Political Studies Review

This Special Issue explores the causes, patterns and consequences of presidential activism, defined as the presidents’ use of their formal powers and their attempts to influence politics through informal channels. Examining ‘going public’ strategies, the influence exerted by presidents through informal and formal coordination mechanisms, links to political parties and foreign policy leadership, it argues that presidential activism shapes intra-executive relations, enabling presidents to wield influence beyond their constitutional powers. Presidential activism is facilitated by the presidents’ popularity and role as head of state, particularly in less stable political contexts. These findings underline the need to investigate further various channels of presidential activism and how the citizens and media react to it, both during normal times and crises.

Presidents can use public speeches for a variety of purposes from rallying support for their initiatives to attacking their opponents or building societal consensus. Contrary to general expectations regarding dual executive systems, this article suggests that presidents in semi-presidential regimes can benefit politically and in terms of popularity from ‘statespersonlike’ behaviour, and thus, they should generally refrain from negative and contentious statements. Examining the tone and content of formal speeches and informal messages of Finnish and French presidents from 2000 to 2020, the study shows that under varying constitutional frameworks and general practical expectations, the presidents in both countries by and large employ a ‘statespersonlike’ style in their speeches. Presidential speeches primarily express a positive tone, and they contain few references to other state institutions and economy and other governmental domains. Instead, presidents typically seek to portray themselves as guardians of national interest, with foreign policy and national unity emphasized in the speeches.

Since the advent of mass media, ‘going public’ has been a key tool in the strategic inventory of presidents seeking to promote their policies to politicians and the public. Over the last decade, social media has offered presidents and their office with a new platform to address the nation directly without relying on traditional media gatekeepers. Nevertheless, both ‘going public’ strategies and presidents’ use of social media have almost exclusively been researched in the context of the presidential systems. The aim of this article is to extend research and offer the first systematic study of presidential Twitter use in European semi-presidential systems. We conceptualise presidential Twitter use as a form of presidential activism that is complementary to the use of formal powers or informal attempts to influence policy. Whereas the latter are driven by institutional or partisan conflict, going public strategies and presidential Twitter use primarily address societal concerns and, hence, are motivated by contextual factors outside the core realm of party politics. Instead, we should expect social conflict and societal grievances to determine demand and supply of presidential Twitter use. We test our propositions using a new dataset of tweets by presidents in European semi-presidential systems 2010–2020.

Country presidents and their political parties have strong connections along partisan lines. However, it remains unclear how this relationship unfolds when country presidents have to be non-partisans and formal ties are not permitted. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature and analyzes how country presidents use informal powers to maintain an influence in the life of their (former) political parties. We use Romania as the most likely case where we would expect such powers to occur and matter, because the country’s constitution bans the country’s president from being a party member once they are elected to public office. We compare the behaviour of the two Romanian country presidents who have each served two complete consecutive terms in office in the post-communist period. Our analysis covers the 2004–2022 period and focuses on the following four dimensions: electing successors, prime ministerial appointments, inclusion in coalition agreements and parties’ electoral performance.

This article seeks to explain variations in presidential activism in semi-presidential countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is one of the continents where semi-presidentialism is most prevalent, but the dynamics of intra-executive relations are severely understudied. The four case studies discussed here—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe—belong to the premier-presidential subtype. In this exploratory study, we aim to examine how institutional dimensions of premier-presidentialism interact with contextual factors to explain variations in presidential activism among Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to fundamental contextual differences among the two pairs of countries, francophone and lusophone, there are specific institutional factors associated with the design and operation of premier-presidentialism that contribute to greater presidential activism in the two francophone cases. Taken together, these contextual and institutional factors skew effective executive power heavily toward the president in our francophone countries. We also find that the degree of political institutionalization matters for the impact of presidential activism on intra-executive conflict and government policymaking capacity. The article increases our understanding of the operation of semi-presidentialism in this understudied region, underscoring the importance of both contextual and constitutional factors for explaining variations in presidential activism in Africa.

This article complements Wlezien’s review of ‘conceptualisation, measurement and interpretation in representational research’ by considering how these operate within five predictive theories validated against comparative evidence, as recommended for cumulative research by Taagepera: and related to their wider institutional and methodological context by Budge. Methodologically, the article illustrates how predictive theories can be set up to explain political processes and validated against statistical evidence. Substantively, the theories both highlight and resolve the ‘Paradox of democracy’ – how can ideologically based political parties effectively match public policy to popular preferences with only weak guidance from citizens?

Developments in contemporary analytic political theory have called for political theory to situate itself near political science, to pay attention to political institutions, to follow the research output of the social sciences, and to present sensitivity to method. This empirical and methodological turn has brought about a debate regarding the form and desirability of such empirically grounded political theory. We aim, first, to clarify what the empirical turn in political theory implies for research in political theory. We shall situate such empirically grounded political theory in contemporary analytic political theory, in contemporary analytic political theory’s descriptive and prescriptive steps, and also examine how this turn complements contemporary analytic political theory’s evaluative step. Second, to suggest a defense of this empirical development, as if properly understood, it would assist empirically grounded contemporary analytic political theory to achieve its own stated goals. Third, to provide a template for a research design in empirical contemporary analytic political theory.

Previous literature argues that macroeconomic conditions and economic news impact socio-tropic assessments. Others find that ideological identification or ideological affinity with the government impact socio-tropic economic views. Here, we test the moderating effect of ideological identification on how economic growth and economic news shape economic perceptions. We test this hypothesis using a dataset that combines monthly polls in Chile (2014–2018), economic news, and economic growth indicators. We find that ideological affinity with the government intensifies the positive impact of good macroeconomic indicators on current and prospective perceptions and, surprisingly, induces more positive current perceptions when negative economic news increases. In turn, ideological affinity with the government is associated with a slightly negative impact of good macroeconomic indicators on current (but not prospective) economic perceptions and a negative impact of negative economic news on current and prospective perceptions. Ideology moderates the effect of macroeconomic indicators and economic news on economic perceptions.

Non-compliance with compulsory military service as a form of homeland defence (i.e. conscription) is typically justified by various types of conscientious objections. However, in this article, I offer an alternative type of justification that is based on the common good. To achieve this, I present the concept of the common good and its relationship to the political obligation of homeland defence from the perspective of different traditions of political thought. Subsequently, I outline two types of exceptions to this political obligation: the liberal type of exceptions and the membership-based ones.

The use of innovation rhetoric by non-tech individuals reinforces their personal branding. Studying four non-tech political personalities, this study provides evidence of how and why non-tech politicians are trying to present themselves as tech-savvy. As the article describes, innovation buzzwords, stories, narratives, and metaphors add value to any non-tech brand, enhancing promotional presence and marketing effectiveness. It is apparent from the findings that innovation rhetoric has the aim of creating a positive public image, which contributes to the public perception of an individual.

What kind of people choose to join protests in contemporary Africa? Aiming to reduce the existing uncertainty related to the impact of different factors on protest participation, this article tests several hypotheses about participation in Third Wave demonstrations across the African continent, related to democratic values, socioeconomic status, and corruption perceptions. To do so, it deploys an innovative regression model that corrects for missing value bias through multiple imputation and that separates the broad survey data into regional subsamples, dependent upon historical patterns of neopatrimonialism and democratization. Its results show for the first time the existence of different profiles of protester associated with North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa. Its most surprising result is that across the board, responders open to considering alternatives to democracy were more prone to protesting, while corruption perceptions mattered only in Western African countries. The largest contrast then regards the urban–rural divide: city dwellers lead the way in Southern Africa, while the countryside takes the helm in the Western part of the continent. Finally, people who declare to have voted and those who have more frequent political conversations also fit the profile of the average protester.

Political engagement is vital to the functioning of democratic systems, yet a significant portion of the population remains disengaged from conventional political activities as voting. These individuals often lack the opportunities and motivation to cultivate their reasoning abilities for understanding politics. This study explores the potential of deliberative minipublics to foster the development of reasoning skills among those excluded from the political discourse. By focusing on individuals with low levels of political engagement, the study investigates three minipublics on the topic of climate change in Switzerland. Utilizing the Deliberative Reason Index, the analysis uncovers how dialogue-driven engagement can enhance political understanding and involvement. The results demonstrate the potential of deliberative practices to bridge the gap between the politically disengaged and the complex world of political participation, offering fresh insights into citizens’ capabilities to deliberate on intricate issues.

In recent years, the concept of intersectionality has gained significant prominence in the policy discourse of the European Union (EU). However, several scholars have noted a lack of engagement with intersectionality’s core social justice principles and stressed the need to carefully examine how intersectionality is taken up in EU policy. To contribute to this effort, the authors propose a new ‘EU-Intersectionality’ framework to analyse intersectionality in EU policy, combining elements of Critical Frame Analysis and identifying eight core criteria to operationalize intersectionality in EU policy texts and leverage its politically emancipatory potential. The resulting framework sheds light on how intersectionality has fared within EU policy contexts. Specifically, it asks which dimensions of intersectionality are captured, and which elements are left behind. We illustrate the framework by analysing the EU’s ‘Union of Equality’ strategies on anti-racism; gender equality; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer equality; Roma equality and the rights of persons with disabilities. We conclude that the EU-Intersectionality framework allows to dissect the varied and conflicting ways in which intersectionality is operationalized within EU policies – while some aspects of the ‘Union of Equality’ agenda resonate with the social justice aims behind the concept, the use of intersectionality remains superficial and largely maintains the status quo. Our findings caution against the co-optation of intersectionality in EU policymaking, while recognising the progressive advancements made within the EU equality policy area.

Opposition parties are a key feature of parliamentary democracies, but their participation rights differ markedly. In the UK House of Commons, the institutional operation of the Westminster model facilitates a marked distinction between the rights afforded to the Official Opposition party compared to smaller opposition parties. During times of crisis, these Westminster model dynamics can shift, impacting opposition rights. This article uses a case study of the COVID-19 pandemic to assess institutional inequalities across opposition party groups. Drawing on an analysis of over 4000 contributions to parliamentary debates and interviews with MPs, we examine the pandemic’s impact on the roles of opposition parties beyond the Official Opposition. We find that the pandemic initially generated unprecedented cooperation between the government and small opposition parties but that this was short-lived. In the long term, the pandemic exacerbated existing institutional barriers and the size and geographical concentration of small opposition parties in the devolved nations brought disproportionate participation and oversight barriers. This suggests the need to guarantee formal opposition rights within Westminster systems beyond the Official Opposition party to ensure that all political parties have the capacity to carry out their functions during times of crisis.

We explore how individual perceptions of the nature of economic hardships correlate with preferences over different types of welfare state responses (i.e. universal or means-tested, temporary or permanent, cash transfers and medical services) in a U.S. survey. We utilize differing public opinion about the length of the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic disruptions and whether it causes nationwide economic instability or unevenly affects the population. Respondents who view the pandemic’s economic hardship as temporary should be less likely to support permanent welfare policies and, due to costs, those who view the pandemic as having targeted effects should be less likely to support universal programs. Unexpectedly, our findings indicate that if Americans believe the effects are temporary, they are less supportive of any new program. If Americans believe that the pandemic’s effects are targeted, they are, as expected, less supportive of universal programs, but are also less likely to support doing nothing, indicating that equity concerns may influence preferences. Patterns of support are very similar for services and transfers.

In May 2018, a record-breaking number of 86 women candidates ran for parliamentary elections in Lebanon, a country with a power-sharing, consociational, sect-based system that guarantees the representation of 18 legally recognized sects (i.e. religious confessions). Yet, only six women were elected. This article explores whether and how sectarianism trumps gender and support for female candidates in general in vote intention. In doing so, it addresses the interaction between sectarian/ethnic and gender voting in contexts where both identities intersect. This intersection emerges when vote intention is influenced by factors that stem from the patriarchal nature of society and structures of sectarianism, creating interdependent systems of disadvantage. Building on a countrywide pre-electoral survey on the attitudes of young voters in Lebanon, I test ethnic voting and gender-affinity theories and develop fine-grained conceptual links between gender and the wider norms of inclusion and exclusion under sectarian-based political systems in post-conflict countries.

One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs.

Even though populism is arguably one of the most researched topics in contemporary political science, the study of its communication is disproportionately focused on its verbal and written dimensions. In recent years, an increasing number of studies have explored its visual dimension, highlighting its importance in the process of meaning-construction and the interaction between political actors and citizens. In this state-of-the art review, we discuss the importance of analysing visual communication and how it relates to the main approaches to the study of populism. Then, we outline the main works conducted on the visual politics of populism and suggest some potential directions for future research. The review reveals that existing research has primarily focused on the content of visual populism, highlighting, in particular, the role of images in constructing ‘the people’, ‘the enemy’ and in depicting populist leaders as ordinary yet exceptional figures. More research is needed on how images are produced and who receives and interpret them. Beyond content analysis, future research should adopt a broader range of methodological tools to fully explore populist visual communication.

One requirement for spatial election models to succeed is that voters are knowledgeable and can assess the parties’ programmatic stances (and changes therein) correctly. Studies find, however, that this requirement is only met to a limited extent. Instead, voters rely on certain cues to evaluate parties and their (changed) policy stances. Recent research shows that a new party leader can act as a clear heuristic for voters to correctly assess (changes in) party positioning. Moreover, along with a new party leader, the credibility of such policy shifts increases and these shifts are more noticeable to voters. Hence, we argue in this article that the electoral effects of programmatic shifts interact with the electoral effects of party leadership changes. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a multiple regression analysis investigating the potential electoral consequences of a change in programmatic stances on the Left–Right and GAL/TAN cleavage, a change in party leadership, and combinations of the two across 10 established democracies in 33 mainstream parties during a period of over 30 years. In contrast to our expectation, we do not find any evidence supporting the idea that combining programmatic reforms with a change in party leadership is rewarded at the ballot box.

A new challenger seeks to enter the German party system: Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). With her new party, former Die Linke politician Sahra Wagenknecht combines a left-authoritarian profile (economically left-leaning, but culturally conservative) with anti-US, pro-Russia and anti-elitist stances. This article provides the first large-n academic study of the voter potential of this new party by using a quasi-representative sample (n = 6,000) drawn from a Voting Advice Application-like dataset that comes from a website designed to explore the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht’s positions. The results show that congruence with foreign policy positions and anti-elitism are strong predictors of the propensity to vote for the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht. In contrast, social/welfare and immigration policies are less predictive for assessing the party’s potential. Among the different socio-demographic groups, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht has a strong potential among baby boomers, the less educated and East Germans. Regarding party voters, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht is favoured by supporters of some minor parties like dieBasis, Freie Wähler and Die PARTEI, but also non-voters. Among the established parties, the party’s potential is high among Die Linke voters and, to a lesser extent, voters of the Social democrats (SPD) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). A potential below the average is reported for the supporters of the Liberals (FDP) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and most clearly for Green and Volt voters.