Modern China

This article traces and analyzes the longitudinal changes in the operative structure, rules, and practices of the Chinese Communist Party’s disciplinary institution not for the purpose of appraising its performance in corruption control but to demonstrate how the party regulates its own enforcement agency through institutionalizing the disciplinary decision-making process. To that end, this article identifies and explains the exact measures the party has used to delegate authority to the party’s disciplinary institution in a systematic and institutionalized manner without losing control over disciplinary outcomes. It also identifies three features of the institutionalization process: concentration and centralization of disciplinary power and further depoliticization of disciplinary activities.

The account books of the Tong Taisheng 统泰升 grocery store in Ningjin county of northern China in 1800–1850 constitute the most complete and integrated surviving archive of a family business in premodern China. They contain unusually detailed and high-quality statistics on exchange rates, commodity prices, and so on. Utilized once in the 1950s, the archive had been left largely untouched until our recent, almost accidental rediscovery. This article introduces this unique set of materials and traces the personal history of the original owner and donor. The story of this archive encapsulates the history of modern China and how the preservation and interpretation of evidence and records of Chinese economic statistics were profoundly impacted by the development of political ideology in modern and contemporary China. We briefly discuss the historiographical and epistemological implications of our findings for the current Great Divergence debate.

China is the world’s largest aquaculture producer, accounting for 63% of global output by volume. However, since the 2000s, the reputation of China’s seafood has been tainted by a series of drug residue incidents. The need to ensure food safety, combined with the state’s determination to fulfill its responsibility for animal epidemic control in the aftermath of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and avian flu, forced the government to launch a veterinary system reform. This reform sought to transform quasi-public rural vets into market-sensitive and technology-savvy licensed professionals who can discipline unruly fish farmers. However, the vets encountered many dilemmas in balancing food safety versus drug profits, animal health versus human health, and regulatory imperatives versus the practical exigencies of farmers themselves. The article demonstrates how the neoliberal program of cultivating rational and responsible veterinarians redistributes rather than minimizes the risks that result from market-oriented aquaculture production.