“Will America Work? Racial and Economic Equity in a Post-COVID World”

Work in the Contemporary Era

The world of work looks much different today than in the past. Workers are much less likely to remain with one company for the duration of their careers, and upward mobility in that company alone is even more rare. Instead of a career ladder, the path for mobility is more akin to a jungle gym, with workers making more lateral and zigzag moves rather than simply rising through the hierarchy of one organization (Williams, Mueller, and Kilanski 2012). Consequently, workers change jobs more often than they did in the past, with most changing jobs about every 4 years (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020).

At the same time that workers are changing jobs more often, organizations are less likely to offer the same benefits and supports that they once provided. Guaranteed retirement pensions are largely a relic of the past in many companies, and today employees contribute a growing share of their own incomes to health care and retirement benefits (Acker 2006). Companies are also more invested in cutting labor costs, which means that they often subcontract low-wage work out to other companies rather than hiring these workers directly (Weil 2014). As a result, companies can offer generous benefits (paid leave, vacation time) to a few high status workers within a company, without having to extend the same to custodial staff or food service workers who are employed by organizations that contract with them (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2020).

The shipping and manufacturing industries referenced on The Wire have also continued to decline. Today, the service industries are the largest sector of the US economy. The service industries include a variety of fields including education, health care, and personal services, among others. Thus, some professions in the service industry are well-paying with a great deal of prestige, while others offer low status and wages. On both fronts, however, a growing number of jobs are contingent, part-time, or contract work, which means that workers often experience less employment and occupational stability due to the knowledge that their positions are less secure (Weil 2014). Contingent work means not only that employees have fewer opportunities to build long-term tenure with organizations, but that they are not entitled to the benefits accrued to full time employees (e.g., unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation, and others). Employees in lower wage service jobs also experience more uncertainty around work schedules (Misra and Walters 2022) while those in higher status jobs may find that the expectations associated with these “greedy professions” necessitate ever-increasing demands on their time (Moen and Kelley 2020).

What explains these significant changes between work in the post–World War II era and work in the post-1980s era of neoliberalism, free market orthodoxy, and deregulation? The decline of the manufacturing industry and the rise of the service industry in its place had a lot to do with advances in globalization and technology that made it easier and more cost-effective for many companies to move production overseas. Accompanying this shift has been the rise of service jobs, many of them low paying with few benefits, contributing to stagnating wages and growing economic inequality (Chen 2015). Further, Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) have also noted that increasing financialization of the US economy has helped increase inequality by empowering that industry and enhancing growth among institutional investors. Aspects of this financialization include a neoliberal ideology that glorifies free markets, demonizes unionization and collective bargaining, and promotes deregulation, thus weakening workers’ positions and creating increasingly more precarious, fragile employment arrangements. And growing numbers of low-skilled immigrants constitute a vulnerable pool that employers can easily exploit for cheap labor.

These structural changes have had significant consequences for most workers. They help to explain the erosion of the social safety net over the past few decades. They also contribute to an economy where workers are working the same amount or more than they had been in previous eras, but are capturing less of their share of the financial gains from that labor. These changes also contribute to record low levels of social mobility for American workers (Chetty et al. 2014). Kalleberg (2003) has argued that a major defining feature of work in the modern economy has been the transition to a widening gulf between “good jobs” and “bad jobs.” As a consequence of the increasing proliferation of “bad jobs,” many workers now experience pronounced economic and emotional uncertainty, with heightened worries and less confidence about their financial security (Chen 2015; Cooper 2003; Silva 2013).

Shifting Racial Contexts

While they may not be directly related, it is also critical to note that these changes to how we work, and the resulting insecurity, precarity, and instability for workers, also occur as racial demographics in the United States that are undergoing pronounced shifts. In 1950, 89% of Americans identified as non-Hispanic Whites. By 1980, that number remained fairly steady at 88% (US Census Bureau 1961). However, by 2000, demographers began to project that declining birth rates among Whites and increasing immigration and birth rates among Latina/o communities meant that the White majority was rapidly dwindling. These estimates suggested that by the year 2015, most children born in the US would be children of color, and that by 2045, Whites would be a numerical minority (cf. Alba 2020; Frey 2018).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, these estimates generated a great deal of controversy that continues today. Though Alba (2020) asserts that the projections of an impending White minority overlook the growth of new generations who consider themselves multiracial, thus complicating these dynamics, the prospect of a shrinking White majority remains a common narrative. This perception is often accompanied by the implication that growing populations of color stand to alter fundamental aspects of US culture permanently, irretrievably, and for the worse. Pundits like Lou Dobbs and Tucker Carlson regularly opine that immigrants stand to worsen US society, and in 2016, the claim that Mexican immigrants were disproportionately inclined to criminal behavior helped advance a presidential candidate.

Research indicates that these perceptions of changing racial dynamics have concrete implications. Metzl (2019) has shown that concerns about immigration and changing racial dynamics prompt Whites to support policies that actually worsen their own health. In this self-defeating pattern, fears about growing populations of color are part of Whites’ motivations for opposing gun control, expanded health care, and improved public education, despite the fact that their positions on these issues are literally killing them. As one respondent (who himself was severely ill and uninsured) put it, “Ain’t no way I would ever support Obamacare or sign up for it. I would rather die. We don’t need any more government in our lives. And in any case, no way I want my tax dollars paying for Mexicans or welfare queens” (Metzl 2019:38).

Two patterns, then, are emerging concurrently. Work is becoming more insecure, uncertain, and increasingly characterized by “bad jobs” that provide low pay, few benefits, and minimal stability. There are fewer opportunities for social mobility, and income inequality is growing. “Good jobs” that pay well and provide comfortable retirement, insurance, and paid leave benefits still exist, but they are harder to attain with economic restructuring and without the public infrastructure and social supports present in previous eras. Furthermore, even in “good jobs,” the constant threats of layoffs and downsizing mean workers are expected to devote ever-increasing amounts of time to work, heightening the risks of burnout and stress, and these jobs increasingly adopt the precarity and uncertainty associated with the “bad” (Ho 2009; Kalleberg 2003; Moen and Kelley 2020). Whereas work in the Post–World War II era benefited from a greater balance between organizations and labor, the current picture of work reveals arrangements where workers’ power has declined, work itself offers less security, the middle class is shrinking, and inequality has grown exponentially.

At the same time, racial demographics are undergoing a profound shift as well. While the Black population has remained relatively stable at around 13% for several decades, Latino/as are now the largest ethnic group at 19% of the US population. Additionally, while only about 4% of the populace, Asian Americans are the fastest growing group of color. These demographic changes are unmistakably changing the fabric of the United States in multiple ways, with voters of color emerging as a decisive (and multifaceted) voting bloc, and consumers of color showing that they comprise key markets whose tastes and preferences can influence many industries. Predictably, the rise in racial diversity and the growing visibility of multiracial communities has prompted backlash, perhaps seen most starkly in the rise of White nationalism and White supremacy, and its move into the political and cultural mainstream (Daniels 2018).

These trends together tell us several things. One is that the US is unmistakably becoming a more racially diverse society. This is evident not just in the shifting demographics, but in the media representation, cultural changes, and political calculations and alliances of recent decades. Yet, the country still remains stubbornly segregated on many fronts—in neighborhoods, school systems, and even peer groups—and these divisions are encouraged and stoked by White nationalists whose ideas about inherent racial superiority increasingly receive more acclaim, recognition, and support (Feagin 2006).

The second thing these trends tell us is that workplaces are not immune from the consequences of these shifting racial contexts. The “bad jobs” that used to be the province of primarily Black workers are now widespread, commonplace, and the only option available for many workers of all races, while “good jobs” become ever more scarce and difficult to attain. Concurrently, as the gulf widens between these two types of jobs, work too becomes more polarized and unequal. These changes beg the question: what happens as the US grapples with increasing racial diversity while “bad jobs” become more the norm and “good jobs” the rarity?

Race and Work: More Diversity, More Divides

Changing racial demographics mean that the consequences of shifting patterns of work have specifically racialized implications as well. Kalleberg’s (2003) “good jobs/bad jobs” framework is useful here for considering racial stratification in the workplace, as workers of color, particularly Black and Latino/a workers, tend to be overrepresented in the “bad jobs” that offer the least security and lowest wages. For instance, Black workers are 31% of transit workers and Latino/as are 43% of landscape workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). In these jobs, there are few opportunities for advancement or mobility. Thus, as work is becoming more fractious and uncertain, there are implications for a racially stratified society in that workers of color are less likely to land in the jobs that offer the most stability and highest wages.

Even in “good jobs,” Black workers still face challenges. They are more often excluded from critical social networks, which can make it more difficult to access these positions and to advance once hired (Pedulla 2020). In her study of Black women lawyers, Melaku (2019) finds that these attorneys face an uphill battle finding mentors and sponsors who can support and guide their careers. They also pay an “inclusion tax” where they must do additional work on their appearance, comportment, and even emotions in order to assimilate into these predominantly White spaces. Other data indicate that highly educated Black workers in professional jobs still face a racial wage gap where they earn less than their White counterparts (Wilson and Rodgers 2016). And organizations often engage in a process of “racial outsourcing” where, instead of devoting critical resources to increasing diversity and creating more equitable environments, they shift this responsibility to the few Black professionals in their employ (Wingfield 2019).

Other challenges befall Black workers in both “good” and “bad” jobs. As Black workers disproportionately live in the south, they are underrepresented in the parts of the country job growth is occurring most rapidly (Cook et al. 2019). Across the board, Black workers are also subject to greater oversight, surveillance, and scrutiny than their counterparts of other races (Roscigno 2007). This means that as managers are watching Black workers more closely to look for mistakes or errors, they are more likely to find faults among their work than with their colleagues of other races. Greater oversight helps create a situation where Black workers are held to a higher standard and, as the old adage goes, really must be twice as good to get half as far. Additionally, racial disparities in hiring persist, with Black workers facing rampant discrimination (Pedulla 2020). Candidates whose names seem to signal a Black identity are less likely to receive callbacks than those whose names suggest they are White (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and White candidates with a criminal record are more likely to receive callbacks than Black candidates with no criminal history (Pager 2007).

These issues are especially pronounced among Black workers, but they are by no means exclusive to them alone. Other workers of color also report similar challenges. Despite the fact that Asian Americans are overrepresented in professional/managerial positions, they are less likely to move into supervisory roles, essentially hitting a glass ceiling at midlevel management jobs. As Chin (2021) notes, this often attributes to racial stereotypes that mischaracterize Asian Americans as “model minorities” who are too passive and docile to “fit” the expectations for the highest ranking positions. Flores and Banuelos (2021) also find that Latino/a physicians are often stereotyped as cleaning or janitorial staff, and that they are subject to a “gendered cultural taxation” where colleagues expect them to do the equity work of serving as Spanish language translators in addition to completing their actual duties as doctors. In other words, as the labor force becomes more multiracial, workplaces do not necessarily follow suit. They remain stratified in ways that create ongoing complications for employees of color.

Race and Economic Changes

How can we make sense of why these disparities exist? What explains why, as the US population becomes more multiracial, we continue to see workers of color concentrated in “bad jobs” and thinly spread among the “good?” What are the implications of this pattern? Economists tend to highlight the ways that widening inequality and changes to work have implications for the labor market and for workers writ large. However, sociological theories of race are increasingly useful in understanding how these economic changes also have racial implications, and to highlight that these changes will not affect all workers equally or in the same fashion.

An Inflection Point?

These racial and economic trends have been under way for some time. However, there are several recent developments that suggest that we may be at a turning point where these trends begin to shift again.

One obvious event that could possibly portend a change to work and racial inequality is the coronavirus pandemic. While it is too early to say conclusively how COVID has reshaped US society, there are a few interesting points to consider. For one thing, when many cities and states imposed lockdowns that closed businesses and limited interactions, this decision highlighted glaring inequities in the service sector. High status, well-paid workers in parts of the service industry such as education, information technology, or financial services had the luxury and advantage of working from home. Lower wage service sector employees such as grocery store clerks, delivery drivers, and food service workers did not enjoy these advantages, but the pandemic revealed that their work was far more essential than their pay, benefits, and status implied. It is also important to note that Black and Latino/a workers are overrepresented in many of these fields, which put them at higher risk of contracting COVID (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). Yet, ironically and unfortunately, many of these same lower wage jobs have shifted to a model where much of this work is available on a contract or part-time basis, or with no guarantee of health care coverage. Essentially, the pandemic underscored that while our society relies on essential workers, we do not really value them.

Apart from the effects of the pandemic, other societal changes appear to be amiss as well. Researchers and policymakers have drawn renewed public attention to widening inequality and the way it is hardly inevitable or incidental, but rather a consequence of decades of policy decisions. Piketty’s (2014) indictment of the role capitalism plays in perpetuating income inequality was an international bestseller, and 2020 survey data from Pew Research Center indicate that 70% of American citizens believe the current economic system is unfairly rigged to benefit the wealthy. Over 80% believe that politicians, wealthy households, and large corporations wield a disproportionate amount of power and influence. Pew finds wide levels of support for these propositions across income levels, indicating that even those in upper income households observe these disparities (Igielnik 2020). Consequently, mainstream conversations about income inequality and the way it is shaping American life are becoming routine and commonplace.

At the same time, majorities of Americans support (at least in the abstract) the idea that government has a role to play in reducing these inequalities. Pew data show that majorities believe this existing inequality is a problem that requires major systemic overhauls to fix. These measures range from support for taxing the wealthiest households to government investment in education and job training programs (Pew Research Center 2020). Significantly, Pew also found that over half of Americans support the federal government acting to provide “high-quality K-12 education, adequate medical care, health insurance, adequate income in retirement, and an adequate standard of living” (Pew Research Center 2020:5). Of course there are partisan divides here, but these results suggest that there is widespread support for seeing government action as a potential solution for various problems, rather than, as some political ideologies have characterized it, as the problem itself.

It is also key to note that generational shifts are driving some of these changes. Millennials, born at the turn of the century and coming of age during two major economic recessions, a once-in-a-lifetime global pandemic, and confronting a far less robust social safety net than many previous generations, perhaps unsurprisingly are more critical of capitalism and show more support for government action to redress some of the problems they associate with it. In 2019, Gallup reported that millennials’ declining opinions of capitalism were driving polling data indicating that capitalism and socialism were tied in popularity among this age group. Not only that, these young adults overall have a higher positive view of socialism (near 50%) than Generation X (34%) or baby boomers (30%) (Saad 2019).

Younger generations are also more multiracial than their predecessors, with millennials constituting one of the most racially diverse generations in recent US history. However, there is reason to be cautious here—these demographic changes do not necessarily mean ideological shifts around race and racial attitudes as well. In fact, many millennials hold racist attitudes at numbers that are comparable to their predecessors. Survey data indicate that between 20–30% of millennials believe Blacks are lazier than Whites, a number that parallels baby boomers and Generation X’ers (Johfre and Saperstein 2019). But growing numbers of millennials of color may potentially mean more voices to draw attention to issues of structural, organizational, and individual racism, particularly as these factors influence work in an already uncertain economy.

Apart from these attitudinal shifts, the successes of recent social movements are potentially relevant as well. Since it took off in 2017, one consequence of the #MeToo movement has been that many famous and powerful figures faced consequences for sexually harassing colleagues and subordinates. Additionally, one study indicated that 2 years after the movement began, fewer working women reported unwanted sexual attention and harassment at work (Johnson et al., 2019). Other major movements have also yielded successes. Following George Floyd’s killing in summer 2020, between 15 and 26 million people took part in Black Lives Matter protests, resulting in this social movement becoming the largest in US history (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020). The Black Lives Matter movement has also yielded documented successes, with up to a 20% decrease in police killings in areas that had Black Lives Matter protests. Areas that held these protests also saw results in the form of higher rates of police wearing body cameras and more community policing (Campbell 2021).

Yet, these progressive movements also have their opposing counterparts. Even as #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo have taken off in recent years, so too have movements to ensure that Whites remain in a position of social, cultural, and political power. The rise of White nationalism and White supremacy means that explicit statements and ideologies of White dominance which once were relegated to the fringe now receive more credence and support from mainstream political figures (Belew 2018). Perhaps, the most jarring recent examples of this are the failed January 6, 2021 attempt to overthrow the US government, where many insurrectionists carried flags and symbols associated with far right groups such as the Proud Boys and the Three Percenter Movement, and sitting Congressional representatives’ attempts to justify and legitimize the rioters as “peaceful protesters.”

What impact will these various changes have on work, race, and economic inequality? It is too soon to say with certainty, but they do portend possible new directions. The coronavirus pandemic exposed a stark divide between workers, and laid bare the minimal supports (worker protections, health care) available to those who do the core work necessary for a society to function. As a result, when the economy began to reopen, many retail and food service workers refused to return to low-paying jobs, particularly without the social supports of child care, health insurance, and basic worker protections. Could this potentially be the beginning of a movement in which workers drive a shift in wages, treatment, and status among “bad jobs?” Research does not yet provide concrete answers, but this is a potential area to watch.

Increasing support for government action to redress widening economic inequality may also mean that there is broad political leverage for improving these workers’ conditions and lives. With large majorities attuned to the fact that current policies have contributed to the growth in inequality, there is renewed attention to the ways that increased dependence on contract workers, declining unionization, technological changes, and increased financialization are collectively creating an economy that works well for very few. Furthermore, with most Americans in favor of government support for job training, education, child care, and health insurance, policymakers may find it an easier sell to propose legislation that strengthens the social safety net and makes it more possible for “bad jobs” to become a bit better. If these attitudinal shifts translate into sustained social movements for more economic equity, there is at least the possibility that legislative results could follow.

Successive generations are also becoming more racially diverse, which means workforces are increasingly comprised of people of color. This has not yet led to more racial diversity across occupations. But as workers of color are persistently channeled into “bad jobs” and underrepresented in “good” ones, they may perhaps be more likely to highlight the overlap between these racial and economic inequalities. In particular, workers of color in “good jobs” may decide, as discussion of systemic racism has become more mainstream, that they are willing to address the challenges and obstacles they encounter in these occupations. And as social movements around racial and gender inequality have shown some successes in creating tangible outcomes (though the rise of White nationalism threatens these goals), these workers may be more motivated to try to create more equitable workplaces. If, as early research suggests, the #MeToo movement has had a demonstrable impact on decreasing workplace harassment, this could have important consequences for Black, Latina, and Asian women workers, who are frequently dogged by racial and gendered stereotypes of hypersexuality (Chou 2012; Collins 2004).

The culmination of these events suggests that when it comes to race and work in the post-COVID era, US society is at an inflection point. There is certainly a growing understanding of the mechanisms and consequences of increasing economic and racial inequality. Additionally, there is now more social movement and political support for action that could change these. But it is also important to remember that in today’s polarized environment, popular support for policies does not necessarily yield change (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Furthermore, there is a long and extensive history of American inaction and stasis when it comes to racial progress, where even hard fought gains fail to result in racial equity because of resistance and backsliding. As Seamster and Ray (2018) point out, racial progress is rarely a straight line to improvement, but rather a path where racism and the resulting inequality routinely reinvents and repackages itself to adapt to changing norms. The rise of White nationalism and its increasing visibility in mainstream politics certainly suggests that measurable, sustained progress towards racial equity is far from inevitable.

I want to conclude by highlighting two divergent paths available from this point forward. On one path, workers continue to fault themselves for increasing inequality. Like the millennials Silva (2013) studied who blame themselves for the difficulties they face finding work in an increasingly precarious economy, these workers take an individualist approach to the systemic problems of increasing automation, outsourcing, and the dearth of “good jobs.” On this path, White workers blame the growing population of color for their occupational woes, and erroneously believe that as Whites, they now are the primary targets of racial discrimination. This tendency is encouraged by the rise of White nationalism and its increasing acceptance and legitimacy in political spheres (Feagin 2012). In this scenario, the majority of the US population lives with economic precarity, with good jobs becoming more and more rare. Workers of color remain concentrated in the “bad” ones, and the unchecked rise of White supremacy leads White workers to resist, sometimes violently, efforts to create more economic and occupational equity, especially if they suspect Black workers may benefit too. This outcome ultimately fosters more racial and economic inequality and is an enormous waste of human capital.

Another, different, path is a possibility. In this one, a multiracial coalition of Americans stands up to and forcefully denounces the rise of White nationalism, successfully punishing organizations, policymakers, and leaders who indulge its principles. Concurrently, workers are able to push for policies that actually provide necessary support, among these an increase to the minimum wage, improved support for child care, and paid sick and vacation leave time. In conjunction with this, policymakers enact—and enforce—legislation designed to combat racial workplace discrimination and protect against sexual harassment. Here, “bad jobs” take on more of the attributes of “good jobs,” erasing (or at least minimizing) the dissonance between the two. Additionally, leaders put in efforts to remedy racial disparities within organizations, reshape their cultures, and institute tangible consequences for racial harassment or abuses. This path takes concrete steps toward a future with more racial and economic equity.

It is too early to say conclusively which path the US will take. But our society is at a critical juncture where there is an opportunity to redress these racial and economic divides at a time when they are wider than ever. It remains to be seen what result we choose.