cadre training and purchasing equipment, including modern automatic weapons essential for maintaining law and order and for confronting the troubles stemming from sectarian activities. Out of the total police funds, 30 and 50 percent in rural and urban regions respectively are consumed for VIP protocol duties (Ahmad, 2016: 27). Police stations regularly lack the budget for ordinary things like stationery, proper sitting rooms for applicants/guests or fuel and travel stipends for field duties (Jamal and Patil, 2008: 136).

The police’s substantial deficiencies in resources are reflected in sub-standard arms and low-quality training, which make them vulnerable to sectarian-terrorists attacks instead of reducing crime opportunities for them (Cordesman and Vira, 2011: 115). In March–April 2016, the police withdrew from action against the Chotu gang (a small group of criminal and sectarian LeJ activists) after seven police officers were killed and 24 others were made captive in the Rajanpur district of Punjab (Khan, 2016).

Due to the police’s lack of professionalism, they pay less attention to enforcement of anti-sectarian laws and detection of crimes. Instead of proactively taking action, they mainly handle the apprehension of those who had previously committed crimes. Tariq Khosa, a former Director General of Federal Inverstigation Agency, noting police plans, said that the simple release of a ‘black book’ (containing the names of the most-wanted criminals) by the Inspector General of Police is a futile exercise. He said that for sectarian crimes, the police need a permanent list of sectarian militants’ categorizations and then following of such militants could be effective in crime prevention if enforced at a police station level (Khosa is cited in Jamal and Patil, 2008: 132).

In reality, the police lack the competence to check the activities of known sectarian militants. Most suspected or confirmed sectarian-terrorists and their organizers’ names are merely placed in the Fourth Schedule clause 11-EE of the Anti-terrorism Act 1997. The Fourth Schedule is a list that “comprises the elements found to be or suspected to be involved in anti-state activities, delivering hate speeches and/or activists of religious outfits not yet banned but related with militancy in any way” (Mahmood, 2016). Three types of militants are put on the Fourth Schedule list: Islamic extremists, sectarian extremists and Baloch nationalists. Fourth Schedulers are under regular surveillance by different intelligence agencies, including the police (personal communication with a senior police officer at the National Counter-Terrorism Authority, 27 March 2017, Islamabad).

In Pakistan, 8000 sectarian-terrorists (including their sponsors and sympathizers) are listed in the Fourth Schedule. According to a December 2016 report, this list has been reduced by 20 percent, with 5 percent of the terrorists reportedly missing. Police Station House Officers usually avoid taking action against latent militants or supporters until they are no longer involved in violence within their areas of concern, which encourages militant sleeper cells to get involve in other regions (Noorani, 2016). Out of a total 254 Fourth Schedulers in the Rawalpindi division of Punjab, 15 have gone missing since May 2014. These missing sectarian-terrorists were linked with Sunni SSP and LeJ, TTP (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan) and Al-Qaeda. Israr Ahmed Abbasi (City Police Officer), revealing their disappearance, said that “some of those on the watch list have gone off to fight in Afghanistan and others have gone abroad to other places, all without informing the Police” (Asghar, 2016). This shows that sectarian-terrorists have to inform the police, rather than the police keeping surveillance on their activities. Maulana Ahmad Ludhianvi, the anti-Shia ASWJ (Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat) leader, despite his name being on the Fourth Schedule list, went to Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj (Muslim religious obligation) in 2016 (Zarar Khuro, 2018).

The police’s poor information collection and mishandling of data create hurdles in monitoring sectarian-terrorists’ daily activities. Data on many proscribed organizations are not well recorded either, making it difficult for the police to trace sectarian militants’ associations with jihadi and terrorist groups. The police get confused when sectarian-terrorists, or other criminals, change affiliations to jihadi outfits which are allowed to operate due to the state policies toward India and Afghanistan. A similar confusion is observed in the legally proscribed groups’ publications and literature after simple changes in their names (Abbas, 2011: 11), while their identity and agenda remain the same. By law, organizations’ publications cannot be banned without first banning the group itself, and most banned outfits have morphed themselves into charity groups (Rana, 2008: 8) which are legally permitted.

Likewise, the police lack the capacity for exercising powers of investigation of sectarian crimes. Investigation is the police task of collecting evidence to prove the happening of a crime and the role of one or more actors in that crime. In Lahore, the crime rate is 3000 per month with no more than 10 investigators. A former Inspector General of Police Khawar Zaman says that: “One investigating officer has to handle 30 to 40 cases [at a time]. These officers are not even focusing exclusively on investigations. How do they tackle this, while doing the cases justice?” (Zaman is quoted in International Crisis Group, 2010: 14).

Most of the police investigation officers (IOs) are underequipped and untrained in handling of crime scenes. For dealing with crime scenes, IOs are merely equipped with investigative kits which contain instruments like cardboard, ball-point pens and paper. Sectarian-terrorism crimes like suicide attacks and bombing of explosive-loaded vehicles are investigated by untrained ordinary staff (Chaudhry, 2014: 28–31). In the absence of CCTV footage or eyewitnesses, the police regularly practice the traditional arts of investigation even for mass shootings or suicide attacks in which evidence is gravely damaged (Fasihuddin, 2012: 60).

Most police IOs lack the knowledge of what constitutes standard scientific evidence. According to a manager at the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA), Dr Nasir Iqbal, the police do not utilize their technical support, even though the PFSA has bases in every division of Punjab. He said, “We are a support service for law-enforcement agencies. We visit crime scenes upon request of Police. A lot of times, the Police don’t call us,” and “at least in 60pc of cases” DNA evidence is gathered by unqualified police investigators. He said, “If samples are not collected properly, stored properly, packaged properly and evidence gets lost, the chances of solving cases are low” (Rehman, 2018).

Forensic laboratories’ results carry weight in investigations of terrorism; however, such facilities are underdeveloped and could not produce admissible evidence on time. Police investigation in reality lacked the art of forensic laboratories and, despite the police reforms of Police Order 2002, the laboratories were not transformed and modernized. Moreover:

Facilities as DNA tests, finger prints, eye matching, sampling examination in the laboratories, keeping record of national database programme for cross examination of the samples, etc are operational in the investigation processes and quite frequently available in the modern world, but very rarely and poorly seen in Pakistan. (Fasihuddin, 2012: 59)

Police-linked investigative intelligence agencies are also low performing. The Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) has become non-functional, while the Police Special Branch (PSB) is disorganized and does not have much capacity to investigate sectarian crimes. They have no equipment or access to investigate sectarian militants’ activities on social media like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Viber, etc. One survey in April 2017 discovered that 41 out of 64 proscribed outfits are active on Facebook. The survey revealed anti-Shia ASWJ with 200, SSP with 148 and anti-Sunni SMP with 45 pages and accounts that spread sectarian hate and glorify violence against sectarian minorities by posting videos and pictures (Haque and Bashir, 2017).

In the absence of modern equipment and forensic labs, police investigators rely on oral evidence which “means that investigation rests mainly on witnesses, with all the possibility of coercion, of distortion and subjectivity that this entails” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2007: 144). Producing eyewitnesses in the investigation of sectarian crimes is the most arduous task for the police. In sectarian crimes, the co-sectarianist will not provide evidence to the police against their own sect’s suspects. Eyewitnesses frequently receive intimidation from militants such as “if you are going to give evidence, then be aware that the punishment of 1 and 20 murder is the same.” Militants have even abducted and murdered witnesses and their family members (personal communication, Ahle-Hadith sect member, 6 March 2017, Thookar Niaz Beg). In the investigation of Malik Ishaq, LeJ chief, around 20 witnesses including their family members were killed (Kharal, 2011), but still the suspect was not convicted through police investigation following legal procedures and was instead killed extra-judicially in a staged police encounter. This lack of capacity, professionalism and competence of the police causes interference in their autonomous functions.

Police autonomy issues in exercising impartial powers in sectarian crimes

This section deals with the police’s autonomy issues within the mandate delegated to them, which restrict police effectiveness (neutral exercise of powers) in relation to sectarian crime prevention-investigation and anti-sectarian law enforcement.

Punjab’s executive interference in the police’s functions

In a representative system, law enforcement agencies like the police are answerable to the political executive and the latter to voters because they have to answer for the citizens’ safety and security. To maintain law and perform duties as per the rules, the police must regularly remain accountable to representative bodies. The executive controls the police administration and oversees as well as appraises the tasks given to them, particularly the effective enforcement of anti-terror policies and plans. However, the term “legitimate supervision” by the executive is in contrast with the “illegitimate” meddling in police mandate (Srivastava et al., 2010: 14).

Punjab’s executive carries powers of the highest administrative authority, and the practice of executive interference in the police, or other civil bureaucracy functions, is common. Through illegitimate meddling, the executive deprived the police of its power and of its responsibilities as an impartial enforcer of anti-terror laws and legislative policies. Owing to the “political imperative” of taking electoral popularity over political rivals, sectarian activists received every type of relief from the police through the executive. The executive commonly interfered in police duties to set free sectarian militants. Prominent legislators “from Faisalabad, Multan, Gujranwala and Sheikhupura have been providing shelter to innumerable most wanted sectarian killers” from police detention (Hussain, 2012: 139).

The executive has often utilized the police for personal or coalition partners’ illegitimate and private concerns. Due to the Sunni ASWJ’s ideological and political backing of the provincial government, the executive permitted them to carry out sectarian pursuits without fear (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, March 2015: 16) of police apprehension despite criminal charges against them. A journalist based in Islamabad explained that in place of formal written orders, the police received “unwritten orders” – oral messages that could be denied if needed – from the executive to exhibit restraint in handling SSP/ASWJ militants (Rafiq, 2014: 39).

The simple reason for the frequent executive, particularly national- and provincial-level parliamentarian, interference in police duties in favor of sectarian elements is to sustain parliamentary alliances or to make new electoral alliances with religious parties at the federal and provincial level (Nasr, 2002: 101). The sect-based politics in Punjab increased sectarian groups’ political clout. Although they could only win a few seats, their electoral and armed support is ample enough to alter results, particularly in narrow contests (Grare, 2013: 997–998). In the 2008 elections, 163 candidates, belonging to different parties, were elected to the Punjab Assembly with the support of Jihadi and sectarian outfits on the condition of reciprocating the favor if they became legislators (Hussain, 2012: 149). In a pre-poll patch up, an electorial alliance before elections, SSP withdrew its applicant, Maulana Abdul Hameed Khalid, from contesting the byelections in PP-48 Bakkar-II against designated Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif (Zaidi, 2014: 13).

Due to the said political, besides ideological, reason that sectarian militants often get favor from local politicians, the police are generally seen as helpless in enforcement of the state’s anti-sectarian laws in regard to hate speech, hate literature, etc. In the southern areas of Punjab, where the majority of the sectarian infrastructure (Mosques and Madrassas) exists, “the situation is so precarious that local extremist movements are given carte blanch to operate, often under the protection of local Police authorities and/or local politicians giving them shelter and even co-opting them into political processes” (Hansen, 2012: 4).

Punjabi society has deep sectarian cleavages, and politicians are associated with Sunni-Shia belief systems and have quietly assisted or occasionally applied political clout to defend sectarian activists from police prosecutions (Nasr, 2000: 180). Two low-ranking police officials who were questioned confirmed that they are always with the party in government. They said the police entirely function as per the whim of politicians, without concern for legitimate and illegitimate orders. They have no choice except to comply with whatever the executive says. On orders from legislators, sectarian activists are getting favor with no concern for criminal cases against them, i.e. no registration of cases of hate speech, no detention in already registered crimes and misleading of investigations, etc. (personal communication, two low-ranking police officials, 15 March 2017, Faisalabad). A high-ranking police official said, “the Police follow the Provincial executive’s orders and give various types of concessions to different sectarian groups” (personal communication, high-ranking police officer, 31 March 2017, Lahore).

The executive’s interruptions in police power exercises in the delegated mandates and responsibilities weaken their competence and autonomy in exercising impartial powers in sectarian matters. The police rarely arrest militants; even if imprisoned, the militants were in touch with field operatives via mobile phones, were candidly meeting cohorts who came to visit them and were in most crimes released immediately by presenting their own guarantor (Ispahani, 2013: 62). When the police detained Malik Ishaq, anti-Shia LeJ’s Chief and the ASWJ’s vice president, the provincial government gave him a monthly stipend (Rs 10,000) during the period he spent in jail. Punjab’s law minister openly confessed the government’s financial help to Malik Ishaq’s family (Ahmad, 2013: 40).

Generally, the police are an instrument of oppression in the hand of the executive, and mainstream as well as religious parties’ support of sectarian activists provides them with protection from police investigations, helping smooth the passage at each stage of the justice system (Nasr, 2000: 152–153). A retired Inspector General (IG) of police said: “An investigation always goes against someone. If that person is influential they will go to a parliamentarian…to have the IO changed, and this will go on and on until a ‘friendly’ investigator comes along” (IG is quoted in International Crisis Group, 2010: 14).

In such practices, police officers are transferred back and forth, which not only interrupts the investigation specialization of IOs but also disturbs progress in high-profile sectarian crimes. The result is that sectarian criminals are frequently acquitted because of insufficient evidence against them and thus sectarian crimes continue to be unsettled and unpunished (Blue and Hoffman, 2008: 26–27).

Instead of merit and fairness in the police, undeserved promotions, lucrative postings as well as matters of tenure greatly influence the police’s effectiveness and neutral exercise of power in sectarian activists’ arrest and investigation (Srivastava et al., 2010: 12). Pointing to the executive’s meddling, a police officer questioned: “How can one expect the Police to be impartial and unbiased when it is subjected every day to untold political pressures from all sides?” He further clarified that the “[Police] have no choice but to do the bidding of their political masters. Any defiance on their part could, and often does, wreck their careers” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 8).

These undermined the police’s role in their special task of enforcement of laws and arrest and investigation of crimes. On many occasions, the police detained the most-wanted sectarian militants and made detailed charges against them on electronic media. However, due to the executive’s intervention, all these proclamations concluded in compiling a weak case in the court of law. Similarly, police crackdown on sectarian outfits’ hideouts is also useless. Many times, the police arrested sectarian-terrorists from religious parties’ headquarters, but after the executive’s intervention they were powerless to register crimes against them (Awan and Zain, 2012: 517–518). Instead of convicting a suspect through legal procedures, the executive prefers the extra-judicial killing of undisciplined sectarian-terrorists through fake police encounters which further undermines the autonomy (neutral power exercises) of the police to maintain law and order in the province through effective enforcement of anti-terror laws.

Police capacity issues and the army deployment for police duties

Pakistan’s army has institutionalized prerogatives, due to e.g. the National Security Council (NSC) and aid-in-civil power, to be deployed for domestic security and provincial law and order; these prerogatives were enhanced after the National Action Plan (NAP). The state has also authorised retired and in-service military officers’ deployment in the police and civilian intelligence agencies. General Zia’s 10 percent reserved time quota, which classified deployment of in-service military officers in higher positions in the police, is still valid and in practice. Redeployment of retired military officers in the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) further increases the military’s institutionalized interference in police functions of enforcement of anti-terror laws and handling of sectarian crimes (Fair et al., 2010: 102-106). The said rules and classified positions, according to S. E. Finer, an author of the article ‘The Military and Politics of the Third World', have opened the door for the “military colonization of other institutions” by which “the military acts as a reservoir or core of personnel for the sensitive institutions of the state” (Finer is quoted in Rizvi, 2000: 234-238).

The army’s meddling by means of institutionalized prerogatives in police functions has affected the latter’s autonomy, distinctiveness and effectiveness. Many police officials in Punjab, especially in the high ranks, seek military influence of the political executive in matters of transferring and posting, which has greatly politicized and psychologically subjugated the police to multiple principals (Siddiqa, 2016). Those military officials who availed the above-mentioned classified positions are often appointed as Provincial Police Chiefs in Punjab, which at times begets real conflicts of interest, while considering the military intelligence agencies’ role in contesting their concerns through political maneuvering (Grare, 2010: 5).

The functions and exercise of powers of civilian intelligence agencies, those assisting the police, are also influenced by the military intelligence agencies. The Federal Investigative Agency, the CID and the Intelligence Bureau are repeatedly constrained from exercising power in regard to sectarian-terrorism crimes. These agencies are frequently led by the military officials, which impairs their confidence and causes interruption in their functions. An ex-anti-terrorism officer stated that civilian agencies are dependent on the ISI, and “without ISI approval, you can’t get anything done” (International Crisis Group, 2009: 19).

The military limits the police’s functions in their assigned tasks, because of the latter’s capacity issues, and involves the army in retaining internal coercion, quite contrary to other states where militaries are mostly concerned with foreign security threats while domestic coercion is considered a police responsibility. This is because of the interconnection between Pakistan’s internal security threats and foreign policy objectives. The army consider themselves responsible not only for the defense of the state’s geographical boarders but also for the insecurities that emanate from the state’s nurtured sectarian-Jihadi organizations (Fair, 2014: 4). The link between foreign and domestic securities undermined the police’s autonomy in maintaining internal coercion, except in circumstances where their officers are from the military or their leadership is performing a subordinating role and supporting the military’s concerns in the domain of internal security. Most District Police Officers (DPOs) are appointed in line with the military’s satisfaction (Grare, 2010: 7), and the force receives guidance from the ISI instead of the police.

The police are facing capacity issues in preventing opportunities for sectarian crimes, or for investigation, and relies on the state’s army since the latter is a product of resources in Pakistan. Rhodes (2007: 1245) writes that agencies or institutions need each other’s resources and have to share them to attain common goals. The police reliance on the ISI’s equipment, especially for radio communication interception and cellphone tracking, deeply constrains their exercise of power within their mandates (Petzschmann, 2010: 7).

Instead of cooperation and sharing resources, the military insistently presses for their officers’ induction and interference in police mandates owing to the excuse of fixing political governments’ weaknesses. A military official of the rank of Major-General proclaimed that whereas the military has preserved internal security and assisted harmony between various ethnic-sectarian communities, the civilian governments have aggravated sectarian regionalism (Aziz, 2008: 94). Thereby, in most anti-terror operations, the police, the military and other security agencies are deployed together. The military-linked agencies often conduct the vital investigations, and police access is limited to the primary parts of the evidence (Fasihuddin, 2012: 58–59).

The ISI intrusions in police functions influence the latter’s autonomy despite police complaints to the army’s top officials about regular phone calls favoring sectarian-terrorists (Fair, 2012: 15). In 2016, Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, although he himself is close to Sunni ASWJ, complained to army seniors, in a meeting on National Security held between civilian and military leaderships, about the ISI’s intervention in police actions against proscribed sectarian-terrorism activists (Almeida, 2016). Instead of the military acting against those officers who asked for favors for militants, Dawn newspaper reporter Cyril Almeida who reported the civilian and military leaderships’ verbal encounter over the latter’s favors to terrorists was placed on the Exit Control List (a law applicable since General Zia’s time for stopping citizens’ exit from Pakistan) ( Dawn, 2016).

Such interference in provincial law and order and domestic security completely undermines police autonomy in their functions of handling sectarian conflicts and terrorism-related crimes. Not only did the police fail to act upon court orders to arrest sectarian-terrorism suspects like Maulana Abdul Aziz and others (Hussain, 2016) but they also failed to present in court thousands of missing persons suffering in military custody without criminal cases registered against them. Fifty-two secret internment centers operated by the military have been discovered by the Asian Human Rights Commission (2009: 29–30), where detained, abducted and missing persons are kept in isolation for years with no communication with their families or access to the courts. Well-known sectarian-jihadists, like Asmat Ullah Mavia, Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, Masood Asghar and Aurangzeb Farooqi, are still at large and the police are powerless to arrest them despite many sectarian crimes being registered against their names.

The military agencies, particularly the ISI, interfere in police functions because the sectarian violence (or the domestic insecurity) has boosted the presence of the army to control law and order and hence increase their influence on the state. The sectarian groups’ activities:

have ostensibly legitimised praetorianism [indirect or direct military control on state power] either by their fomentation of violence, thereby eliciting military intervention (indirect praetorianism), or by providing a justification for a coup d’état or the continuation of military rule (direct praetorianism). (Haleem, 2003: 474)

Religious groups are frequently used by the ISI to channel citizens’ complaints against civilian governments to weaken or destabilize them. In addition, as the sectarian groups, particularly Sunni groups, produce Jihadis (freedom fighters) for Afghanistan and Kashmir, they are considered state strategic assets and thereby ISI interfere in police action against such elements even if found involved in sectarian crimes at the domestic level (Abbas, 2009: 15).

Since the NAP in 2015, the police have been informally, not formally or legally, deprived from performing duties related to countering terrorism, sectarian crimes included. Each province has a special force called the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), staffed by police and retired military officials, and trained by the latter on military line and taking preemptive operations as per intelligence from military sources. The CTD has its own stations in five divisions of Punjab and is authorized to register cases and investigate crimes. Without care for prescribed rules and procedures of justice, the CTD’s approach is shoot on sight (power given to law enforcement agencies under the Pakistan Protection Act 2014). According to HRCP data, 3345 people died in CTD operations between January 2014 and May 2018; this includes 12 children and 23 women ( Siasat, 2019). Extra-judicial killings undermined the deterrence value of the justice system, because justice is not only for the victim but also for the accused offenders.

Conclusion

The study concludes that the police, due to lack of capacity for exercising state powers and lack of autonomy in the domain of delegated responsibilities, cannot exercise powers as per the standards of rules and procedures (i.e. as necessary for effectiveness) in sectarian crime prevention-investigation and enforcement of anti-terror laws. The police autonomy in power exercises within mandates delegated to them is often undermined when it comes to their dealing with sectarian crimes. Because of the lack of capacity and autonomy, the police frequently compromise on the day-to-day sectarian crimes and violations of sectarian laws, and mostly exercise power in dealings with those sectarian groups where one of them is dominant. Crimes of hate speech and literature, hurting other belief systems or insulting their revered figures in religious gatherings are not registered under anti-sectarian laws. To maintain temporary harmony, not really to eradicate sectarian crimes, in Shia sect areas police give favor to Shias, and in Sunni sect areas to Sunnis. In some areas hate laws, under the Loud-Speaker (public address system) Act, are implemented and in others they are not, depending on police Station House Officer understandings with sectarian activists and prayer leaders in mosques and Imambarghs (personal communication, Mufti Amjad Hussain, 24 April 2017, Rawalpindi).

In terms of capacity, the police lacks strength, resources, modern equipment and weapons, forensic labs, professional and technical training, access to mobile data, etc. for exercising powers to fulfill their delegated tasks and responsibilities. The shortage of manpower and resources are caused by the police political responses and performing non-police duties which also affect their effectiveness in prevention-investigation of sectarian crimes and enforcement of anti-terror legislations. The police’s low quality of training and lack of competence engender ineffectiveness in their duties of crime prevention and investigation. Instead of decreasing crime opportunities for sectarian activists, the police themselves frequently become the victim of sectarian-terrorist attacks.

In terms of autonomy, the police are deeply politicized and interference in their power exercises is common. Punjab’s political executive and the army intrusion in police functions of dealing with sectarian crimes not only helped sectarian activists to operate beneath the surface by keeping their profile low but also restricted police powers in their special task of crimes registration and investigation. The sectarian communities consider the police are powerless, pathetic and themselves victims of terrorism. Maulana Aziz stated that police officers care more about their jobs, salaries and postings. Low-level officials are poor and follow what power elites order them to do. Police issue is bread and butter, not to enforce anti-terror laws and investigate terrorism incidents or to go after criminals and terrorists (personal communication, Maulana Abdul Aziz, 23 April 2017, Islamabad).

Theoretically, as stated in the rules and procedures, the police have enough autonomy. But operationally through transferring and posting, exercise of police power is regulated by the executive, which undermines the autonomy necessary for effectiveness in enforcement of anti-terror laws and for dealing with various kinds of crimes. Instead of reacting to sectarian-terrorist violence or maintaining law and order situations in a professional way, the police comply with the executive’s guidance and advice who exercise power with partisan interests due to political imperatives. The executive’s interference in the police’s enforcement of laws functions occasionally to help sectarian militants to continue activities with less concern about arrest or with the knowledge that they will be released soon if arrested. There are many reported cases in which the executive has influenced police investigations in twisting rules and in application of wrong clauses or in production of evidence that helped politically-affiliated militants to get bail in court trials of criminal charges against them.

Likewise, the army, by having extreme autonomy and being over-resourced, overpowers the police in matters of the state’s internal security. Due to the military institutionalized prerogatives, i.e. NSC, aid-in-civilian power and NAP, they are occasionally deployed to handle sectarian-terrorism crimes and to maintain law and order in the provinces. The police, at present, share their core functions of domestic security and enforcement of laws with the military and para-military forces, which causes the latter’s interference in the police’s functions and power exercises in sectarian crimes prevention-investigation. In the majority of areas in Pakistan, para-military units and military intelligence agencies that constitute a parallel structure to the police are deployed to respond to sectarian-terrorism violence, not really to deal with the day-to-day sectarian crimes and laws violations that incite violence.

The police are reliant on military capacity (i.e. manpower, resources and modern equipment) for exercising powers to fulfil their responsibilities of sectarian crime prevention-investigation. But they are not qualified to reach the trust level required for the army to share sensitive information on matters of national security. Instead of cooperation and sharing resources, the army has embroiled itself in police anti-sectarian drives by including military officials in the CTD and has deployed the ISI for terrorism-related endeavors, which affected the police’s exercise of autonomous power in the prevention-investigation of crimes and enforcement of anti-sectarian laws. It obstructs the police from the prosecution and investigation of those sectarian and Jihadi elements that are famous for their close connections with the ISI. This adversely has deepened the police’s apprehension about the military’s interference in their domain to help in tackling religious violence (Abbas, 2011: 11), thus causing mutual distrust.

The government needs to pay attention to police capacity and autonomy issues. The police are necessary for effective governance of sectarian crimes and enforcement of sectarian laws. In terms of capacity, the police should not be dependent on other agencies and needs direct access to modern equipment and forensic labs, cellphone tracking devices, Global System for Mobile locators and electronic data like emails, cellphone messages, wiretapping, etc. They also should have the required strength, professional training and experts for operation of modern equipment. In terms of autonomy, the political principal after fixing the mandate for the police should not interfere in the police’s transfer-posting, promotion and recruitment of cadres. Extreme subordination causes ineffective governance. The Inspector General of Police, DPOs and Station House Officers need security not only of tenure but also of posting-transferring as per the police’s internal hierarchy; it should not be as per the whims of politicians.

This essential capacity and autonomy, within mandates delegated to them, could make the police more accountable and responsible, which will also improve governance in matters of sectarian crimes. In the present militarized structure of too many parallel agencies for one mandate, i.e. domestic security, it is difficult to fix responsibility in cases of sectarian violence. Very few police officials have ever been made accountable and the military deployed for domestic security exempted themselves from accountability to any legal or political forum control by civilians.

However, the police is not the sole pillar of the criminal justice system. The study recommends research on the other pillars, i.e. prosecution and courts, to expose the latter’s capacity and autonomy issues in their delegated mandates.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Muhammad Umar

Note

References

Abbas

(2009) Police and law enforcement in Pakistan: Crucial for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism success. Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU). Available at: http://www.balochistanPolice.gov.pk/thesis/ple.pdf (accessed 5 January 2015).

Abbas

(2011) Reforming Pakistan’s police and law enforcement infrastructure: Is it too flawed to fix? United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Report 266. Available at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr266.pdf (accessed 15 February 2016).

Ahmad

(2016) Mapping Pakistan’s political superstructure. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) special report 55, pp. 11–32. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/04302016/SR55_Mapping_Pakistan_February2016.pdf (accessed 23 May 2019).

Ahmad

(2013) The next decade of jihadism in Pakistan. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 15: 35–56.

Almeida

(2016) Exclusive: Act against militants or face international isolation, civilian tells military. Dawn, 6 October. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350 (accessed 17 July 2018).

Asghar

(2016) 15 fourth schedulers missing from homes. Dawn, 15 February. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1239631 (accessed 12 September 2019).

Asian Human Rights Commission (2009) Deterioration of human rights and security accompanies increase in terrorism and conflict in 2009. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B8AF31730264B7F2C12576880039B4A3-Full_Report.pdf (accessed 21 September 2017).

Awan

Zain

(2012) The upsurge of religious extremism: A challenge to democracy, governance and national unity in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 32(2): 511–520.

Aziz

(2008) Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. Abingdon: Routledge.

10.

Blue

Hoffman

(2008) Pakistan rule of law assessment. USAID Report. Washington, DC. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO130.pdf (accessed 7 February 2015).

11.

Chaudhry

(2014) Anti-terror laws, policing and the criminal justice system: A case study of anti terrorist efforts in Punjab. Centre for Public Policy and Governance, FC College, Lahore. Available at: http://cppg.fccollege.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Anti-Terror-Laws-Policing-and-the-Criminal.pdf (accessed 14 April 2017).

12.

Cordesman

Vira

(2011) Pakistan – Violence versus stability: A national net assessment. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistan-violence-versus-stability (accessed 9 July 2015).

13.

Dawn (2016) Information Minister Pervaiz Rasheed asked to step down aimed Dawn story probe. 29 October. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1293026 (accessed 10 November 2016).

14.

Fair

(2012) Security sector governance in Pakistan: Progress, but many challenges persist. Security Sector Reform 5. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136845/SSR_Issue_no5.pdf (accessed 15 December 2016).

15.

Fair

(2014) Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. New York: Oxford University Press.

16.

Fair

Crane

Chivvis

, et al. (2010) Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?. RAND Corporation. Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG910.pdf (accessed 17 June 2018).

17.

Fasihuddin (2012) Terrorism investigation in Pakistan: Perceptions and realities of frontline police. Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3(3): 51–78.

18.

Fukuyama

(2013) What is governance? Center for Global Development, Working Paper 314, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426906 (accessed 12 January 2019).

19.

Grare

(2010) Political dimensions of police reform in Pakistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_Police.pdf (accessed 22 April 2016).

20.

Grare

(2013) Pakistan’s foreign and security policies after the 2013 general election: The judge, the politician and the military. International Affairs 89(4): 987–1001.

21.

Haleem

(2003) Ethnic and sectarian violence and the propensity towards praetorianism in Pakistan. Third World Quarterly 23(3): 463–477. DOI: 10.1080/0143659032000084410.

22.

Hansen

(2012) The threat of growing extremism in Punjab. Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution. Available at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Asia/Pakistan/Publications/The-threat-of-growing-extremism-in-Punjab (accessed 14 April 2016).

23.

Haque

Bashir

(2017) Banned outfits in Pakistan operate openly on Facebook. Dawn, 13 June. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1335561 (accessed 19 June 2017).

24.

Hussain

(2012) Punjabi Taliban: Driving Extremism in Pakistan. Trans. T Afzaal. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

25.

Hussain

(2016) Above the law. Dawn, 10 February. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1238496 (accessed 26 October 2015).

26.

Imam

(2011) Police and the tule of law in Pakistan: A historical analysis. Berkely Journal of Social Sciences 1(8).

27.

International Crisis Group (2008) Reforming Pakistan’s police. Asia Report No. 157, Brussels. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_Police.pdf (accessed 8 December 2014).

28.

International Crisis Group (2009) Pakistan: The militant jihadi challenge. Asia Report No. 164, Brussels. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/southasia/pakistan/164_pakistan___the_militant_jihadi_challenge (accessed 11 March 2015).

29.

International Crisis Group (2010) Reforming Pakistan’s criminal justice system. Asia Report No. 196, Brussels. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d00dee42.pdf (accessed 9 August 2015).

30.

International Federation for Human Rights (2007) Slow march to the gallows: Death penalty in Pakistan. HRCP Report with the Support of European Commission No. 464/2. Available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Pakistan464angconjointpdm.pdf (accessed 13 January 2015).

31.

Ispahani

(2013) Cleansing Pakistan of minorities. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 15: 57–66.

32.

Jamal

(ed.) (2011) Revisiting police laws. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) Report. Available at: http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/19.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016).

33.

Jamal

Patil

(2008) Police reforms in Pakistan: Beyond analysis. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) Consultation Report. Available at: http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/19.pdf (accessed 9 November 2015).

34.

Jones

Fair

(2010) Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RANDMG982.pdf (accessed 12 September 2016).

35.

Kappeler

(2012) What is the place of police within the criminal justice system? School of Justice Studies. Available at: http://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/what-place-Police-within-criminal-justice-system (accessed 15 October 2018).

36.

Khan

(2016) Who are Pakistan’s Chhuto bandits? BBC News, 20 April. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36072596 (accessed 22 April 2016).

37.

Kharal

(2011) LeJ’s Malik received monthly stipend from Punjab government. The Express Tribune, 16 July. Available at: https://tribune.com.pk/story/210827/lejs-malik-received-monthly-stipend-from-punjab-govt/ (accessed 15 February 2016).

38.

Mahmood

(2016) All Fourth Schedule suspects to be arrested. Dawn, 29 March. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1248604 (accessed 13 April 2019).

39.

Nasr

SVR

(2000) The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: The changing role of Islamism and the Ulama in society and politics. Modern Asian Studies 34(1): 139–180.

40.

Nasr

SVR

(2002) Islam, the state and the rise of sectarian militancy in Pakistan. In: Jaffrelt

(ed.) Pakistan Nationalism without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar Publisher, pp. 85–114.

41.

Noorani

(2016) Fourth Schedule. Dawn, 15 December. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1302330 (accessed 19 December 2016).

42.

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (March 2015) A report on national policy for internal security. Islamabad: Secretariat Youth Parliament Pakistan.

43.

Perito

Parvez

(2014) A counterterrorism role for Pakistan’s police stations. United States Institute of Peace, Report 351. Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/08/counterterrorism-role-pakistans-Police-stations (accessed 8 August 2017).

44.

Petzschmann

(2010) Pakistan’s police between centralization and devolution. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Report. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120172/NUPI%20Report%20Petszchmann.pdf (accessed 13 August 2017).

45.

Rafiq

(2014) Sunni Deobandi-Shi’i sectarian violence in Pakistan: Explaining the resurgence since 2007. Middle East Institute. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/content/report-sunni-deobandi-shii-sectarian-violence-pakistan (accessed 5 September 2017).

46.

Rana

2008) Jihadi print media in Pakistan: An overview. Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Islamabad.

47.

Rana

(2017) Hitting the wrong target. Dawn, 12 March. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1319888 (accessed 14 March 2017).

48.

Rehman

(2018) Why is DNA evidence not given weight in Pakistani courts? Dawn, 25 January. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1385125 (accessed 26 January 2018).

49.

Rhodes

RAW

(2007) Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organization Studies 28(8): 1243–1264.

50.

Rizvi

(2000) Military, State and Society in Pakistan. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

51.

Siasat (2019) Social media news and discussion forum. Blog post. Available at: https://www.siasat.pk/forums/threads/3-345-killed-in-Police-encounters-from-january-2014-to-may-2018-in-pakistan.671317/ (accessed 22 July 2019).

52.

Siddiqa

(2016) Cyril Almeida’s story points to old fault lines and new strains in Pakistan army-govt relationship. The Indian Express, 14 October. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/dawn-journalist-cyril-almeida-banned-pakistan-civilian-govt-military-meet-3081347/ (accessed 16 October 2016).

53.

Srivastava

Balakrishnan

Kotwal

(2010) Feudal forces: Reformed delayed moving from force to service in South Asian policing. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives, New Delhi. Available at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/Police/feudal_forces_reform_delayed_2010.pdf (accessed 23 February 2015).

54.

Waseem

(2010) Dilemmas of pride and pain: Sectarian conflict and conflict transformation in Pakistan. Religions Development Research Programme (RaD) Working Paper 48. University of Birmingham. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b37e5274a31e0000a3c/working_paper_48.pdf (accessed 23 July 2016).

55.

Zaidi

SMA

(2014) The Punjabi Taliban. Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) Report 12. Oslo. Available at: http://strategiskanalyse.no/Publikasjoner%202014/2014-02-20_SISA12_The%20Punjabi%20Taliban_MZ.pdf (accessed 3 September 2015).

56.

Zarar

Khuro

(2018) Zara Hat Kay. Dawn News. [In Urdu]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTP9CiZd2-s (accessed 28 June 2018).