International Journal of Maritime History

At the end of August 1781, the combined fleets of France and Spain appeared in the mouth of the English Channel. Stormy weather and sickness soon forced them to retire to their home ports of Brest and Cadiz, and so this brief invasion threat attracts little more than passing reference in most studies of eighteenth-century Britain. This article examines the reporting of this crisis in London newspapers, which provides evidence of public interest in the navy and anxiety about the security of Britain.

This is a micro-study of the most radical ship in the Spithead mutiny of 1797, the Pompée, which experienced another mutiny soon after the Spithead confrontation was settled. The court martial papers of this singular event reveal a politically divided crew, which leads one to reconsider the dynamics of mutiny in this tumultuous year. I argue against the conventional interpretation of inside-outside influences, of pre-political seamen infiltrated by radical forces and also against reductive binaries such as mutiny versus subversion. While stressing the seamen's own capacity for collective action and their exposure to the political currents of the 1790s, I suggest the Pompée's experience illustrates the volatility of maritime protest in a rapidly changing environment in which Britain dug deep into its population, maritime and non-maritime, national and international, to man its fleets.

Since the late sixteenth century, parallel with the growth of West-European ocean shipping, seaborne connections between the North and Baltic seas increased constantly. The rising maritime powers, the Dutch Republic and Great Britain, carried to the Baltic colonial and manufacturing produce in exchange for grain and raw materials, thus connecting the area with their oceanic trades. These commodity flows are amply illuminated by the Sound Toll records. In contrast, evidence of intra-Baltic shipping is fragmentary and imperfect, with many gaps. Such an imbalance of sources implies a drawback: we do not know how dominant the West-European connections actually were in Baltic shipping. Fortunately, there are a few primary records that shed light on intra-Baltic shipping, notably the ship-lists of the port of Cronstadt published by the Russian and German-language journal Sankt Peterburgskije Vedomosti/St. Petersburgische Zeitung from 1744. The port of Cronstadt is particularly interesting as it constitutes the extreme eastern terminus of sea routes from the wider world. No comprehensive data from these ship-lists have hitherto been published. Utilising them, this article analyses the main trends in the development of St. Petersburg's shipping connections within the Baltic Sea as well as with the regions beyond the Danish Sound.

From its creation, the Africa Squadron, although tasked with suppressing the slave trade, did more to defend American sovereignty and expand American commercial access along the west coast of Africa. In both of these regards, Great Britain and the British Navy were the most prominent obstacles in the way of the United States achieving its goals. These tasks were among the most important imperatives that drove American foreign relations during the antebellum era. Thus the Africa Squadron is best understood as a case study of the vital role the navy played in not just conducting but also shaping American diplomacy. This article examines the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Africa Squadron, concluding that the flotilla was less concerned with actually ending the transatlantic trade in humans than with serving as a check on British power at sea.

Despite minor amendments to the Royal Navy's Articles of War throughout the eighteenth century, and a major reworking in 1749, both capital and corporal punishments were frequently employed as punishment for minor offences in a system that made England's ‘Bloody Code’ look positively humane. The 1860 Naval Discipline Act provided the first substantive overhaul of the original Articles of War, but historians have generally lamented this act as providing little comprehensive change to the governance of the navy. Using statistical data collected from thousands of courts martial records, this article takes a broad look at trends in naval courts martial, studying how these courts interacted with the legislative changes of the 1860s. Viewing how charges and sentences altered on the global scale, it becomes clear that the ‘arbitrary and cruel punishments’ of the previous century had at last given way to a centralized, formal expression of discipline.

During the First World War, more than 800 Norwegian ships were sunk by hostile action, with a loss of about 2,100 seafarers. The Norwegian merchant fleet was extremely important for Norway's economy and for securing the import of vital goods. In addition, Britain and her allies needed goods carried in Norwegian merchant ships, such as coal shipped across the Channel to France. This article examines the relationship between Britain and Norway during the war, concentrating on the roles of two important resources, coal and maritime labour. The first part of the article outlines the wartime Anglo-Norwegian relationship. Negotiations around the so-called ‘coal trade surplus’, and how the surplus was allocated, are analysed in the second section. The coal trade surplus derived from British coal exports to Norway and was transferred from the British to the Norwegian Government in 1919. The British Ministry of Shipping, in recognition of the efforts of Norwegian seafarers, demanded that part of the surplus should be allocated to their well-being and to a memorial for the Norwegian merchant seafarers who had perished during the war.

Between 1925 and 1935, several private firms capable of constructing warships, or parts thereof, collapsed, merged or were partly or fully ‘sterilised’ against any return to shipbuilding during a period of ‘rationalisation’ to reduce perceived overcapacity relative to demand in British shipbuilding. Thereafter, rearmament had the opposite effect upon industry; lack of capacity in some key areas created almost unprecedented demand, and led eventually to uncontrolled price collusion and profits, particularly on warship contracts. An investigation into profiteering was undertaken in 1943, which embarrassed the remaining builders and their principal contractors. This article establishes that the Admiralty had allowed a form of price-fixing at taxpayers’ expense to proliferate for some time, a largely unknown episode that spanned the years of disarmament and rearmament. Further, it explains how and why collusion occurred when it did, and discusses the catalytic role of shipyard rationalisation. Finally, we conclude by suggesting reasons for such loose Admiralty control of warship costs during rearmament.

Britain long sought to establish, develop and utilise local military capabilities across its empire. In its informal empire among the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, Britain increasingly encouraged – and often cajoled – its protégés to build up their own security forces as London's moment in the Middle East was coming to an end. The scholarly literature on imperial assistance to local forces is invariably army-centric; little attention is given to how powers such as Britain helped establish local naval forces. This article seeks to address this imbalance by describing how British naval institutions supported the establishment of the local naval force in Abu Dhabi in the years immediately before British withdrawal from the region in 1971. This case study expands the historiography of British military assistance to cover naval forces and describes the repertoire of support provided by the Royal Navy and Navy Department.